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ABSTRACT 
There is significant contemporary interest in `imperialism' and the role of states, markets 
and fines in transforming international economic relations and reordering domestic 
economic structures in favour of an imperial power. The history of such economic 
transformations is important to a deeper understanding of these contemporary processes. 
The creation of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1899 incorporated Sudan into the 
British Empire, creating a constitutionally unique imperial possession in North-East 
Africa. This state enjoyed considerable independence as long as its economic and 
financial basis was secure. This security was dependent on economic development. 
The Sudan Government had limited success with the development of general economic 
infrastructure, but the failure of various mining companies before 1914 indicated the 
marginal nature of economic and commercial opportunity. After the initial failure of 
private enterprise, the Sudan Government worked closely with the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate over a period of decades to finance, create and then run the Gezira Scheme -a 
large scale cotton growing plantation. Sudan thus developed a cash-crop economy based 
on cotton. Cotton became Sudan's principal export and a significant source of income 
for the Sudan Government. The depression of the 1930s was to negatively affect this 
industry and the fortunes of the colonial state. During the Second World War the Sudan 
Government withdrew the Sudan Plantation Syndicate's monopoly, effectively 
nationalizing the Gezira Scheme in order to better pursue their own conception of 
Sudan's economic, social and political interests; it did this at the expense of private 
business. Thus, in the long-run it was the state, and not business, that came to dominate 
the political economy of the Sudan during the imperial period. 
V 
Introduction: The Political Economy of Empire 
Economic history and the history of political economy have lost favour in 
recent years. They have clearly failed to attract the same interest and 
enthusiasm as cultural history and the history of discourse in particular! 
- Pi. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, 2002 
The primary focus of this thesis is to examine the business and economic history of 
Sudan during the period of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1956) with 
reference to two central questions. First, was the operation of business and the nature of 
capital accumulation in Sudan a case of Gentlemanly Capitalist imperialism, as suggested 
by the work of Cain and Hopkins? 2 Second, was the operation of business and the nature 
of capital accumulation a case of `business imperialism' as discussed by D. C. M. Platt and 
Charles Jones, among others? 3 The third aspect of this thesis is to relate these 
historiographical investigations to a broader question about the nature and trajectory of 
Sudan's economy in the imperial period. 
The argument presented here is that Sudan was not a prima facie case of 
Gentlemanly Capitalism, nor was it a straightforward case of `business imperialism'. 
Rather, it was the colonial state acting in concert with business and capital that was the 
primary economic driving-force behind the development of Sudan's colonial economy. 
In this sense Sudan was unique, but aspects of Sudan's experience were similar or ran in 
parallel to the economic and business history of other colonies in the same period. 
IP 
. 
J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, `The Peculiarities of British Capitalism: Imperialism and World 
Development', in S. Akita (ed), Gentlemanly Capitalirm, Imperialirm and World Development (London, 2002), 
p. 245 
2Pj. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (London, 1993; 2002) 
3 CA. Jones, Business Imperialism and Argentina, 1875-1900: a theoretical note', Journal of Latin American 
Studies, 1980,437-444; D. C. M. Platt, `The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations', Economic History 
Ret iew, 1968,296.306; Finance, Trade and Politics in British Foreign Polic, 1815-1914, (Oxford, 1968); (ed. ) 
Business Imperialism, 1840-1930: An inquiry based on the British experience in Latin America (Oxford, 1977) 
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Moreover, the evidence presented here does not refute either the case for Gentlemanly 
Capitalism or the idea of `business imperialism'. Instead, it suggests that economic 
resources were coordinated in a variety of ways within the British Empire. In Sudan there 
was a marked level of cooperation between business and the state but crucially the 
influence of the state over business intensified its dominance throughout the period. 
Whether this is a case of `business imperialism' to a certain extent depends on what is 
understood by the term, as will be discussed. 
The analytical approach used to answer these questions is expressly concerned 
with the relationship between business and the state, between business and capital, and 
between capital and the state. Though it necessarily touches on the political and 
constitutional development of the colonial state in Sudan, it is not a political history, the 
primary unit of analysis is not the colonial state. Similarly, this is not an economic history 
in its purest (or broadest) sense. There has been the necessary omission of details of 
indigenous economic activity that are undoubtedly important to any complete economic 
history. Nor is this purely a business history, especially because the historiographical 
focus is founded in the central questions connected to British imperialism rather than the 
development of modern business organizations and, in any event, the organizational 
structure of business in Sudan was not especially remarkable, nor were the corporations 
found there comparatively large. Instead, this is a history of the political-economy of 
Sudan as a colony, alternatively, it is a business-centred analysis of the political economy 
of Sudan during the imperial part of its history. Whichever terminology is used, however, 
the function of this thesis is to ask fundamental questions of Sudan's economic 
experience of British imperialism and to do this it draws on some of the methods and 
techniques of business and economic history, as well as those of political history and, 
even, international relations. Judged solely against the disciplinary demands of anyone of 
these areas of historical enquiry the thesis would be incomplete and no doubt coverage 
2 
could have been usefully expanded. However, the questions central to the thesis could 
not have been addressed from just one perspective. Bearing this is mind it is now 
possible to lay out the context, the historiography and the argument that will be made 
here. 
I. THE CONTEXT 
In the Nineteenth Century Sudan was a distant province of Egypt, itself a peripheral part 
of the Ottoman Empire. Increasing British influence in Egypt from the century s mid 
point culminated in direct intervention in 1882. At the same time a religiously inspired 
separatist movement sought to wrench Sudan from Egypt and thence to govern the 
country according to Islamic principles. The effort to retain Sudan for Egypt led the 
British to become militarily involved. This campaign ended in a rare and humiliating 
reverse for British military power when General Gordon was defeated in Sudan's capital, 
Khartoum, in 1884. ' In this way from circa 1884 Sudan was autonomous and 
independent of both British and Egyptian influence, the Islamic state that was created 
being referred to as the Mahdiya. The invasion of Sudan in 1898 reversed the defeat of 
Gordon and ended the Mahdist period. Sudan was thus incorporated within the British 
imperial system in the region, substantially expanding British influence in sub-Saharan 
North-East Africa. The subsequent creation of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
established a legal entity for colonial governance that mapped to a vast territory, Sudan 
being the largest country in Africa by area. This territory was administered by the British 
until independence in 1956. 
The recurrent theme developed at length here is that the colonial state dominated 
the economic life of Sudan. Known as the Gezira Scheme, the development of cotton- 
4 IL MacMichael, `A summary of events in the Sudan from 1819-1899, in J. A, de C Hamilton (ed), The 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from Within (London, 1935), 61-72 
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growing in the Gezira area of Sudan on a plantation basis by the Sudan Government in 
cooperation with the Sudan Plantations Syndicate was the backbone of the colonial 
economy and the centre-piece of a novel form of corporate economic development. Not 
only was the cotton produced the principal export during the colonial period and the 
main earner of foreign exchange, but the revenue it generated was vital to the finances of 
the Sudan Government itself. 
The triangular importance and interdependence of business, government and 
economy has required a diverse historiographical context. This thesis is therefore rooted 
in four approximately separate though not unrelated fields of enquiry; namely, Sudan 
studies; imperial studies; business history and business imperialism; and international 
political economy and international economic history. The contribution of each to the 
frame of reference of this thesis is outlined below. 
II. SUDAN STUDIES 
Sudan has not enjoyed the same level of interest as other countries in Africa or elsewhere 
with a similar experience of British colonialism. The existent literature has a tendency to 
focus on administrative history and to discuss Sudan without placing the colony in a 
broader comparative context. Nevertheless, useful among these are the contributions of 
Martin Daly, in particular Empire on the Nile (1986) and Imperial Sudan (1991) 5 From these 
works the following trends are identified that have shaped the history of Sudan and the 
challenges faced and sometimes met by colonial government. Chief among these are the 
tensions between the Arab Muslim North and the predominantly black Christian and 
indigenous faith South; the problems of governing such a large and environmentally 
harsh and varied land with limited resources and men; and the uneasy relationships 
s M. W. Daly, Empire on the Nile (Cambridge, 1986) and Imperial Sudan (Cambridge, 1991); see also P. M. Holt 
and MW. Daly, A history of the Sudan from the coming of Islam to the present day (London, 1988) 
4 
between Sudan and the countries on her borders, in particular, Egypt. Distance, 
communications and scarcity are themes that recur, and will do so here too. Daly further 
provides a useful overview of the economic history of Sudan during the Condominium 
period, though as might be expected this account is mainly descriptive 6 
Sudan's political and to a certain extent economic and financial relationships with 
Egypt are tackled by Gaby Warburg whose book Egypt and the Sudan - studies in history and 
politics (1985) is a useful companion to the works of Daly! These themes are also 
explored byMekki in The Sudan Question (1953). 8 For these authors the history of Sudan is 
the story of developing statehood, but the account is typically without reference to the 
economic dynamics of British imperialism. Heather Sharkey's living with colonialism (2003) 
is also useful, particularly with regard to the developing political culture of the country. ' 
Externally, developing statehood created tensions with countries for whom Sudan held 
an actual or notional `border', legal or otherwise. An ongoing point of friction for Sudan 
and Egypt, and a factor for development and economic growth, was access to and the 
use of the Nile waters. The works of Robert Collins and Terfe Tvedt provide an 
introduction to these issues. lo 
In addition, there are also texts written during and shortly after the 
Condominium period by authors with a personal knowledge of Sudan. These constitute 
primary sources in their own right. Chief among them are the works of Richard Hill and 
Arthur Gaitskell, who - as former employees of the Sudan Government - wrote, 
6 Daly, Empire, Chapter 5,192-239; Chapter 11,420-450; and Imperial, Chapter 5,84-126; Chapter 7,172- 
205; Chapter 10 302-351 
7 G. R. Warburg, Egypt and the Sudan - studies in history and politics (London, 1985); also noteworthy on this 
topic is material contained within MW. Daly, 'The Development of the Governor General of the Sudan, 
1899-1934', Journal ofAfrican History, 1983,77-96 
8 A. Mekki, The Sudan Question (London, 1953) 
9 HJ. Sharkey, Lining with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in theAnglo-Egyptian Sudan, (London, 2003). See 
also Hj. Sharkey, 'Colonialism and the culture of nationalism in the northern Sudan, 1898-1956' 
(unpublished PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1998); H Bell, Frontiers of medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan, 1899-1940 (Oxford, 1999) 
10 RO. Collins, The Watery of the Nile (Oxford, 1990); see also T. Tvedt, The River Nile in the Age of the British 
(London, 2004) 
5 
respectively, Sudan Transport (1965) and Gezira -a story of development in the Sudan (1959). " 
From an earlier period still, Harold M2cMichael's The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1934) is a 
unique study written from an insider position during a period of considerable economic 
flux during the colonial period. " For all their strengths, insights, and insider knowledge 
these sources are not systematic and inevitably suffer from authorial subjectivity. 
Part of the contribution made by this thesis is to focus on areas that are under- 
explored in the existing literature, in particular to explain the importance of Sudan's 
economy and international economic relationships to the formation of the state. 
III. IMPERIAL STUDIES 
Imperial historians have wondered about the future of the discipline for some time. In 
1984 David Fieldhouse argued that there was no longer a unified field, while only a 
decade later David Cannadine observed that Cain and Hopkins' gentlemanly capitalist 
thesis of British imperialism (developed in British Imperialism, 1993; 2002) with its novel 
synthesis of both economic and sociological interpretations and its applicability to the 
periphery and the metropole had brought a divergent literature partly together again. " 
However, as Martin Daunton notes in a review, the relatively recent five volume Oxford 
History of the British Empire (OHBE) omits any direct reference to Cain and Hopkins' 
Gentlemanly Capitalism thesis (it does not appear as a topic for discussion or even in the 
index). Daunton goes on to criticise somewhat the OHBE treatment of the metropole as 
11 R. IIll, Sudan Transport (Qdord, 1965); A. Gaitskell, Gezira -a story of development in the Sudan (London, 1959) 
12 H. H. MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (London, 1934) 
13 DK. Fieldhouse, "`Can HumptyDumptyBe Put Together Again? ": Imperial History in the 1980s, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1984,9-23; D. Cannadine, 'The Empire Strikes Back', Past and 
Present, 1995,180-194; A. G. Hopkins, The Future of the Imperial Past (London, 1997); L. Colley, ' What is 
Imperial History Now? ', in D. Cannadine (ed ), What is History Now? (London, 2002), 132-147; Cain and 
Hopkins, British Imperialism 
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a factor in British imperialism (a topic handled, incidentally enough, by Peter Cain). " In 
some ways the omission of Gentlemanly Capitalism from the OHBE is curious because 
despite its consciously revisionist and somewhat controversial stance, it has been a 
dominant perspective for some time, even though many historians that have tackled the 
subject have been sceptical of its empire-wide applicability. " Nevertheless, the breadth, 
scope and originality of Cain and Hopkins' work is still significant. 
The Gentlemanly Capitalist interpretation of British imperialism links the growth, 
governance, maintenance and exploitation of the British Empire to a gentlemanly elite 
centred in the metropole (particularly in the City of London) that through networks and 
contacts extended across the entire globe. Cain and Hopkins argue that the gentlemen 
capitalists used their financial might, social connection, and economic and political 
influence to give themselves an advantageous position within the burgeoning British 
Empire and, moreover, that this expansion was driven by the economic needs of this 
group. 16 In order to apply this interpretation to the whole British Empire they developed 
variations of Gentlemanly Capitalism to fit specific contexts. In one such variation Cain 
and Hopkins argue that in Africa the North and the South of the continent followed 
their orthodox interpretation, which resembles Hobson's `economic taproot of 
imperialism'; that is, where imperial expansion is closely connected with the needs of 
finance capital. This contrasts with East and West Africa where, Cain and Hopkins argue, 
14 M. Daunton, `Britain's Imperial Economy, Journal of Economic History, 2001,476-485; The Oxford History of 
the British Empire, editor in chief: Wm. Roger Louis; Volume I: N. Canny (ed. ), The Ori gins of Empire: British 
Overseas Enterprise to the close of the Seventeenth Century (1998); Volume II: P j. Marshall (ed. ), The Eighteenth 
Century (1998); Volume III: A. Porter (ed. ), The Nineteenth Century (1999); Volume IV: J. M. Brown & W. R. 
Louis (eds), The Twentieth Century (1999); Volume V. R. Winks (ed ), Historiography (1999). All volumes 
published by Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York; P j. Cain, `Economics and Empire: The 
Metropolitan Context', A. Porter (ed. ), Nineteenth 31-52 
15 See M. Daunton, `'Gentlemanly Capitalism" and British Industry', Past and Present, 1989,119-158; A. 
Porter, `Gentlemanly Capitalism and Empire: The British Experience since 1750? ', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 1990,266-295; N. J. White, `The business and the politics of decolonisation: the 
British experience in the twentieth century', Economic History Review, 2000,544-564. These rebuttals are 
often contested vigorously by Cain and, especially, Hopkins: recently, for example, in the Australian 
Economic History Review, 2003, A. G. Hopkins, `Gentlemanly Capitalism in New Zealand', 287-297; J. 
McAloon, `Gentleman, Capitalists and Settlers: a brief response', 298-304 
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the interests of British manufacturing, not finance, led the imperialist process 17 They link 
this (in the metropolitan context) to the perception of financial and industrial division in 
the British economy (which while favoured by some economic historians has been 
attacked by others18) and, secondly (in the peripheral context), to the cash-crop 
economies of the countries in the tropical East-West band of Africa. However, Cain and 
Hopkins subsume their analysis of Sudan into that of Egypt19 
This is a common feature of imperial history where Sudan is regarded, by and 
large, as an `outwork for the strategic defence of Egypt'. " Egypt is placed firmly into the 
North-South category of possession by Cain and Hopkins, which leaves Sudan, with a 
cash-crop economy, between the two interpretations. However, the development of 
Sudan's cash-crop economy (based on cotton) was financed by large amounts of publicly 
financed debt. Just as the role of bondholders is often cited in the interpretation of 
British and French interests in Egypt prior to 1882, it is possible that finance and not 
cotton production was the underlying factor at play in configuring Sudan's imperial 
relationship with Britain. " There is therefore scope for examining Sudanese and 
Egyptian relations in light of the different needs of the two states, and the different 
forms of capital that entwined each with the international economy and the British 
Empire. 
Secondly, then, the Gentlemanly Capitalist interpretation of British imperialism 
raises issues connected to the social fabric and financial architecture of the imperial 
16 For more detail see Cain and Hopkins, British; R. E. Dumett (ed. ), Gentlemanly Capitalism and British 
Imperialism - The New Debate on Empire (London, 1999); S. Akita (ed. 
), Gentleman?, Capitalism, Imperialism and 
Global Hirto0y (London, 2002) 
17 J. A. Hobson, Imperiaksm (Ann Arbor, 1902; 1965); Cain and Hopkins, British, OL 11,303-339 
18 See respectively. MFL Best and J. Humphries, 'The Qty-IndustryDivide' in B. Elbauni and W. Lazonick 
(eds ), The decline of the British economy (Oxford, 1986), 223-239; G. Ingham, Capitalism Divided? " The City and 
Industry in British Development (London, 1984), and M Daunton, "Gentlemanly Capitalism" and British 
Industry', Past and Prerent, 1989,119-158 
19 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 317 
20J. Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians: the dynamics of expansion', English Historical Review, June 
1997, p. 635; see also J. Gallagher, and R. Robinson, with A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians - the Official 
Mind of Imperialism (London, 1967), esp. 351-378 
21 See, for example, D. K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 1830-1914 (London, 1976), p. 120 
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world. Raymond Dumett considers that the Gentlemanly Capitalist thesis rests on three 
axioms. The first is the existence of a `Gentlemanly Order' of interrelated hegemonic (or 
near hegemonic) interests, created via a fusion of the landed gentry and the financial 
elites of the south-east of England in the Nineteenth Century. The second is the 
dynamism of the City of London and the power of capital markets to drive the process 
of imperialism, and the third leg of the tripod is what Durrett describes as `the periphery 
of the imperial and quasi imperial structures - the outer regions of political control and 
commercial penetration which Cain and Hopkins dub "the wider world". ' Cain and 
Hopkins largely reject excentric causes of British imperialism in favour of metropolitan 
impulses. This helps frame some of the questions relating to the interface of business, 
finance and government in Sudan. Simply put: how and from where did business in 
Sudan obtain capital, who obtained the capital, how were businessmen in Sudan socially 
integrated with the imperial elites, both in Sudan and in the metropole, and how did this 
configure the business-government relationship? Gentlemanly Capitalism implies a large 
degree of co-operation and complicity, business history tends to suggest that friction, 
tension and compromise play a larger role in shaping the bargains made between 
government and business. How, then, does business in Sudan fit the Gentlemanly 
Capitalist interpretation of British imperialism) 
From the early twentieth century the significance export capital to the 
phenomenon of empire has been well known, highlighted by both J. A. Hobson in 
Imperialism -A Study (1902) and C. K. Hobson in The Export of Capital (1914). " In 1912 
Edgar Crammond, Secretary to the Manchester Stock Exchange, estimated that the 
overall amount of British capital invested in the crown colonies (excluding the colonies 
of European settlement) was approximately 100 million pounds. He also estimated that 
u RE. Dumett, `Introduction' in Dumett (ed), Gentlemanly, 4-5 
23 JA Hobson, Imperialism -A Study (1902; University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1965); CK. Hobson, 
The Export of Capital, (Constable and Company, London, 1914) 
9 
the overall capital value of British overseas investments was 3,800 million pounds? ' 
Thus, according to Crammond investment in these colonies was only 2.6% of total 
British foreign investment. GK. Hobson estimated that in 1912 alone, capital issues for 
foreign investment were 144 million pounds, which in just one year dwarfed the figure 
for cumulative colonial investment up to the same year. 25 Though these figures indicate 
that while there was clearly a great deal of money available for investment in the 
metropole, colonial governments were faced with a stiff challenge to attract investment 
from private enterprise. In Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire (1987) Lance Davis and 
Robert Huttenback estimate that in 1900 seventy-five per cent of international capital 
movement had its origin in Britain, and between 1904 and 1914 annual capital flows 
emanating from Britain were in the region of £ 173 million everyyear. 26 Michael Edelstein 
has noted that by 1913 circa thirty-two per cent of net national wealth was represented 
by overseas assets and that `never before or since has one nation committed so much of 
its national income and savings to capital formation abroad', which echoes through 
Sidney Pollard who observes that `whether ... these were 
higher proportions that any 
country before is less important than the sheer weight of British investment in the world 
economy'. 27 That this vast flow of capital had a relationship with the growth of the 
British Empire is to be expected, but as Davis and Huttenback demonstrate and Cain 
and Hopkins acknowledge21 it is not a straightforward link: 
The result of a survey of 79,944 shareholders of 260 British, foreign and empire 
firms chartered between 1883 and 1903 ... suggests that 
businessmen turned first 
24 E. Crammond, 'Imperial Defence and Finance' in The Nineteenth Century and After, 1912, p. 237 [GreyPam 
1144 (11)1 
25 Hobson, Export, p. 226 
26 L. E. Davis and R. A. Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire -The political economy of British 
imperialism, 1860-1912 (Cambridge, 1987), p. 38 
27 M. Edelstein, `Foreign investment and accumulation, 1860-1914' in R. Floud and DN. McCloskey (eds ), 
The Economic History of Britain since 1700, Volume Two: 1860-1939 (Cambridge, 1994), p. 173; S. Pollard, 
'Capital Exports, 1870-1914: Harmful or Beneficial? ', Economic History Review, 1985, p. 491 
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to the domestic economy, then, with somewhat less enthusiasm, to those parts of 
the world not painted red, and only then, and with a marked lack of enthusiasm, to 
the formal Empire Z9 
What Cain and Hopkins argue using evidence from Davis and Huttenback is that 
`gentlemanly capitalists' were more likely to invest in imperial business projects than less 
elite business men in the City or in the provinces? ' In his reflection on Gentlemanly 
Capitalism Lance Davis confirms this position and, in addition, argues that these 
investments were often demand led, rather than supply led? ' At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Britain was the chief source of international capital, and-the City of 
London the World's chief financial centre. The ability of the periphery of the Empire to 
absorb capital has been considered vital to the expansion process and the maintenance of 
imperial links. However, the role played by capital in the process of imperial expansion is 
very complex and still only partly understood. 
There were two main methods in which a company could attract capital to 
support a venture overseas. The first was to issue shares to subscribers and the second 
was to obtain debt, either in the form of loans or bonds. 32 A useful guide to the public 
issue of quotable securities in the City of London can be found in Ranald Michie's The 
London Stock Exchange -a history (1999) and The City of London - Continuity and Change since 
1850 (1992)? ' The flotation of public debt by foreign governments in the City of 
London's capital markets is discussed by Toshio Suzuki in Japanese Government Loan Issues 
28 see Davis and Hustenback, Mammon, Chapter 7 `The shareholders in imperial enterprises', 195-220; Cain 
and Hopkins, British, 182-183 
29 L. E. Davis, `The late nineteenth-century British imperialist: speculation, quantification and controlled 
conjectures' in Dumett (ed), Gentlemanly, p. 82 
30 Cain and Hopkins, British, 182-187 
31 Davis, The late', p. 106 
32 see B. Tew and RF. Henderson, Studies in Company Finance -a rympo rium on the anafyjis and interpretation of 
British company accounts (Cambridge, 1959), p. 66 
33 RG Michie, The London Stock Exchange -a history (Oxford, 1999); The City of London - Continuity and Change 
since 1850 (London, 1992) 
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on the London Capital Market (1994)3' In the period under discussion here William 
Kennedy argues that these capital markets performed poorly: 
Investors were unable to identify and evaluate investment opportunities; at best, 
they appear to have been aware of the subsets of the possibilities, and the subsets 
known varied from group to group. It is a reasonable inference then that much of 
the information available in British capital markets was expensive to obtain and of 
low quality, creating sharp informational differential among groups of wealth 
holders, differential that led to sub-optimal choices relative to the choices that 
would have been made with more complete information of uniform costliness. " 
Kennedy maintains that a capital market has essentially three functions. The first 
is to identify and evaluate all investment opportunities; the second is to make this 
information widespread at a low cost; and the third is to provide channels through which 
the success or failure of a venture can be assessed so as to provide a means to increase or 
remove resources depending on the performance of the venture. 36 How the capital 
market was constructed in regard to these three facets is relevant to our understanding of 
how capital was formed in Sudan. The social context of capital subscription clearly has 
direct relevance to the Gentlemanly Capitalist interpretation of British imperialism, and 
in point of fact has relevance to the initial development of business in Sudan. How 
important was the capital market to the development of cotton-growing in Sudan? Was 
access to the capital market dependent on Gentlemanly links? Who came to control the 
capital invested in Sudan, and who invested in it in the first place? 
34 T. Suzuki, Japanese Government Loan Issues on the London CapitalMarket, 1870-1913 (London, 1994), 
especially Ch. 1, `Foreign Government Loan Issue in London 1870-1913', 7-22 and Ch. 2 'Loan Issue 
Mechanism of the London Capital Market', 23-48 
35 W. P. Kennedy, 'Capital markets and industrial structure in the Victorian economy, in Y. Cassis and j j. 
van Helten (eds) Capitalism in a Mature Economy: Financial Institutions, Capital Exports and British Industry, 1870- 
1939 (Aldershot, 1990), p. 42 
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It is often assumed that investors in securities are generally rational, albeit that 
the environments within which they exercise their decisions may not allow for a perfect 
expression of rationality (so called bounded rationalitý ' Ranald Michie has argued that a 
distinct difference exists between an institutional investor and an individual investor. His 
view is that an individual investor has to be understood in their unique social context. 
This difference is important to the understanding of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate in 
particular, which began as an entrepreneurial enterprise financed by a small number of 
people. If, as Michie argues, `individual shareholders tend to be much more interested 
than institutions in the managerial personnel of a company, and the changing 
environment within which it operates' it might lead to variations in investor behaviour. 
Imperfections in information for the investor might be overlooked in favour of a 
personal connection and contact, faith in the business originators or the very nature of 
the business itself. This process `distorted investment' but also increased the availability 
of risk capital that could be used for funding more speculative investments. As Michie 
concludes, `the social web of investment was an important adjunct to the impersonal 
capital market as it facilitated the finance of innovation. ' 38 Therefore, an aspect of this 
study will be to examine what social webs (social networks) underpinned the origins and 
development of business in Sudan. These ideas are developed further by Michie in 
subsequent articles and a developing literature relating to the importance of networks of 
individuals to the organisation of business in this period? ' 
36 Kennedy, 'Capital', p. 26 
» Kennedy, 'Capital', p. 26 and O. E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, (The Free Press, New 
York 1987) 44-46 
38 RGNlichie, 'The social web of investment in the nineteenth century' in Revue Internationale d Histoire de la 
Banque (1979), 158,175 
391n particular RG Miichie, 'Options, Concessions, Syndicates, and the Provision of Venture Capital, 
1880-1913', in Business Hrrtoy, 23,1981,147-164 
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IV. BUSINESS STUDIES 
The description and analysis of the structure and operation of business in this thesis will 
use the relatively orthodox contracting paradigm associated with Alfred Chandler and 
Oliver Williamson. 40 Here economies of scale and economies of scope are exploited by 
firms to deal with changes to the economic environment that they find themselves in, 
either by integrating forward into distribution and marketing or backward into 
production and supply, or horizontally by expanding capacity (economies of scale), or by 
diversifying the products and services offered (economies of scope). The firm is 
understood as a series of contracts between units that are internalised within a firm to 
create a cost saving. This process - which involves integration of functions as described 
above - is undertaken because in contrast to classical economics and the idea of the 
perfect market, market transactions are not costless. This internalisation of functions 
encourages the trajectory of the firm in a particular way, leading to the development of 
large scale modem business and provides a descriptive language for the scale, scope, 
strategy and structure of the firm. " 
Network analysis will also play an important part in the exploration ofthe 
economic structure of business in imperial Sudan. Though the term network is used 
widely, it is often misapplied and requires some theoretical specification. The principal 
scholarship in this field has been undertaken by sociologists and, to a lesser extent, 
institutional economists. '' There is no consensus within the literature as to whether 
networks are `a metaphor, a method, or a theory. " In fact they can be all these things, 
40 See G. Boyce and S. Ville, The Development of Modern Business (Basingstoke, 2002), 1-28,227-288; A. D. 
Chandler, Scale and Scope - The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (London, 1990); Williamson, The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism (New York, 1987). 
41 See J. P. Wilson and A. Thomson, The Making of Modern Management. - British Management in Historical 
Perspective (O)dord, 2006), 26-36 
42 N . 
J. Smelser and R. Swedberg, `The Sociological Perspective on the Economy', in N. J. Smelser and R. 
Swedberg (eds), The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ), 18-19 
43 W. W. Powell and L. Smith-Doerr, Networks and Economic Life', in Smelser and Swedberg (eds. ), 
Handbook, p. 360 
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depending on what is being investigated. The great strength of a network approach is 
that it allows individual actors or agencies to be seen as part of an overarching structure. 
However, there are different types of network. There are social networks of the kind 
discussed by Scott, and Wetherell; there are also inter-organisational networks as implied 
by the work of Chapman and as discussed by Fruin. " Fruin makes a useful distinction 
between loosely and tightly coupled inter-organisational networks, and the different 
levels at which networking can occur. 45 Loose networks operate where governance is 
minimal - the sinews are formed by a common 
institutional heritage or name. Tight 
networks are formed by vertically integrated companies that are co-reliant. Intermediate 
coupling between tight and loose occurs when there is evidence of inter-firm 
shareholding, for example. In addition interlocking directorates indicate intermediate 
tightness of network coupling that operate both as social and inter-organisational 
networks. 
The work of Scott and Hughes, Wilson and Popp, and Ville, has indicated the 
continuing importance and potential utility of network analysis to business history. " 
Networks are an important alternative mode of business to a classical `market' 
understanding of economic transactions. " Networks operate as channels for information 
and capital; they are often bound by economic, social and/or kinship ties that circumvent 
the open market. For example, Ville makes a strong case that networks formed by Stock 
and Station agents in Australia and New Zealand led to better economic information for 
all parties - the farmers, the agents, the buyers, shippers and eventual commercial sellers. 
Networks provided better access to capital and specialist expertise than each individual 
J. Scott, Social Network Analysis: a handbook (London, 1992); C. Wetherell, 'Historical Social Network 
Analysis' in LJ. Griffen and M. van der Linden (eds. ), New Methodr for Social History (Cambridge, 1999) 
Chapman, British-based'; W. M. Fruin, The Japanese Enterprise System (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), Clh. 7 
'Interfirm Networks', 256-300 
as Fes, Japanese, p. 257-8 
46j. Scott and M. Hughes, The Anatomy of Scottish Capital (London, 1980); S. Ville, The Rural Entrepreneurs 
(Cambridge, 2000); J. F. Wilson and A. Popp (ed), industrial clusters and Regional Business Networks in England, 
1750-1970 (Aldershot, 2003) 
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business would have commanded in the open market. In addition, networks allowed 
businesses to develop specialisms to provide services within the network. Mutual interest 
thus developed and in this way engendered stability. Trust borne of mutually-reliant 
necessity, reinforced by the need of maintaining individual reputation, regulated the 
networks 48 Furthermore, it is suggested that networks can help explain economic 
decisions are not necessarily purely rational - something that might go some way to 
explaining why investors were undertaking a relatively poor investment when they put 
their money into colonial business 49 With specific reference to Gentlemanly Capitalism 
in particular, the social context of the capital market and the development of small 
businesses, network analysis provides a useful evaluative framework to explore the social 
context of the capital market and the development of business. 
The literature relating to the metropolitan dimension of British business overseas 
is extensive, necessitating selectivity here. The work of Stillson and Munro provides 
examples of where commercial enterprise enjoyed moderate success in Malaya failed in 
tropical Africa. " The central, if basic, question to arise from these pieces is whether 
commercial failure (and this study is, in part, the study of failure) was as a result of 
managerial error or of insurmountable structural features connected to the general 
viability of business in Sudan. The differing strategies of British business when raising 
capital and developing entrepreneurial opportunities for such overseas ventures is 
developed by the work of Michie, Chapman and Wilkins, who respectively give 
amplification to the importance of concession holders and syndicates, investment 
47 Ville, Rural, p. 56; M. C. Casson, 'An economic approach to regional business networks', in Wilson and 
Popp (eds. ), Industrial, 19-43 
48 Ville, Rural, 56-58 
49 Michie, 'The social'; Davis, The late' 
R. T. Stillson, 'The Financing of Malayan Rubber, 1905-1923', Economic History Review, 1971,589-598; J. 
Forbes Munro, 'Monopolists and Speculators: British Investment in West African Rubber, 1905-1914', 
Journal ofAfrican History, 1981,263-278 
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groups, and free-standing companies. " In addition to the significance of Cain and 
Hopkins, further work by Michie, and also the work of Daunton, Cassis and Rubinstein, 
gives a picture of the multiplicity of functions provided by the City of London, and the 
wealthy and not so wealthy people connected with it through ties of family, class, wealth 
and institutional association. " This study will address the issues of provision of specialist 
services, and social and business interconnection with regard to the companies in Sudan. 
Finally, there is a considerable literature relating to British owned mining 
overseas and the City of London. Of particular note is the work of Harvey and Press, 
and Phimister. 53 These authors stress the dynamic nature of the overseas mining 
companies that were based in the City of London and highlight the following: the 
presence of established networks of companies and individuals with a mining specialism; 
the (sometimes deplorable) actions of company mongers/promoters who floated 
companies on the basis of often egregious information; and the practice of obtaining and 
developing concessions from overseas governments, and then selling on the concession 
for a profit, or floating a company to further develop the concession. 
`Informal imperialism' is used in imperial history and development studies as an 
analytical tool to explain the exertion of extra-territorial power. ' It is a crucial building 
block in some of the main historiographical interpretations within imperial studies, in 
particular the `Imperialism of Free Trade' and Gentlemanly Capitalism, though it has 
recently fallen out of favour among many historians, especially in the recent Oxford 
51 R. G Michie, 'Options'; S. D. Chapman, 'British-based Investment Groups before 1914', Economic History 
Review, 1985,230-251; M Wilkins, `The free-standing company, 1870-1914: an important type of British 
foreign direct investment', Economic History Review, 1988,259-282 
52 Michie, The City of London; M. Daunton, 'Firm and Family in the City of London in the Nineteenth 
Century: the case of F. G. Dalgety', Historical Research, 1989,155-177; Y. Cassis, City Bankers, 1890-1914 
(Cambridge, 1994); W. D. Rubinstein, Men of Property (London, 1981) 
53 C. Harvey and J. Press, `The City and International Mining, 1870-1914', Business History, 1990,98-119; I. 
Phimister, 'Comers and CompanrMongering: Nigerian Tin and the City of London, 1909-1912', Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2000,23-41 
54 For the use of informal imperialism in development studies see C. Newbury, `The Semantics of 
International Influence: Informal empires reconsidered' in M. Twaddle (ed. ), Imperialism, the State and the 
Third World (London, 1992), 46-52 
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History of the British Empire. " It is closely associated with economic interpretations of 
imperialism, and also with the idea of `economic imperialism' itself because it helps 
bridge the gap between politics and economics in contexts where the origin of influence 
is unclear. ' A significant strand of investigation in this thesis will be to examine the 
relationship between business and imperialism in Sudan. Given the centrality of one 
business to the colonial project in Sudan (the Sudan Plantations Syndicate), the 
mechanisms of informal subjugation of sovereignty by business are therefore of interest. 
Studies in informal imperialism highlight that the institutions of territorial empire 
do not have to be present as a necessary or sufficient condition to create an imperial 
relationship. From the perspective of informal imperialism, businesses can be sovereignty 
subjugating agencies and imperialistic in their own right. The bargains struck between 
business and the state are important regardless of whether that state was not - or in this 
case was -a colonial state. It should not be assumed that business was supportive of the 
imperial project. This is an fundamental question of the fabric of the imperial system - 
how do business and capital imperialise a territory, how do they subvert sovereignty 
separate from - though perhaps complimentary to - the colonial state? Or, alternatively 
do they act as an agency of imperialism: ) Is business responsible for imperialism in 
`formal' settings? 
The innovation in the concept of informal imperialism identified as business 
imperialism can be seen most clearly reflected in the work of D. GM. Platt. " Platt's 
`business imperialism', as a variant of informal imperialism, did not involve `antagonism 
between native and foreigner'. Indeed, `in most cases ... business would have been 
controlled and conducted irrespective of nationality. ' Platt concludes that `it might fairly 
55 A viewpoint expressed in D. M. Peers, `Is Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again?: The Revival of 
Imperial History and the Oxford History of the British Empire', Journal of World History, 2002, p. 452 
56 A distinction made byD. Landes in'Some thoughts on the Nature of Economic Imperialism' (1961) 
reprinted in P. J. Cain and M Harrison (eds), Imperialism - critical concepts in historical studies, (Routledge, 
London, 2001), p. 260 
57 Platt, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade'; Platt, Finance, Trade and Politier, Platt, Business 
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be said that although returns derived from a political relationship maybe grossly unequal, 
any economic relationship, unless enforced politically, must offer at least some appearance 
of mutual benefit. ' This is backed up by a considerable amount of evidence that British 
business in Latin America did not rely on preferential consular intervention, which in any 
case was not a common occurrence 58 Platt did not deny that the British had influence in 
Latin America; instead, he proposed that the influence manifested itself through the 
businesses that were active in that region. This also suggested that the power relationship 
did not have to be one of simple one-way domination or subordination as under the 
territorial model of formal imperialism. Platt's contribution was, therefore, to recast of 
the nature of agency. A succinct expression of this is given, not by Platt, but by one of 
his contributors, W. M. Mathew. Mathew argues that there are three ways in which 
business/capital could influence the overseas state: directly though contact with officials; 
indirectly by officials finding policies of mutual self interest with business; and, thirdly, 
where control or influence `manifests itself in mercantile authority and initiative in the 
fields of activity vital to the government's well being, the government itself lacking the 
power to restrain merchant and exercise a jurisdiction of its own. 'S9 This could, for 
example, manifest itself through the terms under which credit was offered between City 
financiers and a foreign government, or that control over public utilities in Latin America 
in some cases was in foreign hands. None of these forms of influence relied or needed to 
be closely associated with British state institutions, but the reality was effective British 
influence. These types of relationships will be explored here. 
In a related vein there is a considerable amount of research that relates to the 
relationship between business and government in the British Empire. ' The key issues 
that come out of this extensive literature are (eclectically) as follows. Tolliday highlights 
58 Platt, Business, 6-11; Platt, Finance, passim.. 
59 W. M. Mathew, `Antony Gibbs Mon, the Guano Trade and the Peruvian Government, 1842-1861', in 
Platt, Business, p. 337 
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that though notions of British authorities defending the interests of British capital have 
to be questioned, it was also the case that British business was capable of aligning itself 
with broader imperial strategy to commercial advantage 61 In an article on Egypt, E. KJ. 
Owen observes that there was notable business failure in cotton-related start-up 
companies in Egypt before the First World War despite British rule. Moreover, Owen 
notes that the state in Egypt had an important role to play in the economy, something 
that was distinctly different to the role of the state in the UK at that time. This 
inexperience more than specific malign intent retarded the development of business bZ 
The fact that the officials in Egypt later figure in the story of the early economic 
development of Sudan (notably Lord Cromer and Eldon Gorst) is interesting in itself. In 
an essay on on in India, 1890-1947, Geoffrey Jones argues that there was an important 
transition in attitude of the colonial officials relating to economic development. `The 
economic imperialists became, first, benevolent nightwatchmen, and then `development- 
orientated' officials formulating an embryonic unbalanced growth model for Indian 
development. ' Such a transformation applied in Sudan as well. Jones' article is notable 
also for highlighting the role that government must play in supporting infant industry in 
a developing context -a notion that resonates also in the article mentioned previously 
by 
Owen. As Jones points out, there was always a `tension between international firms and 
`host' governments, regardless of those governments' political complexion. '6' This notion 
of `host' government is important in identifying the nature of foreign direct investment, 
but also in establishing the different interests of state and business in any commercial 
endeavour undertaken in a colony. The extent to which these interests were different is 
important in determining whether the capital or business can be thought of as having 
60 See S. W. Tolliday (ed. ), The International LJbray of Critical Writings in Business History, Volume 2: Business and 
Government, (Edward Elgar Publishing, Aldershot, 1991) 
61 S. W. Tolliday, 'Introduction', in Tolliday (ed), The International, p. xi 
62E. R. J. Owen, 'Lord Cromer and the Development of Egyptian Industrl, Middle Eastern Studies, 1966, 
282-301 
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`captured' the state, or whether the state in some sense captured capital/business. One 
recent contribution to this debate observes that degrees of cooperation between business 
and the state is normal, that neither government nor the state is unitary. `Policy making 
usually occurs across the divide between public and private spheres and often involves 
intermediate institutions', argues M. Kipping. " This creation of policy and of 
transactional arrangements between the business and state spheres will form a central raft 
of analysis in several chapters of this thesis. 
63 G. Jones, `The State and Economic Development in India, 1890-1947: The Case of Oil', ModernAsian 
Studier, 1979,353-375 
64M. Kipping, Business-Government Relations Beyond Performance Issues', in F. Amatori and G. Jones, 
(eds), Business History Around the [World (Cambridge, 2003), p. 391 
21 
V. DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
As Cain and Hopkins point out in the quotation at the beginning of this Introduction, 
studies in the historical political economy of empire have become increasingly rare with 
the notable exception of their own British Imperialism. In truth, this kind of research has 
never dominated the landscape, though the implication is that older contributions still 
hold currency. Alongside Cain and Hopkins and DCM. Platt then, the work of E. R. J. 
Owen is important. In Cotton and the Egyptian Economy (1969) Owen analysed the 
importance of cotton to the political economy of Egypt in a similar way to that which 
will be conducted here. Of special note is his observation that as a cash crop cotton was 
both inedible and not consumed locally in any great volume, making it an ideal monopoly 
concession based product 65 His analysis of cotton's importance to the Egyptian state as 
an export, as an earner of foreign exchange, and as a link between the developing and the 
industrialised world is also relevant to this study of Sudan. More recently, Owen has 
turned his attention to the political history of the Middle East, including Sudan, by 
examining the economic, cultural and political factors that have shaped the region. " He 
analyses the development of Middle-Eastern states thematically, exploring the ways in 
which pan-Arab nationalism, colonialism, authoritarianism, religion and economics have 
affected the transition from colonised to decolonised region. These relate to questions 
that will be posed here with regard to the economic effects and effect on business of 
decolonisation. 
In The International Economy and the Undeveloped World 1865-1914 (1978), A. J. E. 
Latham points to the importance of understanding, and at the very least being aware of, 
the mutuality of economic relations between the undeveloped and the developed world, 
a point underscored by A. G. Hopkins in An Economic History of West Africa (1973), who 
65 ERJ. Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian Economy -a study in trade and development (Oxford, 1969), p. 29 
66 E. R. J. Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London, 2000 
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wrote that `exchange and subsistence activities were (and still are) integrated. i67 Though 
this study will have reference to the traditional and indigenous modes of economic 
activity in Sudan, the prime focus of this study is the imperial and international aspects of 
the political economy of Sudan between 1899 and 1956. Both authors above identify the 
following as the most salient analytical units of the experience of African economies in 
relation to their interaction with the World economy. communications (including 
transport); money and capital; the effects of international trade; population and 
migration; economic growth and/or underdevelopment; social change and political 
responses to the changing economic landscape 68 Clearly this study touches on these 
issues, particularly on the question of economic growth and export trade. However, the 
principal focus will be to examine capital, business and government with the emphasis on 
the question of metropolitan causes and `imperial' historiography. " 
The questions of colonial development policy relevant to this thesis are tackled 
by E. A. Brett in Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (1973), by R. M Kesner in 
Economic Control and Colonial Development (1981), and by Michael Havinden and David 
Meredith in Colonialism and Development: Britain and its tropical colonies, 1850-1960 (1993). 7° 
Kesner's work is particularly relevant in describing the mechanics of the Colonial Office 
and the development policies at its disposal, in particular the facility to raise Treasury 
guaranteed debt to finance a variety of staple/cash crop schemes designed to pay for the 
cost of colonial administration. " The impact of colonial development on tropical 
67 A. J. H. Latham, The International Economy and the Undeveloped World 1865-1914 (London, 1978), p. 13; A. G. 
Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (London, 1973), p. 5 
68 See also J. Forbes Munro, Africa and the International Economy (London, 1976); P. L. \Wickins, Africa 1850- 
1980: an economic history (Cape Town, 1986) 
69 The focus here is on capital, business and government; the focus on the factors of production (land, 
labour and capital) has not been adopted. 
70 E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London, 1973); RM. Kesner, Economic Control 
and Colonial Development: Crown Colony Management in the Age of Joseph Chamberlain (Oxford, 1981); M. 
Havinden and D. Meredith, Colonialism and Development: Britain and its tropical colonies, 1850-1960 (London, 
1993) 
71 Kesner, Economic, p. 5; See also Meredith and Havinden, Colonialism and Development, p. 45; C Ehrlich, 'The 
Uganda Economy, 1903-1945, in V. Harlow & E. M. Chilver (eds. ), History of East Africa, Vol.. III (Oxford, 
1965), p. 400 
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colonies in that period is best taken up by Brett, and in a comparative context by 
Havinden and Meredith. The history of colonial development in Sudan suffers in a 
similar way to its imperial history - as mentioned earlier Sudan is by and large omitted. 
Sudan does not fit within Kesner's analytical framework, for example, because it was a 
condominium and because it was administered from the Foreign Office rather than the 
Colonial Office. Havinden and Meredith make a similar distinction: they `decided that 
more than enough material was available for [their] purposes from the large number of 
colonies that were under the control of the Colonial Office. ' The broad outline traced 
by Havinden and Meredith, Brett, and Hopkins and to a certain extent by Kenwood and 
Loughheed is that states that adopted the cash-crop development model suffered both 
long-term economic difficulties and accompanying political problems related to the lack 
of development and the difficulty of escaping the confines of a narrow economic base, a 
problem compounded by significant debt" 
Finally then, the impact of decolonisation on business and the economy of Sudan 
will be discussed in the last chapter of the thesis. After the trauma of colonialism itself, 
there is little doubt that the process of decolonisation has dramatically shaped the 
political economic landscape of the ex-colonies. The manner in which both economic 
and political power were redistributed in the run up to and then during decolonisation is 
a central question. In Black Africa (1986) David Fieldhouse stresses that economic 
decolonisation was not simply a process that ended when the British left a territory, or 
when a significant period of time had elapsed from the end of formal control, but rather 
should be seen as a process which sculpted African economies and polities, and defined 
the architecture of various governments, agencies, institutions and frameworks within 
which African states and politicians continue to operate. 74 In Capitalism and Nationalism at 
the end of Empire R. L. Tignor argues that foreign business operating in Egypt, Nigeria and 
n Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Development, p. 3 
73 A. G. Kenwood and AL. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy, 1820-2000 (New York, 1999) 
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Kenya did not thrive during decolonisation? 5 In Egypt, for example, the systematic 
sequestration of overseas assets is attributed to the antagonism of Egyptian nationalists 
toward foreign influence within the country. A feature of this study will be to examine 
the key bargains struck between business and government in the years immediately 
before decolonisation, to determine who held the whip hand during the final years of the 
British Empire in Sudan. Decolonisation will be examined as a process in terms of how it 
shaped the short and medium term political economy of Sudan, especially, of course, 
with regard to business; and how the process of decolonisation was shaped itself by the 
bargains struck and the relationship between government, business and economy. The 
contrast with Egypt and Nigeria was that in Sudan, the state managed (or was able to 
manage) economic decolonization in a somewhat different way because the most 
significant business interests had been effectively nationalized prior to the final phase of 
decolonization. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis will contribute to the debates outlined above first and foremost by relating 
Sudan to central questions presented by imperial historiography. One of the weaknesses 
of the existing research on Sudan's economic history is that it does not explore questions 
relating to that literature. This is also somewhat the case in reverse: the imperial 
historiography tends to discuss Sudan in overly simplified terms. One of the aims, then, 
is to draw these strands of enquiry together. Questions of political economy and the 
texture of the relationship between business and government are explored in detail; the 
Gentlemanly Capitalist account of British imperialism as it applies in Sudan will be 
examined as will the debate around business imperialism A corollary of this will be a 
74 D. K. Fieldhouse, Black Africa: 1945-80 - Economic Decolonization and Arrested Development, (London, 1986) 
75 RL. Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism at the end of Empire (Princeton NJ, 1998) 
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more functional analysis of the operation of business in Sudan up to and including an 
analysis of the process of decolonization. A natural accompaniment to this is an account 
of Sudan's economy - its structure and trajectory, and how it changed over time. 
Ultimately, though, these areas of focus are drawn in contrast to the central importance 
of state power to the economic history of Sudan, which is also the narrative of a 
burgeoning economic actor in its own right. These themes are developed in the thesis 
through the following chapters. 
Chapter 1 (`Public Enterprise: Infrastructure and Economy, 1899-1914) first of 
all establishes the context of economic activity in Sudan by examining the economic 
geography of the territory. From there economic growth, the development of transport 
and services, and the expansion of international trade are discussed. The conclusion 
drawn is that Sudan's mainly agricultural economy enjoyed modest success in this period. 
The transport infrastructure of the country was built up and the extent of a monetised 
economy engaged in trade was expanded. 
Chapter 2 (`Private Enterprise: British Business in Sudan, 1899-1919) is divided 
into two sections. The first explores the attempt to develop a mining industry, while the 
second introduces the cotton-growing Sudan Plantations Syndicate. The first set of 
British businesses in Sudan did not enjoy success and this helped shape the view of the 
Sudan Government, already of critical importance to Sudan's economy itself, that future 
economic development of the country was going to require governmental partnership 
with business. The Sudan Plantations Syndicate thus came to be central to the plans to 
develop Sudan's economy via a large scale cotton-plantation in the Gezira area. The links 
between the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and other British business overseas are also 
explored. 
Chapter 3 (`Business and Government, 1907-1914) analyses the development of 
the relationship between the Syndicate and the Sudan Government during the critical 
26 
period before the First World War when both parties were trying to organize the finance 
for the Gezira Scheme. It was during this period that the essential structures of the 
political economy of the imperial period with regard to business and government were 
formed, establishing the basic pattern for partnership in cotton-growing founded on a 
highly indebted plantation scheme. 
Chapter 4 (`Economy, Government and Business, and War, 1914-1919) deals 
with the economic and political effects of the First World War. First of all, the disruption 
to the economy and the plans for the Gezira Scheme are charted. From there attention 
turns to the emerging tension connected to the development of cotton-growing in 
Sudan, in particular with reference to Egypt. British `interests' in the region were diffuse 
and included three distinct loci of power. Khartoum, Cairo and London. Friction in the 
region during the Condominium period was therefore largely between different British 
parties, but often defined and rhetorically pursued with recourse to national interests 
(`Sudanese'; `Egyptian'; `British'). The politics as well as they economics of irrigation in 
the Nile valley are analysed as well as changes to the Syndicate - government 
relationship. This theme is further developed in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 (`Government and the limits of economic growth, 1919-1939) is the 
first of three chapters that analyses the critical inter-war years. During this period the 
Gezira Scheme became operational and the economy suffered the devastating effects of 
the depression. The argument advanced in these chapters is that the needs of the 
Sudanese state begin to predominate in this period at the expense of the position of 
business. Chapter 5 first explores the trajectory of the Sudan economy between 1919- 
1939 and the effect of the depression on the finances of the Sudan Government. This is 
then used as a platform to continue the analysis begun in Chapter 4 that examines the 
tension between Sudan and Egypt in relation to the distribution and nature of imperial 
power in the North African region of the British Empire. 
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Chapter 6 (`The Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 1919-1939) traces and analyses the 
fortunes, internal organization, and business strategy of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate 
as it reached maturity as a business alongside the Gezira Scheme, and how it dealt with 
the challenges of the depression era. 
Chapter 7 (`Business, Government and the Political Economy of Sudan, 1919- 
1939) continues the analysis begun in Chapters 3 and 4 relating to the texture of the 
relationship between business and government. Specifically, it examines changes to 
arrangement of the agreements that governed the relationship between the Syndicate and 
the government, especially with regard to taxation. 
Chapter 8 (`The Economy, Business, War and Decolonization, 1939-1955) draws 
to a close the substantive evidence presented in the thesis. It examines the trajectory of 
the economy to 1956, in particular the economic effects of the Second World. The 
critical event of this period is the decision of the Sudan Government to effectively 
nationalize the Gezira Scheme. This brought to an end the Syndicate's involvement in 
the economy of Sudan. The changes that this wrought on the political economy of Sudan 
are also explored. 
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Chapter 1 
Public Enterprise: Infrastructure and Economy, 1899-1914 
Stocktaking on January 19,1899, when the Condominium Agreement was signed, would 
have listed few assets of any certain worth. The frontiers of the Condominium were not 
then drawn but there were certainly more than 800,000 square miles of territory 
supporting, at bare subsistence level, a population thought to be less than two millions. 
... 
Disease and warfare and the disturbance to traditional ways of life during the Mahdia 
(1881 - 1898) had reduced numbers but the Sudan could never have supported a 
large 
and prosperous population! 
Development in the Sudan will be handicapped for some years by the scarcity of and 
inefficiency of the labour procurable. The population is said to have dwindled down by 
disease and warfare from over 8,000,000 people before the Mahdi's revolt, to under 
2,000,000 at the present time? 
I. ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 
The invasion of Sudan in 1898 acquired a vast territory for Great Britain and, nominally, 
Egypt. With it came the need for government and administration and though the acquisition of 
a colony was prestigious, paying for it was unwelcome. This drove the colonial state toward 
economic management and taxation. The problem was that the initial economic prospects for 
Sudan were not good. In 1906, the Sudan Government estimated that of the 950,000 square 
I Stone, Sudan Economic Development, 1899-1913 (Khartoum, 1955), p. 1 
2 BUL OGA 2/2/2 'Cotton Cultivation in Egypt and the Sudan' (1906) 
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miles the country was then thought to inhabit, only 1576 square miles were cultivated? 
Disease, famine, civil conflict, and invasion had also all wrought their toll on an already harsh 
country. 
The land of Sudan is broadly divided into three bands as categorised by rainfall. The 
first can be thought to inhabit all the lands north of a notional line drawn from Kassala in the 
East, via Khartoum, to El Obeid in the West. This area is very and with annual rainfall in the 
region of 25 centimetres per year. South of the notional line is a band that can be thought to 
progress approximately five hundred kilometres south, characterised by rainfall in the range of 
25 to 50 centimetres per year. Stone notes that this second band enjoys rainfall `normally 
adequate for fairly safe raincrop production', and consists of scrub and grassland capable of 
bearing grazing animals in the south of this band, with more and land toward the north. The 
third band in the south of Sudan has a heavy rainfall, described by Stone as a `region of much 
forest and swamp, limiting the areas suitable for cultivation. ' Across most of Sudan, cultivation 
was of a subsistence nature in 1899! 
Nevertheless, Sudan produced a diverse range of products including cotton, cattle, 
gum arabic, grains, hides and on seeds, though irrigation methods played little role in 
agricultural production, nor did the production methods bear much resemblance to organised 
commercial agriculture. ' Sudan's major export in the period before the Condominium was 
Gum Arabic, which had been harvested commercially for hundreds of years, with some 
suggestion that Arab merchants were trading Sudanese gum two thousand years ago. ' The gum 
is tapped from the gum trees (Acacia Verde, sometimes known as Acacia Senegal) in gum 
gardens! The nature of the gardens should not be mistaken. The term garden implies 
deliberate and organised cultivation whereas the gum gardens of Sudan were in fact areas of 
land in which individuals enjoyed various rights to tap. The principal area where gum was 
3 cGR 1906, p. 7 
4 Stone, Sudan Economic, 121-122 
S SAD 201/8/22, `Report by PLP. Heroins, Director of the Commercial Intelligence Department on the trade of 
the Sudan with special reference to the fostering of trade between Britain and the Sudan', 20th September 1916 
6 Stone, Sudan Economic, p. 208 
7 Sudan Trade and Investment Guide 1960-61, p. 56 
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harvested was Kordofan, and Sudan came to dominate the World production of gum. In 1916, 
for example, it was believed that Sudan `was the world's principal source of gum arabic' and 
this was certainly still the case at the end of the Condominium when Sudan held as much as 
eighty per cent of the World's market share! Gum arabic is important in the manufacture of 
adhesives, pharmaceuticals, confectionery, textiles, inks and dyes, and explosives. In addition 
to gum arabic, wild rubber could be found in the Bahr el Ghazal province, though its 
collection was limited and cultivation non-existent! 
In terms of edible foodstuffs, the staple of the Sudanese is dura, a type of wheat 
produced across the country. In addition to this dates were cultivated particularly in the 
riverain areas of the northern provinces (Haifa, Dongola and Berber). Many of the inhabitants 
of the regions in the north of the country came to be economically reliant on the date crop, 
and the Sudan Government made efforts to encourage the commercialisation of production in 
the early years of the Condominiumlo 
The presence of elephants in Sudan led to hunting for ivory, again something that had 
occurred for centuries. During the Mahadiya the trade in ivory was thought to have diminished 
so that in the early years of the Condominium the Sudan Government encouraged the ivory 
trade in the belief that `accumulated stocks might be released to give an immediate growth in 
the export and for the longer term there were understood to be plenty of elephants in the 
southern provinces to maintain and expanding trade. ' The Sudan Government declared a 
monopoly over the trade in ivory, taking a royalty of twenty per cent and introducing a permit 
system; in 1900 the hunting of young elephants was prohibited as was the sale of tusks 
weighing less than 10 lb. " Likewise, the fishing for Mother of Pearl shell in the Red Sea was 
regulated to attempt to conserve such natural resources as existed, the trade in Mother of Pearl 
8 SAD 201/8/28, 'Report by HP. Hewins', 20th September 1916; Stone, Sudan Economic, p. 210; Sudan Trade and 
Investment Guide 1960-61, p. 56 
9 Stone, Sudan Economic, 241-244 
10 Stone, Sudan Economic, 180-184; Sudan Trade and Investment Guide 1960-61, p. 57 
11 Stone, Sudan Economic, 235-236 
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and pearls themselves having been known in Sudan since before the Mahdia. 12 A trade in 
ostrich feathers similarly took place. 
Because Sudan had no coal deposits, tree vegetation was important to provide fuel. In 
the South of the countrythe dense mass of papyrus and reeds known as suddite provided fuel, 
but elsewhere the wood resources were scarce. The Sudan Government was to find this 
problematic, eventually resorting to importing timber for construction from elsewhere in the 
British Empire. 13 
In Egypt high grade long staple cotton had been grown since at least the early 
Nineteenth century. " In Sudan cotton was grown only sporadically but it was of the same type 
as that in Egypt (mainly Domains Sakel'), and though cotton was believed to have been grown 
near the Nile for hundreds of years, the Egyptian varieties were only introduced by Egyptians 
in Suakin in the preceding century, possibly at the time of the governorship of Mumtaz in the 
1850s. 15 Rain cultivation was for the most part the norm, the cotton produced used to make 
rough damur cloth. Only in the Tokar region was flood irrigation used to supply water to 
cotton plantations. " As a consequence the Sudanese had little familiarity with the farming 
requirements of cotton cultivation. 
Aside from the variety of harsh climatic conditions, the physically huge size of the 
country and the basic nature of production of agricultural produce, Sudan did boast some 
infrastructural advantages. Sudan's Red Sea coastline had one significant port in Suakin, a 
longstanding trading centre located on the crucial imperial trade route to India, vitalised by the 
opening of the Suez Canal and development of the Eastern Mediterranean / Red Sea shipping 
route in the 1870s. Similarly, the Nile is one of Sudan's most influential natural assets. The 
White and the Blue Niles meet just south of where the cities of Khartoum and Omdurman 
were settled. All of the Niles are somewhat navigable, providing a natural internal transport 
12 Stone, Sudan Economic, 245-247 
is Stone, Sudan Economic, passim. 
14 Owen, Cotton, Ch2 `The Introduction of long-staple cotton, 28-57 
15 Sudan Trade and Investment Guide 1960-61, (London, 1960), p. 56; SAD 201/8/27, `Report byHP. Heroins', 20th 
September 1916; Stone, Sudan Economic, p. 141 
16 Stone, Sudan Economic, p. 142 
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system and corridor to Egypt. The area between the two Niles south of Khartoum is known as 
the Gezira plain, is characterised by fertile soil and ready access to the important Nile irrigation 
waters, and was where the cotton plantation scheme in Sudan was developed. 
This set of economic circumstances, defined the base from which the economy of 
Sudan was to grow during the colonial period. How, then, did the economy fare to 1914? 
II. ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Between 1899 and 1914, Sudan experienced a highly predictable spurt of economic growth, in 
part driven by peace and security, and the development of basic economic infrastructures. 
Increased marketisation, the approximate rule of law, enforceability of commercial contracts, a 
reduction in the dislocation of the populace which existed during the Mahdiya period, along 
with better containment of the problems caused by war, famine, disease and so on, all 
contributed to more fertile conditions for trade and commerce. As Daly notes, `the greatest 
achievement of the Condominium - security - itself ensured relatively rapid economic 
growth. '' 
National Income accounting data was not available for Sudan until 1956.18 As a result 
export data is used as a proxy for economic performance throughout this thesis. Between 1901 
and 1905 annual Sudan exports grew by an average of 6.5% per year as compared to the 
annual average growth of `crown colonies' trade of 1.2% per year. Between 1906 and 1910, 
Sudan exports grew by an annual average of 29.2% compared to an annual average growth in 
trade of 7.0% amongst the crown colonies, though between 1911 and 1913 Sudan export 
growth stalled at 3.2% annually, compared to 9.3% increase in overall annual colonial trade 19 
Sudan out performed the crown colonies in terms of average annual growth for the period 
17 Daly, Empire, p. 194 
is 0. Osman and AA Sulieman, `The Economy of Sudan', in P. Robson and DA Lury, (eds. ), The Economies of 
Africa (London, 1969), p. 439. 
19 Sudan data from Daly, Empire, p. 488; Crown Colonies data: Havinden & Meredith, Colonialism and Development, 
p. 116 
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1901 to 1910. The subsequent dip in annual average growth can be attributed to the economy 
reaching a fuller capacity, and suffering short-term market shocks. However, this dip should 
not alter the view that during this period the economy of Sudan was both an absolute and 
relative success. Between 1901 and 1914 exports increased 282% and imports increased 246%; 
the area under cultivation in Sudan went from 1,000,000 feddans in 1904 to 2,100,000 feddans 
in 1913, an increase of 110%. 20 The growth in the economy was accompanied by increasing 
export diversity, as can be seen in the chart below. 2' This is a relatively unusual feature of a 
tropical colony. Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Ghana and the other tropical colonies had 







Although gum, cotton products and dura made up the biggest elements of the export economy 
for Sudan in this period, the instability in the relative share of different exports and their 
numerousness caused a number of difficulties. Not only were the products subject to 
fluctuations in world market prices, but internal production levels could vary very widely, a 
particular problem for dura production. This can be see in the chart below, which also shows 
the general increase in export levels over time including a slight decrease in 1914. 
20 data from Daly, Empire, p. 216 
21 See Appendices for sources of data used in all graphs, charts and tables. 
22 See W. A. Lewis (ed), Tropical Development, 1880-1913 (London, 1970) 
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Chart 1.1. Exports by product (%), 1901-1914 
Source: GGR, various years; GIB, Annual Reports, various years 










Chart 1.2. Exports by product (£ E), 1901-1914 
Source: GGR, various years; GIB, Annual Reports, various years 
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The question now turns to why the economy developed as it did. To this end transport, the 
development of commercial and communication services, and the patterns of Sudan's 
international trade will be examined. 
III. TRANSPORT 
Railway construction by colonial governments was a policy notably advocated by Joseph 
Chamberlain when at the Colonial Office at the end of the nineteenth century, and has been 
described by Forbes Munro as the `deus ex machina' of colonial development. " Railways 
facilitate trade and economic activity in several ways. Firstly, through the movement of goods 
to and from market. Secondly, through the movement of labour - though in Sudan this is was 
not specially crucial, other than in allowing officials, businessmen, engineers and technicians to 
move around the country more swiftly. Thirdly, railways open up districts, not just as in reason 
one outlined above, but also by fostering the growth of railways service towns and 
settlements. 24 Fourthly, the growth of a railway network is also closely associated with the 
growth of telegraph communications, often seen as essential to the co-ordination of 
movement of goods and services in a market environment. Fifthly, they also facilitate the 
23 Kesner, Economic, p. 91; J. Forbes Munro, 11rica, p. 91 
24 A. A. Sikainga, City of Steel and Fire: a Social History o%Atbara, Sudan's railwa 
2002) 
y touu, 1906-1984 (Portsmouth NH 
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development of engineering and technical knowledge, with itinerant specialist service 
departments; as a long-term infrastructural feature requiring constant maintenance, they 
employ and train labour leading to the long-term replication of expertise able to carry out this 
work. 25 Within the history of colonial development railways are viewed as one of the standard 
economic development policies pursued by colonial governments, especially in the inter-war 
period. 26 
Though alternative forms of transport did operate in Sudan, these were to prove 
inadequate to provide the necessary services. Though the network of roads was expanded 
rapidly from 1,500 miles of relatively serviceable road in 1904 to 4,000 miles by 1905, the 
quality was, on the whole, poor and the capacity for heavy haulage almost non existent ' 
Steamers operating on the Nile had the capacity for heavy haulage, but they were confined to 
the Nile and were subject to problems associated with seasonal variation and navigational 
difficulties! ' Railways, however, offered relative flexibility and the capacity for heavy haulage. 
John Stone, the early writer on the political economy of Sudan, observed that government 
policy in this period did not `go far beyond the provision of channels to market'. ' Sudan's 
railways became the major form of transport linking the interior of Sudan to markets within 
the country as well as internationally. 
The Sudan Government undertook railway construction for ideological reasons already 
alluded to; as Forbes Munro put it to `launch a dramatic transformation in Africa's productive 
capacity', and because, as Lord Cromer observed in 1905, `the prospects of an immediate 
return are not sufficiently attractive to induce private capitalists to embark in railway 
undertaking save on terms which are so onerous as to render it cheaper for the government to 
25 See also: G. R. Hawke &J. P. P. I- Higgins, 'Transport and social overhead capital', in R. C. Floud and D. N. 
McCloskey (eds), The Economic History of Britain since 1700, Volume 1 (Cambridge, 1981), 227-252; S. Strange, States 
and Markets (London and Washington, 1988; 1994), Ch. 7, Transport Systems', 141-164 
26 Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, 128-132; S. I{ Frankel, 'Some aspects of investment and economic 
development in the continent of Africa', in Z. A. Konczacki & J. M Konzacki (eds. ), An Economic history of tro pical 
Africa (London, 1977), p. 233 
27 Daly, Empire, p. 207; Daly notes that a road was 'a track about 30 feet wide, more or less straight, cleared of trees 
and stumps' 
28 Daly, Empire, p. 206 
29 Stone, Sudan Economic, p. 6 
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construct railways themselves. '30 However, initially the Sudan Government hoped that private 
enterprise would provide adequate transport services. 
Early in the Condominium period the link between improved transport and expanded 
trade was understood to be clear. Cromer observed in his report of 1902 that `even with the 
very imperfect means of railway communication which at present exist, external trade is 
growing. '31 Nevertheless, it was also clear that without expansion of the country's transport 
facilities in terms of both quantity and cost, development in Sudan was unlikely to occur at the 
rate that was desired. As Richard Hill noted, the `economic development of the Sudan was 
hindered at every turn by the tortuous routing of its imports and exports', pointing out that 
imports into Sudan via Egypt made their way via four transhipments: `at the port of entry, at 
Luxor and el-Shelia and again at Wadi Halfa. i32 Similarly, in 1903 J. H. Neville, the Inspector of 
Agriculture criticised the cost of internal shipments stating that `wheat can be sent from 
Chicago to Liverpool at practically the same rate as freights from Khartoum to Halfa. '" 
The idea to develop the railways was simple enough, as Cromer explained in his report 
for 1902: `As I have said in my Egyptian Report, the Suakin-Berber railway is absolutely 
essential to the well-being of the Sudan... This line will place Sudan in easy communication 
with the sea [and] it will bridge over the waste of desert that now separates the Eastern Sudan 
from the outer world. ' Cromer also correctly identified that the development of transport ties 
to El Obeid would `give greater stimulus to the gum trade' and, if the Gezira were to be 
opened up, would prove the territory were capable of economic development. " By 1910, 
Khartoum had been lined to Suakin, at that time the principal Red Sea port? ' The subsequent 
construction of Port Sudan and its incorporation into the rail network further increased the 
ability of Sudan to export goods without having to pay tariffs to Egypt. As a result the 
30 Forbes Munro, Africa, p. 91; CGR, 1905, p. 26 
31 OGR, 1902, p. 6 
32 Hill, Sudan, p. 67 
33 GGR, 1903, p. 172 
34 OGR, 1902, p. 7 
35 Hill, Sudan, p. 56 
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destinations for exports became increasingly international, facilitating the integration of Sudan 
into the World economy. 
Railway building in Sudan took place first in 1884 when Khedive Ismail's civil 
administration in Egypt laid track from Wadi Halfa to Sarras. During the early sequence of the 
re-conquest in 1895 a section was quickly laid following the Nile south to Akasha, 
approximately 60 miles south of Wadi Halfa. Though this second section was subsequently 
destroyed by the Khalifa's army, it was rebuilt in 1896 to facilitate the second expedition to re- 
conquer Dongola; it was added to by a line to Kerma, some two hundred miles from Wadi 
Haifa, in May 1897.36 This military railway network was extended so that Wadi Haifa was 
linked to Khartoum by 1899. 
However, the existing railway between Wadi Haifa and Kenna had been hastily 
constructed during the Reconquest was neither physically robust nor financially solvent, nor 
was it ideal for fostering trade. In 1902, the line cost £E23,500 to run but only earned 
£E8,916, of which some sixty per cent was on the government's account. It was, Cromer 
opined, `impossible to go on working any railway at this ruinous loss'. " This continued to be 
the case in 1903, when Cromer distilled the difficulty for the government in the following way, 
describing the problem as a `dilemma': 
[the government] must either work the railway at paying rates, which would result in 
killing the trade, or they must practically subsidise the trade by working the railway at 
rates which do not cover the cost of transport" 
Thus, not for the first time as it would turn out, the government of Sudan adopted a 
policy of intervention. The justification that was used in 1903 was that because the 
government wished to attract imports and stimulate exports the policy of `subsidy could 
36 Stone, Sudan Economic, p. 61 
37 OGR, 1902, p. 11 
38 cGR, 1903, p. 12 
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continue, at least as long as the Suakin-Berber railway remained unfinished. More worryingly, 
however, was the diagnosis of the trouble for the railways deemed to be structural and 
therefore problematic. `It is obvious, ' the Report for 1903 maintained, `that neither a 
Government nor a company can continue to work the railway on a system that renders the loss 
heavier in direct proportion to the increase of traffic. ' By 1904 the situation had worsened, as 
the Halfa-Kerma was no longer thought to be safe. Nevertheless, the opening of the Nile-Red 
Sea Railway in 1905 was a turning point, and began a sustained period of network 
development 3' 
'T'his line was planned from as early as 1901 but was hampered by the difficulty of 
finding a route through the Red Sea Hills. Instead, a route was followed `north from Suakin 
along the foot of the Red Sea Hills for nearly 50 kilometres before advantage could be taken of 
a series of knors (river valleys) to proceed south again through the hills' before turning west to 
Atbara where it joined the Nile Valley line. Despite difficulties with labour, water supply for 
both men and engines, and occasional storms the line was finished six months ahead of 
schedule in October 1905 ao 
The hopes for railway transport got to the core of the idea for development prevalent 
in the Sudan Government at this time. In his annual report for 1905 Cromer stated that 
improved transport was creating positive conditions for the first time. `A short time ago, ' he 
wrote, `the price of dura at Khartoum went from PT25 to PT30 an ardeb. The market price at 
the ports of the Red Sea varies from PT30 to PT110 an ardeb. The cost of Transport from 
Khartoum to the coast will not amount to more than 15PT per ardeb. It follows from these 
figures that the Khartoum merchants will have to offer a price of over P170 an ardeb, or all 
the dura will go down to the Red Sea. '4' This process of creating a market would, it was hoped, 
show the advantage of production capitalism to native cultivators resulting directly from the 
construction of the railway. 
39 OGR, 1903, p. 13; CGR, 1904, p. 30; cGR, 1905, p. 33 
40 See Stone, Sudan Economic, 64-65 
41 OGR, 1905, p. 33 
39 
It was ... necessary to prove to the native 
by example that if he would sell his live stock 
for export he could make a profit, and that so far from diminishing his capital and his 
consequence by parting with his cattle he was adding to both. `' 
This view is supported by John Stone who has argued that while `Sudan would not have 
developed so fast without the railway network and a port on the Red Sea it is also to be 
emphasised that without the market opportunities provided by the Egyptian middlemen there 
would have been little incentive to the cultivator or gum picker to find more than 
subsistence. ' 1his additional idea, of the importance of Egyptian merchant traders for trade is 
an unexplored topic. Alongside Indian, Levantine and Greek merchants, Egyptian traders were 
present in Sudan in large numbers, indicating the existence of links between the Indian Ocean 
and Red Sea trading mutes and the North African/Eastern Mediterranean commercial world. 
By 1907 it was planned to connect the Gezira to the railway network, as the line was 
gradually to be extended to Kordofan. Eldon Gorst, by then Consul General in Cairo, 
reported that `the bridging of the Blue Nile at Khartoum will facilitate the extension of the 
railway into the fertile district of the Gezira. ' A plan was drawn up, and an engineering firm 
from Darlington in County Durham were commissioned to construct the bridge, which, it was 
hoped, would open in 1909. Indeed, it was noted that the extension of the railway to the 
Gezira was a pre-requisite for the development of commercial agriculture in the district. This 
accompanied encouraging figures for the railways more generally. the number of passengers in 
1908 was recorded at 320,222, compared to 259,674 in 1907, and the volume of goods carried 
on railways also increased during this period. 4S By 1909, the extension of the railway to the 
South continued apace, the cost of which was advanced by the Egyptian Treasury. ' At the 
42 The Sudan To-day (Khartoum, 1913), p. 18 
43 Stone, Sudan Economic, p. 7; Sudan Chamber of Commerce Monthly journal, passim/various. 
µ Stone, Sudan Economic, p. 67 
45 OGR, 1907, p. 5,16,19; OGR, 1908, p. 19 
46 OGR, 1909, p. 5 
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same time the original line between Wadi Halfa and Kerma was re-laid, with improvement 
made to the quality of the track. 47 'T'his work was finished in 1910, the Annual Report 
commenting that `the commercial and strategic importance of this improvement in the 
communication is already apparent... the revenue earned by the Sudan Railways in 1910 
amounts to overLE 391,000 as against £E331,000 in 1909 and shows a profit of LE123,000. '48 
The Annual Report explicitly indicated the links between the development of transport and the 
specific hopes for the wider economic development of Sudan along specific agricultural lines: 
The immediate stimulus given by the southern railway to agricultural development 
became obvious when the government was approached by a British Syndicate with a 
view to the construction of a barrage across the Blue Nile in neighbourhood of Sennar, 
and the undertaking of a canalisation scheme providing water for the irrigation of some 
half-million acres suitable for cotton growing and cereals, out of the area of several 
million cultivable acres which the Gezira is calculated to possess 49 
Nevertheless, a significant problem existed in ensuring that the transport rates were set 
at economically viable levels. An official report in 1910 observed that different rates in 
different parts of the country were `hampering' economic development. `It is the general 
opinion of both the provincial authorities and merchants', the report concluded, `that the rates 
prevailing, and particularly those of the Sudan Government Steamers require revision and 
should be reduced considerably. i5° Similarly, Bernard, the Financial Secretary, reported to 
Wingate the position held by the Governor of the Dongola Province that a reduction on rates 
on railways and steamers was necessary `in order to provide markets for this year's produce' 
[1910] and that `facilities granted in this direction will encourage natives to cultivate more land 
47 cGR, 1909, p. 17 
48 OGR, 1910, p. 5 
49 OGR, 1910, p. 5 
50 SAD 112/1/6-11 `Report to Secretaryof General Economic Board from Inspector General Sudan Irrigation 
Service', 2rd March 1910 
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next flood. "' The future direction of railway policy was discussed around this time. Among 
those thought to be economically advantageous were opening track to connect Kassala on the 
Upper Atbara with the Red Sea, on a line to include Gedaref and Sennar. Another was to link 
the fertile Tokar Delta with Suakin. The success of the line to Wad Medani left the 
government with `little doubt that the project would be financially sound. ' The reason for this 
was the improvement to export trade that the building of the railways had achieved, and a faith 
in the native cultivator to respond positively to the opportunities that improved access to 
market provided. " 
By December 1911 the railway line to El Obeid in Kordofan had been completed thus 
bringing, `the gum gardens of Kordofan within easy reach of Port Sudan. i53 Again, it was 
observed that the increased access to markets was stimulating increased trade and was 
increasingly the extent to which the native producers responded to market signals, the 
international dimension of which was not lost on the government: 
the construction of new railways and the creation of Port Sudan has brought the Sudan 
within easy reach of international commerce. Our interests are no longer parochial, and 
it has become evident that this country occupies what is potentially an extremely strong 
strategic position in relation to European and Eastern Markets. 
The introduction of integrated pricing systems of through charges for traffic on both rail and 
steamers helped this along. ' Thus, by 1911, the system had been effectively developed over 
the previous six years or so. The bridging of the Blue Nile at Khartoum and the White Nile at 
Kosti, and the opening of 430 miles of track to El Obeid via Wad Medani were the significant 
sl SAD 112/1/3 Bernard to Wingate, 21,11 March 1910 
52 CGR, 1910,21-22; GGR, 1911, p. 35 
53 Stone, Sudan Economic, p. 67; GGR, 1911, p. 5 
54 GGR, 1911, p. 36 
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steps that were taken. The whole system comprised some 1,500 miles of track along which 
were to be found one hundred and eight stations. " 
The success of the railways was such that by 1911, they were threatening to destroy the 
carrying trade of independent mercantile traffickers on the lower reaches of the Blue and 
White Niles. Indeed, such was the impact of the railways on this traffic that the Sudan 
Government actually took over the transport assets of the Sudan Development Company, 
which mainly consisted of Nile steamers 56 This process continued into 1912. The future of 
river-borne transport was to be `looked upon as a feeder or contributory system to the Sudan 
railways. "Ihis development had advantages for the Sudan Government, not least control over 
the chief means of distribution of Sudan export produce to the outside world, at this time, still 
dominated by goods to Egypt. `There is no doubt whatever, ' it was reported in 1912, `that the 
development of closer commercial relations with Egypt is a sound policy, and every possible 
assistance will be afforded to the railways to enable them adequately to maintain the steamers 
and offer increased facilities for the through transport of goods. "' A second factor at play was 
that despite the recommendations of the Commission on the Egyptian State Railways, presided 
over by Lord Fan-er, which advised linking the Egyptian Luxor-Aswan line to Wadi Halfa, `no 
line to connect the two systems was built. "' 
However, there were signs that the future development of Sudan's economy was going 
to be held back by problems further developing the transport infrastructure of the of the 
country. The first was financial and resources based, connected to the need to expand the 
railways and improve their condition so as to accommodate the agricultural development in 
the Gezira. As Wingate bemoaned to Lee Stack in 1913 as the Gezira Scheme was being 
planned, `I am afraid that Lord Kitchener does not quite understand that the railway has long 
since used up every scrap of spare material and we cannot make even a third class line on our 
55 GGR, 1911, p. 59 
16 GGR, 1911, p. 63 
57 GGR, 1912, p. 68 
58 Hill, Sudan, 52-53 
43 
own as might have been the case ten or fifteen years ago. ' Wingate later suggested that 
Kitchener was `startled' by the possible expense of establishing new railway lines to meet 
economic need, and was not fully aware of the improvements that had already been made, 
commenting that `Lord Kitchener does not appreciate the fact that since he was Governor 
General many lines have been made in the Sudan and every spare scrap of material has been 
utilised. Personally, I think that the railways have done well and economically there cannot be a 
shadow of doubt that they are now in an infinitely better state then they were in the old days. '59 
In addition to the railways, of course, the vast navigable stretches of the Nile were a 
natural transport facility that historically had been very important and, moreover, had tied 
Sudan's trade to Egypt. In 1902 E. E. Bond Pasha, formerly of the Royal Navy, was placed in 
charge of the government's Nile steamer service. At the same time the Sudan Government 
somewhat optimistically guaranteed a three per cent return on the capital outlay of the Sudan 
Development and Exploration Company who were commercially operating steamers and 
steam barges on both the White and Blue Niles 60 In the opening years of the condominium, 
there was moderately successful widespread use of Nile transport facilities, though it was 
always the government's intention to push railways above all else as Cromer indicated in the 
Annual Report for 1904: 
I trust that a railway will eventually run up the Blue Nile, but as some time will probably 
elapse before the constructing of the line can be undertaken, it is desirable, as a 
temporary measure to do all that is possible to develop the river navigation 61 
This mirrored what happened over the following few years. By 1910 though trade with 
Abyssinia via the Blue Nile had increased, overall traffic on the Blue Nile was reported to have 
59 SAD 108/15/39-40, Wingate to Stack, 29th April 1913; SAD 108/15/44-45, Wingate to Stack, 4th May 1913 
60 cGR, 1902, p. 11 
61 CGR, 1904, p. 31 
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decreased because of the increased use of railways. ' Despite the fact that it was hoped that the 
Nile route would eventually regain its position, especially with regard to grain and cattle 
exports it was the case that by 1912, river transport - and the revenue that went with it - was at 
an all time low because of `the diversion of gum traffic to railways, to private charterings (sic) 
being below the average of recent years, to an over-estimate of Army transport, and to the 
abolition of the Blue Nile Ferry at Halfa owing to the cattle trade not fulfilling expectations. ' 
The steamer traffic on the Halfa-Shellal reach was taken over by the Railways Department in 
November 1911 because of the impetus towards forming an integrated through transport 
system; as a result of the change it was able to `recover its prosperity after a considerable falling 
off at the first opening of the Red Sea Railway. ' 
The development of railway transport in Sudan was both seen to be an important step 
in the development of the economy and actually helped develop trade, especially in two 
regards: firstly, the creation of a better integrated national market in dura facilitated both 
labour movement and urbanisation, and secondly, through gum Sudan developed an export 
trade. The state provision of railway transport services was a natural function of the inability of 
private enterprise to supply the necessary capital; returns on railways in Sudan were always 
somewhat variable. In 1913, for example, the government noted that receipts were down some 
twenty. five per cent because gum exports were reduced. " Similarly, by taking the decision at a 
governmental level, it was possible to develop a line to the Gezira where, before the 
development of commercial agriculture, there was no significant market or producers to 
service. The early hopes for the development of the Gezira all turned on the need to establish 
adequate transport links prior to any significant commercial projects. By doing this, the Sudan 
Government had taken an important step towards what would become the Gezira Scheme. 
62 OGR, 1910, p. 22 
63 GGR, 1912,69-70 
64 GGR, 1913, p. 39 
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The final infrastructural features that will be briefly touched on are the Red Sea Ports of 
Suakin and Port Sudan. From here goods were shipped to the outside world. " The 
development of modem shipping and loading facilities enhanced port capacity, and helped 
build on merchant trade that was already provided by the established indigenous merchants " 
IV. SERVICES 
A neglected though nonetheless crucial feature of the overall infrastructural development of 
Sudan in the period before 1914 was the provision of banking and to a certain extent postal 
services. These acted as important market integrators, allowing an increasingly money based 
economy. The history of banking in Sudan is only slightly mentioned in the sources. The 
Annual Report for 1902 commented that `British banks are established at Khartoum and 
appear to be thriving' while not mentioning which banks were present 67 The National Bank of 
Egypt, however, certainly operated in Sudan. Fred Roland, writing on behalf of the bank, 
stated that the role of their branches was to give `every encouragement to legitimate trade'. " 
Local managers were able to give credit to merchants; for example in the form of advances on 
merchandise and bill discounting up to a value of £500. Most of their activity was, however, 
confined to the major northern towns, though they did open a branch in El Obeid in 1912.69 
Similarly, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate introduced a non-money bank in co-operation with 
the National Bank of Egypt in 1909 when they opened a Merchandise Branch Bank at Zeidab. 
During the Ordinary General Meeting of the Syndicate in September of that year, Frederick 
Eckstein commented that he was `glad to be able to say that he experiment has proved a great 
success. Tenants may store direct to the Syndicate or, if they prefer, may store with the Bank 
65 See K j. Perkins, Port Sudan: the Evolution of a Colonial City (Boulder, 1993) 
66 SAD 281/5/50-51 Fred Roland, National Bank of Egypt, to Wingate 17th November 1907 
67 (GR 1902, p. 6 
69 SAD 281/5/50-51 Fred Roland, National Bank of Egypt, to Wingate 17th November 1907 
69 Stone, Sudan Economic, 118-119 
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and then draw against such deposits. This is the usual system in Egypt i7° The importance of 
this facility to the operation of the cotton-growing scheme was not lost on the Directors of the 
Syndicate: 
As you may be aware, it is essential to the Syndicate's business to perform the functions 
of bankers to tenants, and we must be prepared to give financial assistance to the 
cultivators for the purchase of seeds, for labour, for animals etc, seeing that no other 
banking facilities for this class of work [is] available in the Sudan! ' 
By 1913 it was reported that the circulation of silver `constituting the greater part of 
the currency among the natives' had to be increased in both 1911 (by LE 190,000) and 1912 
(by a further LE 170,000) to `meet demands when crops are being moved'. At the same time a 
savings bank for private banking needs was authorised to open on 28' May 1913, and 
branches were subsequently opened in Khartoum, Khartoum North, Omdurman, Atbara, 
Merowe and Dongola on the 27`h October. By the following year the six branches had opened 
eight hundred accounts; LE 7,000 was deposited and LE 4,000 withdrawn. In the main those 
opening accounts were `Government employees, soldiers, school children and minors, servants 
and artisans', but the report also lamented that native Sudanese were not using the bank as few 
`had learnt the value of banking their money. ''Z 
The development of commercial services was enhanced by the development of the 
post and telegraphic network. In 1902 the Telegraphic service in Sudan was minimal, though 
was in the process of being expanded. Receipts from public usage totalled LE 5,000 while 
receipts from government use totalled LE 11,000. " By 1913 receipts from public use were LE 
25,054; receipts from government remained around the same level, however, at LE 9,474. " 
70 SAD 415/5/50, Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 8th September 1909 
71 SAD 416/1/24, Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 18th December 1913 
72 GGR 1913, p. 27,45; GGR 1914, p. 32 
73 OGR 1902, p. 12 
74 Stone, Sudan Economic, p. 116 
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Across the same period the number of private telegrams sent went from 75,865 to 360,315; 
government telegrams varied from 65,957 (1903) to 114,797 (1907), but from 1908-1913 were 
around the 80,000 mark, enjoying no significant decline or increase in volume. " 4,237 miles of 
telegraph lines were open in Sudan by 1906; this had expanded to nearly 5000 miles by the end 
of the decade. 76 By 1914, three wireless telegraph stations were being constructed to connect 
areas in the south-west of the country with the north for the first time; this was also the first 
time that this technology was introduced to Sudan. The effect of the First World War, 
however, while increasing government telegraphic traffic, was to decrease private 
communications `due no doubt to bad trade and the restrictions enforced by the censorship. ' 
The Consul General's report for 1906 noted that `a sign of increased commercial 
activity is to be found in the fact that the total amount of cash that has passed through the 
Money Order Office has grown from LE 550,000 in 1904 to LE in 808,000 in 1905, and again 
to LE 1,200,000 in 1906. ' By 1907 there were fifty-six post and telegraph office operating in 
Sudan, and a travelling post office commenced service in November 1907. Within Sudan a 
daily postal service operated from 1907, with an international service operating three times per 
week. Post Offices were also used to integrate other services vital to the colonial state, for 
example, as a result of an arrangement with the Sudan Medical Service, post offices were used 
as depots for the distribution of quinine. '' 
V. INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
The two principal questions that need to be asked are: with whom did Sudan trade during the 
period 1899 to 1919 and, secondly, what products were traded? The first of these can be 
answered simply by examining the table below. The period between 1908 and 1913 is the most 
75 Stone, Sudan Economic, p. 116 
76 cGR 1906, p. 23; GGR 1909, p. 18 
77 GGR 1914, p. 31 
78 OGR 1907, p. 17; OGR 1906, p. 23 
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appropriate to gauge Sudan's trading position before the development of plantation agriculture 
in the inter-war period. This is because it was only by 1908 that the Sudan Government 
decided to concentrate on the promotion of agricultural business and the First World War in 
1914 distorted the nature of Sudan's international trade so that only the period in between 
gives us any sense of what the trend in trading relationships was. 
Table 1.1 Sudan's international trading partners: imports and exports (% 
Source: Stone, Sudan Economic Development, (1955)79 
) 1908-1913 
Imports 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 
Egypt 47.9% 45.5% 45.3% 39.7% 52.8% 45.0% 
UK 32.4% 33.8% 31.1% 34.9% 29.2% 29.2% 
India and Aden 5.4% 5.2% 5.6% 6.8% 1.3% 11.0% 
Australia 2.5% 2.9% 7.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Abyssinia 1.4% 1.8% 1.9% 2.6% 3.6% 3.1% 
Austria 1.4% 12% 1.2% 2.2% 1.5% 1J% 
Germany 1.5% 2.1% 0.9% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 
Eritrea 12% 1.1% 1.2% OJ% 1.2% 0.6% 
France 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 
Italy 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 2.5% 2.5% 2.9% 
Belgium 0.8% 0.6% 0.8% 0.4% 0.7% 0.6% 
Turkey 0.5% 0.6% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 
USA 1.5% 0.8% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.4% 
Parcel Post (not distributed by countries) 1.4% 1.6% 17% 1.5% 2.4% 1.9% 
Other 0.8% 1.4% 1.0% 1.4% 2.5% 1.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Exports 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 
Egypt 61.8% 59.8% 65.5% 55.0% 45.7% 43.0% 
UK 10.7% 12.3% 10.2% 16.4% 19.5% 22.6% 
India and Aden 0.4% 0.9% 2.1% 0.4% 0.1% 0.4% 
Turkey 1.2% 0.9% 0.9% 0.4% 0.7% 1.0% 
U5A 2.9% 4.0% 3.3% 3.6% 8.7% 7.4% 
Germany 3.1% 5.2% 4.4% 6.8% 9.0% 6.8% 
Belgium 2.5% 1.9% 11% 2.0% 2.7% 2.7% 
France 8.9% 8.0% 5.8% 9.9% 8.1% 9.0% 
Austria 3.1% 2.8% 1.7% 1.5% 1.8% 1.9% 
Italy 0.8% 1.2% 0.6% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 
Eritrea 2.1% 1.2% 1.3% 0.5% 0.7% 1.4% 
Abyssinia 1.0% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Other markets 1.6% 1.3% 1.9% 2.2% 1.5% 2.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Between 1908 and 1913 Egypt and the UK were Sudan's most significant trading 
partners for both imports and exports, a not unsurprising fact given the Condominium 
relationship, Egypt's proximity, and British ubiquity in World trade. This period is 
marked by a stability in both the absolute levels and relative share of imports from both 
of these countries. Egypt's share of imports hovered around circa forty-five per cent; the 
UK share varied around circa thirty per cent. However, it is clear from the data that this 
stability in imports was matched by changing relationships in export destination of good 
produced in Sudan. Across this period Egypt's share of exports dropped from 61.8% to 
43%, while Britain's share of exports rose from 10.7% to 22.6% with the USA's share 
79 See `Appendix 1: Sudan's international trading partners: imports and exports, 1908-1913' for complete data 
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rising marginally from 2.9% in 1908 to 7.4% in 1913, peaking at 8.7% in 1912. It is also 
noteworthy that France's share of exports remained consistent at around nine per cent 
throughout this period; interestingly Sudan received virtually no imports from France. 
These trends have to be set against the context of an overall increase in exports; even the 
absolute levels of exports to Egypt rose in this period. This is suggestive, but not 
conclusive, of the increased importance to Sudan of export markets in the industrialised 
world, particularly the increasing importance of Britain. These trends are also important 
in configuring the imperial relationships between Sudan and both Britain and Egypt. 
Table 1.2. Imports, 1908-1913 (£ E) 
Source: Stone, Sudan Economic Development (1955) 
1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 Total % of total 
Cotton goods 391,000 372,400 420,900 580,700 412,700 503,600 2,681,300 32.9% 
Machinery 162,900 132,800 114,200 165,800 81,100 53,000 709,800 87% 
Iron, steel & hardware 190,600 190,100 198,000 166,200 83,300 101,200 929,400 11.4% 
Sugar 133,600 151,600 185,500 199,000 257,800 231,800 1,159,300 14.2% 
Timber 97,200 110,600 158,400 152,100 23,100 29,100 570,500 7.0% 
Wheat 65,300 69,600 59,400 81,400 110,700 101,800 488,200 6.0% 
Millet/Dura 0 200 0 700 50,700 58,300 109,900 1.3% 
Coal 74,300 74,200 73,900 74,300 99,900 108,000 504,600 6.2% 
Coffee 37,800 45,200 39,800 55,400 64,500 67,500 310,200 3.8% 
Tea 27,700 16,600 24,500 32,900 35,700 39,100 176,500 2.2% 
Soap 18,600 18,100 21,800 27,400 27,000 28,500 141,400 1.7% 
Perfumery 20,600 20,700 18,900 22,900 13,200 10,700 107,000 1.3% 
Tobacco 66,300 33,500 33,600 35,400 42,600 47,300 258,700 3.2% 
The table above shows that between 1908 and 1913, the most important import into 
Sudan was finished cotton goods, followed by sugar. Iron and steel products, 
machinery and timber are the next most significant. Collectively representing 27.1% of 
total imports across the period, these goods are indicative of those used in general 
industrial construction, though it is noteworthy that in all three categories the amount 
imported was decreasing year on year. 
A breakdown of the imports by international origin gives us a further insight 
into the emerging trade relationships. " Firstly we see that with regard to finished 
cotton goods Egypt's share is roughly constant between 1908-1913, whereas the 
80 See Appendix 2: Imports by international origin and type, 1908-1913 
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increase in imports is attributable to goods from Great Britain, rising by 259% from 
LE 55,300 to LE 143,500. The majority of Sudan's sugar imports came from Egypt 
whereas Britain dominated the steel, iron and hardware, and machinery imports. 
Timber was obtained from both Egypt and another imperial possession, Australia. 
Egypt dominated the imports of consumables such as tea, soap, perfumery and 
tobacco, though coffee was mainly from Abyssinia. Coal was predominantly from 
Great Britain. Wheat was mainly imported from Egypt, India and Aden. During a 
shortage of dura caused by the poor harvests of 1912 and 1913, supplies of this 
product were brought in from India and Aden and sold by'the government at the 
lowest prices or, when needed to alleviate acute food shortages, sometimes distributed 
free. " In conclusion, most of the goods imported into Sudan were driven by the needs 
of the expanding economy: items such as iron, steel and machinery that came from 
Britain. Equally, demand for goods created as a result of the expanding economy 
tended to come from countries with a proximity close to Sudan - for example Egypt 
with consumables, though an exception is Britain with cotton goods. 
In terms of exports, those to the industrialised world - Britain, the United 
States, France, Germany and some other European countries - increased between 
1908-1913.8' Sudan was becoming increasingly integrated into the World economy. 
Secondly, connected to this, in terms of the principal export products of Sudan - gum 
and cotton - Great Britain in particular was becoming increasingly important. 
81 GGR 1914, p. 12 
82 See Appendix 3: Exports byproduct and destination, 1908-1913 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In the long run Sudan developed a cash-crop economy along the typical tropical colony model. 
The conundrum that is presented here is that before the development of cotton in the 1920s 
Sudan had a diverse economic base, albeit agricultural. The economic geography of Sudan 
reveals that there was a degree of potential in the varied and huge landscape. After the invasion 
of 1898 the effect of peace and stability, coupled with the integrative and stimulative effects of 
railway building, the advent of a money economy with accompanying commercial and 
communication services, created the conditions for local and regional marketisation, and 
export production - the `growth spurt' of the Sudan economy. It would be surprising if this 
was not accompanied by greater specialisation within the economy, centred on the production 
of prestige crops for which there was an export market, based on geographical, agricultural and 
economic constraints. The converse increase in the importation of other products is likely to 
have made local production of those products gradually redundant -a process that would 
naturally reduce the economic diversity of the economy, such is the economic logic of 
comparative advantage. 
By 1912 the economy had reached the full extent of its latent capacity as the spurt in 
growth came to an end. Faced also with the failure of mineral extracting private enterprise 
from 1907/8 (which will be dealt with later) the Sudan Government chose to give preferential 
concessions to agricultural businesses where previously they had been cautious: economic 
capacity and business activity had to be increased. Nevertheless, the Sudan Government had 
proved itself to be a powerful vehicle and facilitator for economic growth, and most of the 
economic and infrastructural development seen in this period was as a result of the public 
enterprise provided by the state (excluding, of course, the developments in commercial and 
communication services described above). 
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The economic role of the state had implications for the Sudan Government in terms of 
revenue and expenditure. Taking comparative data from Meredith and Havinden, it is possible 
to examine the position the financial constraints that the Sudan Government faced as a result 
of the performance of the economy. 
Graph I. I. Cons parative Colonial Revenue, 1899-1914 (L ) 
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Graph 1.2. Comparative Colonial Revenue, 1899-1914 (% of 1899 total) 
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Bettered only by Nigeria, in absolute terms Sudan had the second highest revenue throughout 
the period. In relative terms Sudan records unparalleled increases in revenue from 1902 
onwards. The Sudan Government was therefore well placed in comparison with 
administrations in other tropical colonies and in all cases except Nigeria held a superior 
position. 
Notwithstanding the high level of military expenditure in Sudan, a straightforward 
assumption that the Sudan Government had little revenue at its disposal - such as that 
made by Sir John Carmichael, who argued that `the Sudan Government was in no position 
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to plan major capital works from its own resources' - is questionable. " This issue of the 
annual subvention paid by Egypt muddies this question because it gives the impression of 
a government unable to meet its own costs, subsidised by a third parry. However, there are 
four reasons why this picture is not as straightforward as first it might seem Firstly, 
revenue is revenue regardless of the source, be it taxes or subvention, and secondly, from 
1902 the Sudan Government was able to transfer any budget surplus to the General 
Reserve, including revenue from the subvention. As Carmichael himself observes, `to 1913 
these transfers amounted to LE 1,592,000', most of which was used for capital works 84 
Thirdly, the budget was balanced from 1913 and immediately recorded a surplus, 
something that continued into the war years. " Fourthly, the figures on Sudan Government 
revenue included in the graph above do not include the amount given in development 
loans from Egypt (which were not included in the annual subvention). These amounted to 
c. j5.4 million between 1899-1914 86 Seventy-two per cent of this was spent on railways, 
representing c. £3.9 million. Between 1899-1906, LE 2,548,000 was spent on railway 
construction, and between 1907-1914, LE 1,373,000 was expended. The only other 
country to receive loan based financial assistance to construct railways at this time within 
the colonial system was Uganda. Between 1896-1905 Uganda received £5,503,000 from 
the British Government; between 1910-1913 she received only £295,000 '000.87 As Havinden 
and Meredith point out, `British government funds for any kind of colonial development 
up to the early 1920s were meagre', so, in many ways, Sudan enjoyed a significant financial 
advantage when compared with other colonies. Indeed, the evidence presented here 
suggests that at this early stage of Sudan's colonial history, the Sudan Government had 
83 J. Carmichael, `Economic developments in the Sudan 1899-1956, in D. Lavin (ed), The Condominium 
Remembered; VoL 2: The trap formation of the old order in the Sudan (Durham, 1993), p. 4 
84 Carmichael, `Economic', p. 4 
85 Daly, Empire, p. 457; The Times, Friday August 4th 1916, p. 12, article title: 'Sudan Finances: substantial surplus 
achieved in 1915 Budget' 
e6 Carmichael, 'Economic', p. 4 
17 Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Development, p. 141 
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Private Enterprise: British Business in Sudan, 1899-1919 
In all pioneer work there must be a considerable percentage of failure and 
disappointment, but the Sudan has already lived down its evil reputation, and 
there can be no doubt as to its future prosperity. 
- The Sudan Today (1913)1 
The extent to which Sudan attracted or, more precisely, did not attract capital was one of 
the limiting and shaping factors in the economic history of the country and had the effect 
of defining the developmental constraints faced by the Sudan Government. The simple 
fact is that Sudan did not attract commercial activity. The long-run economic history of 
Sudan became, of course, dominated by the corporatist state-supported cotton growing 
schemes and as with many other colonial countries, reliance on one cash-crop led to 
problems of dependence. The economic histories of Sudan have concentrated on 
infrastructural development and the co-operation between government and private 
enterprise, as indeed does this thesis? The agricultural sector in Sudan was given 
significant assistance by the Sudan Government during the colonial period through the 
provision of extensive capital in the form of Treasury guaranteed loans. ' The expectation 
expressed by Lord Cromer in 1903 that `it is quite hopeless to expect that unaided private 
enterprise will supply this want [for capital investment]' seems, then, to have been 
I The Sudan Today (Khartoum, 1913), p. 28. The articles within the pamphlet first appeared in the Manchester 
Guardian, 6th November, 1913 
2 Gaitskell, Gerira, Daly, Empire, Hill, Sudan Transport 
3 PadiamentaryBill; (220) 1913 ii. 911 to authorise the Treasuryto guarantee the Payment of Interest on a 
Loan to be raised by the Government of the Sudan; Parliamentary Bill; (271) 1.97 to amend the Schedule 
to the Government of the Soudan Loan Act, 1913. 
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entirely correct. ` 'T'his interpretation of the development of the Sudanese economy, with 
a highly interventionist government offering protective succour to favoured businesses 
is, however, only one part of the story. 
This chapter will explore the business history of Sudan by looking, firstly, in 
some detail at the failure of mining enterprise in Sudan before 1914. Between June 1900 
and March 1905, the Sudan Government issued fifteen mining concessions to companies 
and private individuals. ' These businesses, with one exception, proved to be 
unremarkable failures and they were not by any stretch of the imagination important to 
the Sudan economy. However, they are interesting because they failed and because of what 
this says about the overall process of imperialism in Sudan. They are also interesting as 
examples of businesses operating on the margins of the British Empire. For the last 
hundred years there has been an association of investment with imperialism and business 
with empire, but little is known about the smaller businesses that tried to eke out an 
existence where commercial opportunity was slender. ' 
The second section of this chapter will focus on the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. 
No one business during the Condominium period had more impact on the economy, on 
the government, and on the nature and experience of imperialism in Sudan than the 
Sudan Plantations Syndicate, not least because no product was more important to the 
economy than the cotton that the Syndicate produced and the government revenue it 
generated. The focus of this chapter is to chart the business history of the Syndicate itself 
- its origins, its organisational structure, its links with international business and the City 
of London, the social linkage of its directors and its performance. The emergence of the 
Syndicate's managerial form was shaped by the way in which entrepreneurs and investors 
4 GGR, 1902, p. 6 Lord Cromer to the Marquis of Lansdowne, Cairo, February 26th, 1903 
s GGR, 1903, Appendix «A", p. lviii; GGR, 1904, Schedule "K", 78-80; GGR, p. 113; Sudan Gayette, 15 
February 1904; Sudan Garette, 1 June, 1905 
6 Amongst many others, Hobson, Impe ialism; Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism; a partial corrective to 
this is G. Jones, Merchants to Multinationals (Oxford, 2000), esp. 17-44 
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interacted in the creation and development of the company. By examining in more depth 
the institutional links with other businesses and with the services provided from the City 
of London the Syndicate can be categorised in relation to the business history literature 
that charts the development of international business in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Relating to and building on this theme, a network diagram will be used to place the 
directors of the Syndicate in their business context. This analysis will be interpreted in 
the context of the Gentlemanly Capitalist explanation of British imperialism as it relates 
to the people and the process described. Finally, the performance of the Syndicate will be 
described, charting the business as it transformed itself from speculative entrepreneurial 
start-up into a corporate partner of government between 1907 and 1919? 
The chief locus of metropolitan economic activity in the British imperial era was 
the City of London. Cain and Hopkins have stressed the importance of the financial 
aspects of the City to British imperialism, but though thought of chiefly as a financial 
centre (which, of course, it was), the City was also home to a host of other businesses 
which were intimately connected to non-financial commercial activities. Merchants, 
agents, shippers, brokers, dealers, jobbers, wholesalers, importers/exporters, 
warehousemen, bankers, solicitors, accountants, manufacturers, company promoters and 
a host of other more nebulous 'City types' all could be found within the City, many of 
whom were connected to international trade. ' Some of this international trade was, 
naturally, conducted by businesses operating within British imperial possessions. ' As 
Margery Perham observed over fifty years ago, there has been a tendency to look at the 
larger companies at the expense of smaller economic players because, as she puts it, 
`since their dissolution [they] have been much harder to distinguish, interwoven as they 
7 See the Introduction to this thesis for a discussion of the relevant literature to these areas. 
8 RG Miichie, 'The City of London and International Trade, 1850-1915', in D. GM. Platt (ed. ) with A. JH 
Latham and R. C. Miichie, Decline and Recovery in Britain's Overseas Trade (London, 1993), 21-63 
9 K. M. Stahl, The Metropolitan Organisation of British Colonial Trade (London, 195 1) 
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are with the entire body of metropolitan commerce. "' The chief aim will be to develop 
some quantitative specification with regard to the companies that are known to have 
operated in Sudan, who also had a metropolitan business connection. What is revealed is 
a picture of entrepreneurs, financiers and investors and the networks and markets that 
they formed, and the story that unfolds is one of the marginality of economic 
opportunity in Sudan. 
10 M. Perham, `Preface' in Stahl, Metropolitan, p. ix 
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Part 1: Colonial Opportunity? The failure of mining in Sudan 
"I am still in the dark, " she said. "Finance, as I have heard of it, means floating 
companies, and companies are floated to earn money for those who invest in 
them. Now this afternoon, as I was dull, I got hold of a book called `The Directory 
of Directors', and looked up all your names in it, except those of the gentlemen 
from Paris, and the companies that you direct -I found those in another book. 
Well I could not make out that any of these companies have ever earned any 
money, a dividend, don't you call it? Therefore how do you all grow so rich, and 
why do people invest in them? " 
Barbara Champers in Yellow God byE Rider Haggard, 44-45" 
I. MINING 
In 1896 Reginald Wingate, then an assistant to Lord Kitchener in Cairo, wrote to FL 
Rider Haggard, the novelist and sometime African adventurer, to respond to a request 
made by Haggard about obtaining a mining concession in Sudan. Wingate informed the 
novelist that Kitchener `did not view the matter favourably', adding that `the country 
being still unsafe for the development of commercial enterprise being the principal 
reason for his objection'. " Nonetheless, Sudan continued to be a source of interest for 
concession hunters, including Haggard's own brother, Andrew. 
The attitude of the Sudan Government to concessionaire entrepreneurs was 
mixed. On the one hand they wanted to aid private enterprise; on the other they disliked 
the style of the concessionaires. In 1903, for example, Edgar Bernard the Financial 
11 H Rider Haggard, The Yellow God An Idol ofAfiica (London, 1926), 44-45 
12 SAD 263/1/172-173, Wingate to H Rider Haggard, 16th November 1896 
60 
Secretary in the Sudan Government wrote to Wingate complaining that `these concession 
hunters are all the same - they all seek to obtain the promise of a monopoly before even 
troubling to find out what they are talking about'13 The reason for this was a 
combination of misguided hopes and misinformation with regard to the fabled Sudan 
gold fields. 
From ancient times to modern, there existed a mythology relating to Sudan's 
supposed mineral wealth and this impetus drove a good deal of the exploratory mining 
activity in the period up to 1914. As the Sudan Government Geologist G. W. Grabham 
observed in 1929, `during the early years of the last century gold was one of the things 
that attracted attention to the Sudan. ... The country was closed 
during the Dervish 
rebellion but after the reconquest, during the early years of the present century, the more 
settled parts were covered in prospecting expeditions: " However, the businessmen that 
speculated on Sudanese mineral wealth were mistaken, and in the long-run only one 
prospecting license was ever fully transformed into a working mine. 
Writing at the end of the mining mini-boom in Sudan (around 1914), the 
government mining engineer Stanley Dunn included a series of extracts from sources 
relating to mining in Sudan. The lack of explicit commentary within this book concerning 
the extracts should not disguise that Dunn was highly critical of the pioneer prospectors 
who used older sources as a guide. In an extract from Bergrath Russegger's Travels in the 
Sudan which was originally published in the mid-nineteenth century (which Dunn notes 
was translated by Charles Tuchmann, a director of the London and Sudan Development 
Syndicate), Dunn uses the selective translation to amplify the folly of the speculators who 
bungled in, seeing what they wanted to see in the sources, hoping to strike it rich. In one 
passage Russegger was quoted to illustrate the supposed potential of the gold bearing 
13 SAD 272/5/76, Bernard to 'Wingate, 16 July 1902, 
14 G. W. Grabharn, 'Gold in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan' reprinted from The Gold Resources of the World XV 
International Geological Congress (South Africa, 1929) 
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land, coming to the conclusion that the total `may certainly be reckoned as at least 24,000 
English geographical miles' and he believed that `with few exceptions the gold was of 
extremely high quality' and would be available in abundance, writing that `there is 
enormous wealth of gold in the interior of Africa (i. e. the Sudan) within the matrix of the 
primitive rock and in the alluvia of the streams and rivers. '15 The evidence presented on 
behalf of Russegger is highly suggestive, containing Tuchmann's own interpretation of 
the content of the text: 
West of Sennar are two groups of mountains known as Seguin and Moya ... 
[there] are some remarkable mineral bodies consisting of microscopic black 
crystals (which Russegger does not presume to identify, but which the translator 
suggests maybe diamonds! ). " 
The implication was that Sudan held untold riches, waiting to be developed by 
commercial enterprises such as the one for which Tuchmann was a director. The 
London and Sudan Development Syndicate itself held a concession in the south of 
Sudan, along the Abyssinian border. Within the concession was a region called Jebel Dul 
which Russegger had described as `eldorado'". A series of surveys carried out between 
1901 and 1905 by various mining engineers `proved that ore was not sufficient or rich 
enough to work' in the Jebel Kukuli and Jebel Mogoga areas, and no ore was found in 
the Khar Adi and Ghezan regions. The license of the company expired without success 
in August 1911'$ 
is S 
.C 
Dunn, Notes on the mineral deporitr of the Anglo Egyptian Sudan (Khartoum, 1911), 27-28 
16 Dunn, Notes, 30-31 
17 Dunn, Notes, p. 29 
18 Dunn, Notes, 52-55 
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Tuchmann was the kind of concessionaire or businessman of which the Sudan 
Government were suspicious. The Legal Secretary of the Sudan Government, Edgar 
Bonham-Carter, had official responsibility for administering mining concessions. In the 
process he came into direct contact with many of the businessmen with which the Sudan 
Government had dealings, most of which occurred in London during the long vacation. 
In August 1903 he had cause to meet with Tuchmann: 
I saw Mr Tuchmann of the London and Sudan Development in town. He said to 
me I know it is against Government Regulations for you to hold shares in our 
company but if you would wish to obtain some for any of your family, send them 
round to me and I will see to it. 
This offer led Bonharn-Carter to express his distaste, writing that `Mr Tuchrnann's bribe 
is the first one that has been offered me in or out of the Sudan', going on to comment 
unpleasantly that `it says something that the offer comes from an Austrian Jew and not 
an Englishman or an Egyptian. "' These themes, of the businessmen seeking advantage, 
of the tension between probity of the government on the one hand and the way the City 
worked on the other, will be discussed again later in this study. 
The confusion connected to the presence of gold in Sudan directly relates to the 
interpretation of historical texts of questionable validity. Even Dunn was wrong in one 
instance. In `Native Gold Washings' Dunn wrote that `when Browne wrote his `Travels 
in Darfur' in 1788, he mentions Sheibun and Lukka as being sources of gold well known 
to the Arabs of Darfur. 2° In fact, a close reading of Browne does not corroborate this at 
all, as the only mention of gold in Browne's travelogue shows, reproduced below. 
19SAD 273/8/75 E. Bonham-Carter to Wingate, 31 August 1903 
20 S. G Dunn, `Native Gold Washings in the Nuba Mountains Province', Sudan Notes and Records, October 
1921, p. 139 
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Of gold, in the countries to the east and west, the supply is abundant. Little comes 
to Darfur, except by accident. What is produced in the west reaches the northern 
markets by means of other caravans. The monarch occasionally obtains a small 
quantity for his own use from the east? ' 
As Dunn later points out, `in spite of universal opinion and belief, there are no old 
workings at Sheibun and there is no gold in the district - it would be a geographical 
miracle if there were. "' And this in a sense, was the whole problem for mineral extraction 
in Sudan. Despite the historical mythology and widespread presence of ancient gold 
workings, there was little gold in Sudan. As both Dunn and Grabharn realised, this was 
because the gold had been either fully extracted or could only be extracted under 
conditions of forced and unbearably harsh slave labour unavailable to modem business. 
" 
The problem for modem business, however, was that Dunn and Grabharn only reached 
this conclusion as a result of early concessionaires and the surveys they carried out. 
21 Mr Browne, 'A Journeyto Dar-fur -A kingdom in the Interior of Africa' in J. Pinkerton (ed. ), A general 
collection of the best and most interesting voyages and travels in all parts of the world voI XV. " Africa (London, 1814), 
p. 144 
u Dunn, Native, p. 143 
23 Grabharn, 'Gold', p. 33; Dunn, 'Native Gold', p. 145 
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II. MINING CONCESSIONS, BUSINESSES AND NETWORKS 
Between 1900 and 1905 the Sudan Government issued fifteen mining concessions. After 
March 1905 the Sudan Government chose to concentrate on agricultural economic 
activities. 24 This was because most of the companies were not viable commercial 
concerns. 
Table 2.1. Mining Concessionaires /Prospecting Licensees, 1900-1914 
Source: GGR, various years; Sudan Gazette25 
11.06.1900 Egypt and Sudan Mining Syndicate (formerly held byArchibald Knox Brown) 
14.01.1901 London and Sudan Development Syndicate 
20.09.1901 George Haig 
22.06.1901 The Victorian Investment Corporation 
01.08.1903 The Nubia Sudan Prospect Syndicate 
22.08.1903 Andrew Charles Parker Haggard 
14.10.1903 William T. Preston 
21.12.1903 The Sudan Exploration Limited 
14.11.1903 The Suakin Mining Syndicate Limited 
28.12.1903 Egypt and Sudan Mining Syndicate Ltd 
14.09.1904 Peregrine Wilson/Tokar Prospecting Syndicate 
05.12.1904 The Sudan Gold Field Company 
30.12.1904 The Sudan Mines Ltd 
21.03.1905 The Victorian Investment Corporation 
21.03.1905 The Deraheib and African Syndicate Ltd 
The history of the London and Sudan Development Syndicate has been briefly 
mentioned previously, and the license held by the Egypt and Sudan Mining Syndicate was 
sold on to Sudan Gold Field Ltd and is dealt with below at some length, as is the account 
of what happened to the Sudan Mines Ltd. The remaining companies fared as follows. 
George Haig's concession was prospected in 1902 and 1903. Though mining 
operations began in November 1905, they ceased in the summer of 1906 and the mine 
24 GGR 1907, p. 17, the report of EM Bonus, Director of the Department of Agriculture and Lands 
25 Sources: GGR 1903, Appendix "A", p. lviii; GGR 1904, Schedule "K", 78-80; GGR 1905,111-113; 
Sudan Gazette, Ist February 1904; Sudan Gazette, 1st June, 1905 
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was eventually abandoned in May 1907.26 The second license held by the Victorian 
Investment Corporation was prospected by Stanley Dunn himself in 1905 and 1906 and 
he reported that not only were no discoveries of gold made, there was no sign of ancient 
gold-workings either. ' This survey was carried out on the second concession that the 
Victorian Investment Corporation obtained (in 1905) after it had sold on the first 
concession that it obtained (in 1901) to the Gabait (Sudan) Mining Syndicate 28 
Two mining engineers - one called Peregrine Wilson - prospected the license 
held by the Nubia (Sudan) Development Company in the spring and early summer of 
1903, and again in the winter of 1904. Although they discovered some evidence of 
ancient iron smelting, no mining work was attempted, the concession was given up in 
August 1907 and the company went into liquidation. Peregrine Wilson's second bite at 
prospecting in Sudan fared no better than the first, and his concession in the Tokar 
region expired in 1905 because though the prospecting engineers found `black graphite 
material' it turned out be a type of coal with no value as a fuel! ' 
The concession held by W. T. Preston (the Dongola concession) expired in 1906 
after the prospecting work carried out in the winter of 1903-4 showed that such deposits 
of gold as there were present were of `no value'. The Sudan Exploration Company's 
concession was `[p]rospected by Mr Arthur Thomas for Messrs John Taylor and Sons, 
Mining Engineers' to no avail and the concession was surrendered in April 1906. The 
Suakin Mining Syndicate's concession was prospected in 1904 and 1905 and because `no 
discoveries of importance were made' was abandoned in 1906, and the Deraheib and 
African Syndicate Ltd surrendered their licence in 1908 after `stating that they [did] not 
26 Dunn, Notes, 49-51 
27 Dunn, Notes, 69-70 
28 GEL MS 18,000/98B/290 London Stock Exchange Listing File - Sudan Mines Ltd: `Agreement between the Victorian Investment Corporation Ltd and Hubert Edward Madden Bourke [Licensees] and 
Gabait (Sudan) Mining Syndicate, 26th February 1903' 
29 Dunn, Notes, 55-57,67-68 
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consider that it would pay to work the concession, in view of the cost and difficulties of 
transport. ''o 
Andrew Haggard, the brother of FL Rider Haggard, had served in Sudan with the 
Egyptian army and consequently knew Reginald Wingate 31 His concession was obtained 
in August 1903 and it is evident from correspondence with Wingate that Haggard was 
determined to exploit his relationship with the Governor-General. Haggard asked 
Wingate to `instruct the legal secretary to the Sudan Government not to be in a hurry to 
close up matters with any existing applicants for concessions' until he had sent his 
confirmation letter relating to his concession, once he had secured `the names of good 
commercial backers who I have behind me in this matter. ' Haggard was a tragically 
gauche self-publicist, writing that he was able to send Wingate a copy of his new book 
entitled `Sporting Yarns', with the hope that Wingate `have a good laugh over some of 
the 164 comic pictures with which it is illustrated. ' He was also unafraid of pandering to 
Wingate's sense of vanity and/or also of wanting to obtain some free copies of Wingate's 
books: 
Should you, by the bye, have nearby you a copy of your own books that you could 
send me with your autograph in it I should be most delighted to receive it as also 
any recent photograph of yourself. I have still got the old one that you gave me in 
the old days in Egypt in which you look a mere slip of a lad. ''Z 
30 Dunn, Notes, 38-41,57-58,66-67; GGR, 1908, 'Mineral Concessions', p. 83 
si H. Keown-Boyd, Soldiery of the Nile: a Biographical History of the British Officers of the Egyptian An y, 1882- 
1925 (Hertfordshire, 1996), 89-90; SAD 273/5/24, Letter from A. Haggard to F. R. Wingate, 14th May, 
1903 
32 SAD 273/5/24 Haggard to Wingate, 14th May, 1903 
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Bonham Carter wrote to Wingate in August 1903 to say that Haggard had `good 
financial backing' and that his concession should go ahead. " Haggard sent two 
expeditions to his concession which, predictably, failed? ' In March 1906 the Sudan 
Gazette reported that the concession had been withdrawn on the grounds that `His 
Excellency the Governor General having refused to renew the same [on] account of 
breach of the conditions of the license. i35 Evidence, if anything, that if personal 
acquaintance gave someone a foot in the door, it did not protect them from being shown 
the door equally swiftly. 
As mentioned in the table above, the Sudan Mines Ltd obtained a concession in 
December 1904. However, rather than having bought the concession direct from the 
Sudan Government, Sudan Mines bought the concession/license from an existing 
company called Gabait (Sudan) Mining Syndicate. 36 This licence was itself bought by 
Gabait (Sudan) Mining Syndicate from the Victorian Investment Corporation Ltd in 
February 1903. The Sudan Mines Ltd had actually been established solely for that 
purpose - to purchase the license from the Gabait Syndicate's A clue to the managerial 
structure of these companies can be found in the fact that Hubert Edward Madden 
Bourke who was a director of Sudan Mines Ltd in 1910, was a director of the Victorian 
Investment Corporation Ltd in 190539 The pattern of concessions being sold from one 
company to another where the companies had directors in common is a pattern that is 
seen later with regard to the Sudan Gold Field Company Ltd. While it is difficult to 
33 SAD 273/8/37-38, E. Bonham-Carter to Wingate, 20th August 1903 
34 SAD 280/3/82 E. Bonham- Carter to William Fraser, 23" March 1907 
35 Sudan Gazette, 1" March 1905, p. 457; SAD 280/3/82, Bonham-Carter to Fraser, neither source, however, 
reveals how Haggard broke the terms of his concession. 
36 GHL MS 18,000/98B/290 London Stock Exchange Listing File - Sudan Mines Ltd: 'Agreement 
between the Gabait (Sudan) Mining Syndicate Limited and The Sudan Mines Ltd, 1' December 1904' 
37 GHL MS 18,000/98B/290 London Stock Exchange Listing File - Sudan Mines Ltd: 'Agreement 
between the Victorian Investment Corporation Ltd and Hubert Edward Madden Bourke [Licensees] and 
Gabait (Sudan) Mining Syndicate, 26th February 1903'. 
38 GEL MS 18,000/99B/363- London Stock Exchange Listing File, March 1' 1905: 'Advertisement' for 
Sudan Mines Ltd 
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generalise from only a few cases, it seems to be that small amounts of capital were 
invested in the first company which carried out preliminary work on a mining 
concession; once the concession had been developed to a point where profit might be 
anticipated the company was dissolved and the licence sold on to a new company, or a 
new company would buy the licence from the original company, sometimes in return for 
shares as well as for cash. 
The Gabait concession was surveyed by Noel Griffin in 1903, and because of 
evidence both from Dunn and from the London Stock Exchange Listing file, there is a 
fairly comprehensive picture of how the Gabait mine fared. Noel Griffin hired some 
Egyptian miners in Cairo and proceeded by steamer to Mohamed Ghul, situated on the 
eastern boundary of the area of the concession. There he was met by two men called 
Caulfield and Burr who had travelled directly to Suakin by boat from London with the 
required survey equipment. In addition, a civil engineer called Broadbridge accompanied 
them. His function was to investigate ancient gold-washings in the area and report his 
findings to `some influential City people, who are desirous of increasing their interest, 
provided Mr Broadbridge is able to confirm the opinion of Mr Griffin regarding the 
potential value of [the concession] area. ' Griffin's opinion was that the concession area 
was a decent prospect, commenting that `last season's work proved that there was very 
rich ore at Gabait, and in spite of being unable to complete the work laid out, the results 
obtained were more than satisfactory. " This inability to finish planned work might 
explain what happened to the mine in the long run. However, at that time, Griffin was 
confident. `I see no great difficulties at all, he wrote, going on to say that: 
39 The Stock Exchange Ofciallnte! ligence, 1910 (London, 19 10), p. 1139; The Stock Exchange Of dal Intelligence, 
1905 (London, 1905), p. 1297 
4° GHL MS 18,000/99B/363 - London Stock Exchange Listing File, March 1905, Sudan Mines Ltd: Letter dated 5d, January 1905. 
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From the experience already gained, development costs have come out most 
reasonably and compare favourably with other new countries, benefiting no small 
degree from being reasonable distance from a fine harbour at which large ships can 
land all necessary materials and supplies. " 
Notwithstanding this, the mine failed. Unlike the case of Peregrine Wilson's second 
mining concession in Tokar, transport difficulties were not the problem in Gabait. Nor 
was it the absence of deposits of gold that caused the business to fail. Dunn comments 
that: 
samples of quartz picked from the waste heaps of ancient miners showed that [at 
Gabait] particularly rich ore existed ... Mining operations at 
Gabait started at the 
end of 1904 and ceased in 1907-1908. A very rich vein of gold bearing quartz was 
struck during the prospecting in depth, but mining operations upon it were not 
started. The company's prospecting license expired on 3 150 August 1908 ." 
The failure at Gabait was in fact caused by the information on which the original 
business decision was based. Although various mining engineers had surveyed the 
concession favourably, they placed their confidence on the presence of ancient mine 
workings. Griffin wrote enthusiastically that `the size and area of the old working are in 
my experience unparalleled, and that they must have taken years to accomplish with 
many thousands of workers ... 
in going over the ground one is impressed with the idea 
41 GHL MS 18,000/99B/363 - London Stock Exchange Listing File, March 1905, Sudan Mines Ltd: Copy 
of letter from Noel Griffin to Gabait (Sudan) Mining Syndicate Ltd, dated 13t November 1904. 
42 GHL MS 18,000/99B/363: Copy of letter from Noel Griffin to Gabait (Sudan) Mining Syndicate Ltd, 
dated 1' November 1904. 
43 Dunn, Notes, p. 49 
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of the vast amount of labour which has been expended and quantity of gold extracted. ' 
As mentioned previously, both Dunn and Grabham believed that a misconception of the 
labour needed to extract gold from the relatively rich seams in Sudan lay behind the 
failure of a great manycompanies. 45 So it was unfortunate when Griffin speculated that: 
I feel confident that by careful and judicious management, and an expenditure of 
considerably less than the amount to be set aside for working capital of the new 
company, you will prove yourselves to be in possession of a very valuable 
property! ' 
The letter from which this extract is taken comprised part of the prospectus for the share 
issue for the new company of Sudan Mines Ltd; the Sudan Government reported in 1908 
that the `Sudan Mines (Limited) have been compelled to close down temporarily owing 
to lack of funds. 'a' In many ways the evidence speaks for itself. 
The Sudan Gold Field Company was the only one of the mining businesses in 
Sudan that succeeded. Its mine at Om Nabardi began producing gold from 1908. In 1911 
the £28,268 worth of gold was exported by Sudan Gold Field Limited, while in the first 
eight months of 1912, £22,705 was exported. In the fourteen months to October 1913, 
£45,516 of gold was exported, while for the twelve months of 1914 this figure rose to 
£49,898. The figure was valued at j65,553 in 1915; at L63,889 in 1916; at LE 50,186 for 
1917 and at LE 67,533 for 1918. The company paid a dividend of ten per cent in 1916, 
but from 1918 onwards the amounts of gold produced at Om Nabardi declined, 
44 GHL MS 18,000/99B/363 - London Stock Exchange Listing File, March 1905, Sudan Mines Ltd: Copy 
of letter from Noel Griffin to Gabait (Sudan) Mining Syndicate Ltd, dated 1n November 1904. 
45 Grabhani, 'Gold', p. 33; Dunn, `Native Gold', p. 145 
% Griffin was referring to Sudan Mines Ltd. See GHL MS 18,000/99B/363 - London Stock Exchange 
Listing File, March 1905, Sudan Mines Ltd: Copy of letter from Noel Griffin to Gabait (Sudan) Mining 
Syndicate Ltd, dated 1 November 1904. 
47 CGR, 1908, `Mineral Concessions', p. 14 
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eventually petering out in the 1920s. Nevertheless, the sums recorded are not 
inconsiderable 48 
The Sudan Gold Field Company, Limited was itself was a reconstruction of the 
Sudan Gold Field, Limited49 and the relationship between Sudan Gold Field Company 
and Taylor and Sons was enshrined in the Articles of Association which established that 
the mining engineers were to be the sole managers and consulting agents of the new 
company. 5° 
Sudan Gold Field limited was listed on the London Stock Exchange in 
September 1905 51 The history of this company is somewhat complex, but reveals a 
pattern that gives an indication of what the overall investment strategy of the Taylor and 
Sons group might have been. On the 19th July 1901, the Egypt and Sudan Mining 
Syndicate bought a mining concession that had been acquired from the Sudan 
Government by Archibald Knox Brown in June 1900. This concession included the 
rights to the site on which the Om Nabardi mine eventually was to sit. This concession, 
along with another prospecting license issued to the company in 1902, in Egypt, was sold 
to the Sudan Gold Field for £ 175,000 in June 1904. This sum was split between £30,000 
in cash and £ 145,000 `by the allotment and issue of one hundred and forty five thousand 
shares of one pound each, fully paid' in Sudan Gold Field. " The directors of the Egypt 
and Sudan Mining Syndicate in 1905 were Lord Vaux of Harrowden, the Hon. M. F. 
48 CGR, 1908, p. 14; GGR, 1912, p. 36; GGR, 1913, p. 21; Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central Economic 
Board, Sudan Government: The Director'' Annual Report for 1914 (Cairo, 1915), p. 38; Commerce and Intelligence 
Branch Central Economic Board, Sudan Government: The Director'' Annual Report for 1915 (Cairo, 1916), p. 28; 
Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central Economic Board, Sudan Government: The Director's Annual Report for 1916, 
(Cairo, 1917), p. 30; Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central Economic Board, Sudan Government: The Director's 
Annual Report for 1918 (Cairo, 1919), p. 24; Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central Economic Board, Sudan 
Government The Director's Annual Report for 1919 (Cairo, 1920), p. 34; Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central 
Economic Board, Sudan Government. The Director'sAnnualReport for 1920 (Cairo, 1921), p. 33; Note - this source 
as UB, year' from here on. 
49 GEL MS 18000/134/184B from 'Notice dated 20th April 1915' 
GHL MS 18000/134/184B: 'Articles of Association of the Sudan Gold Field Company, Limited (2" 
December, 1908)' 
31 GEL MS 18000/97b/100, London Stock Exchange Listing File, 17th September, 1905 
52 GHL MS 18000/97b/100: 'Agreement made 10th June 1904 between the Egypt and Sudan Mining 
Syndicate and the Sudan Gold Field Limited', p. 3 
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Napier, Frederich Cuthbert, Robert Taylor and Edgar Taylor. " The 145,000 shares in 
Sudan Gold Field were allocated in the following way. 91,046 shares went to the Egypt 
and Sudan Mining Syndicate; 10,000 shares went to The Gold Fields of Mysore and 
General Exploration Company, and 43,954 shares were allocated to Ernest Theodore 
Smith of Gresham House Old Broad Street ' The Gold Fields of Mysore and General 
Exploration Company was, of course, one of the two share-holding companies identified 
in chapter one. 
In the Prospectus for the 1904 share subscription, the share buying public were 
informed that: 
The Gold Fields of Mysore and General Exploration Company, Ltd and the Egypt 
and Sudan Mining Syndicate Ltd invite subscriptions for 153,250 shares at par.... 
The Syndicate recently applied for and the Sudan Government have agreed to 
grant a mining lease for 21 years over the Om Narbardi section of the land. " 
The old company passed special resolutions at two extraordinary general 
meetings on 16' November and 2°d December 1908 that reconstructed the company. 
The reconstruction was carried out `with a view to providing further working capital's' 
and the terms of the reconstruction entitled every shareholder in the old company to 
`claim as a right of an allotment of one of the said ten shilling shares with six shillings 
paid up in respect of every share held by him or her in the old company. 'S7 The directors 
were, in addition, allowed to apply for more shares. 
53 Stock Exchange Offi alInte! kigence, 1905, p. 1171 
54 GEL MS 18000/97b/100: `Agreement', p. 4 
55 GEL MS 18,000/100B/547: London Stock Exchange Listing File - Sudan Gold Field Limited, January 
24th, 1905: 'Copy of Prospectus for Subscription, June, 1904' 
56 GHL MS 18000/134/184B: 'An Agreement between The Sudan Gold Field Limited and W. F. Garland, 
4th December 1908', p. 1; GGR, 1909, p. 163 
57GEL MS 18000/134/184B: `An Agreement', p. 3 
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The original shareholders of Sudan Gold Field Company, Limited were all 
directors of the original company. They were: the Rt Hon. Lord Vaux of Harrowden of 
the famous recusant noble family who owned 1,925 shares; John Taylor and Robert 
Taylor of Taylor and Sons owned 2,000 and 1,245 shares respectively, Sir Edward 
Tennant owned 7,260 shares; Captain W. B. McTaggart owned 250 shares, and the Hon. 
Mark Napier owned 606 shares 58 
The group of people were part of an inter-organisational network fairly tightly 
coupled through managerial control and interlocking directorates. However, the 
possibility that they might have their origins in pre-existing social networks is intriguing. 
The 7`h Baron Lord Vaux of Harrowden (Hubert George Charles Mostyn) was born in 
June 1860 and attended Trinity College Cambridge. Edward Priaulx Tennant, the 1" 
Baron Glenconner, was the brother of Margot Asquith and a member of the rich 
Glasgow based Tennant family who made their money from chemicals in the nineteenth 
century. He was born in May 1859 and after attending Eton College he took an M. A. 
from Trinity College Cambridge in 1885. This would seem to verify that Vaux and 
Tennant had a significant prior association in the form of being contemporaries at 
university before they both served as directors as part of the Taylor and Sons group of 
companies. After travelling in `Africa, India and America' Tennant was called to the Bar 
(Inner Temple) and between 1892-95 he served as Assistant Private Secretary to George 
Trevelyan at the Scottish Office. Mark Francis Napier, son of the 10`h Baron of Napier 
and Ethrick, was born in 1852 and though he also attended Cambridge it is unlikely that 
he was a contemporary of Vaux and Tennant. However, between 1892-95 he served as 
58 GHL MS 18000/134/184B from'The Sudan Gold Field Company Limited: Report and Abstract of the 
Receipts and Payments of the company to 27th February 1909'; G. Anstruther O. P., Vaux of Harrowden: A 
Rtcusant Family, (R. H Johns, Newport, 1953); R. Burt, john Tay/r, Mining Entrepreneur and Engineer, 1779- 
1863 (Moorland Publishing Company, 1977), passim.; C. Welch, London and the opening of the Twentieth 
Century, (Brighton, 1905), p. 427; GHL MS 18000/134/184B from 'The Sudan Gold Field Company 
Limited' 
74 
UP. for Roxburgh in Scotland, making it possible that he knew Tennant from as early as 
the 1890s 59 
The other directors of the Sudan Gold Field Company were connected together 
and to the Taylor and Sons group in other ways. By 1910 the Suakin Mining Syndicate 
had been liquidated 60 However, in 1905 its directors were Lord Vaux of Harrrowden and 
Captain W. B. McTaggart (both directors of Sudan Gold Field) alongside T. B. Edwardes 
(about whom nothing is known), H. C. Taylor, Edgar Taylor and General Sir Charles 
Holled-Smith. " After joining the army in 1865 Holled-Smith served with distinction in 
South Africa, Egypt and in Sudan during the campaigns of 1885-86. He was then posted 
to Suakin and in 1892 was made Commandant of the port city, a post held two years 
afterwards by Reginald Wingate. Holled-Smith's connection seems not to have been 
social but connected to his military service. His military service roughly overlapped with 
that of Captain W. B. McTaggart who also joined the Army in the 1860s, and they were 
both members of the same club in London - the Naval and Military. This is, however, to 
be suggestive. A more balanced conclusion it to suggest that the Taylor and Sons group 
might have utilised the insider knowledge of colonial contexts that military men such as 
Holled-Smith and McTaggart would have possessed. 62 
Notwithstanding that the networks of business that are portrayed here are self- 
defining, the presence in Sudan of companies connected to Taylor and Sons (The Sudan 
Gold Field Company and Barramia Mining and Exploration Company), establishes that 
these businesses were part of a pre-existing and extensive business network' This 
network needs considerable further research to establish more fully the managerial and 
investment strategies of Taylor and Sons, and more importantly, the nature and 
59 Who was Who, 1929-1940, p. 1386; Rubinstein, Men, p. 79; Who was Who, 1916-28, p. 412,798 
60 Stock Exchange OfficialInte! ligence, 1910, p. 1496 
61 Stock Exchange Offi alIntelligence, 1905, p. 1147 
62 Summary Guide to the Sudan Archive (Durham, n. d. ), p. 72; Who was IVbo, 1916-28, p. 690,970 
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importance of the ties. However the presence in Sudan of these (and prior to 1910 some 
additional) Taylor associated businesses suggests that Sudan was a country within which 
they expected to be able to develop business. However, by utilising the addresses listed 
for the companies known to be associated with Taylor and Sons, and from inference 
based on the presence of Taylor and Sons directors there were 31 businesses connected 
to the group. " Of these the biggest in terms of capitalisation was the Cape Copper 
Company which owned copper mines in Namaqualand in the Cape as well as mines in 
India and North America, but from the available source material there is no evidence of 
wider linkage. This is not true, however, of the next largest, the Tasmania Gold Mining 
Company. 65 
The Chairman of Tasmania Gold was Abraham Hoffnung who was also the 
chairman of at least five other Taylor and Sons companies, the Anglo-Australian Assets 
Company, the Gibraltar Consolidated Gold Mines (which despite its name owned a gold 
mine in New South Wales), the North Mount Boppy Limited, the Mount Boppy Gold 
Mining Company and the South Mount Boppy Gold Mining Companybb The latter two 
of these companies were also based in New South Wales, and they enjoyed a fairly high 
degree of inter-organisational coupling. Not only did they share a partially interlocking 
directorate, but the Mount Boppy Gold Mining Company owned 55,000 shares, fully 
paid up in the South Mount Boppy Company. S. F. Hoffnung-Goldsmid was a director of 
Barramia Mining and Explorations Company (which was one of the companies that 
63 Barramia had taken on the mining interests of the Egypt and Sudan Mining Syndicate Limited, another 
Taylor and Sons business. 
64 Harvey and Press indicate that in 1907 Taylor and Sons were connected with 45 companies around the 
world, see C Harvey and J. Press, 'Miineral wealth and economic development: foreign direct investment in 
Spain, 1851-1913', Economic History Review, 1987, p. 189, fn. 22; the Post Office London Directory, 1911 (London, 
1910), p. 522 indicates that forty-one companies were listed at Taylor and Sons addresses in Queen Street 
Place in the City of London. My own research indicates that in 1910 there were thir i-seven companies 
with a direct managerial and directorial link to John Taylor and Sons. See. SM Mollan, `The business 
network of John Taylor and Sons: 1890,1900 and 1910', Economic History Society Conference Proceedings (April 
2004), 64-75 
65 Stock Exchange OfcialInte! ligence, 1910, p. 1387 
76 
owned a mining concession in Sudan) and also a director of the Mount Boppy Mining 
Company. Hoffnung-Goldsmid was related to Abraham Hoffnung. Abraham Hoffnung 
was a director of the multinational merchant firm S. Hoffnung and Co., the records of 
which can be found in the State Library of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. This 
kind of connection hints at the nature of the inter-organisational networks that were 
present in the City of London. The Hoffnungs were themselves at the centre of an inter- 
organisational network that took in part of the Taylor and Sons network. The hub of the 
Hoffnung network was the firm S. Hoffnung and Co, their interests stretching from 
London to New York, Sydney and Brisbane 67 
Taylor and Sons provided technical and managerial services to the companies 
within the network because they were consulting mining engineers. However, Taylor and 
Sons was a family partnership and was not the fulcrum of the finances of the group. The 
largest concentrations of capital within the group were held by mining companies in 
India. Two companies within this network had a role as share-holding companies that 
themselves did not carry out mining. The first was the Anglo-Australian Exploration 
Company which held shares in the Mount Boppy Gold Mining Company, the Tasmania 
Gold Mining Company, the Mysore Gold Mining Company, Barramia Mining and 
Exploration Limited, the Dareheib and Africa Syndicate, the South Mount Boppy Gold 
Mining Company, and North Mount Boppy Limited. " Anglo-Australian was also part of 
the Hoffnung network. The second share-holding company was the Gold Fields of 
Mysore and General Exploration Company. Despite owning land in Mysore, this 
company did not carry out any mining, instead holding shares in several other mining 
66 This company's shares were interchangeable on the both the London and Sydney Stock Exchanges. See 
Stock Exchange OfcialIntel/igence, 1910, p. 1463; Stock Exchange OfcialIntel/. gence, 1910, p. 1028,1412,1447, 
1494 
67 Stock Exchange Officiallntelligence, 1910, p. 744; MitchellLibrary, State Libraryof New South Wales, 
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; http: //www. archivists. org. au/busrec/archives/ABE0091a. htm; 
Anon., The House of Hoffnung: 100yean ojWhokrata Trading inAustralia (Sydney, 1952) 
68 See Burt, john Taylor, passim.; Stock Exchange OfficialIntelb ence, 1910, p. 1028 
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companies. 9 For both the Anglo-Australian group and the Gold Fields of Mysore group 
the tightness of inter-organisational coupling was intermediate to high. This is because 
the network relationship operated in three interrelated ways. Firstly, the managerial 
function of Taylor and Sons indicates a high degree of specialised operational control. 
Secondly, the presence of inter-locking directorates indicates that the networks operated 
at both an institutional and a social level; thirdly, inter-firm share-holding, and the use of 
specific `holding' companies indicates that this network was financially interlinked in a 
consciously structured way. This in turn poses a number of questions relating to the 
managerial strategies of Taylor and Sons, not just as mining engineers managing mines, 
but also as the centre of a complex web of companies that operated a kind of investment 
portfolio. ' 
69 Stock Exchange Offi allntelligence, 1910, p. 1416 
70 Mollan, The Business Network', passim. 
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III. CONCLUSION: BUSINESS FAILURE AND GENTLEMANLY 
CAPITALISM 
Though most of the mining companies in Sudan failed this shows the strength of 
metropolitan capital, not weakness. The networks allowed marginal commercial 
opportunities (such as mining in Sudan) to be fully explored without committing large 
amounts of capital. The pattern described of companies restructuring and issuing new 
shares reflects not only the relative ease with which new companies could be formed 
under the 1855 Joint Stock Act, but also how high risk business could be developed 
without committing more capital than was necessary. If companies failed, only small 
amounts of capital were lost; if they succeeded, increasing amounts of capital could be 
ploughed in and the original investors could be rewarded by gifting them shares and/or 
cash. At first sight such mining companies might appear to be free standing companies. 
In fact, because they were linked into an extensive business network they can be seen as 
part of a multinational conglomerate, probing for profit in every corner of the globe. 
It is clear that the mythology relating to the mineral wealth of Sudan attracted 
companies immediately after the Reconquest. For example, the likelihood is that Taylor 
and Sons were attracted to Sudan because their success in India was based on the re- 
working of ancient mines; indeed the success of Taylor and Sons outside of Britain 
seems to have been initially built on this method of developing commercial 
opportunity! ' From the 1870s onwards, the acquisition of African territory represented a 
series of new opportunities. Perhaps most importantly, formal empire held the promise 
of preference and governmental support. However, in Sudan before 1914 it is not clear 
that the mining companies were offered much succour, it is also unclear whether the 
71 Welch, London at the Opening, p. 427; Mollan, 'The business network' 
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networks of personal contact were as much of an advantage as the Gentlemanly 
Capitalism thesis might suggest - Andrew Haggard and Tuchmann are cases in point. 
Indeed, there is evidence of a high degree of probity amongst members of the 
Sudan Government72 An example with direct reference to this study is that of the legal 
secretary Bonham Carter. Not only did he rebuff the offer of a bribe from Tuchmann, 
but he also thought it necessary to declare to Wingate his personal connection to the 
Taylor family: 
One of the young Taylors of the firm John Taylor and Sons married a second 
cousin mine of the name of Tillard. I hardly know the girl and I have no personal 
acquaintance with any of the firm but as we are doing a good deal of business with 
them it is as well that you should be informed of the fact" 
As mentioned at the very beginning of this dissertation, the attitude of the 
government was downright hostile to some of the concession hunters. The chief interest 
of colonial governments in commercial enterprise was always as a source of revenue. 
Companies built on flimsy finances and promoted by unscrupulous company mongers 
would not satisfy this want. As a result, the Sudan Government attached a number of 
conditions to the concessions it issued, including time limits and required capital 
expenditure. In 1902 this was set £6,000 per year, enough to dissuade Cecil Rhodes' 
Consolidated Goldfields from becoming interested in Sudan. " The Annual Report for 
1906 expressed a worry that the regulations might be considered by concessionaires to be 
`a narrow officialism which is reluctant to encourage private enterprise', while the Report 
for 1911 conceded that the `Government's insistence on concessionaires having at their 
n Sharkey, Irving with Colonialism, p. 137 
73 SAD 273/8/7475, E. Bonham-Carter to Wingate, 31' August 1903 
74 SAD 275/5/95, LB Friend to F. R. Wingate, 2 1's July 1902, 
80 
command adequate capital has resulted in a considerable number of negotiations coming 
to nothing. i75 The Sudan Government were, however, sometimes flexible. In 1903 W. F. 
Garland, the company secretary of many of the Taylor and Sons associated companies, 
including Sudan Gold Field, wrote on behalf of the Egypt and Sudan Mining Syndicate 
to ask that the directors of the company retain the right to set the capital requirements of 
the concession at Om Narbardi; the Sudan Government agreed to a compromise. 76 
Finally, to turn to the Gentlemanly Capitalist interpretation of British imperialism 
with regard to Sudan before 1914. Firstly, the evidence of finance capitalism in Sudan is 
greater than initially suggested by Cain and Hopkins' East-West interpretation of Africa 
to which Sudan would probably be fitted. Mining companies can be classified as primary 
sector extractive businesses, but they also had a financial dimension in the form of 
metropolitan shareholders, dividend pay-outs, and a Stock Exchange listing. The 
directors of the companies in this study, especially those connected to the Taylor and 
Sons group were certainly gentlemanly - though whether this reflects anything more 
profound than the fact that such men were socially mobile and relatively rich, and 
therefore in a position to be directors of the company, remains to be established. 
Bonham-Carter referred to such men as `titled guinea pig directors', perhaps indicating 
that control really lay with the managers, in this case the professional middle class Taylor 
familyn 
There is no doubt that the social/business networks formed by interlocking 
directorates (such as that associated with Taylor and Sons, and Hoffnung and Co) 
represent a powerful and under-researched group with connections in both the centre 
and the periphery. Though these networks certainly can be characterised as both 
gentlemanly and capitalist, and though the businesses that they were associated with 
75 GGR 1906, p. 17; GGR 1911, p. 136 
76 SAD 273/8/3 1, W 
. 
F. Garland to E. Bonham-Carter, 18th August, 1903; OGR 1904, Lord Cromer to the 
Marquis of Lansdowne, p. 24 
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operated in the Empire, it is inconclusive as to whether they operated as the agents of 
imperialism in the Sudanese context, especially given the relative lack of governmental 
assistance. Of course, the one company that did receive some assistance from the Sudan 
Government was the one business that succeeded; but one tree does not a forest make. 
One possible explanation, of course, is that they never had the chance to be agents of 
imperialism because, by and large, they failed before they could act as such. The presence 
of entrepreneurial speculation so soon after the Reconquest in 1898 is indicative of the 
dynamism of the City in this period and the constant and insatiable search for new 
markets and opportunities. 
77 SAD 273/6/71, E. Bonham-Carter to F. R. 'Wingate, 30th June, 1903 
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Part 2: Imperial Business - the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 1904-1919 
I. COTTON-GROWING 
Though the Sudan Government quickly became aware of cotton growing possibilities 
soon after the foundation of the Condominium, it also was aware of problems associated 
with limited infrastructure and the difficulty of attracting capital and business: `cotton 
cultivation on a large scale cannot be attempted, but once the cost of carriage is reduced 
the capitalist from Egypt or elsewhere can purchase land on the Berber or Dongola 
reaches of the Nile. '78 The `capitalist from Egypt or elsewhere' eventually came in the 
form of Leigh Hunt, an American businessman who toured the Sudan in 1900 and 
became enthusiastic about the commercial possibilities for cotton. ' Hunt became 
interested in Sudan because: 
... the wonderfully rich soil on the 
Blue Nile, and in the immediate vicinity of 
Khartoum on the Lower Nile, together with climatic conditions suitable for cotton 
culture, intrigued me to such an extent that I finally approached General Wingate, 
the head of the Sudan Government, whom I found to be alive to the situation and 
deeply interested in the possibility of testing out the possibility of cotton growing. 
Later on I sought conference with Lord Cromer who was really the father of the 
cotton industry in the Sudan, and the later Sir William Mather, member of the 
British Cotton Growing Association who was godfather of my part in the 
enterprise. " 
78 Extract from report found in 'Appendix `A°' of GG Report, 1902, p. 49 
71 Gaitskell, Ge jra, p. 51; Daly, Empire, p. 94 
80 SAD 802/1/41-45, Statement concerning Leigh Hunt's role in the establishment of the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate made by Leigh Hunt on 19th January, 1931. Mather did not become involved until 
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In his letter to Cromer, Hunt devotes half to a discussion of what he describes as the 
`most embarrassing domestic [i. e., USA] problem, the "negro problem"' and how cotton 
growing in the Sudan might be a solution, commenting that `the climate will suit him, 
they are expert in the growing of cotton... [and] they would assimilate with the natives 
without causing friction. 's' Louis Bluen, secretary to the Sudan Plantations Syndicate was 
later to write that Hunt's intention to `[relieve] the United States of their surplus negro 
population by returning the American negroes to Africa, their country of origin... ', was 
motivated by - of all things - Hunt's `patriotic mind'. 
" Hunt did indeed import some 
Black American labour, an experiment which subsequently failed when Malaria and 
widespread desertion took their toll. " Apparently unsure whether Cromer would be 
impressed by this idea or not, he added that he would `not insist upon the acceptance of 
the negro as an indispensable feature of our proposal. i84 This kind of erratic thinking was 
entirely consistent with a man who was an unusual imperial pioneer. The biography of 
Hunt depicts an unpleasant charlatan, who threatened his striking employees in Korea 
with death by burning unless they returned to work, had diced with bankruptcy many 
times, made and lost several fortunes, had moved through careers in education and 
agriculture in Iowa, property development and publishing in Seattle, and, later in his life, 
was instrumental in the foundation and development of Las Vegas and the world of 
hotels and casinos. " An alternative description might be as a dynamic entrepreneur. 
Either way, Hunt was by no means a `gentleman', British or otherwise. But it was not 
1910. Hunt made an account of the foundation of the Syndicate because a different account had apparently 
been made which expunged Leigh Hunt and Alexander MacIntyre, (Managing Director of the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate, 1919-1946) from the history. Such appeals to posterity are a little problematic, but its 
narrative seems to be at least factually accurate, corroborated by Gaitskell and consistent with other 
evidence. 
81 SAD 802/1/4, Leigh Hunt to Cromer c. 1904 
82 SAD 418/5/1-6 L. Bluer, `Cotton Growing under irrigation in the Sudan', The Empire Cotton Gro wing 
Review, January 1931 (offprint) 
83 SAD 802/1/42, Leigh Hunt 1931 Account 
84 SAD 802/1/5, Leigh Hunt to Cromer c. 1904 
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Hunt's social credentials, his dubious reputation, nor his experience (of which, in terms 
of cotton he had precious little) that attracted the Sudan Government - it was the 
structure of the commercial opportunity that Hunt proposed: 
I am not a concession hunter. All I ask is the privilege to purchase lands along such 
lines, as in your honourable judgement a pioneer deserves, who undertakes to 
make these lands productive for the state and to commerce. I shall ask no 
assistance and no guarantees from the state, but the privilege to purchase land in 
quantities large enough to justify a company working along broad and liberal lines, 
sparing no effort to overcome the difficulties, which must necessarily beset such an 
undertaking sb 
The self-sufficient and self-starting nature of Hunt's plan was attractive to the cash- 
strapped Sudan Government, although Hunt was in fact exactly what he purported not 
to be: a concession hunter. In 1904, Hunt was granted by the government the only land 
concession in Sudan for cotton growing, some 10,000 feddans of land at Zeidab 87 
The next stage of the development of the Sudan Plantation Syndicate, was the 
search for capital and investors. After seeking official approval for the project, Leigh 
Hunt approached Alfred Beit of Wernher Beit and Company, the mining finance house 
to provide start-up capital. " The connection between Wernher Beit and the Syndicate is 
given only light treatment in the literature on South African Mining. Kubicek mentions it, 
briefly stating that `by 1913 the [Central Mining and Investment] corporation's 
85 See L. B. Rand, High Stakes. The Life and Times of Leigh S. J. Hunt (New York, 1989) p. 99 
86 SAD 802/1/3, Leigh Hunt to Cromer c. 1904, 
87 Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 51. A feddan is an area of land `equal to 4200 square metres' as reported by the Sudan 
Government Gazette No. 574 (25th February 1929), SAD 602/3/29. Zeidab is on the Atabara River, just south 
of the intersection of the Nile and the Atabara, which in turn is further upstream of the intersection of the 
White and Blue Niles at Khartoum. 
88 SAD 802/1/42, Leigh Hunt 1931 Account 
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investment also included farms and real estate in the Transvaal, gold mines in West 
Africa and Alaska, cotton plantations in the Sudan, metallurgical companies in western 
Europe, British and German government bonds, and railway and bond leases in central 
America. i89 Aside from the foray into farming in Transvaal, the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate seems to be the only agricultural investment made by Wernher Beit, Central 
Mining or the whole Corner House group. The link between Leigh Hunt and Wernher 
Beit stemmed from Hunt's business dealings in Korea where he had developed Oriental 
Consolidated Mines in which Wernher Beit had become involved, Hunt describing them 
as `a company with which I had extensive Far East dealings. i90 Despite many setbacks in 
a chequered career, Hunt's biggest success had been mines in Korea that eventually 
turned a profit after many years of not doing so; it was Wernher Beit's investment of 
$250,000 in 1900 that finally turned the tide for Hunt, though they could not have been 
oblivious to how mixed Hunt's business career had been up to that point 91 
Leigh Hunt's initial vision was much more ambitious than Wernher Beit were 
willing to underwrite. In April 1904 Wernher Beit wrote to Hunt to tell him that the 
£600,000 that he had requested was too high a figure for them to agree to join the 
venture: 
As we could not agree to join the undertaking (which we regard as being entirely in 
experimental stage) with such a large capital, we mutually agreed to the formation 
of the Experimental Syndicate referred to; the intention being, however, that if (as 
you believe) within the first five years the work should prove so successful as, in 
89 See R. V. Kubicek, Economic Imperial= in Theory and Practice: The Case of South African Gold Mining Finance 
1886-1914 (Durham N. C, 1979), p. 55 
90 Taken from footnote, Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 51; SAD 802/1/42, Leigh Hunt 1931 Account 
91 For detail of Leigh Hunt's business career in the Far East see Rand, High Stakes, 113-192 
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our opinion, to justify the enlargement of the undertaking to such an extent, we 
shall join you in the formation of a company with a capital of £600,000 92 
Wernher Beit and Co offered to help set up an experimental company with a total capital 
of £ 80,000, of which they would provide half, with Leigh Hunt obliged to obtain the 
other half. This he duly did. " 
The first Directors Board Meeting of the Syndicate was held on 2 °d September, 
1904. Present were Lionel Phillips, Leigh Hunt and Luiggi de Chastillion in their capacity 
as directors. At this meeting eighty thousand shares were allocated. There were seventeen 
initial investors. Eight were based in London, two in Ireland, six in New York, and one - 
Luiggi de Chastillion - in Paris 94 
The two most significant London-based investors in 1904 were Julius Wernher 
and Alfred Beit of Wernher Beit, the South African Mining Finance House: both were 
allocated 10,500 shares. The next biggest shareholder was Lionel Phillips, also of 
Wernher Beit who held 5,000 shares. Frederick Eckstein and Ludwig Breitmeyer were 
both allocated 4,000 shares; Charles Rube 3,499 and Louis Bluen one single share. This 
group consisted of men with considerable experience of mining in South Africa. It is 
likely that Lionel Phillips was involved in the decision to invest in Hunt's scheme because 
not only was he was an active board member of the Syndicate, but he was a partner in 
Oriental Consolidated and had accompanied Leigh Hunt on his initial visit to Sudan in 
1900 9s 
Leigh Hunt was the most important investor holding 19,000 shares. In addition, 
William L. Bull, a New York businessman who had been associated with Hunt through 
92 SAD 802/1/7-9, Wernher Beit and Co to Leigh Hunt 29th April, 1904 
93 SAD 802/1/41-42, Leigh Hunt 1931 Account 
94 SAD 415/9/1-3,13t Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Experimental Plantations Syndicate, 
2" September 1904 
95 See Rand, High Stakes, 183-184 
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Consolidated in the 1890s, and Henry C. Perkins - another Consolidated associate - held 
2,000 shares each. Darius Ogden Mills of New York held 1,000 shares as did James 
Morse who was the sometime head of the American Trading Company, a syndicate 
backed by the merchant bank JP Morgan. Hunt had been associated with Morse since his 
time in China in the early 1890s. The final American investor was Jacob Sloat Fassett of 
Elmira, New York who held 2,000 shares. He was, again, another long-standing business 
partner, who had initially become involved with Hunt during his Seattle days in the 
1880s. Hunt raised capital by approaching men with whom he had business dealings with 
in the past. The exception to this was Luiggi de Chastillion. The Paris based shipping 
magnate held 10,000 shares and had accompanied Hunt on the 1900 trip to the Sudan % 
The two Irish investors were Sir John Nutting from St Helens, County Dublin 
and F. G Pilkington who was from Westbury, Stillorgan. Both held 1,000 shares each. 
What their links were to either Wernher Beit or to Leigh Hunt remain obscure, but they 
are assumed to be Hunt's men, rather than those connected with Wernher Beit, because 
of Hunt's obligation to raise £40,000 of the £80,000 initial capital. The first comment to 
make, therefore, about the investors was that there was a significant international 
dimension, an observation made stronger considering that only Lionel Phillips of the 
London based investors was actually British. "' 
This particular structure of ownership and investment changed slightly in 1907 
when Leigh Hunt lessened his personal involvement with the syndicate and resigned as 
Managing Director (though he remained as a director until 1909), and was replaced by 
Donald McGillivray. 98 McGillivray, a Scotsman and a Cairo banker, was a crucial figure in 
the development of the syndicate over the coming decade's A British Cotton Growing 
% Rand, High Stakes, p. 44,74,151,191 
97 Kubicek, Economic Imperialism, p. 63 
98 SAD 415/9/21, Minutes of the 191h Board of Directors Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 2^d 
May 1907 
99 Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 52 
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Association report was later to praise the business and administrative qualities of 
McGillivray, describing him as one of the most `valuable commercial assets in the 
Sudan. '10° At the same board meeting, de Chastillion resigned his directorship, and Lord 
Lovat was made a director as a direct replacement. Lovat, a Scottish landowner and 
Major-General in the British Army who later went on to be Under-Secretary at the 
Dominions Office (1927-28), also became a key figure in the development of the 
syndicate. These changes accompanied an unusual transaction. Leigh Hunt increased the 
amount of money at the syndicate's immediate disposal by personally buying a piece of 
land from the syndicate, something he had been lobbying the government and the 
directors of the Syndicate to allow him to do from as early as October 1905101 
100 BUL OGA 2/2/15 `Report to the Council on the Possibilities of Cotton Growing in the Anglo- 
Egyptian Sudan' (1912), p. 29 
101 SAD 415/9/21, de Chastillion resigned in a letter to the board dated 22" April 1907; Seymour Fort's 
letter was dated 23^' April 1907; Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 52; SAD 415/9/14 Minutes of the 9t1 Board of 
Directors Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 19th October, 1905.. At this time Hunt suggested 
that the land that they might sell would be ideal for real estate development. 
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II. THE BUSINESS NETWORK OF WERNHER, BEIT AND CO 
The renaming of the Sudan Experimental Plantations Syndicate in May 1907 whereby it 
ceased to be `Experimental' effected more than a superficial change. "' Though the men 
principally associated with Hunt remained financially interested in the company (most 
took up debentures that were issued at this time, for example) the board of directors 
became dominated by men connected to the Comer House / Wernher Beit and Co 
group of South African mining companies. The resignation of Leigh Hunt as Managing 
Director along with Luigi de Chastillion and Seymour Fort from the board of directors 
and their replacement by Lovat and McGillivray reinforced the influence that Corner 
House had over the Syndicate. " Collectively, Corner House directors held significant 
numbers of shares and debentures: at least £26,996 of the £50,000 debenture capital 
issued in May 1907, for example, with the strong implication that they held more. 104 
However, unravelling the links between the Syndicate and Corner House is not easy, 
complicated enormously because the organisation of the Corner House group itself was 
far from straightforward. 
The origins of Corner House were not in gold but in diamond mining. Wernher 
Beit was formed in 1890, but was in fact a reformation of Jules Porges and Company. 
The second South African gold-mining share boom of 1894-1895 caused the Corner 
House group some difficulty when it ended and it was around this time that Wernher 
102 SAD 415/9/25,20th Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate Board of Directors, 7th May 1907 
103 SAD 415/9/21-22,19th Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate Board of Directors, 2nd May 1907; 
SAD 415/9/40, Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 8th October 1908 
104 This is, however, easier to state than it is to quantify. The SAD folio 419/9 which are the Directors 
Minutes for the period are damaged. The pages in question that deal with transfer of share ownership and 
the allocation of debentures are badly damaged. As a result the figure quoted should serve as minimum 
only, since the number of debentures taken by Friedrich Eckstein is obliterated, though he nonetheless had 
a holding. As the Sudan Plantations Syndicate was not listed on the London Stock Exchange until 1920 no 
other source that has yet come to light gives any indication of the personal holding of Eckstein before 
1923 when it is known that he held 1500 shares. See SAD 419/9/21-22 Sudan Plantations Syndicate 19th 
Directors Meeting, 2r4 May 1907; GHL MS 18000/228B 1111 Sudan Plantations Syndicate London Stock 
Exchange Listing File, 24th December 1923: 'List of Shareholders as at 315t October 1923' 
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Beit began to pursue a policy of diversification of interests away from South African 
mining. "' The creation in May 1905 of the London domiciled Central Mining and 
Investment Corporation to take over the assets of the African Ventures Syndicate was in 
line with this trend. 106 The initial capital of Central Mining was a colossal £6 million, 
though it was reduced in 1908 to X3.6 million caused by a depreciation of assets. 1°7 In 
1911, Eckstein and Company sold to Central Mining a portfolio of 120 businesses 
(including 5,000 shares in the Sudan Plantations Syndicate), for £ 1,154,109.108 It was in 
this way that Central Mining became directly involved with the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, assuming the role of company secretary, a task undertaken by Louis Bluen. 1°9 
The relationship between Central Mining and Investment Corporation and the 
Rand Mines was similar to that between Wernher Beit and Company and Eckstein and 
Company, and was described by Frederick Eckstein in 1911 in the following way. 
The character of the two companies though similar in some respects, differs 
materially in others. The Rand Mines company is purely a South African Company 
with its directorate and management in South Africa; the Central Mining and 
105 Kubicek, Economic Imperialism, p. 56,69 
106 Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 1914, (London, 1914), p. 1004; GHL MS 18000/350B 988, Central 
Mining and Investment Corporation Ltd London Stock Exchange Listing File, 15th June, 1935, Memo: 
'The Central Mining and Investment Corporation', 21st June 1935 
107 GHL MS 18000/123B 613, Central Mining and Investment Corporation Ltd London Stock Exchange 
Listing File, 25th January 1909 'The High Court of Justice Chancery Division: Mr Justice Neville. The 
Central Mining and Investment Corporation Confirming Reduction of Company's Capital, 15th December 
1908'; 'Central Mining and Investment Corporation: Report of the Proceedings at the Extraordinary 
General Meeting, 10th August 1908' 
108 GHL MS 18000/350B 988, Central Mining and Investment Corporation Ltd London Stock Exchange 
Listing File, 15th June, 1935, 'Memorandum and Agreement made between the 2nd May 1911 between 
Messrs Wernher Beit and Co and Messrs Eckstein and Co and the Central Mining and Investment 
Corporation Ltd' 
109 Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 1914, p. 1083; SAD 416/1/82 1571h Meeting of the Board of Directors 
of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 5th July 1917; Bluen went onto legally become the Secretary in January 
1918, formally replacing Central Mining. See SAD 416/1/91 159th Meeting of the Board of Directors of 
the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 30th January 1918 
91 
Investment Corporation is a London Company and, as its name indicates, has a 
larger and more general scope. "' 
The Rand Mines and Central Mining portfolios seem not to have had much in the way of 
cross share ownership, but they effectively were the South African and London ends of a 
networked and managerially linked multinational group of businesses. "' Indeed, though 
Kubicek gives the impression that the Comer House group was a slightly chaotic 
combine of businesses he also describes the attempts made by Corner House to 
influence and control the market, especially in mining shares, the significant impact the 
group had on mining in South Africa, and their regular forays into the politics of the 
region in defence of their interests. "' 
The inclusion of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate within this framework is crucial 
to understanding its relationship with international business. Firstly, though technically a 
free-standing company, it is clear that the Syndicate was in fact part of a multinational 
network of businesses, where the financial and management was provided by 
representatives of the international network (in this case Eckstein and the other Corner 
House directors), while in the locality it was provided, firstly, by an entrepreneur (Hunt) 
and then latterly by Donald McGillivray a businessman with considerable experience of 
commercial activity in North Africa. 
110 GEL MS 18000/350B 988, Central Mining and Investment Corporation Ltd London Stock Exchange 
Listing File, 15th June, 1935, 'Central Mining and Investment Corporation : Report of the Proceedings at 
the Extraordinary General Meeting held at London Buildings on 19th May 1911', p. 4 
111 This seems curious, but is the only conclusion to draw from the available evidence which by no means 
is conclusive on this point. See GHL MS 18000/177B 6 London Stock Exchange Listing File for Rand 
Mines, 12th January 1914, `Agreement between Rand Mines Limited and Messrs Wernher Beit and Co', 9th 
March 1911, which lists the sale of shares in nine companies to Rand Mines. None of these companies 
appear on the list of 120 companies sold to Central Mining by Wernher Beit and Co and Eckstein and Co 
in May 1911. See GEL MS 18000/350B 988, Central Mining and Investment Corporation Ltd London 
Stock Exchange Listing File, 15th June, 1935, 'Memorandum and Agreement made between the 2^d May 
1911 between Messrs Wernher Beit and Co and Messrs Eckstein and Co and the Central Mining and 
Investment Corporation Ltd' 
112 See Kubicek, Economic Imperialism, CI. 4 `The Rise and Decline of the Corner House Group', 53-85 
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The Syndicate's institutional relationship with the Corner House group was at its 
most basic level defined by the domicile of the company being at 1, London Wall 
Buildings, the location of the brass plate of the company, and the offices of the Central 
Mining and Investment Corporation and Wernher Beit in London. From here the 
commercial services of the City of London required by the Syndicate were co-ordinated. 
In February 1904 the National Bank of Egypt were appointed as bankers and Ingle, 
Holmes, Son and Pott were made solicitors. "' The following autumn Cooper Brothers 
were appointed as auditors, and shortly afterwards a telegraphic address was established 
with the Eastern Telegraph Company. 114 The cost of these services was paid for by 
Wernher, Beit who in the early days of the Syndicate held money on account for the 
Syndicate, in effect providing both banking and financial services. In April 1905, for 
example, the Syndicate had £2,853 deposited with Wernher Beit, while only £634 with 
the National Bank of Egypt. By July these figures stood at £5,613 and £490 
respectively. "' Similarly, in December 1914 the Syndicate's assets included some £40,000 
in UK Treasury Bills held by the Central Mining and Investment Corporation. 16 
The directors of the Syndicate also provided links to other business, and in doing 
so introduced expertise from a variety of different areas of colonial business. This can be 
most clearly seen in the network diagram below. The 1914 directorate is used for 
convenience. 
113 SAD 415/9/1 In Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 2°d February 
1904 
114 SAD 415/9/3 2^' Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 8th October 
1904; SAD 415/9/6 5th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 10th 
November 1910 
115 SAD 415/9/9 5th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 5th January 
1905; SAD 419/9/10 6th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 18th April 
1905; 7th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, l lth July 1905 
116 SAD 416/1/40 125th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 15th 
December 1914 
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Network diagram: Sudan Plantations Syndicate directors and links to other companies, 
1914. "' 
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As can be seen above, Louis Reyersbach and Friedrich Eckstein provide the substantial 
directorial links between the Syndicate and other companies in the Corner House group; 
in particular, of course, both are directors of Rand Mines. Douglas Hannay is linked to a 
series of British Empire and overseas commodity producing companies and he himself 
worked for Kelly and Company, a firm of cotton brokers. Arthur Hutton was heavily 
linked to Manchester cotton interests, including the British Cotton Growing Association, 
and cotton producing companies around the British Empire. As has already been pointed 
out, McGillivray's expertise was in banking in North Africa. Neither Smiley not Lovat 
provided the Syndicate with any significant linkage. 
117 Source: Stock EscJange 0//üial Intelligence, 1914 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1914), p. 1083; I )irectory of 
Directory 1914, (Thomas Skinner, London, 1914), p. 325,463,550,554,675,888,980; arrows point from 
companies to their directors. 
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This directorate and the links to the Corner House group gave the Syndicate two 
benefits. Firstly, the links with Corner House provided investment and institutional links 
with international business, provided links to services in the City of London (not least, of 
course, a legal domicile in the London Wall Buildings) and the association with a famous 
international financial house was in itself important from a reputational point of view. 
Secondly, the specific mix of directors provided a deep familiarity with the capital 
markets of London and Johannesburg, knowledge of dealing with colonial governments, 
and specific knowledge of different areas of the kind of business the Syndicate hoped to 
develop in Sudan. 
III. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRM 
The final section of this chapter deals with the pattern of development within the 
Syndicate in the period to 1919. The primary objective will be to convey the key features 
of the evolution of the company in the context of the challenges faced by the company 
in the areas of production, marketing and finance. The development of plans and 
facilities to grow cotton in Sudan were interrupted by the First World War, which in turn 
affected the market for the cotton that was produced. The financial performance of the 
Syndicate can then be set in context against, on the one hand, the difficulty of 
establishing a cotton growing business in Sudan given the limited historical association 
with the crop, limited infrastructural development but seeming opportunity provided by 
buoyant conditions in the pre-war international market for cotton; and on the other 
hand, to weather a war that retarded the international economy and circumscribed the 
ability of government to offer support for capital intensive development schemes. 
In the early period of the company's existence it was necessary for the Syndicate 
to undertake a series of experiments to establish whether cotton could successfully be 
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grown in Sudan under commercial conditions. Plans for a pumping plant were approved 
in early October 1904. " In April 1905 plans were drawn up to irrigate the land the 
Syndicate held near Khartoum, and by October the Board of Directors had accepted the 
general policy that the 10,000 acres at Zeidab would have to be profitable before they 
considered expanding the Scheme. "' Initially, only a few feddans were successfully 
irrigated and labour problems encouraged the Syndicate to change to a system of tenancy 
rather than direct employment. "' This system was used in the second cotton-growing 
scheme at Tayiba, and was judged to be a success in September 1909; it subsequently 
provided the model for the whole of the Gezira. "' By October 1908 the Syndicate were 
ready to engage in preliminary canalisation at Zeidab, and though these pilot schemes 
were not a roaring success, a yield of three to four kantars of cotton in 1908/1909 
confirmed that commercial cotton growing was possible in the Sudan. ' This was then 
reconfirmed in mid 1913 when the Syndicate's Board's reported to the shareholders that 
in `the month of May this year the Sudan Government and your Syndicate agreed that 
the results of the Test Station in the Gezira were sufficiently successful to warrant the 
undertaking of the Gezira Scheme. "' 
Pending approval of the Sudan Loan in 1913, the Syndicate again took control of 
the Tayiba farm in August having left it the previous June. The agreement made with the 
Sudan Government in September 1913 gave the Sudan Plantations the entire 
management of the Gezira Scheme for ten years from the date of full operation of the 
118 SAD 415/9/3 2" Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 8th October 
1904 
119 SAD 419/9/13 9th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 19th October 
1905 
'20 V. Bernal, 'Cotton and Colonial Order in Sudan: A Social I iistory with Emphasis on the Gezira 
Scheme', in A. Isaacman& R. Roberts (eds) Cotton Colonialism and Social History in Sub- Saharan Africa 
(London, 1995), p. 100. This would seem to support the idea that the 'vent for surplus' model was used in 
the Sudan. See Ni Johnson, `Cotton Imperialism in West Africa', inAfricanAffairs, 1974, p. 182 
ul SAD 415/9/50 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 8th September 1909 
122 SAD 415/9/40 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 8th October 1908; BUL 
OGA 2/1/3 'he Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd and the Kassala Cotton Company Ltd and their work in 
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scheme with a five year optional extension. "' Towards the end of 1913 the Syndicate 
began to invest further in the buildings, canals, agricultural implements and ginning 
factories needed for cotton growing. " While the Board reported to the shareholders that 
climatic problems meant the results from Zeidab were rather poor, they noted that 
government tests at the Gezira tests station had been successful. "' In conjunction with 
the government, the Syndicate worked for the next six months on developing the Gezira, 
providing irrigation for 2,500 feddans at the southern end of the Gezira. " 
During the war the Syndicate continued to manage the Tayiba research station on 
behalf of the government. The government itself was not inactive in these years. By 
January 1915 they had opened a new farm at Barakat - which was to become the 
headquarters of the Syndicate in the Gezira. By early 1915 some 7,500 feddans were 
cultivated, with 2,181 four hundred pound bales of cotton shipped to Liverpool. 
Eckstein informed the shareholders that: 
As regards our prospects for the coming year, I can see no reason why the present 
war should interfere with the cultivation of cotton. What the price of cotton will 
be, nobody can tell, but it must necessarily depend to a greater extent on the areas 
put under cotton in other parts of the World. Both America and Egypt plant early 
in the spring, whereas in the Sudan planting starts in mid-summer. " 
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan' (Reprinted from the 45th Annual Report of the British Cotton Growing 
Association, 1950), 3-4 
1 SAD 416/1/24 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 18th December 1913 
124 SAD 416/1/16-17 98th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 10th 
September 1913 
125 SAD 416/1/21 105th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 4th 
December 1913 
126 SAD 416/1/23 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 18th December 1913 
' SAD 416/1/28 109th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 30th 
January 1914 
u8 SAD 416/1/45-46 Minutes of an adjourned Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 13th January 1915 
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By the beginning of 1917 the Syndicate had begun to plan to extend the cultivated land at 
Tayiba and Zeidab, but this was planning only. "' The effect of war breaking out was to 
halt the development of the Gezira Scheme until 1919. Though the Syndicate managed 
to consolidate the irrigation systems and cotton-growing farms that were established 
before the war, in reality they were engaged in little more than a holding operation. This 
conclusion helps periodise the Syndicate's business history. To 1913/14 it proceeded on 
the basis of a close and (ultimately supportive relationship with the Sudan Government 
with the likely prospect of the Gezira being developed quite quickly after the passing of 
the Loan Acts in 1912/13. From 1914 these plans went into abeyance, the prospects of 
success increasingly poor albeit tempered by some consolidation of what had already 
been achieved. How then did this affect the internal governance of the firm. ) 
From an operational point of view the years to 1919 were marked by gradual 
progress. The Syndicate began to produce enough cotton to sell on the World market by 
the end of 191313° In April 1915 the Syndicate agreed to sell all its cotton through the 
British Cotton Growing Association on the basis of the price for September delivery 
futures. "" The process of moving cotton from Sudan to London was co-ordinated via 
the London offices of the Syndicate. They issued bills of lading whereby samples of the 
cotton were sent to the London office, while the consignments of cotton were sent 
directlyto Liverpool. The cotton was sold there on behalf of the Syndicate by the British 
Cotton Growing Association, who used the firm of Kelly and Co as their brokers. The 
British Cotton Growing Association was also used to insure the cotton. Sudan cotton 
was typically sold in the market for Egyptian cotton (it being of a similar grade for the 
most part), but the Syndicate certainly examined whether it should be marketed as part of 
129 SAD 416/1/80 155th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 24th 
January 1917 
130 SAD 416/1/23 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 18th December 1913 
131 SAD 416/1/47 129th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 15th April 
1915 
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the American futures market. "' In August 1916 it was estimated that the total 
forthcoming crop would be 3,800 kantars `American' and 24,200 kantars `Egyptian'; as a 
result the Syndicate decided to hedge their position by taking futures on one half of the 
crop, or 14,000 kantars. "' The marketing arrangements seem to change, however, in 
1916 when the British Cotton Growing Association became solely responsible for the 
Gezira Crop, while Kelly and Co were solely responsible for the Zeidab crop. "' 
However, the war badly affected the market for the Syndicate's cotton as the 
world price dramatically fell, so much so that by the end of 1914 the `market was 
practically closed. "35 As Eckstein commented in December 1915: `I regret to say that the 
bulk of our cotton was sold at the lowest prices ever realised by this Syndicate since we 
started growing cotton. This, as you will understand is entirely due to the war. ' The 
decision taken at around the same time to take responsibility for Tokar cotton produced 
by the native Sudanese using traditional methods was, however, seen to be a useful and 
risk free opportunity. The cotton was reportedly sold at `satisfactory rates', with the 
Syndicate taking a 1% commission on sales, with the government responsible for any 
loss. In 1917, this rose to 2%, with the Syndicate to receive a minimum amount of 
£500.136 
In July 1917 McGillivray commented that over the previous six seasons Sudan 
cotton had been sold in Liverpool on average 3/ad per pound above the price of `"Fully 
Good Fair" Brown Egyptian'. This was an enduring trend in the performance of Sudan 
132 SAD 416/1/55-57137th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 21s, 
December 1915 
133 SAD 416/1/64 146th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 23' August 
1916 
134 SAD 416/1/66-67 150th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 19th 
October 1916 
135 SAD 112/9/4 'Confidential Memorandum No. 60 of the British Cotton Growing Association by J. 
Arthur Hutton to Under Secretary of State Colonial Office', 15th December 1915 
136 SAD 416/1/57 8th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 21's December 1915; 
SAD 416/1/66-67 150th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 19th 
October 1916 
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cotton in comparison with cotton from elsewhere. By early 1918 as the prices of cotton 
began to rise, the Syndicate benefiting accordingly. "' 
The financial history of the Syndicate was shaped, firstly, by the pressing need 
before 1907 to expand the capital of the company. Leigh Hunt wanted to do this either 
by selling land from the concession area or by issuing debentures. Both happened. In 
May 1906 it was agreed by the Board to issue 800 debentures at £800 each, issued in May 
1907.18 The sale of land to Leigh Hunt further increased the capital of the company by 
£40,000. The issued share capital of the Syndicate was increased by £25,000 between 
1906 and 1907, and with McGillivray as Managing Director a further £80,000 issued in 
1908. As a consequence, the balance sheet value of the company stood at over £200,000 
by 1908. In 1910 50,000 shares of £1 were issued with a premium of £2, helping to 
increase the balance sheet capital of the company to £321,365, which rose to a peak of 
£369,322 in 1912 as a result of increased profits and small scale capital issues. A minor 
reduction in profits reduced the balance sheet value of the Syndicate to £363,647 and 
£355,116 in 1913 and 1914 respectively. "' Thus on the eve of the First World War the 
Syndicate was capitalised £27,782,000 at 2002 prices (for comparison), and yet had 
produced precious little in the way of either cotton or profit. 
137 SAD 416/1/96 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 20th February 1918 
138 SAD 415/9/14 Minutes of the 9th Board of Directors Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 19th 
October, 1905; SAD 415/9/17,15th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
11th May 1906; SAD 415/9/21,19th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
2" May 1907 
139 SAD 415/8/1-152, The Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd, Report and Accounts, 1906-1924 
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Graph 2.1. Sudan Plantations Syndicate Balance Sheet Total Capital 
and Adjusted for Inflation (£), 1906-1919 









1 Capital adjusted for inflation (1906 prices) 
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Increases in the total capital of the Syndicate during the war have to be set against the 
inflation that affected sterling. As the graph above shows, though the capital of the 
Syndicate increased quite markedly, its real value declined. In 1919 the capital value of 
the Syndicate reported on the balance sheet had increased to £498,687, but this would 
only be worth £210,361 at 1906 prices. "' This gloomy picture of real-terms capital 
depreciation is made worse when the increase in short term debt owed in London and 
Sudan is taken into consideration. In 1910, onlyL2,432 appears as debt on the credit side 
of the balance sheet. It stood at £ 11,409 in 1914 and increased quite dramatically during 
the war to £110,212 by 1919, including a war loan of £5,000 at five per cent applied for 
in 1917.14' 
In total, this represented over 20% of the total capital of the company. The 
Syndicate did undergo some debt restructuring during this period, however, when the 
Central Mining and Investment Corporation were used to purchase debenture stock in 
1915, prior to the first redemption date in June 1916 in order to extent the period of the 
140 All data here is deflated to 1906 prices. All conversions undertaken using EH-NET GDP-deflator: 
http: //eh. net/hrnit/ukcompare/ 
141 SAD 415/8/1-152, The Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd, Report and Accounts, 1906-1924; SAD 
416/1/81 155th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 2411, January 1917 
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debenture. 142 This policy was successful and in May 1916 the debenture repayment date 
was extended to July 1923 . 
113 In October 1918 they decided to pay off the entirety of the 
remaining debentures. 144 The question now turns to what the Syndicate spent the capital 
on, and to look for reasons why the position went from bad to worse. 
The Syndicate invested across the period in structural projects requiring 
significant capital expenditure. The Syndicate held a strong cash position prior to 
development work beginning in 1911-12, a policy deliberately adopted by the Board. "' 












This was then run down, but before the inflationary effects of the war. This was largely 
spent on structural capital investment items consisting of concession and land, general 
development, buildings and furniture, canalisation, pumping installation, agricultural 
implements and ginning factories. As the graph below shows, there was increased 
investment in structural capital investment; but again, allowing for the inflation, the real 
terms value of investment was falling. The graph below also shows some nominal value 
reduction in the capital value of the company - possibly as a result of accountants 
revaluation following the financial and monetary impact of war being felt. 
142 SAD 416/1/56 137th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 21" 
December 1915 
143 SAD 416/1/60 141st Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syandicate, 411, May 
1916 
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Graph 2.3. Sudan Plantations Syndicate Capital Investment, 1906-1919 (£) 
Source: SAD 415/8/1-152 
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Though all sources of structural investment suffered from the effects of inflation, the 
greatest relative depreciation in value was in general development and pumping 











Graph 2.3. Sudan Plantations Syndicate Capital Investment by Area, 1906-1919 (£ at 1906 levels) 
Source: SAD 415/8/1-152 
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Against the backdrop of a difficult international climate and depreciating asset values 
then, the Syndicate sought to retain investor confidence by issuing dividends. Prior to the 
144 SAD 416/1/100 162nd Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 9th 
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war Syndicate issued a dividend in December 1913 of 121h%, and managed to issue a 
dividend of 5% in 1914 at the end of 1914 before the full disruption of the war and the 
collapse in market confidence was felt. In 1915 another 5% dividend was issued despite 
the continuation and increased intractability of the conflict. "' There were no dividends 
issued in 1916 or 1917, but in early 1918 a dividend of 10% was issued; at the end of 
1918 a 25% dividend was announced. Yet this should be seen as a sign of relative 
weakness, because the Syndicate made little profit in this period, and could ill afford to 
haemorrhage more capital. 147 
October 1918 
145 SAD 416/1/24 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 18th December 1913 
146 SAD 416/1/22 105th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 41h 
December 1913; SAD 416/1/46 Minutes of an adjourned Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate, 13th January 1915; SAD 416/1/54 136th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the 
Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 2°d December 1915 
147 SAD 416/1/94 159th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. 30th 
January 1918; SAD 416/1/105 163'' Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 10th December 1918 
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CONCLUSION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MANAGEMENT AND 
STRATEGY 
To my mind it is an extremely interesting experiment and I cannot recall any 
similar case in any other part of the World ... 
for a Government and a Syndicate to 
combine on co-operative principles, and for a Syndicate to become, in some 
respects, a Government Department, is an entirely new departure. 
- Reginald Wingate, June 1913148 
Between 1904 and 1919 the Sudan Plantations Syndicate was transformed from a 
entrepreneurial speculation in the periphery of the British Empire, into an established 
business occupying a potentially central position in the nascent economy of a colonial 
state, with a special and preferential relationship to government. Analytically, this process 
can be broken down into three spheres within which the transformation occurred: 
ownership and control, function and operation, and the political-economic compact. 
The analysis of ownership and control has three aspects. Firstly, the early history 
of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate can be thought to reflect the complex picture of 
investment in imperial business, incorporating both gentlemanly and non-gentlemanly 
interests. This should not be taken to be a rejection of the gentlemanly capitalism thesis; 
rather it points to a nuanced understanding of the interplay of gentleman and non- 
gentlemen in the imperial arena. Leigh Hunt was an international entrepreneur, who by 
chance and opportunism became involved in Sudan. He provided the link to Wernher 
Beit, the City based finance house and to investors in New York. Neither of these 
interests could be described as very gentlemanly, nor were they very British. Once the 
Syndicate began to develop as a business, the substitution of Lord Lovat for Leigh Hunt 
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gave the Syndicate a greater gentlemanly profile, and the close association with the Sudan 
Government and its two early luminaries, Wingate and Kitchener (who certainly could be 
described as gentlemen), gave the Syndicate access to the British Government at the 
highest level. 
Secondly, the management structure of the Syndicate changed significantly across 
the period. The first transformation relates to a critical reflection of the work of Alfred 
Chandler who has outlined a thesis for the perception of industrial decline in the United 
Kingdom based on a failure to transform business management structures from personal 
(or family) to professional managerial systems where ownership and control were 
separated. 149 It is clear from the evidence presented here that in contrast the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate did undergo some kind of transformation along these lines, which 
is supportive of newer research in this area. 150 From an entrepreneurial perspective Leigh 
Hunt did well out of the Syndicate. For arranging the initial concession with the Sudan 
Government he was paid £ 14,000 which he took as fully paid shares in the company. 
However, his involvement was short-lived in comparison with the involvement of 
Corner House/Wernher Beit/Central Mining. Once the South African investors became 
more influential after 1907 Leigh Hunt's involvement waned and professional 
management was introduced. Donald McGillivray who succeeded Hunt as Managing 
Director performed a far more important management role than Hunt did during the 
critical pre-war years when planning and early development was being carried out, and 
also by guiding the Syndicate through the war. For this McGillivray was paid £ 1,500 per 
annum which rose to £2,000 per annum in 1918, and though he was given bonuses in 
addition to his salary from time to time, this contrasts rather sharply with the financial 
148 SAD 186/3/9 Wingate to Phipps, 6th June, 1913 
149 Chandler, Scale and Scope, Wilson and Thomson, The Making of Modern Management, 32-33 
150 L. Hannah, The "Divorce" of ownership and control from 1900 onwards: Re-calibrating imagined 
global trends', Bu iness History, 2007,404-438 
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rewards that Hunt derived. "' The transition from Hunt to McGillivray illustrates the 
transformation of the Syndicate from a vehicle for personal capital and management to 
something approaching a professional managerial system. Though McGillivray was on 
the Board of Directors and owned shares in the company, the strategy used was to 
employ professional businessman as a salaried managing director. This almost certainly 
stemmed from the South African experience and expertise in mining where the use of 
mining engineers as managers was an established practice. 
Thirdly, the change in the composition of the Board of Directors, with the 
greater involvement of men who were involved with the Corner House group from circa 
1907 can be seen as reinforcing an international business link that was present from the 
formation of the company, but became stronger over time, in this period. Related to this 
is that the initial directorial composition in 1904 reflected the needs of Leigh Hunt and 
Wernher Beit to raise the £80,000 required to start the business. By 1914, however, as 
the network diagram shows, the Syndicate's Board was composed of men who provided 
strong links to British based companies connected to international commodity 
production and trade throughout the British Empire - ideal for the kind of oversight and 
strategic guidance needed for a business of the nature of the Syndicate. 
The transformation of function can be seen through, firstly, the concentration of 
the company on cotton-growing. The Plantations Syndicate was, as its title suggests, 
interested in any form of agricultural plantation that conceivably might have been 
successfully developed in Sudan. Thus, in 1913 the Syndicate briefly toyed with 
diversifying into rubber by forming the Sudan Rubber Syndicate. "' This idea was 
151 SAD 415/9/3 2°d Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 8th October 
1904, though at a later meeting it was stated that of the £ 14,000 paid only£ 1,000 was for the cost to the 
Syndicate of the concession. SAD 415/9/19 17th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate, 3' January 1907; SAD 416/1/21 105th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the 
Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 4th December 1913; SAD 416/1/92 159th Meeting of the Board of Directors 
of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. 30th January 1918 
152 SAD 416/1/23 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 18th December 1913 
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dropped by early 1915, though it is unclear whether this was because of a lack of viability, 
an issue of it being beyond the scope of the Syndicate at this time, or being a direct result 
of the shortage of capital caused by the war. In any event by 1918 the shares in the 
company were valueless. "' Either way, the development established prior to the war 
coupled with the disabling effects of the conflict locked the Syndicate into cotton- 
growing, something that was nevertheless consolidated during a difficult financial period 
where the real value of the capital invested in the company declined. 
The Syndicate's primary achievement between 1904 and 1919 was to establish 
that cotton-growing in Sudan under pre-war world economic conditions was 
commercially viable. The successful development of experimental farms, the successful 
production and marketing of a limited quantity of cotton, and the attendant commercial 
relationships that were formed by doing this provided a framework on which the 
Syndicate could reasonably hope to build on as war ended and world cotton prices began 
to recover. The Syndicate also established the tenancy system by which the Gezira 
Scheme went on to be run until decolonisation. They established and shaped their 
relationship with the tenants and the services that the Syndicate was to supply, in 
particular (in addition to marketing and distribution) to function as bankers to the 
tenants. Without the Syndicate to do this, the tenants would not have had enough 
liquidity from year to year to pay for seed, animals, and short-term labour. " 
Finally, the political-economic compact - touched on at length elsewhere in this 
thesis - nevertheless needs to be mentioned in terms of the structural and to a certain 
extent cultural bonds that tied the Syndicate to the government. Firstly, very practically, 
the salaries of the Syndicate's British staff were paid by the Sudan Government with the 
Syndicate paying the government in return. This gives some indication of the closeness 
153 SAD 416/1/46 Minutes of an adjourned Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
13th January 1915; SAD 416/1/103 163rd Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 10th December 1918 
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of the operational relationship that existed between business and government, certainly 
by 1915.155 Secondly, and perhaps with more suggestion, during the First World War half 
of the Syndicate's staff volunteered for active service at the front. "' These included Lord 
Lovat who rose to the rank of Brigadier General by the end of the war and was invalided 
through injury in late 1915.157 McGillivray was mentioned in despatches for his help to 
the Sudan Government and received from the Sultan of Egypt the Order of the Nile. ` 
The tenor of the Sudan Government was military at this time; the extent to which 
participation in the violence associated with empire was an integrative factor in the 
imperial project should not be underestimated. "' Certainly, the martial connection in the 
non-martial sphere is one that is not properly understood in an Empire not often 
conceived of as being primarily military, but having nonetheless a significant number of 
soldier administrators, engineers, entrepreneurs and financiers. 
As the Sudan Government's chosen vehicle for the development of cotton- 
growing in Sudan, the Syndicate held a unique position and a unique function. The Sudan 
Government gave the Syndicate the protection of a monopolistic land concession and 
access to an imperial stamp of approval; the Syndicate gave the Sudan Government 
access to a complex web of international finance and individuals whose sense of 
entrepreneurial adventurism, willingness to take risks, and business expertise was greater 
than that of the Sudan Government itself. The Syndicate's long-term attractiveness to 
investors, despite the fact that it paid no dividend at all until 1912 and made no 
substantial profit until 1920 was largely a facet of the advantageous position it occupied 
154 SAD 416/1/24 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 18th December 1913 
155 SAD 416/1/55 137th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 21n 
December 1915 
156 SAD 416/ 1/47129th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 15th April 
1915 
157 SAD 416/1/57 8th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 21st December 1915; 
SAD 416/1/96 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 20th February 1918 
158 SAD 416/1/79 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations. Syndicate, 24th January 1917 
159 J. Willis, 'Violence, Authority and the State in the Nuba Mountains of Condominium Sudan', The 
Historical Journal, 2003,89-114 
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in relation to the government and the leverage it had in a number of spheres, both in 
Sudan and in the City of London. 160 
In 1913, just prior to the period when Wingate and Kitchener for the Sudan 
Government were locked in an endless round of meetings with the Foreign Office, the 
Treasury, the Syndicate and Gary financiers to thrash out mutually agreeable terms of the 
Sudan Loan Act, Wingate observed to Lee Stack that a careful approach to business 
ought to be taken because the Sudan Government `has not much experience in such 
matters. "" Though the government and the Syndicate operated closely together and the 
relationship was relatively cosy, it was also dynamic, constantly evolving and sometimes 
tense. The relationship was one of mutual self-interest, and often guardedly so. Equally, 
however, the relationship was symbiotic. By the time that McGillivray died in March 
1919, the Syndicate and the Sudan Government were bound together, optimistic for the 
future, and ready to develop the Gezira Scheme after fifteen years of frustration. "' 
160 See SAD 415/8/1-152, The Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd, Report and Accounts, 1906-1924; 
Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 94 
161 SAD 186/1/161 Wingate to Lee Stack, 10th Apra 1913 




Business and Government, 1907-1914 
To develop cotton growing in Sudan, the Sudan Government formed a relationship with 
the Sudan Plantations Syndicate that defined the nature of the primary economic activity, 
the boundaries of state control over the economy, the trajectory of economic 
development, and the role of commerce and business to the vitality of the colonial state. 
The focus for this chapter, therefore, is the evolving relationship between the Syndicate 
and the government. The basis for this is the analysis of the negotiations between the 
Syndicate and the government, and the structural roles formed and played by the two 
parties with regard to the management of the Gezira Scheme, the raising of capital, and 
the nature of control. These themes are examined to explore the distance, tension and 
flexibility of the relationship as the two created the political economic compact that 
provided the basis for future interaction. In a sense, this defined an important imperial 
relationship, between business and government, the nature of which was hugely 
important to the execution of power over Sudanese territory. 
The central argument presented in this chapter is that at this stage in the 
development of the -Gezira Scheme, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate inhabited a 
proximity to the Sudan Government that was close, and a position that if not superior 
certainly enjoyed advantages and benefits. Nevertheless, the Sudan Government was 
interested in maintaining its interests and what emerged was neither the state being 
wholly captured by business capital, nor business being captured by the state, but a 
mutually reinforcing framework for economic development which incorporated the state 
and business, but where business was ascendant, albeit with evidence of the beginnings 
of decline. 
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT 
In providing for the cost of administration, colonial governments had a clear reason for 
developing the economies of the countries over which they ruled. ' This often placed 
colonies in a paradoxical or circular situation. In order to raise a loan for a crucial project 
to develop the economy the colony needed to be able to re-pay the loan. As 
governmental revenue was based on increased levels of trade, which might be contingent 
on the development project, economic development could be painfully slow, or even 
non-existent 2A further problem for tropical colonies issuing public debt was that they 
were a comparatively poor risk, based on their variable and limited revenue generating 
capacity (hence the need to develop the economy in the first place) and were therefore at 
a disadvantage when competing with debt issued by dominion or foreign governments. 
Thus, if a loan were to be offered it would be made on the basis of a higher rate of 
interest which, problematically, made repayment even more difficult. In some ways this 
problem was solved by the Colonial Loans Act of 1899 and the Colonial Stock Act of 
1900 which allowed colonial governments to raise money on the basis of a Treasury 
guarantee. This effectively gilt-edged colonial borrowing, though in reality the use of this 
facility was limited by a sceptical Treasury until the 1920s 3 The various Sudan Loan Acts 
that were passed between 1913 and 1919 are therefore interesting early examples of 
Treasury guaranteed loans. Although not administered via the Colonial Office, the Sudan 
Government took early advantage of the mechanisms created to raise credit for the 
Crown Colonies. 
I Kesner, Economic, p. 5; Meredith and Havinden, Colonialism and Development, p. 45; C Ehrlich, The Uganda 
Economy, 1903-1945, in V. Harlow and E. M. Culver (eds. ), History of East Africa, voZ III (Oxford, 1965), 
p. 400 
2 See Kesner, Economic, p. 14 
3 Kesner, Economic, p. 73; Meredith and Havinden, Colonialism and Development, p. 140 
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The Government of Sudan Loan Act was passed in 1913 and amended in 1914.4 
The Act allowed three million pounds to be raised in a loan to be guaranteed by the 
Treasury. Initially, £1,300,000 was allocated for irrigation while£1,600,000 was for 
railway building. This was later amended to £2,000,000 for irrigation and £800,000 for 
railway building. ' This money was to be raised in the City of London by the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate at three and a half per cent; in return the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate was to be given control of the management of the Gezira Scheme 6 As will be 
discussed later at more length, this did not happen at this time because the outbreak of 
the First World War brought the financial machinery of Britain to a halt before the loan 
could be issued. Sir Murdoch MacDonald, the under secretary of state for public works 
in Egypt, along with the Sudan Government, decided to put the plans to irrigate the 
Gezira into temporary stasis, but not before a considerable part of the £500,000 
advanced to the Sudan Government by the National Debt Commissioners had been 
expended. ' This was to be but the first of a series of unforeseen problems that increased 
the cost of the project and the amount of debt that eventually was undertaken. Between 
1914 and 1919 there was then a gradual change in the relationship between Syndicate and 
government. Initially, the war stymied the development of the Scheme, but from 1916 
the Sudan Government and the Syndicate began to plan for the eventual 
recommencement of development work once war had ended. However, controversy 
over the specific plans for development, and changes to the capital market in London 
and how the Sudan loans were to be raised (and by which party) reshaped both the 
importance of the Gezira Scheme to the strategic interests of Britain in the North 
African imperial region and the relative importance of the Syndicate and the government 
4 ParliamentaryBill; (220) 1913 1 911 to authorise the Treasury to guarantee the Payment of Interest on a 
Loan to be raised by the Government of the Sudan; ParliamentaryBill; (271) iii. 97 to amend the Schedule 
to the Government of the Soudan Loan Act, 1913. 
5 ParliamentaryBill; (271) iii. 97 to amend the Schedule to the Government of the Soudan Loan Act, 1913. 
6 SAD 201/5/72 'Note as to the effect of war on the raising of the capital required for the Gezira 
Irrigation Scheme', 14th August, 1916; SAD 416/1/17 Director's Minutes, Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
10th September, 1913 
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to the process of capital investment and economic development. An increasingly dirigiste, 
state-centred model of development emerges from this period -a legacy that was to 
significantly alter the economic history of Sudan during the inter-war period. 
The scope of this chapter is curtailed by the limitations of the sources. Firstly, 
most of the available correspondence comes from archives containing mainly 
government material. Secondly, there are chronological gaps in the sources and the 
narrative of the business-government relationship is frequently interrupted and 
sometimes discontinued. This problem is compounded because, thirdly, the 
correspondence often relates to conflict where the issue at stake is known to both parties 
and as a consequence noted by neither. Both the latter two problems are partly overcome 
by the intention to analyse rather than merely narrate the process. The central questions 
therefore relate to the ability of each party to shape the relationship to their own interests 
and ultimately how the eventual settlement suited each. 
7 SAD 201/5/72 `Note as to the effect of war' 
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II. BACKGROUND TO THE LOAN NEGOTIATIONS 
The initial concession given to the Sudan Plantations Syndicate to develop an area in the 
Gezira led eventually to the opening of the Zeidab farm in 1906. In the context of the 
failure of most other business in Sudan, the success of the Zeidab farm brought pressure 
to bear on the Sudan Government from two directions towards the end of the decade. 
Firstly, the very fact of modem capitalist enterprise failing to thrive in Sudan led to an 
economic development problem of which the goverment were increasingly aware. 
Secondly, the apparent success of the farm at Zeidab interested the cotton lobby in 
Manchester who began to push for further development of the crop in Sudan. Sir 
William Mather of the Lancashire engineering firm Mather and Platt and a member of 
the British Cotton Growing Association, gave an address to the cotton lobby in 
Manchester in 1910 in which he `urged that Britain should acknowledge a special 
responsibility to develop irrigation works in the Sudan. ' In 1910 the Plantations Syndicate 
was invited by the Sudan Government to manage the new development at Tayiba, and it 
was from here that the famous tripartite partnership structure for the Gezira scheme 
evolved. 8 However, it became a source of considerable difficulty for business- 
government relations as Gaitskell reflected: 
The decision made, in 1910, to use the Syndicate rather than the Department of 
Agriculture concerned only the management of the Tayiba experiment, and had 
been taken before Lord Kitchener returned to the scene. No decision had yet been 
made for the future management of the Gezira Scheme itself. The Tayiba 
agreement provided that the experiment, to prove conclusively that cotton could 
8 Gaitskell, Gezira, 51-54; Detail of subsequent somewhat technical development of the tenant- 
government-syndicate division of profits (etc) can be found in the Wingate papers: SAD 109/11/58-60 
Wingate to Clayton, 26th August, 1913; SAD 109/11/61-62 J. Asser to Wingate, 11th August, 1913; SAD 
109/11/63-65 Dickinson to Director of Agriculture , 9th August 1913; SAD 109/11/66 Telegram, Wingate 
to Governor-General Khartoum, 26th August 1913 
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be grown on a commercial scale, should be carried out over a period of at least 
four years and should cease if the object had been attained before this period 9 
Once the Tayiba farm proved itself a success, which it more or less did, the Syndicate 
were given an option to buy land in the Gezira - either 10,000 feddans on government 
irrigated land or 30,000 feddans on rain-land. " Compounded by the technical knowledge 
that the Syndicate had amassed, this left the Sudan Government in a comparatively weak 
position and as Gaitskell cites, suffering from a `fear of being outwitted. "' In comparison 
to the government, the Syndicate had better access to the City of London and the British 
capital market, their personnel had developed crucial expertise and as a result the 
government knew its position was beholden. 
Kitchener's re-emergence in Sudan in 1911 when appointed Consul-General in 
Cairo marked a renewed interest - or interference - in the governance of Sudan. By this 
point Kitchener was a successful man in his sixties, a veteran of long imperial experience 
which had been cut in the military surveys of the 1860s and 1870s and the campaigns in 
Sudan and Southern Africa in the 1880s, 1890s and early 1900s. It is clear that he 
regarded Sudan as his personal territory. Not forgetting that his aristocratic title was 
styled `of Khartoum', his view of empire building was military rather than commercial 
and his manner authoritarian. The effect this had on the tenor of negotiations was clear. 
Kitchener regarded business and commercial interests with suspicion; so did the Sudan 
Government. Thus it was that the Sudan Government's latitude in policy became 
circumscribed, even constrained - defined by Kitchener's stringency and rigidity on the 
one side, and by the relatively powerful position occupied by the Syndicate on the other. 
9 Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 63 
10 Sources on this point disagree. One brief history of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate maintains that in 
1910 the Syndicate had control of some 80,000 feddans of land. See BUL CGA 2/1/3 `The Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate Ltd and the Kassala Cotton Company Ltd and their work in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan' (Reprinted from the 45th Annual Report of the British Cotton Growing Association, 1950) p. 4 
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III. LOAN NEGOTIATIONS 
The limitations of the sources force us to concentrate on two features of the business- 
government relationship. Firstly, material dating mostly from April 1912 gives an insight 
into the attitude of the Sudan Government with regard to the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate and the negotiation process, in particular the influence of Kitchener. 
Problematically, there is then a break in the chronological coverage, and it is only from 
January 1913 that the tensions and conflicts that affected the negotiation process itself 
can be explored. 
In April 1912 the Plantations Syndicate began to make demands and requests of 
the Sudan Government with regard to the future direction of the Gezira scheme with 
which, of course, they intended to participate. In respect of the issue and allocation of 
funds, the fractious tension that Kitchener helped create was obvious and noted. " 
Wingate wrote: `I of course realise that McGillivray is a man determined to get all he can 
out of us and that he is holding out the threat of the Syndicate going elsewhere if not 
satisfied with our treatment but ... no one 
knows better than he does that the Syndicate 
has got a good thing in hand in the Sudan and I think that his action is to a large extent 
brought about by a feeling that he must convince Wernher, Beit, Eckstein and Co of this 
fact. '" 
When Lee Stack put the Syndicate's requests to Kitchener, the Consul General 
responded in a typically irritable way, describing the Syndicate demands as `preposterous', 
while also stating that he could not make head nor tail of them. Stack made a more 
circumspect and realistic judgement, revealing a more informed view of business 
negotiation and the dynamics of opening gambits. `I told him [Kitchener] that they were 
probably put forward with the idea of asking a good deal in order to get a little', Stack 
11 Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 64 
12 SAD 108/15/1-6 Stack to Wingate, 11th April 1912 
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wrote, going on to state that `this did not appease him and as he was intractable I 
suggested that I should make an abstract of their requests and put opposite each one 
how the council were prepared to consider them or not as the case may be', a proposal to 
which Kitchener agreed. Nevertheless, Kitchener's hostility was obvious when he also 
asked Stack to prepare a statement of how much the Syndicate `ought' to have paid the 
government for the concession that they held in Tayiba. Stack was worried that 
Kitchener's hostile attitude might lead to deadlock with the Syndicate and they `in a huff 
[might] go out of the Sudan altogether. ' 14 Wingate reluctantly appreciated Stack's 
suggestion that the Syndicate's Managing Director Donald McGillivray should be 
prevented from seeing Kitchener at that time, though he himself `was rather hopeful that 
he would have seen him, for it is clear that he [Kitchener] is taking a considerably sterner 
view than the council does as regards the Syndicate's claim for the remission of taxation 
and other concessions. ' Though Wingate had his misgivings about the initial agreement, 
expressing the view that `we had to be prepared to dance on either leg as the case might 
be', he also recognised both the desirability of encouraging business and the impetus 
coming from Lancashire and the cotton lobby. " 
The indications are that metropolitan pressure for the loan continued to be 
pressed in the latter half of 1912 and on the 23'' January 1913 in London the British 
Cotton Growing Association lobbied the Prime Nfiinister, H. H. Asquith, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequor Lloyd George and Sir Edward Grey from the Foreign Office about the 
£3,000,000 loan guarantee for cotton-growing in Sudan, and laid claim to a decisive 
influence in the decision to issue a guarantee. However, by March 1913 the Syndicate- 
government negotiations were at an impasse, mainly over how the Gezira Scheme was to 
be managed. The Sudan Government were aware that the Sudan Plantations Syndicate 
13 SAD 108/15/7-10 Wingate to Stack 18th April 1912 
14 SAD 108/15/1-6 Stack to Wingate, 11th April 1912; it is unfortunately unclear what the Syndicate's 
demands were 
is SAD 108/15/7-10 Wingate to Stack, 18th April 1912; SAD 108/15/49-52 Wingate to Stack, 6th May 
1913 
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were able to use their connections with the Sudan Government in the City to procure 
advantage, while at the same time using the unresolved issue of the loan to leave their 
financial commitments to the Gezira project somewhat vague; this was certainly the view 
held by Lord Kitchener. However, as both Wingate and Kitchener were aware, the three 
million loan guarantee was a necessary precursor to any subsequent financial contribution 
by the Syndicate16 
Wingate was convinced that the negotiations with McGillivray were proving 
difficult because they couldn't determine what form the irrigation scheme was going to 
take, the plans being at that time in the hands of `the Cairo experts'. Held in Khartoum, 
the negotiations were in `full swing' by the beginning of May 1913, though delays were 
caused by McGillivray's need to telegraph the Syndicate's board of directors in London. 
The sources are vague on the twists and turns of the negotiations at this stage, but the 
future of the Tayiba farm was, however, settled. The Tayiba station was vacated at the 
beginning of June 1913 at the end of the previous agreement, but `preliminary to 
negotiations' the Syndicate made a favourable arrangement with the government that it 
be placed under Syndicate control. "' 
By the beginning of June this had resulted in tentative optimism that the 
Syndicate were likely to accept the deal on the table, but the final decision rested with the 
board in London who were unable to consider the matter until July. " Once they had 
done so and settled in principle to advance to the next stage, a meeting between the 
Syndicate and the Sudan Government was set up for the 21st July to discuss the 
16 BUL CGA 2/1/3 'The Sudan Plantations Limited and the Kassala Cotton Company Ltd and their work 
in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan' (Reprinted from the forty fifth Annual Report of the British Cotton 
Growing Association, 1950), p. 7; Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 62; SAD 108/15/13 Stack to Wingate, March 311, 
1913; SAD 108/15/17 Wingate to Slatin, 5th April 1913 
17SAD 108/15/37-40 Wingate to Stack, 29th April 1913; SAD 108/15/44-48 Wingate to Stack, 4th May 
1913; SAD 108/15/55-56 Wingate to Stack, 13th May 1913; SAD 108/15/68 Wingate's copy of letter from 
Stack to Acting Governor General in Khartoum, undated; SAD 109/11/7 Wingate to Lovat, 22'd July 
1913; SAD 416/1/24 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 18th December 
1913 
18 SAD 108/15/65 Wingate to Bernard, 6th June 1913 
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Scheme" The Syndicate's Lord Lovat was keen for Wingate to attend this meeting and 
for the terms agreed to be placed on the record as soon as was possible. Wingate was 
unable to attend but he invited Lovat and McGillivray to write to him with their 
impressions of the meeting. `As we are now partners, will you let me know how you view 
this proposal', he wrote. He also suggested the formation of a sub-committee consisting 
of Wilkinson, Bonham-Carter and Bernard to `work out the various details with ... the 
Syndicate representatives. ' Lovat agreed with Wingate on the idea for a joint committee 
to thrash out details, noting that meetings were far less likely to suffer misunderstandings 
as written correspondence. In turn, Wingate agreed with Lovat that `the main heads of 
the new arrangement' were what was needed rather than a detailed agreed text. The new 
agreement was conditional on the loan being issued, but that once it had been issued the 
agreement was due to run for ten years with the condition that: 
at the end of ten years - provided the Sudan Government is entirely satisfied with 
the manner in which the Syndicate has done its work and that no political or other 
considerations have in the meantime arisen to influence the government or cause it 
to consider a change necessary then the arrangement would be continued for 
another five years. ... In other words the Syndicate can rely on the good will of the 
Government to renew the arrangements under the above stipulations 2° 
The Sudan Government were prepared only to hand over the Tayiba farm to the 
Syndicate on the condition that the Syndicate provide £500,000 at par as the first 
instalment of the loan so that `works may be taken in hand without further delay. ' This 
interest rate was to prove problematic as the Syndicate's best estimate in July 1913 was 
19 SAD 109/11/6 Lovat to Wingate, 213, July, 1913; Correspondence between Wingate and Eckstein, SAD 
109/11/1-2,5,13, various dates July 1913 
20 SAD 109/11/6 Lovat to Wingate, 21, July, 1913; SAD 109/11/7 Wingate to Lovat, 22nd July 1913; SAD 
109/11/8 Lovat to Wingate, 23' July 1913; SAD 109/11/9-11 Wingate to Lovat, 24th July 1913 
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that given the terms of the Loan Act, the Loan would only be acceptable to the market 
when issued at 93, that is, with 7% of the face value discounted. In addition to this 
problem, Lovat signalled that the `fate of the loan appears to depend mainly on the 
renewal clause', though he also reassured Wingate that the difference between their 
positions was `not great. ' The Syndicate, with malign intent or not, used the issue of 
getting the loan raised on the market as a lever on the renewal clause issue. `If we can 
frame a good working renewal clause', Lovat wrote, `I believe we ought to be able to 
persuade our City friends to come to a deal. '21 
The chief problem surrounding the clause turned on the phrase in Wingate's 
letter to Lovat of the 24th July over the somewhat vague justification that `other 
considerations' might legitimately be used not to renew the concession at the end of the 
concession period. The Syndicate thought this was `too wide a term to make the renewal 
clause of any real value. ' The government were all too aware that under a concession 
with a limited time period, the Syndicate would naturally be concerned whether or not 
they would make enough money to justify their investment and, secondly, would be 
concerned at the possibility of renewing the concession and on what basis they might be 
able to do this. However, it was also the general opinion that this problem was not a 
great one to the successful negotiation of the agreement u Wingate's line on the renewal 
clause and the Syndicate's objection was that `I never intended what I said in my letter to 
be the actual wording of the Renewal Clause ... I merely used these words to save 
categorical details. i24 The view of the Sudan Government side was that this was therefore 
not a significant barrier to progress and in effect the government backed down. 
However, despite Wingate being aware of the difficulties of raising capital in the 
London money markets from as early as May of 1913, he was unhappy at the issue at 93 
21 SAD 109/11/9-11 Wingate to Lovat, 24th July 1913; SAD 109/11/21-22 Lovat to Wingate, 29th July 
1913 
u SAD 109/11/21-22 Lovat to Wingate, 29th July 1913 
23 SAD 109/11/34-35 Clayton to Wingate, 3d August 1913 
24 SAD 109/11/28-29 Wingate to Kitchener, 30th July 1913 
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stating critically that `this works out at really over four and a half per cent. i25 Kitchener 
thought that the 93 issue was `absurd' stating that `we better hold out for par and say we 
would rather put off operations on the Blue Nile than pay too dearly for the money. This 
ought to make them play up and produce the cash to go on with. '26 Wingate subsequently 
wrote to Lovat to voice his concerns over this issue, threatening the Syndicate as 
Kitchener suggested. ' Similarly, both Wingate and Kitchener were initially mystified as 
to why the Syndicate wanted £35,000 in cash immediately, only later becoming aware 
that this was the additional cost of raising the £500,000 on the money market 28 By taking 
subscriptions (`scrip) on the promise of the loan, the Syndicate would have to find a way 
to finance the difference between the discounted rate (93) and the face value of the 
actual bonds the scrip were to be replaced by (Treasury Bond Certificates). Once this 
issue was clarified, the basic position became agreed between both sides. There seems to 
have been a dawning realisation on the part of the Sudan Government that their position 
was at the very least dependent on the Syndicate who, in turn, had no obvious reason for 
badly financing a loan issue. 
In mid August 1913 Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer contacted 
Kitchener to tell him that the Treasury was prepared to instruct the National Debt 
Commissioners to issue the Sudan Government with £500,000 for six years, effectively 
being an advance on future public issue of the debt. 29 By September the final 
negotiations were drawing to a close. Lovat wrote to Wingate asking that he be in 
London for the final stages in case of any problems: 
"Capital" may require gentle and tactful handling and no-one could do this better 
than yourself. Eckstein is a man who takes broad views. I think I can promise you 
25 SAD 108/15/44-48 Wingate to Stack, 4th May 1913; SAD 109/11/28-29 Wingate to Kitchener, 30th July 
1913 
26 SAD 109/11/33 Kitchener to Wingate, 3t August 1913 
27 SAD 109/11/36 Wingate to Lovat, 5th August 1913 
28 SAD 109/11/42-43 Wingate to Kitchener, 10th August 1913 
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that there will be no petty peddling over minor conditions. I believe that 9/10ths 
of the head of agreement will go through by consent and that with you to give the 
lead over the vexed issue of the "extension clause" and "half a million loan" there 
is no reason that we should not move the whole of the business through up to the 
legal drafting stage. The business will go quickly or not at all' 
Though Wingate responded to Lovat that after conversation with Kitchener the 
Syndicate would find the Sudan Government's position `entirely satisfactory, the inside 
position was far more fractious. " On the 2d September 1913, Wingate met with 
Kitchener in Edinburgh to read the draft of the agreement. Kitchener was not happy. In 
a letter to Clayton, Wingate stated that Kitchener was `anxious that there should be some 
paragraph to the effect that the Syndicate should act in accordance with the view of the 
Government', going to add that `he wishes to establish some form of control over loans 
issued by the Syndicate and considers that the Government should have a sort of veto; in 
other words, he thinks that loans should only be given under regulations to be issued 
from time to time by the Government, and that it may be necessary to stop them 
altogether. ' It is not clear from this whether it was loans taken out by the Syndicate or (as 
seems more likelý loans issued by the Syndicate to tenants operating on their concession 
that was at issue, though in a sense this distinction is irrelevant to the argument. Under 
either scenario, Kitchener wanted the Sudan Government to retain a high degree of 
control over the operations of the business. Kitchener also wanted to prevent the 
Syndicate from `making too much profit out of the sale of seed, agricultural implements, 
ginning etc'; in fact Kitchener went as far as to indicate he did not want the Syndicate to 
make more than 5% profit. Wingate was more laissez-faire in his attitude. `I do not think 
that we should interfere too closely in such questions, except to safeguard the tenants 
29 SAD 109/11/54-57 Wingate to Clayton, 17th August 1913 
30 SAD 109/11/86 Lovat to Wingate, 2nd September 1913 
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from undue extortion and I hardly think it will be in the interests of the Syndicate to 
attempt anything of the sort', he wrote? ' 
Kitchener was also keen to push the terms of the agreement in other respects, 
including trying to frame in the agreement that the £500,000 from the Syndicate was not 
part of the £3,000,000 Treasury Guaranteed Loan, as this would put £3,500,000 at the 
disposal of the government. In these restrictions on practice, Kitchener was showing 
himself to be naive and unreasonable. While wanting detailed strictures on Syndicate 
behaviour, he also wanted the agreement to be brief, with the detail agreed outside of the 
legal document, if possible only verbally agreed. While wanting to introduce such 
strictures he also wanted to show that the Sudan Government intended to deal with 
them `fairly and sincerely' and that `all idea of suspicion and sharp practice on either side 
should be avoided. ' Though much of this rhetoric was driven by problems he associated 
with previous dealings with the Syndicate, two things are clear. Though Kitchener was 
not fully aware of the needs and modes of business, and wanted to retain a large degree 
of control, both he and Wingate were aware that they were engaged in establishing an 
innovative, corporate form of economic activity with the Gezira Scheme. `He [Kitchener] 
also considers that we have not made nearly a sufficient point of the fact that the 
Syndicate are partners of the Government and not Agents, as was the case in the Tayiba 
Agreement', Wingate observed. 33 This move and the conscious understanding that 
underpinned it were in the long run to have significant implications for the development 
of Sudan. Secondly, the Sudan Government were suspicious of business and suspected 
that they were being outmanoeuvred. Their desire to leave certain terms within the 
agreement rather vague probably reflected this, but it also reflected a certain naivety with 
regard to the implications of not defining and codifying fundamental features of the 
agreement they were entering into. 
31 SAD 109/11/88-89 Wingate to Lovat, 3n1 September 1913 
32 SAD 109/11/92-98 Wingate to Clayton, 3'd September 1913 
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At a meeting attended by Bernard for the Sudan Government and Lovat, 
Eckstein, McGillivray, J. A. Hutton and lawyers on behalf of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate in early September, the final details of the Agreement were thrashed out. 
Eckstein pointedly refused to agree to raise the half a million separate to the loan. 
Though Bernard held it out as a deal breaker, he was forced to capitulate when Eckstein 
explained that the £500,000 was to be raised in the form of scrip to be exchanged for 
£500,000 of actual bonds once the loan was issued, and that without the Treasury 
guarantee the capital market was likely to remain unresponsive. 34 At a Syndicate 
Directors' meeting, MacGillivray told his fellow directors that `it was to be made a sine 
qua non that £500,000 - which the Syndicate would have to find in the event of a 
mutually satisfactory agreement being entered into must be considered part of the 
£3,000,000 loan authorised by Parliament and not as a separate advance. '35 Haggling also 
turned to the phrasing of the Agreement. Firstly, the Syndicate prevailed in ensuring that 
it was `not less than 100,000 feddans to be irrigated' rather than the government's 
preferred phrasing of `about 100,000 feddans', though the government were happy with a 
statement of intention only. " In this matter, it appears that the Syndicate achieved the 
upper hand because Kitchener had promised them something similar in the previous July, 
and Eckstein made it clear to the Syndicate's directors that in meetings with the 
government the need for a definite minimum commitment had been expressed strongly 
to the Sudan Government" Secondly, the government agreed to `the omission of the 
reference to competition in the renewal clause', something that would significantly 
improve the Syndicate in the long-run, making them both more attractive to investors 
» SAD 109/11/92-98 Wingate to Clayton, 31d September 1913 
74 SAD 109/11/112-113 Bernard to Wingate, 10th September 1913 
35 SAD 416/1/17 98th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 10th 
September 1913 
M SAD 109/11/112-113 Bernard to Wingate, 10th September 1913 
37 SAD 109/11/119-121 Davidson to Wingate, 11th September 1913; SAD 416/1/18 101st Meeting of the 
Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 9th October 1913 
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and the City at large, and more important to the Sudan Government'' In fact, both of 
these concessions put the Syndicate in a strong position for the future and constrained 
the latitude of government policy. The government's willingness to accept the conditions 
was driven by a need to get the Gezira Scheme in some form or fashion up and running, 
on the basis that they badly needed a success to help obtain further credit in the future39 
38 SAD 109/11/112-113 Bernard to Wingate, 10th September 1913 
39 SAD 109/11/123 Wingate to Kitchener, 13th September 1913 
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IV. THE SUDAN LOAN ACTS 
The House of Commons confirmed that the Loan Act was to be passed on the 24th July 
1913, though in point of fact it was eventually passed on August 15`h 1913. '0 In this, the 
Sudan Government used its connections to achieve a smooth delivery of its objectives. 
In a letter to Kitchener, Reginald Wingate mentioned that he had talked to `Johnny 
Baird about the loan and he had assured Wingate that `they would see that nothing 
happened to make the final passing of the Bill through Parliament in anyway difficult for 
the Government. " Similarly, on the 9th May 1913 Wingate wrote to Lloyd-George at the 
Treasury to thank him for his support of the Sudan Loan Bill through Parliament. 
Optimistically, he made the assessment that `time will show that the future you predict 
for the Sudan has not been overstated'. ' On the 2°d September 1913 Basil Blackett, a 
Treasury official wrote to Bernard, the Sudan Financial Secretary that the `Chancellor of 
the Exchequer has now given his approval on the points submitted to him in regard to 
the Sudan Loan. 343 
On behalf of the Sudan Government Davidson visited the City of London in late 
September 1913 to resolve, unusually, some doubt relating to where the Sudan Loan was 
going to be raised. « The reason for this was the way in which the ordinance had been set 
up: 
The ordinance has been drawn so as to permit another bank than the Bank of 
England undertaking the issue and management of the loan. But the Treasury 
would very strongly urge that if possible the Bank of England should be allowed 
to undertake it. They think that the Sudan would certainly get better terms from 
40 SAD 109/11/12 J. W. Baird to Wingate, 24th July 1913 
41 SAD 109/11/14 Wingate to Kitchener, 26th July 1913 
42 T172/82 Wingate to I1oyd-George, 9th May 1913 
43 SAD 101/11/135 Blackett to Bernard, 22' September 1913 
44 SAD 109/11/143 Davidson to Wingate, 24h September 1913 
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the Bank of England than elsewhere, and this is of course in the interest of the 
Treasury as guarantors, but also of the Sudan itself. The Bank of England will 
naturally regard this as a slight, if the very unusual course is taken of giving the 
issue of a loan guaranteed by the British government to any one but themselves 
and the issue may be prejudiced by such action as 
Davidson counselled that domiciling the loan at the Bank of England was preferable 
because `such bonds and inscribed certificates are treated as "floaters", and are therefore 
distinctly more marketable in times of stress and stringency. i46 The Sudan Government 
did eventually raise the loan via the Bank of England, and it is not clear why the loan 
Ordinance granted the Sudan Government the latitude that it did. 
In addition, the Treasury insisted that they be allowed to appoint the Trustees for 
the sinking fund for the loan, with the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury being one of 
the Trustees. A Treasury official suggested that the Governor of the Bank of England 
`might do very well . 47 The Ordinance itself laid out that any sinking fund payments in 
respect of the loan were to be payable out of `the assets and of the Government of the 
Sudan. ' Any payment made by the Treasury if the loan defaulted was to be repaid by the 
Sudan Government, and the Governor General of the Sudan was required to remit 
monies every half-year to the Sinldng Account or on account of repayment of the 
principal capital of the loan. These measures were subject to approval by both the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and by the Treasury. The loan was to be repaid 
after thirty years, with repayment to begin not more than five years after the loan was 
issued. " 
43 SAD 109/11/135 Blackett to Bernard, 22nd September 1913 
46 SAD 109/11/143 Davidson to Wingate, 24h September 1913 
47 SAD 101/11/135 Blackett to Bernard, 22" September 1913 
48 SAD 109/11/136-139 `Ordinance for the raising of 3 million pounds bythe Government of the Sudan'; 
Government of the Soudan Loan Acts, 1913 and 1914; ParliamentaryBiM (220) 1913 1 911; Parliamentary 
Bill. (271) iii. 97 
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On the 23`' September 1913 the National Debt Commissioners agreed to 
advance to the Sudan Government money drawn against the loan if requested to do so 
by Kitchener and Wingate. The date proposed to make the transaction was the 17' 
November! " The Syndicate wanted to have the right to issue a loan of £500,000 at par at 
any period of time within a period of eighteen months of the Agreement, presumably to 
repay the money advanced by the National Debt Commissioners, but as events 
transpired they never had the chance 50 
The initial planned schedule of expenditure of the loan capital was amended in 
1914, hence the two bills and their referral as the `Government of the Soudan Loan Acts, 
1913 and 1914'. The revised schedule established that the following amounts were to be 
allocated for the following purposes: 
I. Works for the purpose of irrigating the Gezirah Plain £2,000,000 
II. Extension of the Soudan Railway System £800,000 
III. Other Irrigation works and contingencies £200,000 
Total £3,000,000 
In January 1914 £ 500,000 was advanced to the Sudan Government by the National 
Debt Commissioners against the future issue of the bonds of the Sudan Loan. This sum 
was to be repaid on the 3M January 1919. " Work on the initial canalisation in the Gezira 
began in April 1914 when Kitchener and Wingate instructed Sir Murdoch MacDonald to 
contract the first construction works of the Gezira Scheme. `It was a simple matter to go 
on with the canal', MacDonald stated. 
49 SAD 109/11/141-142 W. G. Turpin, National Debt Office to Wingate, 23' September 1913 
50 SAD 416/1/18 101st Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 9th October 
1913 
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I got a suitable contractor and he agreed to put on four great land excavators and 
two smaller ones. The contract would already have amounted to £300,000 in all for 
the first part of the work. The war broke out not a month afterwards, and I said to 
the contractor. "None of us can see where the rest of the money is coming from at 
the moment; what you had better do is to go slowly"S2 
Work on the canal continued but work on the Nile barrage ceased. It was at this point 
that the development of the Gezira Scheme stalled. The work that continued was 
designed to prevent wasting the money already expended s' 
V. CONCLUSION 
Prior to the First World War the Sudan Government, made up as it was of soldier- 
administrators with little or no experience of business or commerce, were feeling their 
way to a settlement with the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. Usually the Syndicate's view 
prevailed where conflict existed. The Syndicate exploited the significance of the Sudan 
Government imprimatur in the City, while the government itself provided access to the 
holders of high office in the British Government; for example, Wingate pressed the case 
for a loan at a meeting with Lloyd-George at Balmoral in May 1913 S4 Such informal 
meetings made a difference in the relatively smallworld of imperial London; in July 1914 
a Treasury official wrote to Wingate expressing Lloyd George's support for the 
development of cotton in Sudan. 55 Similarly, both parties enjoyed support from the 
51 SAD 115/5/2-7 'Note as to the effect of war on the raising of capital required for the Gezira Irrigation 
Scheme'; FO 141/633/6 Note on the Capital Required by the Sudan Government for the Gezira 
Irrigation Scheme and for other projects' (14th May, 1917), p. 2 
52 SAD 112/10/18 Sir Murdoch MacDonald quoted in 'Minutes of evidence taken before the Board of 
Trade Committee on the Growth of Cotton in the British Empire', 1n August 1917 
53 FO 141/633/6 'Note on the Capital Required by the Sudan Government for the Gezira Irrigation 
Scheme and for other projects' (14th May, 1917), p. 3 
54 T172/82 Wingate to Lloyd-George, 9th May 1913 
55 SAD 112/3/53 J. I. Davies to Wingate, 27th July 1914 
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British Cotton Growing Association which had also been active in lobbying Lloyd 
George to support Sudan's application, describing the proposed Gezira Scheme as an 
`exceptional opportunity ... 
for the extension of cotton growing on a large scale in the 
immediate future and to the vital importance to Lancashire of the work being pushed on 
with all possible speed. 'S6 J. Arthur Hutton who wrote the letter on behalf of the BCGA 
was, of course, also a director of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. In December 1913 he 
informed the shareholders of the Syndicate that the British Cotton Growing Association 
was `taking the deepest interest in the work being carried on. We have every confidence 
regarding your prospects, and think the Syndicate has a great future before it. i57 
In terms of the negotiations themselves, they reveal a number of interesting 
feature of the imperial landscape at this time. Firstly, the vast majority of actual meetings 
took place in London where both the Sudan Government and the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate had offices. A not unimportant feature of colonial government in Sudan was 
that for three months every year, the senior officials of the government were in London 
(or at any rate in the United Kingdom and able to attend meetings), as it allowed them to 
be on hand to engage with business and the imperial government in a way simply not 
possible from the periphery. Negotiations conducted in Khartoum were slowed down by 
the need on the part of the Syndicate to refer back to London for instruction and 
guidance. In the broad context of imperial historiography, this reinforces the impression 
that London as the imperial centre was vitally important for the spread of capital and 
commerce to the colonies, and helps us to refine the view that the periphery was distant; 
for three months every year it was proximate. 
Over the extent to which the loan negotiations and the eventual agreement 
framed the imperial relationship between business, government and the colony itself, 
there is little question that it was mutually reinforcing at this time. The Syndicate certainly 
56 T172/82 J. A. Hutton (British Cotton Growing Association) to Lloyd George, 22nd N1ay 1913 
57 SAD 416/1/24 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 18th December 1913 
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gained advantages and through the Syndicate the government gained expertise and were 
granted access to financial circles that otherwise they would not have had. It was 
certainly the view of Lee Stack that this was important in shaping the reputation of the 
Sudan Government in the City of London. 58 However, the Sudan Government also 
thought that the loan itself was a guarantee and lever for imperial power and the 
influence of British officialdom in Sudan. `It is quite true', Wingate wrote, `that had the 
[British Imperial] Government refused to come to our aid it would have been better to 
have resorted to the help of a Company than not develop the Gezira at all, but in that 
case the Sudan would eventually become something like Rhodesia is today, namely the 
company would have acquired such power as would probably have resulted in its 
eventually being given a charter. "' This is a significant and revealing comment. The 
status of Rhodesia, under a company charter, was a mercantilist model of 
imperial/colonial development that had its roots in the chartered companies of the first 
wave of British Imperialism in India and Canada. No matter how unlikely this may or 
may not have been, it reveals a great deal about the way in which the Sudan Government 
viewed business, and its role in supporting commercial enterprises. Without a tangible 
input, they worried they would lose control. By adopting a corporate partnership, they 
intended to retain control. his became the main theme running through government- 
business relations throughout the Condominium period. 
Secondly, in an undated memo by an unknown author, several points are made 
which show that the Sudan Government were conscious of the complex nature of 
business-government relations with regard to land concessions. `If the Company accepts 
the obligation to hand over its system of canalisation without compensation, it 
presumably is satisfied that the cost will not be too heavy, going on to say that because 
canalisation was a gradual process `the result will be that for two or three years before the 
58 SAD 108/15/1-6 Stack to Wingate, 11th April 1912 
59 SAD 108/15/24-27, Wingate to Stack, 10th April 1913 
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end of the concession all additional land [canalised] will mean a loss for the company. ' 
Ibis, the memo deduced, was not in the interests of the government, leading to the 
conclusion in the memo that a compensation clause in the Gezira Agreement was 
generally advantageous, the implication being that it encouraged responsible practices by 
the Syndicate. Secondly, the memo struck a note of caution regarding non-renewal at the 
end of the term of the lease. It noted that if the Scheme was a success a renewal would 
be more lucrative than the initial ten year term and concluded that if there was no 
renewal there would likely be a compensation claim. The memo also considered the 
implications if the Scheme was not a success: 
I have seen so many concessions granted in Egypt with an express stipulation that 
the Government accepts no responsibility for the financial success, and the terms 
subsequently modified to help the concessionaires when in difficulties that I ought 
to draw attention to the possibility of the same thing happening in the present case. 
The importance of the point is all the greater, as the agreement is so drawn as to 
secure that only through the company can foreign capital become interested in the 
development of the Gezira Scheme 60 
The agreement defined the business-government compact in such a way as to establish 
the framework through which much of the economic history of Sudan over the next 
forty years has to be viewed. By granting an exclusive concession to the Syndicate and 
linking the development to capital intensive development based upon public debt, this 
government-business partnership came to be crucially important. 
60 SAD 109/11/146-148 Memo relating to the Gezira Scheme, undated (probably 1913) 
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Chapter 4 
Economy, Government and Business, and War, 1914-1919 
I remember when lunching with Mr Asquith a day or two after the declaration of 
war, when I said goodbye, he said `I want you to go ahead with the Gezira cotton 
growing scheme in spite of the war. ' I was only too ready to do so but Kitchener 
thought it necessary on financial grounds to close down the work of building the 
dam, though we have made some progress in excavating parts of the main canal. 
- Reginald Wingate to David Lloyd George, August 1916! 
This chapter traces the changes to the Sudan economy and the impact of the First World 
War, in particular with regard to the emerging political-economic arrangements between 
business and the colonial state. The war was to significantly alter the setting of politics 
and economics in Sudan, though there was no substantial structural change in the 
economy itself. The delay to the development of the Gezira scheme had significant 
implications for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate as a business, but also to the nature of 
the plans and the development itself, as well as the structure of the financial 
arrangements to raise the capital for the project - all of which were shaped by the 
evolution of the relationship between the Sudan Government and the Syndicate. This 
also has to be set against the background of ongoing and intensifying friction between 
Egypt and Sudan. This chapter will begin with an analysis of the economy in war before 
going on to examine the political-economic situation, in particular why there was friction 
between Egypt and Sudan relating to development plans for Sudan and the increasingly 
1 SAD 112/5/8-10 Wingate to Lloyd George (Secretary of State for War), 14th August 1916 
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independent perspective of the Sudan Government with regard to Sudanese national (or 
at any rate `territorial') interest. From there two interrelated narrative threads are 
analysed: the nature of the relationship between the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and the 
Sudan Government in terms of both operation and structure; and the financial 
arrangements relating to raising capital. 
I. WAR AND THE ECONOMY 
In addition to import and export data for this period there is also, somewhat unusually, 
data described as the `total value of external trade exclusive of specie'. ` This will allow 
two separate analyses of the impact of the war on the economy of Sudan, where 
elsewhere this thesis must rely solely on import/export data as a proxy for economic 
performance. In nominal terms export levels grew year on year, from LE 1,020,260 in 
1914 to LE 3,923,771 in 1918 -a rise of 385%. Imports also grew from LE 1,891,494 in 
1914 to LE 4,024,582 by 1918, a rise of 112%. ' In seemingly doing well the economy of 
Sudan would appear, at first sight, to be something of an exception in Africa! 
Graph 4.1. Sudan Imports and Exports, 1901-1919 
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Martin Daly reinforces this view pointing to continued success in measures to increase 
domestic production, such as improved veterinary care positively impacting on livestock 
exports. Certainly, the continued progress by the Sudan Government on matters of 
agricultural and civil health, and overall improvements to infrastructure continued to 
have a positive influence on the economy. However, this is not the whole story. Though 
Daly notes inflation internal to Sudan, especially impacting on prices and wages by the 
end of the war, he takes no account of the general phenomena of inflation in Sterling- 
based currencies such as the Egyptian pound. ' This is a significant problem as the graph 
below indicates. In contrast to the indication of the graph above, the war-time 
performance of the Sudan economy, the graph below shows static to negative growth in 
the economy in the period between 1914 and 1920. In 1913 total external trade was 
£E3,285,511; in 1918 total external trade was at a similar level, £E3,395,299 (both figures 
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To take a single commodity as an example, the amount of gum exported from 
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1914; 15,490 tons exported in 1918. ' However, the price did vary. In 1914 the value of 
gum exported was LE 314,919 at the price of LE 34.45 per ton, while in 1918 the value 
of gum exported was LE 638,837 at the price of LE 41.24 per ton, representing a 103% 
increase. Gum Arabic is an ingredient used in making explosives, the production of 
which increased as a result of the war, though whether the increase in price was demand 
led or simply tracking the general inflation in prices is not known! The table below 
shows the impact of war on the international distribution of gum exports from Sudan. 
Table 4.1. Gum Exports, 1912-1918 (tons) 
Source: GB, 19189 
1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 
Great Britain 4,328 2,821 2,636 4,923 7,388 8,407 8,034 
Germany 4,211 2,983 2,078 - - - - 
USA 3,503 2,175 2,338 2,031 1,025 703 2,613 
France 3,301 3,641 3,100 3,494 3,845 5,617 1,495 
Italy 475 511 406 369 132 879 746 
Other 3,797 2,998 1,814 843 893 1,007 3,461 
Table 4.2. Average Price of Millet at Omdurman, 1909-1920 (Per 100 Kilos in m/ms) 
Source: QB, 191910 
Mean Average price for April and May Deflated 
1909 351 349 
1910 214 209 
1911 317 308 
1912 904 852 
1913 834 787 
1914 1,312 1,247 
1915 458 382 
1916 540 391 
1917 649 375 
1918 950 468 
1919 1,422 601 
1920 2,016 706 
7 Data from Daly, Empire, p. 459 
8 Sudan Trade and Investment Guide 1960-61 (London, 1960), p. 57 
9 QB, 1918, p. 15 
10 QB, 1919, p. 11; Lawrence a Officer, "Five Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a UK Pound 
Amount, 1830 - 2005" MeasuringWorth. Com, 2006. In all cases the GDP deflator was used. The index 
created was based on 1901 prices. 
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The table above shows that this inflationary increase in prices was felt in food staples of 
Sudan, the prices above indicating the state of the millet (dura) market. In fact Sudan had 
experienced a real increase in millet prices between 1909 and 1914. Daly is right to point 
to the bumper harvest of 1914 having an effect on the price going into 1915, as can be 
seen in the table. In real terms the price of millet stayed lower than the average price for 
1911-1914 throughout the war. However, it is not clear that this was appreciated 
contemporaneously, and it is difficult to control for local market effects such as the 
reported slump in domestic demand as a result of declining foreign demand or the 
effects of hoarding. " 
Graph 4.3. Balance of Visible Trade, 1901-1919 (£ E) 









The balance of visible trade indicates something of the balance of payments in this 
period. The downward trade in the balance of visible trade to 1908 can be attributed to 
the inflow of specialist goods connected to the development of business and the 
government to government transfers between Egypt and Sudan that helped to pay for 
the provision of the early Condominium government. The gradual improvement to the 
balance of trade seen between 1909 and 1917 can be attributed to the economic growth 
associated with agriculture and export trade as explained in Chapter 1. During the war 
the supply of animals, hides and skins, as well as dura, to Egypt in aid of the war effort 
11 QB, 1916, p. 6; GB, 1918, pJ 
h 6 1 0 9 O O 0 1 0 0 
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supported the export economy somewhat. The sudden decline thereafter is largely 
attributable to the effects of the increased development activity associated with the 
Gezira Scheme after the First World War. This points to the inflow of capital in this later 
period. 
In conclusion, the First World War was of marginal significance to the long-term 
economic development of Sudan as there was no fundamental structural change in this 
period. Certainly, the external economic conditions were difficult and inflation was a 
problem, but the war was not a turning point in the economic development of the 
country, rather it was, if anything, merely a hiatus. However, any casual assumption that 
the increase in the nominal figures represents a continuation or, even, an improvement in 
the economic conditions in Sudan has to be refuted. When adjusted for inflation, the 
Sudan economy grew not at all. 
II. THE POLITICS OF IRRGATION IN THE NILE VALLEY 
From early in the Condominium there existed tension between Egypt and the Sudan as 
to the nature and direction of economic development in Sudan. In a report written by 
the British Cotton Growing Association in 1906 they described the problem: 
Until some arrangement can be come to with regard to the Egyptian government, 
by means of which some of the water of the Nile is permitted to be used by the 
Sudan, no forward movement will be made in cotton cultivation. ... 
Anything that 
is brought into competition with the Egypt is regarded by the Egyptians with 
suspicion, so that the development of the former is for a large part dependent on 
the favours of the latter. Water is insufficient in Lower Egypt during the months 
when it is most required, and the carrying out of some scheme such as suggested 
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by Sir W[illiam] Garstin would rectify this, but the fact that Sudan would be made 
capable of cultivating cotton on a large scale at the same time is looked on as 
dangerous to Egyptian interests. " 
Essentially, the question was whether the development of Sudan was better considered as 
a legitimate end in itself even if at the expense of Egypt, whether plans should be 
integrated to provide for the best interests of both countries, or whether plans to develop 
Sudan should be suborned either partly or totally, being mainly inimical to the interests 
of Egypt. This perspective amplified a political concern raised in 1910 by the British 
Cotton Growing Association who observed that though Egypt had been keen to provide 
capital `as has been required' in Sudan, up to that point `any proposal for providing 
capital for developing cotton growing in the Sudan would certainly meet with opposition 
in Egypt'. " A report by Dudgeon, a Consulting Agriculturalist, pointed out that in 
addition to both Egypt and Sudan relying on the Nile for water supply, it was `probable 
that the development of the Gezira Scheme is of more importance than the canalization 
of new areas in Egyypt. '14 
This problem was to provide the backdrop for considerable wrangling, especially 
between 1914 and 1919; i. e., after the initial plans for the Gezira Scheme had been 
accepted but before the delay caused by war had ended and construction could actually 
begin. This can only be understood in the context of Egyptian economic development, 
specifically the development of its cotton industry. 
The development of cotton cultivation in Egypt was driven in part by the 
construction of three major works of engineering after British involvement in 1882: the 
12 BUL OGA 2/2/2, 'Cotton Cultivation in Egypt and the Sudan' (1906) p. 7 
'3 SudA PK 1569 2 BRI, British Cotton Growing Association, 'Memo on the Development of Cotton 
Growing in the Sudan', Novembver, 1910, p3 
la SAD 119/9/18 Report by G. Dudgeon, Consulting Agriculturalist, The Extension of cotton growing in 
British dominions, colonies and protectorates, with special reference to Egypt' (c. 1917) 
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restoration of the Delta Barrages in 1890, the construction of the Aswan Dam and Asyut 
Barrage in 1902, and the construction of the Isna Barrage and the heightening of the 
Aswan Dam in 1912. By 1917 it was considered that the future development of 
agriculture in Egypt rested on the construction of four new engineering works -a dam 
on the White Nile at Gebel El Aulia `for increasing the summer supply of Egypt'; a dam 
on the Blue Nile at Sennar to irrigate the Gezira; a barrage on the main Nile at Nag 
Hamadi for irrigation of the `Girga and South Asyut Provinces in low floods and for 
increasing the storage of summer supply in the Gebel El Aulia reservior'; and `the 
construction of the irrigation and Drainage works in the Delta for the reclamation of 
uncultivated areas' and improvement in land already cultivated. The report concluded 
that `all of the works form the links of one continuous chain and are so interwoven that 
they must be considered as one problem; the construction of one of them will inevitably 
be followed by that of the others. ''' All of these required the increased use of Nile 
waters. The increased tension after 1914 was created by the increased scope of the 
Gezira scheme envisaged by 1917 `as compared with that in contemplation when the 
negotiations were suspended by the war in 1914.16 
Plans to irrigate the Gezira stretched back to the beginning of the Condominium 
and became a principal component of the government's development strategy. " When 
the Sudan Loan Act was passed through Parliament in 1913 it was planned to delay the 
dam work for `at least two or three years'. " No concrete plans for the irrigation of the 
Gezira existed though the outcome had been agreed, including a dam at Makroar, a few 
is SAD 112/6/23-25, Anon, `Egypt and Sudan: Proposed Works of Irrigation, Drainage and Flood 
Protection' (July 1917) 
16 SAD 112/9/23 `Minutes of a Meeting held at the offices of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd on 11th 
September, 1917, between the Sudan Government Delegates and the Board of Directors of the Syndicate' 
17 OGR 1902, p. 7; CGR 1907, p. 19,5-6; SAD 112/10/6 Bonham-Carter quoted in `Minutes of evidence 
taken before the Board of Trade Committee on the Growth of Cotton in the British Empire', 1' August 
1917 
18 SAD 108/14/44-48 Wingate to Stack, 4th May 1913 
141 
miles south of Sennar and a canal taking off from above the dam for the irrigation of 
100,000 feddans in the Gezira. "' 
There were, however, two sets of designs. The first was by Tottenham, Inspector 
General of Irrigation while the second was by Captain Ralston Kennedy of the Royal 
Engineers, more relevantly the Sudan Government's Director of Works at that time. In 
July 1913 both of the detailed plans by Tottenham and Kennedy were rejected on 
engineering grounds by a Commission chaired by Sir Murdoch MacDonald, consisting 
additionally of Sir William Garstein, McClure and Sir Arthur Webb because `they failed 
to deal with the closure of the deep eastern channel of the river in a practical or 
satisfactory manner. ' In early 1914 Macdonald, McClure and Webb conducted a visit to 
Sudan and this was followed by the adoption of new plans to irrigate the Gezira which 
were approved by Lord Kitchener. " These plans were described by MacDonald in 
evidence given to the Board of Trade in 1917: 
The dam itself across the valley, the trough of the Blue Nile, will be 3 kilometres or 
about 2 miles long. There will be 100 sluices through the heart of the structure, 
practically in the same way as in the dam, which is across the main Nile at the dam 
of Assuan. These sluices will be short 26 ft. high by about 6 ft wide. In addition 
provision has been made for the very greatest quantity of water which it has been 
estimated will ever come down in flood time. I have provided for 15,000 tons a 
second. " 
19 SAD 112/6/28 Memo: Blue Nile Irrigation Scheme' (undated but likely 1914) 
20 SAD 112/6/28 Memo: Blue Nile' 
21 SAD 112/10/6 Bonham-Carter quoted in 'M nutes of evidence taken before the Board of Trade 
Committee on the Growth of Cotton in the British Empire', i' August 1917 
u SAD 112/10/13-14 Sir Murdoch MacDonald quoted in'Minutes of evidence taken before the Board of 
Trade Committee on the Growth of Cotton in the British Empire', i' August 1917 
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MacDonald believed that the construction work could be completed in four years, and 
could be completed in three years with much greater expense! ' There was, however, 
significant criticism of the scheme stemming from Colonel Ralston Kennedy and William 
Willcocks (the designer of the Aswan Dam), both of whom were engineers with 
considerable experience of working in Egypt. Kennedy's principal claim was that 
MacDonald had falsified or `tampered' with the data on the Nile flow during 1913/14, 
the lowest year on record. 24 
Kennedy then began a systematic programme of trying to run down MacDonald's 
plan. He questioned when the irrigation in Gezira would end and whether this date 
would interfere with Egyptian irrigation needs. His argument was that irrigation from the 
Nile would continue until too late in the year to suit Egyptian interests. `At the present 
moment', he wrote, `the Sudan Government is being treated to the grotesque spectacle of 
the Sudan Plantations Syndicate trying to get away from these very late dates or irrigation 
by frenzied pumping. It is to be remembered that if cotton is to be watered even as late 
as 15' April perennial irrigation in the Gezira on a large scale has removed its death blow 
till ample storage becomes definitely available which is not the case at present. " 
MacDonald was himself aware of the importance of the Nile waters (it was, of course, of 
inescapable importance to engineers and politicians alike), but claimed that the water 
supply was `ample for all the requirements both of Egypt and the Sudan. It is quite 
true. '26 Though MacDonald conceded that Egypt had had difficulties in the production 
of flour as a result of the First World War and this in turn had limited the water supply, 
he also thought that the Aswan storage facilities were adequate. Instead, MacDonald saw 
a political factor at play. In evidence to the Board of Trade he said: 
u SAD 112/10/17 Sir Murdoch MacDonald quoted in'Minutes of evidence taken before the Board of 
Trade Committee on the Growth of Cotton in the British Empire', 1' August 1917 
24 Tvedt, River Nile, 95-96 
25 SAD 108/14/1-5 Kennedy to Symes, 6th April 1917 
26 SAD 112/10/8 MacDonald quoted in 'Minutes of evidence taken before the Board of Trade Committee 
on the Growth of Cotton in the British Empire', 1x August 1917 
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Egypt has been thinking of expansion, and to provide for that expansion Egypt is 
also considering where to find additional storage. The storage proposed will very 
amply meet all that she requires for many a long day in the future - 50,60 pr 70 years 
at least. ' 
1VIacDonald's view was that a barrage on the White Nile would provide all the water 
needed for Egypt, thus leaving the Blue Nile waters exclusively for the irrigation of 
Sudan and the Gezira. 
Though by April 1917 Kennedy had `severed his connection with the Governor 
General's Council', he continued to be a thorn in the side of the Khartoum and Cairo 
administrations for several years despite repeated affirmations of MacDonald's position 
by both the Sudan Government and the High Commission in Cairo. Kennedy's 
antagonism took on an obsessional quality in the early 1920s, and at the very least his 
eccentricity is obvious, and should be used to question the extent to which he can be 
thought of as credible Z$ 
In a recent book on the politics of the Nile waters, Terfe Tvedt makes an attempt 
to rehabilitate Kennedy stating that his criticisms of MacDonald's plans would have been 
lent greater credence had Kennedy known that MacDonald `in addition to his position in 
the Egyptian government drew £ 1000 as salary from the Sudan Government'29 This 
seemingly innocuous fact is given greater importance because of a court action that 
27 SAD 112/10/9 MacDonald quoted in 'Minutes of evidence taken before the Board of Trade Committee 
on the Growth of Cotton in the British Empire', 1' August 1917 
28 SAD 108/14/4-5 Wingate to MacDonald, 18th April 1917; SAD 108/14/6-7, MacDonald to Wingate, 
25th July 1917; SAD 108/14/8- 10, Bonham-Carter to Wingate, 261h July 1917; SAD 108/14/15-16, 
MacDonald to Wingate 14th July 1920; SAD 108/14/13-14, Wingate to MacDonald, 30th August 1917; FO 
141/451/8 Stack to Allenby, 18th May 1920; FO 141/451/8 Asser to Stack 15th April 1920; FO 141/451/8 
Egyptian Mail, 30th September, 1921, Letter to the Editor from Col. Kennedy; the presence of this cutting 
in the archives indicates that the Residency in Cairo, perhaps not unreasonably on the basis of the 
evidence, thought that Kennedy was slightly mad. 
29 Tvedt, River Nile, p. 96 
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Kennedy sought to bring against MacDonald that was denied because MacDonald was 
not a Sudan official? ' Yet this is to stretch the argument that can be founded on the 
facts. Tvedt's assertion rests on two considerable logical leaps - that MacDonald was 
able to use his connection to Wingate in a venal manner, and second, that it would have 
been wrong of Wingate to deny the legal action because MacDonald was paid a£ 1000 
retainer, whether this establishes that MacDonald was or was not a Sudan Government 
official is moot. 
William Willcocks made similar criticisms to Kennedy, and was more widely 
respected by contemporaries. Tvedt again: 
Willcocks also criticised the close involvement of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate 
in the Gezira Scheme. He said that the Sudan Syndicate official is `out to make 
money, the Sudan Government official is out to do God's work. There is between 
them the difference of a whole Heaven. ' He certainly overlooked the very close 
relationship between the British officers and the Syndicate! " 
Tvedt's conclusion that Wiillcocks was idealising the Sudan Government is by and large 
correct. However, MacDonald was cleared by two commissions formed to examine 
whether there was any substance to the allegations, one of which took evidence under 
oath. Subsequent to this MacDonald sued both Kennedy and Willcocks for criminal libel 
as a result of feeling that his reputation had been impugned'' Nevertheless, a problem 
arises for Tvedt (and also in this study) because a lack of technical scientific 
understanding of irrigation schemes and river flows render a judgement impossible as to 
who was correct. 
30 Tvedt, River Nile, p. 96 
31 Tvedt, River Nile, p. 96 
32 SAD 108/14/15-16 MacDonald to Wingate, 14th July 1920; Tvedt, River Nile, 97-99 
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Instead, our principal task is to set this tension in its political-economic context. 
Tvedt argues that Kennedy and Willcocks were `unable to understand the strategic 
change of policy in London towards the Sudan and that the British government backed 
MacDonald's plan. ' In this Tvedt is essentially correct. By c. 1919, as is developed 
elsewhere in this thesis, Sudan had become a good deal more separate in its relationship 
with Egypt than it had been previously- in the imagination of the Sudan Political Service 
officials, in terms of Sudan's entity within the imperial system, and the North African 
sub-system of imperial relationships. And not least of all of this was that London 
concurred in seeing that that the architecture of the empire in the region had changed. 
Nile water supply and control was important to Egyptian territorial sovereignty and 
claims over Sudan, just as the Nile waters and the developmental plans for the Gezira 
became central to Sudan's territorial independence, the vitality of the colonial state and 
the sustainability of the separation from Egypt, and singular corporate identity within the 
imperial system. Control over these relationships was important to London. As Tvedt 
comments: 
In London the government worked to weaken Egypt's position in the Sudan and 
strengthen its own. A formally independent Egypt, London calculated, would for 
geopolitical reasons be a weak downstream state since its economic lifeline was 
transnational in character. " 
Regardless, then, of whether MacDonald preferred Sudan over Egypt, and falsified his 
data to support for the Gezira Scheme, the principal conclusion to draw is that in the 
tension between Egypt and Sudan over water rights, access to the Nile and control over 
development plans, by 1919/1920 Sudan held primacy. This context therefore embeds 
33 Tvedt, River Nile, p. 96,101 
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evolving relationships between finance, the Sudan Government, and the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate within the increasing and intensifying friction between Sudan and 
Egypt in this period. 
III. FINANCE AND THE GEZIRA SCHEME 
At the last meeting held in the Sudan Plantation Syndicate's buildings in the City of 
London before the outbreak of war it was clear to the Syndicate that they and the 
government `appeared to be mutually agreed on practically all points' and in January 1915 
a meeting between senior government and Syndicate officials concluded by looking 
forward to resuming negotiations `at the point where they were broken off' once `normal 
conditions' returned. 34 Expectations, of course, were that the war would be short. 
Perhaps as a result of this assumption, during the early years of the war the sources 
reveal only a slow gestation of the relationship between the Sudan Government and the 
Syndicate. 
The `Sudan Government Loan Ordinance 1915' was passed by the Sudan 
Government's Governor General's Council in May 1915? ' The effect of this legislation 
was to adapt the envisaged pattern of expenditure for the Gezira Scheme whereby the 
amount allocated for irrigation was £2,000,000, while that for railways and other 
irrigation/contingencies was £800,000 and £200,000 respectively? ' In July McGillivray 
had a meeting with Sir Murdoch MacDonald that advanced the forward planning for the 
Gezira Scheme, and it seems clear from this that MacDonald was the principal state actor 
74 SAD 416/1/46 Minutes of an adjourned Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
13th January 1915 
35 FO 141/633/6 Wingate to Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, High Commission, Cairo, 8th June 1915; E. E. 
Bernard, 'The Sudan Government Loan Ordinance 1915: Explanatory Note' 
36 FO 141/633/6 E. E. Bernard, 'The Sudan Government Loan Ordinance 1915: Explanatory Note' 
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acting to coordinate development plans at this time" Towards the end of the same year 
Wingate requested that Lancashire buyers be present in Sudan during the season, a sign 
that the government were keen to keep the cotton growing project alive, if nothing else. " 
However, the first two years of war reflected an essentially static relationship between 
Syndicate and government and it was 1916 before the nature of the relationship began to 
change more significantly. 
In May 1916 Bonham Carter reported to Wingate regarding proposals to update 
and possibly change the terms of the Gezira Agreement in consultation with 
McGillivray. 39 Meetings in the early summer ensured that by the 23' August the 
questions relating to the area and irrigation had been settled to the satisfaction of both 
parties and the Syndicate thought that it was `practically certain that the Government 
would not insist on the Syndicate's obligation under the draft agreement of finding the 
original £500,000 at par. ' McGillivray added that `there was also every reason to expect 
that a full twelve years run, instead of eight years with a qualified option for a further 
four years would be granted. '40 
At the same meeting it was reported that the Sudan Government had referred to 
London over the issue of the Loan Acts that authorised the loans that were not taken up 
before the First World War. In October 1916 McGillivray was authorised by the Board 
of the Syndicate to offer the Sudan Government £500,000 via two-year Sudan 
Government Treasury Bonds at seven and half percent on the understanding that the 
Gezira Agreement was soon to be completed to the `mutual satisfaction' of both 
37 SAD 416/1/49 132nd Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 8th July 
1915 
38 SAD 416/1/55 137th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 21rt 
December 1915 
39 SAD 112/5/1 Bonham-Carter to Wingate 17th May 1916 
11 SAD 416/1/63 146th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 23^" August 
1916 
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parties! ' While subscribers for this sum had for the most part already been found, the 
Syndicate noted that their function in the Loan raising process might change and the 
imperial government might issue the money direct to the Syndicate themselves, and in 
January 1917 the government rejected the offer from the Syndicate. The reason was that 
the position had changed, the Directors noting that although `the Syndicate might be 
invited to give their assistance towards finding the funds if required, it was understood 
that no financial responsibility of any kind would attach to them in connection 
therewith. ' The Board of the Syndicate left McGillivray to agree the details of the 
agreement. The outstanding issues were broadly agreed at a meeting of the Syndicate and 
the Sudan Government on 29th November 1910 
In a meeting to discuss the provision of funds under the Government of the 
Sudan Loan Acts held in the Foreign Office in late June 1917, Edgar Bernard the 
Financial Secretary of the Sudan Government, pointed out that the effect of war time 
borrowing by the imperial government in London had raised the interest rate for 
government securities with a Treasury guarantee. This, Bernard explained, necessitated 
an early decision as to how the Scheme was to be financed upon the cessation of war, 
though the Sudan Government were also aware that the British Government were 
unlikely to act until war was over. The Sudan Government used this meeting as an 
opportunity to point out that the other widespread financial effect of the First World 
War - inflation - had increased the projected cost of the Gezira Scheme, the scale of 
which they argued should be increased in any case. " Thus, though originally the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate planned to raise the funds, after the outbreak of war the Syndicate 
41 SAD 416/1/66-67 150th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 19th 
October 1916 
42 SAD 416/1/66-67 150th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 19th 
October 1916; SAD 416/1/80 155th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
24th January 1917; SAD 112/9/2-8 'Note of Meeting held on 2" August 1917 at Sir A. L. Webb's office 
between the Sudan Government delegates and the representatives of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate' 
43 FO 141/633/6 Memo: 'Sudan Cotton Producing Scheme' (14th August 1917), p. 2; FO 141/633/6 Note 
on the Capital Required by the Sudan Government for the Gezira Irrigation Scheme and for certain other 
projects' (14th May 1917), 1-4 
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had made it clear that `the rate of interest at which a private company could raise the 
necessary funds would be high and it would possibly be in the interest of the 
government, the Syndicate, and the cultivators alike that the necessary capital should be 
raised as part of the general Government Loan. t44 
The Syndicate's obligation to raise £500,000 at par was cancelled in the summer 
of 1917 with the understanding that the Syndicate would help the Sudan Government 
raise money in the City. 45 Subsequent discussions of finance were postponed on the 
advice of Lovat who insisted that the renegotiation of the Gezira Agreement needed to 
be completed before they proceeded. 46 The Syndicate evidently still assumed that they 
would be vital to the raising of capital at this time, offering to raise £500,000 in the City 
in light of the reluctance of the Treasury to make guaranteed capital available in 
wartime. " However, this offer was not taken up. In December 1918 another offer to 
raise capital on behalf of the Sudan Government was made by the Syndicate, the 
government again declined. " 
Throughout 1917 there were many meetings between the government and the 
Syndicate to agree the terms of the relationship, with an apparent intensification towards 
the Summer and Autumn. 49 In late June a meeting was held at the Foreign Office to 
discuss what was to be done about the Loan Acts that had been passed before the war, 
with representatives present from both the Treasury and the Board of Trade. The 
Treasury was relieved that the Sudan Government did not require the money 
*4 FO 141/633/6 'Note on the Capital', p. 6 
45 SAD 112/9/43 'Note of Meeting held on 2' August 1917 at Sir A. L. Webb's office' 
46 SAD 112/9/24-25 'Minutes of a Meeting held at the offices of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd on 
11th September, 1917, between the Sudan Government Delegates and the Board of Directors of the 
Syndicate' 
47 SAD 112/8/21 Eckstein to Bernard, 12th September 1917; SAD 112/8/22 Eckstein to McGillivray, 12th 
September 1917; SAD 112/8/26-29 Bernard to Wingate, 14th September 1917 
18 FO 141/633/6 Telegram Murdoch MacDonald to Keown-Boyd, High Commission, Cairo, 24th 
December 1918 
49 SAD 416/1/80 155th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 24th January 
1917; SAD 112/9/23-38 'Minutes of a Meeting held at the Offices of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd 
on 11th September 1917 between the Sudan Government Delegates and the Board of Directors of the 
Syndicate' 
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immediately since all financial resources were reserved for the war effort. 5° Nevertheless, 
Bonham-Carter remained convinced that Sir Malcolm Ramsey, the Treasurys 
representative was supportive and `sympathetic' to Sudan's needs. The Treasury seem to 
have been genuinely keen on the plans to develop Sudan. Additionally, at a subsequent 
meeting, Sir Albert Stanley promised the Board of Trade's support to the Sudan 
Government in any application to the Treasury to update the terms of the pre-war Loan 
Ac51 
In early October 1917 the Foreign Office contacted Wingate to inform him that 
Bernard would be required to attend a meeting with the President of the Board of Trade 
prior to plans for the Gezira Scheme being submitted to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. 52 Eckstein commented that: 
During the past summer, as indicated in the Directors' Report, the Sudan 
Government sent to the country eminent delegates for the purpose of bringing our 
Agreement with them up to date and also for the continuation of the Gezira 
district. I am happy to say that all our negotiations - and there were a great many 
meetings - were conducted in a mutually satisfactory and cordial manner, and that 
both objects were achieved, so that the Sudan Government is in the position of 
continuing irrigation work" 
Central to these negotiations was the issue of cost. In July 1917 McGillivray estimated 
the cost of the capital requirements of the Gezira Scheme to be £840,000 s' This figure 
50 SAD 112/8/1-2 Bonham-Carter to Wingate, 9th July 1917 
51 SAD 112/8/5 H. P. Hamilton, H1vL Treasury, to Bonham-Carter, 18th July 1917; SAD 112/8/1-2 
Bonharn-Carter to Wingate, 9th July 1917; the meeting was on 4th July 1917 
52 SAD 112/9/39 Foreign Office to Wingate, 3'd October 1917 
53 SAD 416/1/96 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 20th February 1918 
54 SAD 416/1/83-84 McGillivray to Bonham-Carter, 4th July 1917 
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was supported by MacDonald who concurred. In the passage below MacDonald lays out 
the significant items of cost: 
All the calculations have been based on the assumption that there will be 100,000 
acres of cotton in the first minimum scheme, 100,000 acres of green crop and 
100,000 acres of fallow land. The necessary works were, as Mr Bonham- Carter has 
told you, to cost £2,000,000. As a matter of fact that was the original estimate 
which Lord Kitchener and myself agreed that the works should cost. The site of 
the dam had already been settled, and he asked me to examine the various 
proposals that had been put forward. I had to prepare an estimate for them, and 
the estimate was, as Mr Bonham-Carter said, £2,000,000. But at the time Lord 
Kitchener intended that the canal should be for only 120,000 feddans altogether. 
His lordship intended, as the schemes went on, gradually to widen the canal, 
whereas in my estimates now before you the intention is to provide in the original 
figures for what Lord Kitchener intended to do as the works went along. That has 
rather increased them, and the total now, as compared with the original figure of 
£2,000,000 is £2,300,000. But we have spent some money already in starting and 
stopping the works and, as you gentlemen will appreciate, that is not a very 
remunerative sort of undertaking; if you are bound to lose something of the money 
dealt with in that way, so that I have allowed in all £2,550,000 thus the total cost of 
the dam will be £ 1,750,000 and the canal £800,000, or £2,550,000 for both. There 
are some smaller works which others will undertake . 
Those smaller works are field 
works including probably the provision of ginning factories and farm implements. 
£540,000 has been allowed for those, making a total altogether of just under 
£3,100,000. But interest has to be added during construction and until what is 
considered the paying stage is reached. In the figures that have already been given 
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to you in the note that Mr Bonham-Carter referred to, you will find that the total 
has been put at £4,000,000. Practically £ 1,000,000 has been added for interest. 
£785,000 has been added for interest on the first item of page 2 in the note at the 
top, and lower down there is another item of £164,000 for interest. The £840,000 
item is reduced by £300,000 as per the note below, so that really the cost will be 
about £4,000,000, or, if you add the amount of money which banking people 
would handle in a banking fashion to tenants, £300,000 the total would come to 
practica11y. 4,400,000 ss 
However, estimates varied widely. One source estimated the cost of the irrigation of the 
Gezira plain to be £2,550,000, minor canalisation at £840,000, interest on both of the 
above before production stage was reached to be £950,395 with `repayment to the 
National Bank of Egypt of the balance of the El Obeid Railway' at £740,000, bringing 
the total to £5,080,395. The Sudan Government wished to buy back the loan owed to 
the National Bank of Egypt because as a commercial loan, albeit to a government, it 
could be called in with only six months notice. The Sudan Government also used this 
opportunity to lobby for the repayment on the Sudan Loan Act debt to be extended 
beyond the thirty years originally agreed sb 
It was argued that what was needed in Sudan was not the immediate provision of 
large amounts of capital, but a `steady flow' to `enable well considered schemes, which 
promise to be profitable, to be taken in hand, and carried through without unnecessary 
delays. " In contrast to the Memo on `Sudan Cotton Producing Schemes' (August 1917), 
the `Note on Capital Required' (May 1917) advised that the total capital required for the 
ss SAD 112/10/12-13 Sir Murdoch MacDonald quoted in `Mnutes of evidence taken before the Board of 
Trade Committee on the Growth of Cotton in the British Empire', 1st August 1917 
56 FO 141/633/6 Memo: 'Sudan Cotton Producing Scheme' (14th August 1917), p. 3; FO 141/633/6'Note 
on the Capital', p. 7 
57 FO 141/633/6 'Note on the Capital', p. 7 
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development of cotton growing in Sudan to be £6,600,000, comprising of £3,700,000 for 
irrigation of Gezira, Tokar and Kassala, £2,160,000 for railway development and 
£740,000 for the repayment of the debt owed to the National Bank of Egypt 58 
However, by late 1918 the Sudan Government believed that the overall cost of 
development was in fact much higher. Lee Stack, as acting Governor General of the 
Sudan Government wrote to Reginald Wingate to ask that the Sudan Government 
should renew their negotiations with the Treasury for the amendment of the government 
of the Sudan Loan Acts 1913 and 1914. Stack wanted to change the agreement so that 
the Treasury guaranteed the loans for 51 per cent interest, that the repayment period 
was doubled from thirty to sixty years with the overall cost of development to be some 
£9,000,000 59 
Stack argued that though it was not the intention of the Sudan Government to 
begin the process of development in all of the schemes it was `thought desirable to 
include them now in the schedule to obviate the necessity for a further application to the 
Treasury and the passing of a new act. '60 Wingate wrote to Arthur Balfour, the Foreign 
Secretary, to state that he was in full agreement that the loan arrangements be changed in 
line with Stack's wishes. ' The following month MacDonald cabled the Sudan 
Government to inform them that the estimates for the labour costs of the cotton 
producing development works were significant underestimates, possibly increasing the 
required amount by over one and a half million. ' Indeed, the pressure from government 
at this time seems to have been to ensure that the finance for the Scheme was fully 
costed and provided in full by any loan that was to be issued. The decision to reject the 
58 FO 141/633/6 'Note on the Capital', p. 9 
59 FO 141/633/6 Stack to Wingate, 24th November 1918; £3,780,000 for irrigation in Gezira, Tokar, and 
Kassala; £2,160,000 for railway expansion, £2,310,000 for interest and £740,000 for the buyback on the 
National Bank of Egypt Loan 
60 FO 141/633/6 Stack to Wingate, 24th November 1918 
61 FO 141/633/6 Wingate to Balfour, 29th November 1918 
62 FO 141/633/6 Telegrams: Bernard to Stack, 5th December 1918; Telegram, Stack to Bernard, 6th 
December 1918; Telegram High Commission, Cairo, Egypt, to Foreign Office, London, 10th December 
1918; Sudan Government to High Commission, Cairo, 3 1n December 1918 
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offer made by the Syndicate to raise £6,670,000 using the Treasury guarantee in 
December 1918 was taken in part because the amount was inadequate to fully fund the 
Scheme; it was also thought that to accept the offer would require new Acts of 
Parliament and an additional worry expressed was that in order to meet the difference 
money might have to be raised on the open market without a guarantee 63 
In October 1918 the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate 
considered three points relating to the negotiations that refined some of the parameters 
of the business-government relationship that had been left unresolved by the 
negotiations before 1914, or had changed in the intervening period. Both sides broadly 
agreed, but the recurrent theme of these, relatively minor differences in emphases, was 
the preservation of government influence over the growing and marketing of cotton. In 
future, the government's share of profits was to be paid as soon as the season's account 
has been closed; the Tayiba and Barakat crops were to be sold separately unless 
otherwise agreed with the government in each case; and the government was to be 
consulted regarding policy of selling Tayiba crop prior to any sales. " The government 
was therefore to be included in any significant decision making relating to the marketing 
of cotton. By December of 1918, it was the very end of the war in Europe that prevented 
final ratification of the Gezira Agreement, though it was reported at the Ordinary 
General Meeting that `the draft agreement, as far as we have been able to complete it, has 
this year been approved by the Sudan Government. i65 In January 1919 the National Debt 
Commissioners agreed to new bonds being issued to cover the £500,000 advanced 
before the First World War, which relieved the pressure to repay the amount, due as it 
63 FO 141/633/6 Telegrams: Murdoch MacDonald to Keown-Boyd, High Commision, Cairo, 24th 
December 1918 
'4 SAD 416/1/101-102162" Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 9th 
October 1918 
65 SAD 416/1/ 106 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 20th December 1918 
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was in that month. ` At the same time, the Treasury dealt a slight blow to the Sudan 
Government's hopes of developing cotton growing widely in Sudan with a fully financed 
capital issue. Though the Treasury agreed to amend the Sudan Loan Acts from before 
the war, they only would do so by expanding the guarantee from £3,000,000 to 
£5,000,000. Additionally, they did not think that the City would find acceptable the 
proposed sixty year period for the repayment of capital. The Treasury's justification was 
that `in view of the pressure on the United Kingdom for capital expenditure on urgent 
reconstruction matters [the] Treasury note that it is not proposed to start works other 
than the Gezira Scheme now and consider that that the above provision should meet 
requirements. i67 Stack responded saying that `the Sudan Government regret that HM. 
Treasury are unable to see its way to making any application to Parliament at the present 
moment for authority to guarantee a loan amounting to £9,000,000 and that the Act now 
in question must be strictly limited to such a sure. " 
On the 11" October 1919 the `Sudan Guaranteed Loan Ordinance 1919' was 
passed, which approved that £6,000,000 was made available for the `works of the Gezira 
Scheme including repayment of temporary loans raised under Government of Soudan 
Acts 1913 and 1915' (sic) which totalled £4,900,000, with £700,000 additionally allocated 
for development of the railway system in Sudan and £400,000 allocated for the irrigation 
of the Tokar region. Reuter's reported that this loan was floated on 20th October 1919 69 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Before 1914 the Sudan economy had enjoyed a growth spurt followed by levelling off of 
growth. Between 1914 and 1918, the economy of Sudan did not grow in any significant 
66 FO 141/633/6 Telegranm: Foreign Office to High Commission, Cairo, 15th January 1919 
67 FO 141/633/6 Telegram: Foreign Office to High Commission, Cairo, 19th January 1919 
68 FO 141/633/6 Stack to His Excellency, High Commissioner in Cairo, 27th March 1919 
69 FO 141/633/6 `The Sudan Guaranteed Loan Ordinance 1919'; FO 141/633/6 Letter from Ministry of 
Justice, Cairo, to `The Residency, High Commission, Cairo, 20th October 1919 
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way, compounding the need to develop the productive capacity of the economy. After 
the outbreak of the war the political-economic relationships began to be shaped by 
different circumstances to those that prevailed before 1914. First was the changing role 
of Sudan in overall imperial strategy and security. Whereas Sudan had originally been a 
bulwark connected to the defence and security of Egypt, the war changed this 
relationship. Sudan increasingly took on a dynamic of its own rather than being merely 
subsidiary to the needs of Egypt, seen here in the dual need to use the Nile waters for 
economic purposes. This led to tension between Egypt and Sudan, a topic touched on 
briefly in this chapter, but actually requiring considerable further analysis taken up in 
Chapter 5. Nonetheless, the conclusion drawn here is that the necessity of developing the 
Sudan economy via cotton growing took on a geo-political significance in this period in 
addition to a developmental context related to the viability of the colonial state in Sudan 
itself. As Terfe Tevdt comments: 
This system [irrigation of the Nile for cotton growing] also meant that the interests 
of the Sudanese were directly tied to a British project that was born in conflict with 
Egypt and which, it was expected, would continue to be conflict with Egyptian 
Nationalist Propaganda. 70 
To an extent it was to both London and Khartoum's advantage to have a conflictual 
relationship between Egypt and Sudan, not only as a means of more effectively 
developing and running Sudan from the Sudan Government's perspective, but also as a 
way in which the British Government could maintain its leverage in the region, 
specifically to have influence over Egypt. 
70 Tvedt, Rives Nile, p. 109 
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The second significant shift in the political-economic compact in the period 
between 1914 and 1919 was the declining significance of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate 
to the raising of capital for development, and the concomitant increase in the role of the 
Sudan Government. The initial raison d'etre for the involvement of business in the form 
of the Syndicate was to attract capital. Indeed, as mentioned previously, before 1914 the 
Sudan Government wondered if they failed to attract business they might have to hand 
over Sudan to a chartered company to run. Even though there is some doubt as to how 
realistic this worry was, what is certain is that by the end of the war the government 
needed the Syndicate far less than before, and the Syndicate was increasingly dependent 
on the finance and capital put in place by the government. 'T'his inversion of the previous 
relationship was to shape the economic history of Sudan quite significantly in the inter- 
war period, and was to alter the government's strategy towards the Syndicate. While the 
Syndicate was to remain dependent on the government for capital, the original terms of 
the arrangement in terms of the allocation of the profits remained the same, based on the 
tripartite agreement from 1912. Though this might seem to establish the Syndicate as a 
free-rider in the agreement (and thus to their benefit) it made the Syndicate vulnerable to 
the government's increased influence. Put simply, the Syndicate was far less useful to the 
government once inflation and increased interest rates had put paid to the Syndicate's 
role of raising money for the Gezira Scheme in the open market. 
The third theme to draw upon is the pressure that was brought to bear from 
Lancashire for more cotton, and the continuity of vision offered by the Sudan 
Government to sate this need. In 1917 Arthur Hutton of the British Cotton Growing 
Association and the Syndicate asked Murdoch MacDonald about the future viability of 
the project and the need to support the cotton industry in Great Britain, stating that 
`Lancashire is likely to be hard pressed for cotton and one does not want to see any 
promising scheme delayed, if one can bring sufficient pressure to bear on the 
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government to enable them to find the money. " This view echoed that given by the 
British Cotton Growing Association as communicated to the Board of Trade in February 
of the same year. '' Bernard argued that the Gezira Scheme had already been approved 
and begun; that the interlude of the War had been highly inconvenient, but was not in 
itself enough to consider that the Scheme ought or needed to be approved and 
legitimated again. He submitted that `we have been delegated to come here from the 
Sudan and lay these schemes before the government, not as new schemes but with 
reference to their increased cost and the altered conditions for obtaining the necessary 
funds to finance them brought about by war. ' 
As was the case before the First World War the British Cotton Growing 
Association and other interest groups put pressure on the British Government to 
develop cotton growing in Sudan. In February 1917 the Financial News reported that 
representatives of the BCGA, the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' Associations, 
the Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers Association, the Wigan and District Cotton 
Employees Association, the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton Spinners, the 
Amalgamated Association of Cord and Blowing Room Operatives, the Amalgamated 
Weavers Association, the Operative Cotton Spinners Provincial Association (Bolton) and 
the Chambers of Commerce of Bradford, Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester and Oldham 
resolved that `irrigation works for the development of the Gezira Plain should be pushed 
on with the least possible delay. ' IThis trend was compounded because as The Times and 
The Economist reported in September 1917 Egypt had reduced the area under cotton 
71 SAD 112/10/21 J. Arthur Hutton quoted in 'Minutes of evidence taken before the Board of Trade Committee on the Growth of Cotton in the British Empire', 1' August 1917 
n SAD 112/6/21 Cutting from The Financial News, 15th February 1917, Board of Trade's Encouraging 
Answer to Influential Deputation' 
73 SAD 112/10/28 E. E. Bernard quoted in Minutes of evidence taken before the Board of Trade 
Committee on the Growth of Cotton in the British Empire', 1' August 1917 
74 SAD 112/6/21 Cutting from The Financial News, 15th February 1917 
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cultivation by circa one third so as to devote more agricultural land to growing 
foodstuffs. " 
The position of the Sudan Government when representing their case to the 
British Government was that capital intensive development, backed by the state was the 
best way to ensure general imperial development and trade. As Bonham- Carter wrote of 
a meeting with Lord Balfour of Burleigh: `I suggested to him that the best way to 
encourage inter-imperial trade as far as the colonies and protectorates are concerned was 
for the Imperial Government to facilitate the provision of capital for schemes of 
development. '76 This reliance on large scale debt was to be the modus operandi for 
imperial development as a whole in the inter-war period. In Sudan the singular and 
unique relationship between government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate had tied 
the two together in an economic project which required vast and increasing sums of 
money, committed Sudan to development via one cash crop, and embedded and 
reaffirmed an increasingly symbiotic and interdependent relationship between business 
and government. 
75 SAD 112/68/30-31 Cuttings from The Times, 14th September 1917 and The Economist, 15th September 
1917 
76 SAD 112/8/1-2 Bonham-Carter to Wingate, 9th July 1917 
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Chapter 5 
Government and the limits of economic growth, 1919-1939 
The native press is right in emphasising how disappointing the Gezira Scheme has 
turned out. No great wealth and no great change in the material condition of the 
people has yet resulted, although this is of course due to the world prices and 
influences beyond our control. 
- Arthur Gaitskell, then a manager of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, August 1938' 
Ultimately economic development in Sudan during the Condominium was not widespread? 
The developmental effort was narrowly concentrated on cotton growing in the Gezira 
region, and even there the wider benefits for Sudanese society have been questioned? The 
government's contribution to economic development is important and any assessment has 
to take into account both the long-run structural changes brought about (such as the Gezira 
Scheme itself) and the record of policymaking over time. Martin Daly concludes that the 
officials of the Sudan Political Service showed `[d]isdain for development' -a withering 
criticism. 4 Yet at the time of the opening of the Gezira Scheme in the mid 1920s there was a 
positive optimism among officials and luminaries in Sudan, and they tended to be of one 
voice in praise of the cooperative/corporative nature of the partnership between tenant 
I SAD 418/6/4 A. Gaitskell, 'A Consideration of the General Trend of the Gezira Scheme and its effect on our 
future interests here', 25th August 1938 
2 see J. Tosh, 'The Economy of the Southern Sudan under the British, 1898-1955, in Journal of 1mpe, ial and 
Commonwealth History, 1981,275-288; and P. E. Lovejoy & S. Baier, `The desert-side economy of the central 
Sudan', The International Journal ofAfrican Histo, ical Studies, 1975,5 51 - 581 
3 see V. Bemal, 'Cotton and Colonial Order in Sudan: A Social Historywith Emphasis on the Gezira Scheme', 
in A. Isaacman & R. Roberts (eds. ) Cotton Colonialism and Social History in Snb-Saharan Africa (London, 1995), 96- 
118 
4 Daly, Impena4 p. 91 
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farmers, government and business. ' Friedrich Eckstein, for example, informed the 
shareholders of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate that the company (and by implication the 
government too) were `working on the right lines in a country whose future is bound up 
with steady progress in agricultural development. No one, in my opinion, is more convinced 
of this than the very efficient Government in Khartoum. * There were some dissenting 
voices, notably the Financial Secretary George Schuster, but in general the tone was positive 
and rooted in the developmental language of the British Empire. ' What, then, went wrong? 
How was it that both Daly and G. N. Sanderson, both significant historians of Sudan, 
reached the conclusion that developmental policy in Sudan had been a failure? 8 And - is this 
conclusion robust? 
In part the problem was cotton-growing itself, which resulted in - or more precisely 
formed -a developmental cul-de-sac, a colonial bind from which the Sudan Government 
found it impossible to escape and from which the Sudan economy continued to be 
determined for decades after. Even the best laid plans often succumb to unknown problems. 
The depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s, which will be explored in the first section 
of this chapter, was precisely such an unforeseen calamity and was to have long-reaching 
effects. It is widely known that a severe downturn in the world cotton market compounded 
by the coincidental failure of the cotton crop in 1930/1931 was an economic disaster for 
Sudan. ' This was followed by a realization within the Sudan Government of the limitations 
5 See, for example, Sir Geoffrey Archer, Governor General of Sudan, Teace, Irrigation and trade expansion', 
The Sudan Chamber of Commerce Montb/y Journal (SSCIM, October, 1925,8-10 -a reprint of an article that 
originally appeared in the Manchester Guardian; SAD 707/8/13-14, I. W. Douglas to his Mother, 1n June 1923; 
Editorial, SCQvIJ, January 1926, p. 1; 'Cotton prospects in the Sudan', SOCMJ, March 1926, p. 9 
6 SAD 416/2/29-32 16th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, November 8th 1923 
7 SAD 494/7/3 G. Schuster to S. Shuquir, 25th January 1924 
8 G. N. Sanderson, 'The Ghost of Adam Smith: Ideology, Bureaucracy, and the Frustration of Economic 
Development in the Sudan, 1934.1940', in M. W. Daly (ed ), Modernization in the Sudan (New York, 1985), 101- 
120 
9 see Bernal, `Cotton and Colonial Oiler', p. 113; P. Wicldns, Afnca: 1880-1980: An economic bistory (Cape Town, 
1986), p. 155; Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 138; P. Woodward, Sudan 1898-1989: Unstable State (London, 1990), p. 55; 
Daly, Imperial, p. 84; MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p. 224 
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of the development policies that had been pursued (and an acknowledgement that the 
economic base was too narrow), but was accompanied by a kind of paralysis in innovation 
and action to solve the problems. Economically the future trajectory of the country became 
increasingly locked. The second section of this chapter covers how these events deleteriously 
affected the finances of the Sudan Government and brought into question the whole nature 
of the colonial state. Finally Daly and Sanderson's argument relating to the role of 
government and the limits of economic growth in Sudan is examined. 
I. SUDAN COTTON AND THE WORLD DEPRESSION 
Cotton became the main export of Sudan quickly after the Gezira Scheme opened in 1925. 
When cotton exports were at their highest in 1929, total exports were £E6,526,000 of which 
£E4,981,732 were represented by cotton; in 1919 total exports had been just £E2,740,7591° 
10 GGR 1929, p. 41; Daly, Enrpbr, p. 458 
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Table 5.1. Sudan Cotton Exports, 1920-1938 
Source: GGR, various years 
Year Value of all exports Value of cotton Percentage of total 
(£ E) exports (£ E) exports represented 
by cotton (%) 
1920 4,712,652 1,693,006 36 
1921 2,057,230 444,892 22 
1922 N/A 405,233 N/A 
1923 2,562,000 529,423 21 
1924 3,562,000 1,617,660 45 
1925 2,801,000 1,756,053 63 
1926 4,876,000 3,091,359 63 
1927 4,965,000 3,549,704 71 
1928 5,635,000 3,987,964 71 
1929 6,526,000 4,981,732 76 
1930 4,953,000 3,252,076 66 
1931 1,734,000 641,718 37 
1932 3,798,000 2,341,314 62 
1933 2,605,000 1,576,716 61 
1934 3,849,000 2,173,557 56 
1935 4,567,000 2,736,579 60 
1936 5,581,000 3,665,630 66 
1937 8,130,000 5,906,675 73 
1938 5,490,000 3,659,614 67 
There was a 255% increase in the value of exports between 1923 and their peak in 1929. In 
that year cotton exports were 941% of their 1924 value, accounting for 76% of all exports. 
Cotton never accounted for less than 45% of total exports except in 1931- the worst year of 
the depression. Cotton's mean average percentage share of exports between 1924 and 38 was 
63. Cotton was important, but it was also vulnerable to adverse changes to the world market. 
The value of cotton exports fell by 80% between 1930 and 1931 from £E3,252,076 to only 
£E641,718. Total exports fell by jE3,219,000 across the same two years of which 81% was 
explained by the collapse in the value of cotton exports. 
11 Data sources: 1920-21 from GGR, 1921, p. 19; 1922 from'Egypt and the Soudan' [SAD G//S 1220], p. 18; 
1923 from GGR, 1926, p. 47; 1924-1929 from GGR, 1929, p. 41; 1930.1931 from GGR, 1931, p. 36; 1932- 
1934 from GGR, 1936, p. 38; 1935-1938 from GGR, 1938, p. 33. 
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This collapse was caused by problems on both the supply and demand sides of the 
market. Agricultural problems in production were caused by heavy rains. These triggered a 
bacterial blight and contributed to unusually abundant swarms of locusts. " The effect on 
output was far-reaching and disastrous. The yield dropped to only 1.3 kantars per feddan, 
the lowest ever level. 
Table 5.2. Average yield and average sale price for Sudan cotton, 1925/26 
-1936/7 
Source: SAD 418/3/31-5513 
Year Average Yield (feddans per kantar) Average Sale Price per lb. 
1925/26 4.8 1/41/4d 
1926/27 4.74 1/61/4d 
1927/28 3.29 1/8 d 
1928/29 3.55 1/61/a d 
1929/30 2.12 8d 
1930/31 1.3 8 'h d 
1931/32 4.04 83/4d 
1932/33 1.91 8d 
1933/34 2.31 83/4d 
1934/35 4.33 estimated at 8 'h d 
1935/36 3.72 crops not fully realized 
1936/37 4.46 crops not fully realized 
12 MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 224-225,227; Gaitskell, Geti ra, p. 142 
13 Source: SAD 418/3/31-55, A. Gaitskell, draft of article 'Sudan Plantations Syndicate: distribution of profits 
and expenses on the Gezira Scheme' [marked as 'Not approved by London Office, November 1937] 
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Graph 5.1. World price for raw cotton and the price of Sudanese cotton on 
the world market, 1922-38 
Source: GGR, various years; L. Sandberg, Lancashire; 
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The graph above indicates the prices of Sudan cotton in the inter-war period. " When 
conditions were good, Sudan cotton did rather better than average world price. The relatively 
high quality of Sudan cotton fetched a premium and led J. Arthur Hutton of the British 
Cotton Growing Association and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate to declare: `I have no 
hesitation in saying that there is an unlimited demand for the cases of cotton we are growing. 
There is plenty of room at the top, and as long as we continue to grow a good type of cotton 
we shall have no difficulty whatever in marketing our products. "5 The problems started 
when the demand for cotton contracted as a result in the slackening demand for textiles in 
14 World cotton prices taken from B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abrract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 
1971), p. 491; price of Sudanese raw cotton calculated from the value of Sudanese raw cotton exports and the 
volume exported. Data sources: 1920-21 from GGR, 1921, p. 19; 1922 from SAD GUS 1220'Egypt and the 
Soudan', p. 18; 1923 from GGR, 1926, p. 47; 1924-1929 from GGR, 1929, p. 41; 1930-1931 from GGR, 1931, 
p. 36; 1932-1934 from GGR, 1936, p. 38; 1935-1938 from GGR, 1938, p. 33. British consumption of raw 
cotton is taken from LG. Sandberg, Lancashire in Decline (Ohio, 1974), p. 176 
15 SAD 416/2/46-49 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1924 
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the world economy from 1929. Supply outran demand and the price fell. lb When it did so, 
the price of Sudan cotton fell until it converged with the world price. Manchester's 
consumption of cotton was at its lowest in 1931 in the whole of the period 1924-1938 - just 
when Sudan's crop failed. l' 
Exports in general recovered somewhat in 1932 to LE 2,341,314, but this was caused 
by an increase in production rather than a recovery in the world market. Again, this was 
provided by cotton. The tonnage of cotton exported increased from 24,395 tons in 1933 to a 
peak of 70,413 tons in 1937. World cotton prices rose from £52 per ton in 1933 to c.. 60 per 
ton between 1934-37. The value of Sudan's cotton exports rose from LE 1,576,716 in 1933 
to a peak of LE 5,906,675 in 1937, an increase of 275%. In Sudan, at least, cotton was still 
king. However, the world cotton price fell once again as a result of a world recession from 
£60 per ton in 1937 to £46 per ton in 1938 and Sudan's cotton exports tumbled by 38% to 
LE 3,659,614.18 Cotton was vulnerable to world market changes and this, more than 
anything, was to prove to be a significant problem because of the effect on the finances of 
the Sudan Government. 
16 Indeed, it has been suggested that the origins of the agricultural depression can be found in overproduction 
of products such as cotton. See C. P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Harmondsworth, 1986), 
70-71 
17 see Sandberg, Lancashire in Decline, p. 176 
1B1932-1934 data from GGR, 1936, p. 38; 1925-1938 data from GGR, 1938, p. 33; see J. Forbes Munro, Africa 
and the International, p. 152 
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II. SUDAN GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
Table 5.3. Sudan Government Revenue, 1926-1934 
Source: Budget Note, 1935; Finance and Trade Statistics, 1926-193819 
Percentage of total 
Total government government 
share of receipts Total government receipts obtained 
from the Gezira receipts (revenue) from the Gezira 
Scheme (C E) (£ E) Scheme (%) 
1926 736,233 4,143,940 17.8 
1927 1,199,352 4,177,809 28.7 
1928 956,913 4,680,188 20.4 
1929 1,251,172 4,835,003 25.9 
1930 330,210 4,693,623 7.0 
1931 144,467 4,398,618 3.2 
1932 848,827 3,853,798 22.0 
1933 303,908 3,631,552 8.4 
1934 399,409 3,774,911 10.6 
Between 1926-1929 roughly one quarter of the entire government revenue came directly 
from cotton receipts, notwithstanding any tariffs or transport charges the government was 
able to levy. The effect of the depression on the Gezira Scheme's contribution to 
government income is clear, receipts utterly collapsing to just 3.2% of the total in 1931. 
Overall government receipts were maintained by draughts on the reserve funds. The General 
Reserve Account and the Cotton Equalization Account were liquidated between 1930 and 
1932 in order to make up the deficit caused by the collapse of cotton receipts (see table 
below). 
19 Total Government share of receipts are taken from'Gezira Scheme: comparative table of results', which is 
Appendix 8 found in Budget Note, 1935 (Khartoum, 1935), p. 74; total Government receipts taken from Finance 
and Trade Statistics, 1926-1938 (Khartoum, 1939), Table I (p. 1) 
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Table 5.4. Financial Reserves and Assets of the government of the Sudan, 1926-38 
Source: Finance and Trade Statistics, 1926-3820 
Total of General Reserve Total of Cotton Liquid Assets (cash, 
Account (£ E) Equalization Account investments, sundry 
debtors, stores, 
miscellaneous) 
1926 1,660,844 Nil 4,028,396 
1927 1,547,130 470,703 4,939,701 
1928 1,272,444 479,196 5,155,376 
1929 1,011,503 486,555 5,276,738 
1930 319,672 384,120 4,090,170 
1931 144,817 Nil 2,794,170 
1932 69,920 Nil 2,998,766 
1933 179,754 145,107 3,378,228 
1934 364,954 514,244 4,063,997 
1935 434,118 1,045,091 5,406,072 
1936 578,227 1,750,000 7,034,322 
1937 1,009,711 3,034,974 9,448,561 
1938 1,515,514 3,034,974 9,940,155 
After the depression reserves were built up to staggering levels in a country in need of 
further economic development. The Financial Secretary in 1933 HE. Fass argued that 
`balancing the budget is only the first step to be taken before we can feel we are on the road 
to recovery. The next step is the replenishment of our impoverished reserves. 'Z' Certainly, 
there was difficulty in predicting budget equilibrium in a volatile environment, but as Martin 
Daly has forcefully argued the `relentless accumulation of reserves created as many problems 
as it solved', in particular that it fostered resentment on the part of the tenant farmers who 
suffered debt and hardship all through the 1930s as a result of the depression. The central 
question is why the Sudan Government behaved in this way. 
The first part of this puzzle is that officials were clearly panicked by the events of the 
early 1930s. Evidence can be found in the public words of Sir John Maffey, reflecting on the 
ZOData is taken from Finance and Trade Statistics, 1926-38, Table VI, `Comparative statement of the General 
Account of the Sudan Government, 1926-38' 
21 Budget Note, 1933 (Khartoum, 1933), p. 36 
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financial impact of the depression: `loss of income, loss of leisure, loss of piece of mind - 
these have been the common lot. 'Z' The Budget Note for 1931 similarly articulated the deep 
pessimism that underpinned the belief that golden goose had more or less overnight become 
an albatross: 
[W]e shall have to regard the Gezira scheme as on the whole a liability to be liquidated 
by annual subsidies, not only from indirect receipts attributable to the scheme, but also 
from the normal revenues of government. Time alone will show whether this 
possibility is realised; but in the meantime our finances must be regulated on this 
pessimistic hypothesis, which means that revenue derived directly or indirectly from 
the cotton enterprise, must be treated as highly speculative 24 
The effect was to drastically curtail expenditure. In 1931 a `Special Retrenchment 
Committee' was created to deal with the depression finances ZS The main conclusions 
reached were that the capital `poured into the Sudan' had been wasteful and that the Sudan 
Government faced a long period where central funds might have to be used to subsidise the 
Gezira Scheme. The Retrenchment Committee were not entirely pessimistic about the future 
of Sudan, but they placed a lot of faith in the chance that the fortunes of cotton would 
revive. Moreover, drastic cuts in government spending had to be made even though, as the 
main economic actor, it would have implications for the whole economy. `There is', the 
report concluded, `no precedent for the almost total cessation of expenditure that is now 
u Daly, lmpedai p. 176 
23SAD 634/6/3-4 Open letter from Sir John Maffey, Governor General of the Sudan to `all government 
servants, sheikhs, notables and members of the commercial community', 1st December, 1932 
24 Budget Note, 1931, (Sudan Government Finance Department, Khartoum, January 1931), p. 1 
25 MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p. 229 
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inevitable. " An indicator of this can be seen in the contraction of government imports 
across the depression period in the table below. 
Table 5.5. Government Imports and Total Imports, 1920-28 
Source: GGR, various years" 
Government Imports Total Imports Value of total imports at 
1920 level (%) 
1920 - 7,006,865 100 
1921 - 5,806,070 83 
1922 - - 
1923 1,695,000 4,669,000 67 
1924 1,820,000 5,475,000 78 
1925 1,611,000 5,438,000 78 
1926 1,796,000 5,575,000 80 
1927 2,320,000 6,155,000 88 
1928 2,046,000 6,463,000 92 
1929 2,086,000 6,856,000 98 
1930 1,796,000 6,177,000 88 
1931 1,210,000 3,761,000 54 
1932 550,000 3,055,000 44 
1933 648,000 3,161,000 45 
1934 874,000 3,945,000 56 
1935 1,619,000 5,370,000 77 
1936 1,471,000 5,375,000 77 
1937 1,512,000 6,283,000 90 
1938 2,125,000 6,283,00028 90 
Another factor in the decision for radical financial retrenchment was powerlessness 
based on the observation that the adverse factors that had caused the disaster of the early 
1930s was `beyond the control of any government. 'Z' This view was also expressed in the 
Budget Note for 1933, in which Financial Secretary Fass noted that there was little 
`justification for hopes of an improved demand at remunerative prices for our main 
26 Report of the Special Retrenchment Committee (Sudan Government, Khartoum, 1931), 4-5,9,183 
27 1920-21 data from GGR, 1921, p. 18; 1923-25 data from GGR, 1925, p. 20; 1926.29 data from GGR, 1929, 
p. 37; 1930-33 data from GGR, 1933, p. 30; 1934-38 data from GGR, 1938, p. 27. 
28 This is not a typo; the cumulative values of public and government imports for 1937 and 1938 which make 
up the total imports figure coincidently add up to the same value although in each case the values of the public 
and government imports are different. 
29SAD 634/6/5: Open letter from Sir John Maffey, Governor General of the Sudan to 'all government 
servants, sheikhs, notables and members of the commercial community. ' 1"" December, 1932 
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products. They remain subject to influences beyond our control. In these circumstances I 
have been obliged to budget for further reductions of revenue from provinces and 
departments and also from Railways and Customs. ' In the early-mid 1930s successive Budget 
Notes reflected this sense of emasculated ability to influence economic or, even, agricultural 
outcomes. Cuts to spending and building up the reserves were essentially defensive 
measures, but in a time of uncertainty they were steps that, if nothing else, the government 
could take. Fass noted in his Annual Report for 1933 that `we can barely afford essential 
services. There is nothing to give away, however desirable it may be to the purpose to be 
served we must save every possible penny and every department and province must be ready 
to surrender, for the common purpose, the whole of its savings to the exchequer. ''o 
By the time Francis Rugman was in office in 1935, reserves were looking more than 
healthy. Yet Rugman did not indulge in largesse. `The cash position had advanced to a stage 
where limited funds can, in proper cases, be made available for genuinely remunerative 
investment', he wrote, `but the vulnerability of [the] government's principal sources of 
revenue is still evident. "He went further. 
In my considered opinion, the reserves of the Sudan Government are, under present 
conditions, some LE 1,500,000 short of the figure required for reasonable security. 
To restore this position it will be necessary to combine economy in administration 
with an active policy directed towards broadening the economic basis by encouraging 
native producers and traders to increase the volume and variety of the country's 
commodities. The Government itself is already burdened with commercial 
commitments of which it cannot divest itself, but more can, I think, be done to assist 
development of private enterprise by careful co-ordination of the Government's 
Budget Note, 1933, p. 4,27; Budget Note, 1935, p. 36; GGR, 1933, p. 40 
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research activities, its economic intelligence ... and 
by increasing, in collaboration 
with commercial interests concerned, facilities for marketing, classification and 
upgrading of export produce? ' 
Other than by increasing the reserves, no other remedial action was undertaken. The share 
of cotton as a percentage of the Sudan's total exports did not fall below 56% in the 1930s 
and rose to another peak of 73% in 1937. The Sudan Government did not achieve economic 
diversification. The base was not broadened. This corroborates the argument made by G. N. 
Sanderson that Rugman held a view of the role of the state in assisting economic 
development (he believed that the state should not in any way directly assist private 
enterprise) that held back the development of the Sudanese economy, or, at the very least, it 
did not assist the development of the economy. Sanderson notes that under Rugman, the 
Sudan Government `rejected or at least emasculated, every [new business/economic] project 
that came before it )? 3 This perspective is reinforced byDalywho has argued that the Sudan's 
`financial (and political) officials paradoxically disliked the very idea of public investment yet 
were jealous of their control over the commanding heights of the economy. Private foreign 
investment was therefore encouraged in theory, discouraged in fact; local entrepreneurship 
was awaited as `natural' and hampered when it appeared. ''a 
However, there is another reason for the fiscal conservatism that was embraced in 
the late 1930s that can only be explored by putting the Sudan Government's finances in their 
political-economic context. 
31 Budget Note, 1935, p. 36 
32 Budget Note, 1935,37-38 
33 G. N. Sanderson, `The Ghost of Adam Smith', p. 104 
34 Daly, bipedal, p. 397 
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III. GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH 
EMPIRE IN NORTH AFRICA 
The emergence of the colonial state of Sudan, carved as it was out of the Egyptian sphere of 
influence within the wider Ottoman Empire, created new tensions as a result of overlapping 
sources of power and contested fealties. During the period of General Gordon in the 1880s, 
the Khedive of Egypt had a role in approving taxes, but other than that Gordon was 
essentially autonomous and was reliant on tax revenue generated in Sudan? ' So while Sudan 
continued to use the Austrian Maria Theresa dollar and some other European currencies 
also used in Egypt (with specie based on silver), between 1877-1879 the fiscal systems of the 
Egypt and Sudan were gradually separated to a point of almost total fiscal independence 3' 
The Mahdist period, of course, was disjunctive in extremis and inevitably led to the 
disintegration of Sudan and the Egyptian state as any kind of unitary state. Partial re- 
integration was achieved through the establishment of the Condominium agreement 
inasmuch as Sudan was once more incorporated into a notional monetary union with Egypt 
(this time using the Egyptian pound), but otherwise the Condominium Agreement of 1899 
left the issue of financial control vague. This was an artifact of diplomatic and legal 
subterfuge connected to duality of British interests in Sudan - as co-domini and the 
occupying power of Egypt, the other co-domini. There was in effect only the influence of 
different British political units. As was noted by The Economist in 1945: `In fact, the direction 
of policy and all the higher executive powers were in the hands of the British - since the 
35A. Moore-I-iarell, Gordon and the Sudan, 1877-1880 (London, 2001), p. 89 
56 Moore-Harell, Gordon, 90-93; K. Baedeker, FVpt and Sudan, (Allen and Unwin, London, 1929), p. 442. The 
Maria Theresa dollar continued to be important for Red Sea trade well into the twentieth century. See: A. 
Kuroda, 'The Maria Theresa dollar in the early twentieth-century Red Sea region: a complimentary interface 
between multiple markets', Finaneial History Reaiew, 2007,89-110; Cain and Hopkins, Britisb Impe, ialism, p. 317 
37 SAD 700/10/1-2 'Agreement between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of his 
Highness the Khedive of Egypt, 19th January, 1899; J. W. Climmins, 'Money in War and Peace', a lecture 
delivered at the Sudan Cultural Centre, Khartoum, 6 August, 1941, p. 41 
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British were in control of Egypt herself. i3e But this did not mean that the British in Cairo 
were uninterested in what went on in Khartoum. As Lord Cromer indicated at the outset of 
the Condominium, although the `important question' of financial control was `outside the 
[Condominium] Agreement. As it is probable that for some years the Sudan will constitute a 
charge on the Egyptian Treasury it is manifest that some degree of control must be exercised 
by the Egyptian Financial Department. '39 This meant at the outset Egypt was involved in the 
financial management of Sudan. 40 
Inevitably, this led to tension between Cairo and Khartoum. An early example can be 
seen in a petulant letter sent by Kitchener to Wingate during Kitchener's brief tenure as 
Governor-General of Sudan. The issue was over the transfer of budget surpluses from one 
year to the next. `That little creature Gorst offered O'Leary to give us the excess ... out of 
last year's Soudan [budget] and then told Cromer that the accounts were closed and refused 
to give it', Kitchener whinged. He went on to say that Gorst, at that time financial adviser to 
the Consul General in Cairo, was 
a little liar. I know that the accounts were not closed.... Gorst is the meanest little 
brute I have ever met, proposes all sorts of help and then leaves you in the lurch. We 
will have as little as we can to do with him. [I] am very sorry Cromer backs him up as 
he is not and never has been straight. " 
Straight or not, Kitchener was later to see the relationship between Cairo and 
Khartoum somewhat differently, and so was Eldon Gorst. In 1910 Gorst, by then the 
Financial Secretary of the Sudan Government argued that financial decisions should be taken 
38 'The World Overseas: Egypt and Sudan', The Economist, 11th August 1945,192-193 
39 SAD G//S 1220 'Note on the Financial Control by Egypt over the Sudan Finances, 1924, p. 1 
40 Warburg, Egypt, p. 50 
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in Sudan by the Financial Secretary (i. e., himself) with Egypt limited to oversight and 
approval, despite that others in the Sudan Government - notably Wingate - were well aware 
of the limitations of financial autonomy as long as Egypt continued to extensively fund 
Sudan through the subventions 42 At the same time Egypt wanted the prior subventions to 
Sudan to be treated as a debt to be repaid and was eager to cease the payments altogether 
(though, in fact, this did not happen until 1941 having been run down over the previous 
years43). In 1912 Kitchener, by that time Consul-General in Cairo, made clear the lines of 
power: 
The Governor General should remember and note that a Sudan development debt 
to Egypt exists, both as a principal and interest ... [u]ntil these 
liabilities are 
discharged the supervision and control of the Sudan budget by the Finance Adviser, 
and his concurrence in its provisions, will be just as necessary and binding 
heretofore' 
Reginald Wingate was quite clear that Kitchener's desire to preserve the Egyptian influence 
was to prevent the loss of some power. 45 Though most of the issues of dispute were 
technocratic and of little strategic importance, the issue of control itself was a source of 
considerable frustration for the Sudan Government. `[W]hat I really want to arrive at is to, so 
to speak, grease the wheels and prevent these unconscionable delays, and at the same time 
devise some system which will reduce the present friction between Heads of Department 
41 SAD 269/2/1-2 Kitchener to Wingate, Ist February 1899 
42 SAD 635/10/14-28 'Note on Financial Control in the Sudan' (1927); SAD G//S 1220 'Financial Regulations, 
1910; SAD 469/1/9-10 Wingate to Major P. R. Phipps, 1ld, September 1909 
43 Daly, Imperial, p. 175; GGR, 1938, p. 18 
µ SAD G//S1220'Kitchener Memorandum, 1912 (October)' quoted in'Note on the payments made byEgypt 
to the Sudan since 1899: Financial Memorandum, No. 2,1924', p. 29 
45 SAD 469/1/4-5 Wingate to Clayton, In September 1908 
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and Administrations', Wingate wrote. 46 Nevertheless, this situation endured until the 1920s 
when there began to be discussions linking geo-strategic security and the issue of Sudan's 
debt to Egypt 47 
In 1922 Egypt obtained a degree of independence from Britain. The Egyptians desired 
to style the Khedive the `King of Egypt and the Sudan'. 4e This was problematical, not least 
because it implied that Egypt had legal claim to Sudan. Of course Egypt did have a legal 
claim to Sudan, but the British were not about to surrender Sudan to Egyptian dominance. 
The issue of financial control became part of the discourse related to Egyptian claims to 
Sudan and British ambitions in the North-Africa / Red Sea zone. The Egyptian claim was 
strong. The right to repayment of capital used to develop Sudan was viewed as `legitimate 
and indisputable'. It was, however, also noted that financial advisers in Cairo had `left the 
Financial Secretary to the Sudan Government ... as the only British 
finance officer with 
experience and knowledge of this situation. '49 In reality much of the actual control was 
exercised in Sudan by the Sudan Political Service even though, de jure, Egypt was meant to 
have a decisive influence. For example, there is some evidence that the Egyptians resisted 
the new Treasury guarantee of loans to Sudan in 1923, but ultimately it would seem that all 
they were able to do was to express their reservations through the Council of Ministers 50 
However, these funds and the development of the Gezira Scheme allowed London to press 
a claim also: 
The British Government is also now a potential creditor of the Sudan Government for 
over LE 14,000,000 so that it is no longer appropriate that the sole right of outside 
46 SAD 469/1/9-10 Wingate to Major P. R. Phipps, Ilth September 1909 
47 SAD G//S1220 Letter from E. E. Bernard to Sir Paul Harvey, 29th June 1920, in'Note on the payments 
made by Egypt to the Sudan since 1899: Financial Memorandum, No. 2,1924,30-33, 
48 A. Mekid, The SudanQuestion (London, 1953), p. 61 
49 FO 141/633/6 Sudan Loan Ordinance, June 15th 1922 
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control should be rested, as it is at present, in the Egyptian Government ... it should 
suffice for the Sudan Government to be subjected to the obligation merely of 
supplying full reports on its accounts and finances ... [unless the goverment] 
defaults 
in respect of its obligations to either Great Britain or Egypt s' 
This argument was a canard. The fourteen million referred to was the debt issued to finance 
the Gezira Scheme by the Sudan Government (guaranteed by the British Treasury. Issued as 
bonds the debt was, of course, held by investors - not the Treasury - while the Sudan's debt 
to Egypt was owed directly to the Egyptian government 52 Nevertheless, in 1924 Lee Stack 
wrote that `HMG is committed to a policy of giving substantial support to economic 
development in Sudan and proceeding with the execution of this policy without being in any 
way affected by recent disturbances or the Egyptian demands. "' The disturbances to which 
Stack referred were those by Egyptian nationalists that ultimately led to his own death. The 
assassination of Stack in 1924 and the ensuing crisis compounded the change in the political 
and financial position of the Sudan within the British Empire: Egyptian troops and officials 
were withdrawn from Sudan 54 The sunk costs in developing the Gezira Scheme and the 
massive debts incurred trapped the British, as the extract of a 1924 report makes clear. 
[I]t is inconceivable that under any circumstances the works should now be 
abandoned. The Scheme has proceeded so far and its importance - direct and indirect 
50 FO 141/633/6 Letter from the Egyptian Financial Adviser to the Chancery, Cairo, January 10th 1923 
51 SAD G//S1220 Extract from 'Note on the Financial Control by Egypt over the Sudan Finances' (1924); 
SAD 635/10/14 'Note on the Financial Control in the Sudan' (1927) 
52 In the assertion of political interest as a result of private bond-holding there is an echo of British intervention 
in Egypt in 1882. See Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 312-317; Robinson and Gallagher, Afnca and the 
Victorians, 122-159 
53 FO 141/633/6 Lee Stack to the Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 22nd October 1924 
54 Mekki, Sudan, 63-64 
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- to the future of the Sudan are so manifestly important that nothing but the certainty 
of great financial failure would justify abandonment now. " 
It is also clear, however, that the British wished to retain control. 
By 1924 Egypt's financial role had been diluted, largely as a result of inertia, local 
practicality, and the effect of the fateful events of that year. Though the Foreign Office 
position was to include Egypt in decisions about Sudan, albeit mediated by the British 
Authorities, it is clear that Sudan was increasingly independent of Egypt 56 The debt Sudan 
owed Egypt was eventually fixed at LE 5,200,000 to be repaid at a suitably vague `later 
date. '57 1924 was then the critical moment after which the claim of Egyptian influence over 
Sudan was significantly diminished. From this date onwards Sudan enjoyed autonomy and 
some independent sovereignty as long as she did not default on debt repayment and require 
funds direct from the British Government in London, or from Cairo. Secondly, the point 
was made that if Sudan did default, the British Government was a larger debtor than Egypt 
and consequently the British claim to Sudan was the greater. The argument here is that at 
some point in the first two decades of the Condominium the locus of financial decision- 
making had gradually shifted to Sudan from Egypt, but that the Sudan Political Service 
license to utilize that autonomy was predicated on solvency and avoiding debt default. 
The issue of the continuing debt owed by Sudan to Egypt does not clearly resolve 
itself in the sources because the issue itself appears to have been perpetually deferred. In 
March 1930 the British Financial Adviser to the Egyptian government reported that no 
ss FO 141/633/6 Memo: 'Guarantee of the Government of Soudan Loan: Clause 4' (likelyJanuary 1924), p. 8 
56 An example is agricultural economic policy. it was suggested by Foreign Office official that no decision to 
increase the land under cultivation in Sudan could be made without a'commission' on which representatives of 
both the Sudan Government and the Egyptian Government should be represented: See FO 141/633/6 
Confidential Letter from Lancelot Oliphant to the Secretary to the Treasury, 24th January 1924 
57 SAD G//51220 'Memorandum on the Future Financial Position of the Sudan Government as it may 
develop in consequence of a Resettlement of Political Status of the County and its financial relations with 
Egypt' (1924) 
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settlement was likely to be made regarding the debt prerequisite to a broader constitutional 
agreement, reporting later in the year that the issue was to deal among other issues with such 
matters as stores handed over to Sudan in 1924 as they were abandoned by the Egyptian 
Army. 58 Though at first sight trivial, these issues were so complex that one Foreign Office 
correspondent commented that `when the question was last considered in 1926 it was agreed 
that the matter was so complicated and difficult to solve that it was desirable to postpone a 
settlement for as long as possible: see Residency dispatch of 31" July 1926. ' There was a 
danger that the longer this went on the more difficult the competing claims would be to 
resolve, but there was `no question' that Sudan would immediately be able to pay the sums 
of money involved, rather this would have to be added to existing debts 59 Estimates of the 
overall value of this debt at this time varied ludicrously from between five million to forty- 
five million pounds. Sidky Pasha, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, was reported to have 
commented that he would be very glad to settle for five million, indicating that at the time of 
the depression Egypt had no great hope over recovering larger sums of money. 60 
In 1934, refinancing of the Gezira debt was undertaken using legislation introduced 
to allow the conversion of loans `raised by certain foreign governments, by companies and 
by pubic utility undertakings' in order to diminish the risk of default on loans underwritten 
by Treasury guarantee 61 This reinforces the notion that Sudan was treated as a separate and 
independent state for the purposes of financial diplomacy and this marks the enduring 
situation from the mid 1930s onwards. Thereafter there was no further significant re- 
58 FO 141/501/2 Letter by T. Watson, Financial Adviser to the Egyptian Government to the Chancery 
Residency, recipient not listed, 5th March 1930; the stores were not inconsiderable in value. The Egyptian 
Government estimated their value at £E 1,600,000, while the British estimate was at ccE 1,00,000 - see FO 
141/501/2 Letter by T. Watson, 2nd August 1930; 
59 FO 141/501/2 Minute, 7th August 1930, unknown author 
60 FO 141/501/2 T. Watson, Financial Adviser to the Chancery, Cairo, 3^I August 1930; FO 141/501/2 Note 
byA. J. G Huddleston, Sudan Government, 17th September 1930 
61 FO 141/482/7 Extract of Neville Chamberlain's speech at the House of Commons, Tuesday 17th April 
1934; FO 141/482/7 Minute to Mr Hopkinson, 28th May 1934; FO 141/482/7 Dispatch re Finances Sudan, 
28thMay 1934 
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definition of the status of Sudan, up to and including the 1936 negotiations with Egypt 
which eventually decided to pass on the issue of Sudan's status, and notwithstanding that in 
1937 Francis Rugman - reportedly as the delegate of the British Government - successfully 
negotiated that Egypt's advances to the Sudan should continue to be considered as loans, 
there was no substantive alteration`' Writing in 1942, J. W. Cummins noted that 
`Constitutionally and basically, the control of the budget and the finances of the Sudan are in 
the hands of the Governor General's Council. ' 
Ihe problem for the Sudan Government during the drastic retrenchment of the early 
1930s was the risk of default on the loans: `there is a serious danger that the Sudan 
Government may have to call upon His Majesty's Treasury to implement the British 
guarantee of our loans within the next few years. It is conceivable that this may not be 
enough but that we might have to ask for further help. ' This reflects an earlier worry that 
'the interest of the Treasury in the finances of the Sudan is very large and the potential claim 
for more direct and complete control is possible. '65 During the depression this risk was 
acute. In 1933 the Financial Secretary of the Sudan, HE. Fass, wrote that if the events of 
1930-31 were repeated Sudan would `have to face another retrenchment campaign which 
would involve not only the standard of every service but the whole basis of our civil and 
military administration. ' He went on to comment that there was a risk of an `inevitable 
default on our obligations' that might lead to a `drastic alteration of the whole basis of 
administration. '`i6 Given the previously noted importance of not defaulting and meeting the 
obligations of debt, the very real risk for the Sudan Government in the 1930s was that 
financial failure would be followed by a rapid constitutional change in favour of Egypt. The 
62 Mekki, The SudanQnestion-, H. Ibrahim, The 1936Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, (Khartoum, 1976); SAD 636/8/18 
Clipping: 'Obituary: Francis Rugman', Sudan Star, 4th April 1946 
63 SAD 638/1-3 'Talk by Mr J. W. O mmins at the Khartoum Rotary Club, Friday 13th February, 1942' 
64 Report of the Special Retrenchment Committee, p. 12 
65 SAD 635/ 10/ 14 Note on the Financial Control in the Sudan' (1927) 
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Sudan Political Service pursued their own conception of Sudan's national interest, as Travis 
Hanes puts it, `with stubborn determination against the instructions (and interests) of both 
Egypt and Great Britain. ' Pace Daly and Sanderson, the pursuit of independence stymied 
innovation, action and ambition with regard to economic development policy in the late 
1930s. 
66 Budget Note, 1933, p. 37,40 
67 W. Travis Hanes III, 'Sir Hubert Huddleston and the Independence of the Sud an', Journal of lmperial and 
Commonwealth History, 1992, p. 248 
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CONCLUSION 
Although there were aspects of the economic and financial crisis of the 1930s that might be 
said to have benefited Sudan, such as the increased access for Sudanese to hold official posts 
-a change precipitated by the need to cut governmental labour costs and credited with 
beginning the `Sudanization' process within the Sudan Government - the reality was that by 
1939, some forty years after the British had entered the Sudan, the economic position was 
far from robust ' After investing a great deal of time and money the Gezira Scheme was 
not quite the success that had been hoped for and as Arthur Gaitskell (himself a former 
General Manager of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and the Gezira Board) points out, it 
`was not a very showy investment, even by 1946. iG9 When MacMichael wrote that Sudan 
`stood or fell by the result of its cotton sales' in 1934, he probably did not realise that he was 
describing a significant and problematic structural weakness that tied the Sudan into a cash- 
crop economy with an ailing product and delivered an administration that, in the absence of 
anticipated economic success, chose to pursue a financial and economic policy that was 
defensive and without ambition enough for the successful economic development of the 
country. 7° 
The economic depression and the financial crisis of the early 1930s certainly reveal 
the fragility of the economic basis of the colonial state. Sudan Government officials were 
aware of the problems of over-reliance on one cash crop but by the end of the decade they 
had not broadened the Sudanese economic base or encouraged private enterprise. Does this 
reveal the intellectual and development policy limitations of the officials responsible for 
68 H. J. Sharkey, 'Colonialism and the culture of Nationalism in the Northern Sudan, 1898-1956', (unpublished 
PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1998), p. 149 
69 Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 163 
70 MacMiichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p. 224; Daly, Imperial, 87-91 
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financial and economic policy as Daly and especially Sanderson suggest, or was government 
not the decisive factor? 
First of all, the effects of the depression were widely felt around the world and the 
economic impact on Sudan was not unique; indeed the development problems in Sudan 
were similar to those that Egypt faced in exactly the same period. " Second, criticism for 
inaction presupposes some obvious course of action. Yet no easy path for economic growth 
was open to Sudan. The Gezira Scheme itself had taken three decades of imperial rule in 
Sudan to establish and had soon after been beset by serious economic problems. Prior to 
that, as explained in Chapter 2, unaided private enterprise potentially capable of contributing 
to wider economic growth had mostly failed. Certainly, the Sudan Government did not rush 
headlong into further economic development or sponsorship of business in anyway, but it is 
quite possible that the developmental constraints discussed previously genuinely mitigated 
against the success of further schemes rather than their being solely scuppered by Rugman's 
reticence to support business. The third factor, discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter, is that the Sudan Government was an economic institution just as much as any 
business and was primarily concerned with shoring up its own financial position above and 
beyond pursuing a more ambitious economic policy. In this context, the policy pursued by 
the Sudan Government was rational albeit without ambition. Thus ended the inter-war years 
reliant on cotton and this too had an impact on the nature of imperialism in Sudan, because 
the British cotton textile industry after the depression was in decline. 'Z 
The decline occurred at the same time as the importance of cotton to the Sudan 
economy intensified and the wealth generated for the Sudan Government became vital. This 
71 See R. L. Tignor, 'Dependency Theory and Egyptian Capitalism, 1920-1950', African Economic History, 1980, 
101-118 
n See C. Wurm, Badness, politics and international relations : steel, cotton and international cartelr in British pok7ica, 1924- 
1939 (Cambridge, 1993), especially Chapter 7, 'Britain and the rise of Japanese Competition', 193-230, and W. 
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had two overarching long-term effects. Firstly, it slackened the imperial economic ties 
between Britain and Sudan in terms of the markets of demand for production and sale. 
Though the commercial transactions connected to the sale of cotton continued to be rooted 
via Britain, and while the financial arm of the cotton producing business, the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate retained its metropolitan links, Sudan increasingly sold her cotton to 
India and Japan from 1930 onwards and `king cotton' was no longer indicative of industrial 
Britain's need for overseas primary products. 
The second effect was to encourage the Sudan Government toward an economic 
nationalist perspective. With no grand `imperial' reason to produce cotton the purpose of 
economic management and development became increasingly colonial in focus. The events 
of this chapter are the beginnings of the decolonisation process, reflecting a movement away 
from constructive imperial projects, sweeping in scope and large in ambition, leaning heavily 
in favour of British interests, towards a more limited, technocratic style, characterised by 
defensiveness towards the maintenance of the status quo, not so obviously designed to suit 
British industry or business, and perhaps also lacking a certain ambition. The gradual 
incorporation of Sudanese into the technical and managerial occupations of the state, the 
erosion of the faith in grand development policy, and an increased governmental awareness 
of the fragility of the economic basis of the constitutional settlement of the colonial state 
prepared the ground for the inexorable slide towards decolonisation after 1940. 
Lazonick, `The Cotton Industry, in B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick (eds), The Decline of the British Economy 
(Oxford, 1987), 18-50 
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Chapter 6 
The Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 1919-1939 
Ambitious plans for the economic development of the Gezira plain first formulated in 
the early years of the Condominium took until after the First World War to come to 
fruition. Yet slowly from 1918 the Gezira Scheme was completed and the stream of 
capital investment was eventually translated into tangible development. By the early-mid 
1920s the area under cultivation began to increase, nearly doubling from 14,703 feddans 
in 1922-23 to 27,982 feddans in 1923-24; at the same time the Syndicate continued the 
process of recruiting more British members of staff to work in Sudan. ' In the latter part 
of 1923 Friedrich Eckstein informed the shareholders at the Syndicate's Annual Meeting 
that buildings for staff had been erected, ginning machines added to the factory, that 
pumping stations were being completed and the land prepared for cotton planting. The 
Sudan Government had reported that significant irrigation works at Makwar would likely 
be finished by the middle of 1925, prompting Eckstein to tell the meeting: 
We therefore have to get ready and speed up work more than ever... We have to 
develop and to arrange for the minor canalisation of the greater part of the 300,000 
acres area before July 1924 in order to be able to start ploughing in October 1924 
an area commensurate with the anticipated water supply from the Dam in the first 
year. ' 
I SAD 416/2/23-24 189th Board Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 9th May 1923 
2 SAD 416/2/29-32 16th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, November 8th 
1923 
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By the end of 1924 imminent completion of irrigation works indicated that the Scheme 
would be operational for the 1925-26 crop, which in turn meant that the Gezira 
Agreement between the Syndicate and Sudan Government was to run from July 1925. 
The Syndicate made appropriate plans for four new ginning factories and the 
employment of thirty-six new inspectors' Thereafter expenditure on the Gezira Scheme 
was limited, amounting to only £135,000 between 1926 and 1930. ' It was therefore 
during the inter-war period that the Sudan Plantations Syndicate achieved operational 
maturity; it was also during this period that the developmental and economic limitations 
of cash-crop economies became clear. The chronology of events during this period is 
therefore important to the trajectory of the Syndicate as a business. There were two key 
markers: the opening of the Gezira Scheme in 1925 and the depression 1929-1931, which 
was explored as an economic crisis in the previous chapter, but had a clear effect on the 
Syndicate as well. After the depression, Sudan's slow and sometimes faltering economic 
recovery provided a poor business environment for the Syndicate to operate in. This, in 
turn, affected the strategies pursued by the Syndicate, as optimism turned sour in a few 
short years. 
This chapter explores the following themes to explain these critical years in the 
Syndicate's history. The first section examines the operation of the Gezira Scheme itself. 
Though the main questions posed in this thesis relate mainly to economic and imperial 
historiography (rather than the specific genres of colonial or African history), it is also 
the case that the management of the Scheme was also, in part, the operational arm of the 
Syndicate as a business. The nature of management within the scheme is important in 
establishing the genuinely corporate nature of cotton production in Sudan. Governance 
of economic production in the Gezira region was highly complex, involving social and 
3 SAD 416/2/46-49 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1924; 
SAD 416/2/42-43 Minutes of the 1931Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 1n October 1924 
4 SAD 415/6/70 `Estimate of Expenditure on Gezira Extensions 1926-1930' 
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legal institutions among the tenants, labourers and their families. These issues are 
covered in detail by others, but nevertheless need to explain how these unique 
institutions related to and articulated with the Syndicate itself, from both a structural and 
managerial perspective. ' The second part of this chapter deals with capital ownership, 
structure and control as well as the leadership of the Syndicate and the business networks 
to which the Syndicate was connected. This completes the analysis begun in Chapter 2. 
The main issues, here as there, relate to the size of the company and the sources and 
direction of funding, as well as the international and institutional context of the Syndicate 
as a business. The third part of this chapter explores the financial performance of the 
firm before turning to the issue of the impact of the economic crisis caused by the 
depression. The fourth and final section analyses the growth strategies of the Syndicate, 
in particular to explore initiatives beyond the business centred on the Gezira Scheme. 
I. THE MANAGMENT OF THE GEZIRA SCHEME 
Civil authority over the Gezira was invested in two special commissioners for the Gezira. 
They were part of the Blue Nile provincial administration. Their role was to 
[a]ct as a connecting link between the administrative staffs of the Syndicate and the 
Government, and are responsible for seeing that the interests of the natives are 
safeguarded 6 
This indicates the dual function of the officials of the Syndicate in the Gezira region - as 
both managers and quasi-governmental officials. Indeed, the number of Syndicate 
s See A. I. Clarkson, 'Courts, Councils and Gtizenship: Political Culture in the Gezira Scheme in 
Condominium Sudan' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, 2005); Gaitskell, Gerira 
6 The Sudan Directory (Khartoum, 1927), p. 220 
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officials in the Scheme (there were usually over one hundred) outnumbered the 
governmental officials (in 1924 there were only twelve). The Syndicate's officials were 
responsible for the management of the 24,000 tenant farmers on the Scheme and so 
naturally were part of the governance of the region. ' 
The tenants themselves were charged with the actual cultivation of the cotton, 
which they undertook as sharecroppers. Tenancy areas were approximately thirty acres 
on average. This acreage was then divided into three whereby one third was for cotton 
cultivation, one third was for growing grain and other food-stuffs, and one third 
remained fallow. Preparation of land was started in October whereby it was broken up 
using oil-driven engines operated by the Syndicate. Channels and rivulets were then 
prepared for water; first irrigation then began by July. Cotton seed was then planted, with 
the plants flowering the following November. The cotton itself was picked between 
December and May with help of seasonal labour imported for the purpose. ' 
I Clarkson, `Courts', p. 4 
8 SAD 418/5/1-6 L. Bluen, `Cotton Growing under irrigation in the Sudan', The Empire Cotton Growing 
Review, January 1931 (offprint) 
SAD 418/5/7-8 Manager of Sudan Plantations Syndicate (likely A. G. Gaitksell) to A. Maclntyre, 3^1 
September 1932; The Sudan Direc/ory, p. 220 
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The managerial structure of the Gezira Scheme was as below': 
The inspectors supervised the tenants and were an important means of social and 
political control: `the British Inspector is now more or less regarded as a feudal father. "' 
They were responsible for oversight of the work of the tenants of various stages of 
cultivation as well as for the provision of irrigation including the maintenance of the 
minor canals, and they were required to supervise the extra labour required during cotton 
picking and to pay the tenants. " During the inter-war period, at the height of the 
Syndicate's involvement, they enjoyed a large degree of control over the productive 
process; as one source put it, the Syndicate was responsible for `the whole management 
of the Scheme from field to buyers'. " This, of course, meant that Syndicate employees 
were important agents of colonial power among the tenant farmers and other Sudanese 
labouring in the Gezira. 
According to Gaitskell the land on which the Scheme was constructed was 
`nationalized'; `that is to say no individual owner of land has been allowed to refuse the 
use of his land for the country's needs, nor to hold the community to ransom temps 
thereof. "' In fact this somewhat understates the legal situation. The Land Ordinance of 
1921 had in fact precluded the expropriation of land and `implied that the Government 
would rent the land for forty years. "' However, the land was forcibly rented from its 
owners who were paid little more than a peppercorn rent for what became the most 
productive land in the whole of Sudan. " Self-evidently, this was as a result of colonialism 
and reflects an intent on the part of the Sudan Government to utilise land as a resource 
where possible. However, the (re)creation of land rights in such an important economic 
10 SAD 418/7/31 Minutes of the 32°d Meeting of the Gezira Advisory Board, 25th April 1948, Minute 260: 
A. Gaitskell 
11 SAD 418/5/5 L. Bluer, 'Cotton Growing under irrigation in the Sudan', The Empire Cotton Growing Review, 
January 1931 (offprint) 
12 SAD 418/5/29 'Gezira Irrigation Scheme' (likely 1938) 
13 418/5/46-58 `The Gezira Scheme: a talk given at the Sudan Cultural Centre on February 17th 1943 byA. 
Gaitskell' 
14 SAD 418/7/33-34 Minutes of the 32nd Meeting of the Gezira Advisory Board, 25th April 1948 
15 Clarkson, `Courts', p. 3 
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area had other repercussions that affected the political development of the country as a 
whole. 
Anna Clarkson has made an important contribution to the understanding of the 
political and social dynamics that underpinned the joint governance in the Scheme by the 
Syndicate and the government that stresses the role of indirect rule, local courts and 
indigenous authority to maintain, manage and govern what was an increasingly complex 
agrarian society. The emergence of elites from within the tenants and the use of 
employed labour helped to transform aspects of Sudanese society connected with the 
Scheme. This created hierarchies of prestige whereby some tenants themselves became, 
effectively, landlords presiding over economic activity that operated with its own 
management and employees. lb Analysis of the rise of tenant-entrepreneurs is not 
undertaken here, but nevertheless points to the increasingly decentralised nature of actual 
cotton cultivation and the increasing social and political complexity of the Scheme 
throughout the inter-war period. Clarkson also indicates tensions within the Sudan 
Government between a vision of modernity on the one hand and the pursuit of an 
arcadian vision of African society on the other. "' There is little doubt that visions of 
modernity gradually won out of Arcadian notions in the Gezira, something that 
encouraged the Sudan Government toward the pursuit of a developmental vision at the 
expense of the commercial interests of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, especially during 
the Second World War and thereafter. 
16 Clarkson, `Courts', 188-205 
17 Clarkson, 'Courts, 89,123,135,136-142,254 
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II. NETWORKS, OWNERSHIP, STRUCTURE, LEADERSHIP AND 
CONTROL 
Immediately after First World War the Sudan Plantations Syndicate began to expand in 
preparation for the final development of the Gezira Scheme. 
Graph 6.1. Sudan Plantations Syndicate Total Capital on the Balance Sheet, 
1918-1924 








1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 
The capital size of the company increased from L516,482 in 1918 to £2,512,836 in 1924, 
nearly a five-fold expansion of the size of the company. " This expansion began from 
1919 with the final assurance given to the Syndicate from the Sudan Government in the 
form of the agreement signed in October 1919.19 Friedrich Eckstein, Chairman of the 
Syndicate, stated at a meeting of the Syndicate in December 1919 that `we have naturally 
to find a considerable amount of working capital, and to achieve this it is the intention of 
your Board to increase our capital to offer in the first instance say 150,000 share, i. e., one 
new share for each old share to the shareholders at a moderate premium. '2° 
On the 24th March 1920 the Syndicate held an Extraordinary General Meeting to 
approve the expansion of the nominal capital of the company from £250,000 to 
18 SAD 415/8/1-152 The Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd, Reports and Accounts, 1906-1924 
19 SAD 417/4/476-480 Agreement: Sudan Government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 17th October 
1919 
20 SAD 418/8/99 From the Minutes of the 12th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 17th December 1919 
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£750,000. At this meeting the Board suggested that, further to the issued capital of 
£ 150,000 another 150,000 shares of one pound should be issued to the shareholders at a 
premium of two pounds per share, making the cost of each three pounds. This was 
subsequently approved. At the same meeting the Board of Directors of the Company 
recommended to the shareholders that a new set of Articles of Association be adopted to 
replace the previous Articles of Association. This is significant because of the 
justification given: 
The reason for this proposal is that in many respects the Sudan has outgrown its 
original Articles which were designed at a time of formation, when the Syndicate 
was purely an experimental company, and when the control was in the hands of 
Messrs Wernher, Beit and Co. and the original vendor. " 
The separation of the Sudan Plantations from the Wernher, Beit group is structurally 
important and deserves a brief explanation. As was explained in Chapter 2, the Syndicate 
was embedded within the Wernher, Beit group of businesses in the period before the 
First World War. However, the Wernher, Beit group was at its apogee in the period 
before 1914; after 1914 it was not able to exert the same kind of influence within and on 
the capital markets and its business reach was diminished. Though the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate continued to share some directorial personnel with companies within the 
Wernher Beit network of businesses, there are no records relating to the Syndicate in the 
Wernher Beit Archives in Johannesburg dating from after 192W2 This is reflective of two 
things. First, in relation to the Syndicate itself, the financial and business network out of 
which the Syndicate emerged - its institutional cradle - became considerably less 
21 GHL N1S 18000/203B/391 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
28th April 1920: Notice dated 26th February 1920 from Louis Bluen to the Shareholders 
uI was given a remarkable level of access to the Wernher Beit papers in the Barlow Rand Corporation 
Archive by Annalie Kriel in the Autumn of 2004. 
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important to the governance of the firm after the firm itself had achieved operational 
maturity. The second more general point relates to the nature and structure of British 
business and its relationship to the capital market after the First World War. The rich and 
deep vein of cheap capital that helped to finance speculative businesses (especially 
mining companies, but also cotton-growing ventures in Sudan) before 1914 was in part 
coordinated and navigated by a matrix of interlocking directorial networks, agency 
relationships and cross-shareholding as was explained in Chapter 2. After 1918 the 
history of the capital market - that it was diminished - is well known. What is much less 
well known is that the networks that operated within that diminished market-place had 
begun to fragment and to wither, leaving free-standing companies and some consolidated 
groups and companies specifically formed as investment vehicles. ' This contention is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to explore in anything other than the most general of 
terms, but it is generally supported by the evidence of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate as 
it broke away from the Wernher Beit / Rand Mines / Central Mining group, by the 
process of consolidation and ossification of the Wernher Beit / Central Mining group 
itself, but also in evidence from the John Taylor and Sons network of mining businesses, 
touched on earlier and elsewhere! ' As is demonstrated below, links with Wernher Beit / 
Central Mining remained, but they do not appear to be operationally crucial in this period. 
In April 1920 147,890 shares of one pound each were sold for three pounds (in 
accordance with the premium) to shareholders at the rate of one new share for each old 
share held. " Of the remaining allocation 1,300 were bought by the staff of the Syndicate 
and 810 were sold on the open market. Two years later in November 1922,150,000 more 
one pound shares were offered to shareholders on the basis of one new share for two 
23 See Michie, The London Stock Exchange, especially282-283; also Chapter 6, 'The Changing Market Place 
Between the Wars', 235-286 
24 Mollan, 'The business network' 
25 GEL NIS 18000/228B/111 1 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
31st October 1923: Directors Reports and Accounts 1922-23 includes a account of the history of the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate by Louis Bluen dated 19th December 1923 
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existing shares held at a premium of £1 10 shillings. Of these 149,825 were taken up 
by 
shareholders, with 175 sold on the open market. This brought the share capital of the 
Syndicate to £450,000 fully paid by November 1923. At this time the Syndicate had 1,827 
shareholders, both private and institutional. The fact that the shares were not sold on the 
open market via a public subscription is significant as it indicates that the Syndicate 
had 
access to some alternative pool of capital made up of individuals in some way known to 
the Syndicate Z6 
The post 1923 capital expansion of the company developed as follows. In May 
1924 150,000 one pound shares were offered at a premium of £2 10 shillings. 
" In 
October 1925 another 150,000 shares were sold at a premium of two pounds, bringing 
the overall total of nominal share capital to £750,000 28 It was announced to the Board of 
Directors in August 1925 that it was the Chairman's intention to increase the capital of 
the company the following Autumn (i. e., October 1925) from £750,000 to £2,500,000 
(nominal) with £2,250,000 issued. " Thus by October 1925, on the eve of the full scale of 
cotton production on the Gezira, the Syndicate had an issued capital of £600,000; the 
company itself was estimated to be valued at £ 5,000,000 30 
In 1926 following the Gezira Scheme becoming operational the Syndicate 
embarked on a substantial change to the capital structure of the company, doubling the 
26 GHL MS 18000/228B/ 1111 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
31n October 1923: Directors Reports and Accounts 1922-23 includes a account of the history of the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate by Louis Bluen dated 19th December 1923; SAD 416/2/16 Minutes of the 186th 
Board of Meeting of the Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 19th January 1923; GHL MS 
18000/228B/1111, London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 'List of 
Shareholders as at 311, October 1923' 
27 GEL MS 18000/230B/427 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
May 1924: Letter from the Sudan Plantations Syndicate to the London Stock Exchange, 16th May 1924; 
SAD 416/2/46-49 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1924 
28 GHL MS 18000/18000/241B/1030 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 27th October 1925 
29 SAD 416/2/65-58 Minutes of the 198th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 19th August 1925 
30 SAD 416/2/61-66 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 28th October 1925 
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number of shares from 750,000 to 1,500,000.31 These shares were allocated to existing 
shareholders on a one new share to one share held basis `fully paid up ... 
in capitalisation 
as part of the company's share premium account'. " This represented the spoils of 
investment, essentially doubling each shareholders holding overnight. Yet the Syndicate 
itself was circumspect. While noting that the company had paid out 250% in dividends, 
the Chairman also remarked at the 1925 Annual Meeting that it was `nothing to boast 
about, considering that we have been at work for twenty-one years, and have raised all 
our working capital at considerable premium" 
A further expansion in share capital occurred in April/May of 1927 when the 
capital was expanded again by another 750,000 shares issued with premium of £1 10 
shillings (of which £1 18 shillings in total was paid up in the initial offering, to be fully 
paid up by November 1927) 34 In November 1934 the Syndicate authorised the issuing of 
another 225,000 one pound shares, this time to be sold to shareholders for twenty. one 
shillings -a premium of one shilling. Each share was to be available only 
for every ten 
shares already held? ' This then became the settled share capitalisation of the company 
enduring for the remainder of the existence of the firm. 36 There is also an indication that 
the directors of the Syndicate were able to repay £400,000 worth of debentures as well 
as refinancing some of the company's debt by taking advantage of lower interest rates 
31 GHL MS 18000/245B/249 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 4th 
March 1926; SAD 416/2/69 200th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
22nd January 1926; SAD 416/2/73 Extraordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th 
February 1926; SAD 416/2/75 Extraordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 3"' 
March 1926 
32 GEL MS 18000/245B/249 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 4th 
March 1926 
» SAD 416/2/61-66 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 28th October 1925; 
indeed, a considerable sum of money had also been raised through the issue of debentures - SAD 
416/2/17 Minutes of the 187th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 19th 
February 1923 
34 GEL MS 18000/255B/474 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
20th April 1927 
35 GHL MS 18000/338B/1332 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
8th November 1934: Director's Memo, undated (by likely November 1934) 
36 Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, Vo12,1950 (London, 1950), p. 3289 
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available in the City in late 1934 and early 1935. This occurred shortly after the Sudan 
Government had refinanced the its own debt" 
The share-ownership of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate should then be seen in 
two distinct phases. The first prior to c. 1919-1920 was characterised by private share 
issue, limited to a small number of investors owning shares worth £ 150,000. The second 
phase after 1920 was characterised by a massive expansion of the share. What is 
additionally interesting is that it would seem from the shareholding list of 1923 that 
ownership and control of the firm were not directly linked at this time, and that there 
was a diffuse public shareholding of the Syndicate's stock 
In the London Stock Exchange listing files that supply much of the evidence in 
this chapter reveal for the sole instance of 1923 the shareholding of individuals. This is 
important because it allows a rare glimpse of the pattern of ownership of a colonially 
based business. First of all among the directors, there was a preponderance of men with 
a connection to the Wernher Beit group. However, of all directors only three held over a 
thousand shares, and then only Lord Lovat held a substantial shareholding. Indeed, as 
will be demonstrated below, the pattern of shareholding is remarkably diffuse by 1923. 
37 FO 141/497/4 Despatch re Gezira Irrigation Scheme, 13th December 1934; S. G. Symes, Governor- 
General of Sudan to Her Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt and Sudan, The Residency, Cairo, 13th 
December 1934; GHL MS 18000/338B/1332 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate, 8th November 1934: Director's Memo, undated (likely November 1934); SAD 
416/4/18-20 Minutes of the 247th Board Meeting of the Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 1n 
November 1934; SAD 416/4/21 Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 7th November 1934; FO 141/482/7 Despatch: Finances Sudan, 28th May 1934 
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Table 6.1. Directors shareholding in the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 30th June 1923 
Source: GHL MS 18000/228 111138 
Director Number of shares 
F. Eckstein' 1,500 
Lord Lovat* 6,400 
Sir Lionel Phillips's 800 
D. M. Hannay 200 
J. A. Hutton 1,500 
Fredric Wise 750 
Arthur K Asquith 200 
Alexander MacIntyre 400 
*connection to Wernher Beit / Rand Mutes / Central Mining (not including the Sudan Plantations Syndicate) 
Of the directors, only Lord Lovat was in the top-ten leading shareholders, as can be seen 
below. Again, three of the top-ten shareholders had a link to the Wernher Beit / Central 
Mining group, not including the Central Mining and Investment Corporation itself which 
was also one of the leading shareholders. 
Table 6.2. Top ten shareholdings in the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 31" 
Source: GHL MS 18000/228 111139 
Oct 1923 
Shareholder Number of shares 
Colonel the Hon. Guy Greville Wilson 10,025 
Sir Otto Beit* 10,000 
Central Mining and Investment Corporation* 8,375 
Joseph James Brown and Frederick Lees 7,525 
Lord Lovat'E 6,400 
Max Michaelis* 6,000 
David Augustus Bevan 4,950 
Leslie Urquhart 4,300 
Christian Hamilton Gray 4,000 
Princes Street Nominees Ltd 3,870 
*connection to Wernher Beit / Rand Mines / Central Mining (not including the Sudan Plantations Syndicate) 
Indeed, the connection to the Central Mining and Investment Corporation (CIVIC) 
would seem to be significant - the company itself being a substantial shareholder. Yet, 
operationally, Central Mining was not important. However, this all needs to be set in 
38 GHL MS 18000/228 1111 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 24th 
December 1923: 'Report of the Directors: Statement of Account', 30th June 1923 
39 GHL MS 18000/228 1111 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 24th 
December 1923: `List of shareholders as at 3 1st October 1923' 
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some kind of context. What is interesting is that by 1923 the Sudan Plantations Syndicate 
was owned by 1,827 shareholders as reported above, who owned 450,000 shares. The 
board of directors held only 11,750 shares, or 2.6% of the total issued amount at that 
time. The single largest shareholder, Colonel the Hon. Guy Greville Wilson, who was not 
a director, held just 2.2% of the total. A brief survey of the total list of shareholders was 
undertaken by sampling all those names that held 1000 shares or more. This list 
amounted to 71 of the 1,827 shareholders, slightly less than four per-cent. This group 
held 119,280 of the 450,000 shares in 1923. Of these, 20,565 were held by institutions 
(including the CMC), representing 17.2% of the sample group's shares. By contrast, 
ennobled or aristocratically titled shareholding amounted to only 9,800 shares or 8.2% 
of the sample group. A more detailed prosopographical approach based on presence in 
Who was Who (so itself problematical and limited) focused on straightforward indicators 
of gentlemanliness (attendance at public school and/or a University, membership of a 
Gentleman's Club in London, or Parliament; a commission in the Army or Navy, a noble 
title of some kind; membership of the priesthood of the Church of England), reveals that 
only 14 of the 59 personal investors (12 of the top shareholdings were institutions), 
representing 16.4% or 19,565 shares of the sample group, were certainly gentlemanly. This 
is not to say that others were not gentlemanly, but rather that from the readily available 
sources this is difficult to determine. 
This small survey of shareholders is not without its drawbacks. By arbitrarily 
focusing on the larger shareholders (who notionally have more influence) individuals of 
actual influence have been excluded, including several of the directors of the company. 
Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that many of the smaller shareholders might not 
have been classified as gentlemen or, even, gentlemanly capitalists - albeit with modest 
amounts of capital in the company. A conclusion to draw from this is that 
gentlemanliness among capitalists is hard to ascertain. One drawback of the 1923 date is 
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that it is before the Gezira Scheme opens and - as ever - it is problematical to draw 
inferences for the whole history of the Syndicate from 1919 onwards on the basis of a 
sample year so early into the period covered in this chapter. Nevertheless what is 
interesting is the relative diffusion of share-ownership. There were no large blocks of 
shares. Though the directors owned fairly substantial share-holdings in comparison with 
other shareholders, they did not control the firm by dint of ownership. 
There was comparatively little flux in the directorate of the Syndicate between 
1919-1950. There was some turnover in personnel (for example, in March of 1925 Lionel 
Phillips resigned from the Board and was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel S. FL Pollen; 
Harold Wooding joined the board in January 1931), but it was minimal. ' The most 
significant change was the death of Friedrich Eckstein in the middle of 1930 having 
given up the Chairmanship the previous year. 41 Alexander MacIntyre, who was also 
Managing Director, succeeded Eckstein as Chairman. Indeed, after MacGilivray and then 
Eckstein, it was MacIntyre who proved to be the decisive and influential figure in the 
Syndicate's history from 1930. 
His Chairmanship began in relative crisis, not least of all caused by the demise of 
Eckstein whose long stewardship had guided the Syndicate through its formative years. 
`It is hard luck on Mr MacIntyre', the minutes of the Annual Meeting for 1930 
commented, `at this early stage of his Chairmanship to have encountered a year in which 
both crop and prices have been the worst in our experience. The difficulties of the past 
year have increased the burden which our Chairman has had to bear but happily his 
shoulders are broad. " Over the next few years the Syndicate lost several directors who 
4° SAD 416/2/51-53 Minutes of the 196th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 30th March 1925; SAD 416/3/34 Minutes of the 227th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the 
Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 3' December 1930 
41 SAD 416/3/20-22 222^' Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 8th July 
1930; SAD 416/3/30-33 23rd Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th 
November 1930 
42 SAD 416/3/30-33 23'" Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 
1930 
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had overseen the development of the company. Lord Lovat died in 1933, Sidney Pollen 
in 1935. " However, the directorate of the Syndicate was remarkably stable between 1920 
and 1950, as can be seen in the table below. 
Table 6.3. Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 1920,1930,1939,1945 and 1950 
Source: Stock Exchange Offidallntelligence/Yearbook, various years" 
1920 1930 1939 1945 1950 
Alexander Alexander Alexander Alexander Alexander 
MacIntyre MacIntyre MacIntyre MacIntyre MacIntyre 
(Managing (Chairrnan and (Chairman and (Chairman and (Chairman and 
Director) Managing Managing Managing Managing 
Director) Director) Director) Director) 
J. Arthur J. Arthur J. Arthur J. Arthur 
Hutton Hutton Hutton Hutton 
Friedrich Friedrich Harold Harold Harold 
Eckstein Eckstein Wooding Wooding Wooding 
(Caiman) 
Lord Lovat Lord Lovat Hubert Poyntz- Hubert Poyntz- Hubert Poyntz- 
Wright Wright Wright 
D. M. Hannay Arthur M. Arthur M. 
Asquith Asquith 
Lionel Phillips Bernard Bernard 
Eckstein Eckstein 
Fredric Wise Sidney Pollen Evelyn Baring 
F. R. Phillips 
These men were heavily linked to the group of businesses around the Sudan Plantation 
Syndicate. In 1939, for example, Alexander MacIntyre was a director of the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate, the Kassala Cotton Company and Parana Plantations Ltd, as was 
Harold Wooding. Sir Bernard Eckstein was a director of those three companies along 
43 SAD 416/3/71-73 240th Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 23' March 1933; SAD 416/4/35-37 Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of the 
Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 18th April 1935 
µ Stack Exchange OfcialIntelbigence 1920 (London, 1920), p. 1109; Stock Exchange Officiallntelk nce 1930 'ge (London, 1930), p. 1301; Stock Exchange Official Yearbook 1939 (London, 1939), 2399-2400; Stock Exchange 
Official Yearbook 1945 (London, 1945), p. 2126; Stock Exchange Official Yearbook 1950, (London, 1950), 3288- 
3289 
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with Sudan Salt and the Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates. Hubert Poyntz-Wright 
was a director of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and Sudan Salt. J. Arthur Hutton was, a 
director of the British Cotton Growing Association, the Empire Cotton Growing 
Association, Atlas Insurance, Sir Elkanah Armitage and Sons and, of course, the 
Syndicate itself. Francis Phillips was a director of numerous companies - many of them 
part of the Central Mining / Rand Mines Group, while the Honourable Evelyn Baring 
was a director of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, the Kassala Cotton Company, the 
Special Areas Reconstructed Ltd and London Life Association. "' There is, however, 
nothing especially significant about these links; rather, they indicate that the directors of 
the Syndicate were engaged more widely with business some of which had a connection 
to the Empire. 
III. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND THE IMPACT OF THE 
DEPRESSION 
As discussed in Chapter 5, cotton growing in Sudan was affected by both a fall in world 
prices and in worsening local conditions. In the latter part of 1930 it became increasingly 
evident to the Syndicate that the effect of the world depression in the price of cotton was 
not the only problem faced by the Syndicate, as the continuing effects of Black arm 
blight became known. 46 Similar reports were made throughout the Autumn of 1930. " 
This compounded the problems of the previous year. 
45 Directory of Directors 1939, (London, 1939), p. 90,518,886,1095,1361,1391,1901; GHL MS 18000 
350B/ 988 London Stock Exchange Listing File for the Central Mining and Investment Corporation, 14th 
June 1935, Memorandum, 'The Central Mining and Investment Corporation, Ltd', 213, June 1935 
46 Cable from Barakat, 10ce October 1930: SAD 416/3/24-27 224th Meeting of the Board of Directors of 
the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 28th October 1930 
47 SAD 416/3/28-29 225th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th 
November 1930; SAD 416/3/30-33 23' Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
12th November 1930 
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At our last meeting you were informed that we have had extraordinarily heavy rains 
which lasted right into October, and that this meant an exceptionally late crop, but 
that, granted normal winter weather, prospects were still promising. Instead of 
normal weather we experienced exceedingly cold weather in December and January, 
and when the effect of this combination became evident in the pickings, we sent 
you a circular to this effect. 
In all agricultural undertakings one is liable at some time or other to be faced 
with a bad crop, due to climatic conditions, over which one can have no 
control... 48 
Although the Syndicate remained optimistic despite the bad crop and the gathering 
depression, the impact was felt financially. 49 In October 1930 the Syndicate received 
estimates from Sudan of expenditure and cash requirements for the Gezira and Zeidab 
stations for the year ending 1931, including the costs of cotton ginning and transport to 
the United Kingdom. The Board were informed of the need for a loan to meet their 
expenditure of £400,000 without security, which the Chairman had arranged with the 
National Bank of Egypt. In fact by February 1931 only L 100,000 of the loan had been 
drawn down, indicating, if nothing else that the Syndicate erred on the side of caution, 
but this was still a significant liability? 
48 SAD 416/3/30-33 23"1 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 
1930; indeed, blackarm and leaf curl continued to cause problems well into 1931. See: SAD 416/3/48 
Minutes of the 132nd Meeting of the Board and Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 28th October 
1931 
49 SAD 416/3/30-33 23rd Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 
1930 
50 SAD 416/3/24-27 224th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 28th 
October 1930; SAD 416/3/34-37 227th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 26th February 1931; indeed, the Syndicate also took the prudent measure of retaining the 
£300,000 ready to draw down until April 1931. In the same vein, at the February meeting of the Board of 
Directors it was resolved that all directors and the London staff should take a pay cut of ten percent. The 
Sudan staff were also hit with pay cuts ranging from four percent to ten percent depending on how high 
was the salary. 
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As the directors explained to the shareholders `the heavy fall in the price of 
cotton would not have affected our profits to such an extent if we had had an ordinary 
average yield, as the increase in our areas has become such a factor that it would have 
gone far towards compensating for the fall in prices! In increasing the area under 
cultivation the Syndicate adopted a policy and a pattern of behaviour that bedevils cash- 
crop farmers to this day. as prices fall an increase in productive capacity - though 
rational and sensible as viewed from the producer's level -results in increases overall to 
supply and therefore continues to damp down prices. As the Syndicate itself noted, if 
prices were to go up in the 1930s, all well and good. If they didn't, then the Syndicate 
would simply increase the cultivated land to the North and West of the Gezira. " What is 
curious is that later, in 1932, the Annual Meeting discussed the expectations that lower 
prices `should' contribute to `less cotton being grown and less [sic] supplied of the raw 
material being available' (i. e., in the world market), though this logic had not impacted on 
their own planting regime 52 Nevertheless, in 1931 despite the fact that the Syndicate fully 
expected the price of cotton to increase, their response was in many ways prudent. 
Increased capacity by increasing the area under cultivation was one way of maximising 
revenue; another was to raise productivity levels, something they sought to achieve 
through a variety of factors including the introduction of diesel powered pumps to 
replace those driven by steam and the remodelling and enlarging of the ginning 
factories " 
sl SAD 416/3/30-33 23" Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 
1930 
52 SAD 416/3/70 25th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 3^t November 1932 
53 SAD 416/3/32 23" Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1930 
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Table 6.4. Running hours of the main engines of the 
Syndicate Factories (No. 1- No. 7), 1924/25 to 1934/35 
Source: SAD 417/296' 
Sudan Plantations 












As the Chairman noted at the Annual General Meeting for 1930, `In our experience we 
have encountered exceptional rains, occasional cold winters, poor yields and low cotton 
prices, but we have never previously suffered from all these unfavourable factors 
occurring in combination. 'ss A further effect of the downturn was to reduce the balance 
sheet valuation of stocks already held. Louis Bluen informed shareholders that the `lower 
prices realised must, of course, be reflected in the results of the present year. Sales have 
been very slow... ' In order to reduce the costs of production, the Syndicate cut the 
wages of Sudanese labour, as well as reducing the salaries of all staff in Sudan and 
London by 10% (or 4% for those with lower salaries). " Dividends were not paid in 
1932 57 Nevertheless, it is also true that throughout this period the Syndicate remained - 
at least in public - optimistic about future prospects. At the Annual Meeting in 1931 they 
announced: `the profits of our company depend on two things, cotton yields and prices. 
With good yields and even with present prices, which are extremely low, we should be 
54 SAD 417/2/96 Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd and Kassala Cotton Company Ltd: Memorandum on 
Review of Sinking Funds as at 30th June 1935 (Ginning Factories Machinery and Heavy Implements), 20th 
December 1935 
55 SAD 416/3/3123"d Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1930 
56 SAD 416/3/41 L. Bluen, 'Circular to Shareholders', 15th Apri11931 
57 SAD 416/3/68-70 25th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 3" November 
1932 
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able to make profits. Granted normal yields and better prices, we need have no anxiety 
for the future. 'S8 
The eventual recovery for the Syndicate, when it came in 1933, was shaky and 
uncertain, not least because of continuing economic and agricultural problems (on this 
occasion with leaf-curl) 59 As was reported at the annual meeting in 1934, `owing to the 
exchange and political uncertainties, manufacturers in the consuming countries have 
been compelled to adopt a policy of buying their requirements from day to day and are 
averse to entering into any large commitments. i60 Even though the Syndicate's cotton 
itself was selling fairly well, the long-term position of Sudan cotton was damaged, and the 
situation did not improve. In 1935 the company sought to reassure shareholders that it 
was doing its utmost to sell cotton `at home, on the continent, in India, America and 
other parts of the World' but were unable to secure a good price for high grade Sudan 
cotton in a market where low quality cotton was so cheap 61 The Syndicate even took to 
auctioning some of its cotton at Port Sudan, bypassing the Lancashire market entirely. 62 
The futures market in Sudan cotton had collapsed as a result of lack of general 
confidence, a shortage of demand and a glut of supply in cotton, and a specific problem 
that resulted in Sudan cotton being classified in such a way as to disadvantage it in 
comparison with Egyptian cotton of a similar grade. The Syndicate blamed conditions in 
the market, stating that the `interests of the bone fide producer and consumer have been 
58 SAD 416/3/51 241h Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 28th October 1931 
59 SAD 416/3/82-84 26th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 15th November 
1933 
60 SAD 416/4/25-26 27th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 
1934 
61 SAD 416/4/45-26 28th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 14th November 
1935; incidentally, the Syndicate were conscious at this time to thank the 'very valuable service' performed 
by the British Cotton Growing Association in helping to market Sudanese cotton in Britain. 
62 SAD 416/4/49-50 255th Board Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 7th May 1936 
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sacrificed to those of the speculator. ' 11iis claim was repeated at the annual meeting in 
November 1937 " 
Regardless of whether this was true or merely a sop to shareholders, profits 
suffered as a result of the inability of Sudan cotton to fetch the prices it had before the 
depression. Though the Syndicate were able to pay a ten per cent dividend in the 
Autumn of 1936, they had to resist calls from shareholders for a half-yearly interim 
dividend made at the annual meeting held shortly after. 65 
Table 6.5. Sudan Plantations Syndicate data, 1926-1939 (£ unless stated otherwise) 
Source: Gaitskell, Gezira, 267-274 
Amount 
Price of 
of Net dividend 
Sudan return, before 
Yield in cotton after Direct deduction 
Cotton kantars in deducting expenditure Syndicate's of Sudan 
area in per pence marketing on the Total share of Syndicate's and UK 
feddans feddans per lb expenses Scheme profits net return expenses tax 
1926 80,031 4.80 18.00 2,340,616 718,925 536,201 582,281 215,763 375,000 
1927 100,058 4.70 18.00 3,356,629 721,412 840,504 759,319 278,888 450,000 
1928 100,768 330 19.70 2,563,402 814,009 584,466 573,954 223,557 562,500 
1929 131,292 3.60 18.40 3,269,162 970,504 725,080 699,630 237,226 562,500 
1930 174,164 2.30 7.90 885,905 1,027,245 0 192,702 188,060 225,000 
1931 196,799 1.40 6.40 393,940 1,023,103 0 85,552 226,237 0 
1932 194,935 4.10 8.50 2,270,988 992,539 243,366 495,807 190,348 0 
1933 195,941 1.90 8.10 875,347 896,219 0 193,299 214,288 90,000 
1934 175,834 230 8.60 1,025,324 892,907 84,825 226,841 220,407 135,000 
1935 176,150 4.50 8.20 2,187,920 952,483 271,914 470,425 250,355 198,000 
1936 185,758 370 7.90 2,077,858 930,526 272,764 451,386 280,524 247,000 
1937 199,770 4.50 8.60 2,908,401 956,217 500,101 618,832 311,647 309,375 
1938 207,242 4.60 5.90 2,091,913 1,027,844 239,044 451,104 290,667 247,500 
1939 206,274 4.50 6.20 2,252,945 1,032,313 228,486 485,285 274,878 198,000 
Profitability is a useful (if blunt) gauge of success, failure and difficulty in business. 
Profits from the sale of cotton itself were calculated by the Syndicate and the 
government in the following way. If the sale price of some cotton were £ 100 then X20 
would be deducted for the cost of ginning and £5 for marketing expenses. This would 
63 SAD 416/4/54-55 29th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 5th November 
1936 
64 SAD 416/5/23 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 15th November 1937 
65 SAD 416/4/51-53 256th Board Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 22" October 1936; SAD 
416/4/54-55 29th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 5th November 1936 
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leave £75, of which the Syndicate would receive thereabouts of £ 15, approximately a 
twenty per-cent profit "G The remainder went to the tenants and the Sudan Government, 
forty percent to each ." 
The graph below shows the division of profits between partners 
and highlights the significant reductions caused by the economic downturn of the inter- 
war years. 
Graph 6.2. Tri-partitie division of profits, 1926-1939 (L) --ý-Sudan 
Government 
Source: G aitskell, (, r; nu -; -Tenants 
Sudan Plantations Syndicate 
What the graph also shows in addition to the impact of the depression is the false dawn 
of recovery in 1932. This is explained by a fall in the yield in cotton in 1933 and 1934. 
66 SAD 417/4/144 Cooper Brothers Accountants, `Memorandum illustrating the method of ascertaining 
the price to be paid to the tenants for the cotton seed and ginned cotton purchased from them', 22id 
November 1928; SAD 417/4/170-172 Holmes, Son and Pott to the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 121E' 
December 1928 
''' SAD 417/4/21 Sudan Plantations Syndicate Main Agreement, 31'' January 1929: 'Ascertainment and 
Division of Profits' 
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Return on capital employed (ROCS) is a simple but effective measure of a company's 
performance. " Dividing the total annual dividend payment by the capital employed in 
the firm gives an easy comparison of the effectiveness of capital employed in creating 
profits. `i9 ROCE 1 is the dividend payment divided by the shareholding, while ROCS 2 is 
the dividend payment divided by the shareholding plus the share-premium. Both series 
(above) show essentially the same thing - that the depression brought on a significant 
worsening in the conditions of business for the Syndicate, but that the Syndicate did 
revive its position gradually from 1932 onwards. This measure does not take into account 
the effects of wartime inflation, but nevertheless indicates the pattern over the period of 
this chapter. The depression in Sudan fundamentally shaped and conditioned the 
economic trajectory of the colonial state. It also altered the shape and health of the 
Sudan Plantations Syndicate as a business. Significantly, in 1930,1931 and 1933 no 
profits were made by the business and in both 1931 and 1932 no dividend was paid, as 
68 Data from Gaitskell, Gejrra, 276-274; 
69 A discussion of ROCS, it application and limitations can be found in G. Jones, ; 11enhanis to Alultinationals, 
15-16; Jones's ROLE calculations for trading companies indicate that the Sudan Plantations Syndicate's 
performance was not dissimilar in the inter-war period. See, G. Jones, . I1enhants to ; llu//inatronu/s, 354-357 
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can be seen in the table above. Profits recovered somewhat and dividend payments 
began again in 1933, though not at pre-depression levels. They remained at these 
diminished levels for the next few years, during which time the minutes of the Annual 
Meetings of the company and the Board Meetings of the directors turned to the issue of 
the renewal of the concession. Of course, they did not know that the Second World War 
was shortly to occur, and this, more than anything else changed the complexion of 
circumstance in Sudan, something that was to dash the strategic hopes of the Syndicate. 
IV. STRATEGY 
As the Gezira Scheme became gradually became operational from the early 1920s and 
the Syndicate's core business began to yield results, the Syndicate undertook a strategy 
intended to expand the scale and then the scope of its business activities. First of all, the 
Syndicate began to explore the opportunities for expanding the scale of cotton growing 
within Sudan, for example in the Nuba Mountains where both Eckstein and MacIntyre 
believed that a crop could be grown! " There is no evidence, however, that this potential 
opportunity was ever pursued with any seriousness. However, in the Kassala region, 
cotton-growing was developed. 
In 1922-23 the Sudan Plantations helped to launch the Kassala Cotton 
Company and its sister institution, the Kassala Railway Company. The Sudan 
Government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate signed Heads of Agreement on the 7' 
November 1922 that put in place a complex re-financing package. " The idea was that on 
formation the Kassala Cotton Company would purchase and pay in full for 300,000 one 
pound shares in the Kassala Railway Company which it would then give to the Sudan 
70 SAD 416/2/46-49 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1924 
71 GHL MS 18000/222B 160 London Stock Exchange Listing File, Kassala Cotton Company Ltd, 15th 
February 1923, `Heads of Agreement', 7th November 1922; SAD 416/2/12-15 Minutes of the 184th Special 
Board Meeting of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 16th November 1922 
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Government Railways on completion of a railway extension connecting the cotton- 
growing areas in Kassala to the existing Sudan Railways network. In the intervening 
period the shares of the Kassala Railway Company were to have the names of both the 
Sudan Government and the Kassala Cotton Company inscribed on them and were to be 
lodged with the National Bank of Egypt. The Kassala Cotton Company, however, would 
agree not to use the voting rights unless authorised to do so by the Sudan Government'' 
The effect of this was to allow the government to develop the railway, with the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate financing the scheme via the Kassala Cotton Company, which 
through having a separate corporate identity to the Sudan Plantations Syndicate would be 
able to enter the British capital market on its own terms at some later date. Using the 
money there invested to refill the government's coffers, which, by placing it with the 
Kassala Railway Company was a way of providing a jointly owned corporate entity 
through which the two parties could retain influence, and the Kassala Cotton Company 
(and therefore by proxy the Sudan Plantations Syndicate) would not expend money until 
the construction was complete. The incentive for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate was 
straightforward: on completion of the railway extension the Kassala Cotton Company 
itself would be awarded a forty-year concession over the Kassala cotton-growing areas. " 
The British Treasury objected to the capitalisation of the company as originally 
envisaged with £50,000 in shares and £750,000 in debentures, insisting instead that some 
preference shares be issued. 74 The Trade Facilities Advisory Committee made an 
alternative suggestion with £300,000 of capital in ordinary and preference shares and 
n SAD 416/2/14-15 185th Board Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 21st December 1922; GHL 
MS 18000/222B 160 London Stock Exchange Listing File, 15th February 1923 
73 GHL MS 18000/222B 160 London Stock Exchange Listing File, Kassala Cotton Company Ltd, 15th 
February 1923: 'Heads of Agreement', 7th November 1922; 'Memorandum re the Kassala Cotton Company 
Ltd issued by the Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd', 10th January 1923 
74 SAD 416/2/12-15 Minutes of the 184th Special Board Meeting of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 16th November 1922 
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£500,000 in debentures. 75 This was accepted by the Sudan Plantations Syndicate at a 
board meeting in the middle of November 1922; the Syndicate were subsequently 
required to find subscribers for the new company. The £250,000 of preference shares 
were, however, in accordance with the Agreement of November 1922 to be owned by 
the Syndicate! " The Kassala Railway Company Ltd was formed around the same time 
with a capital of L300,000 with a debenture stock of £ 1,250,000 with Treasury guarantees 
of the principal and interest. " 
In February 1923 100,000 shares and 100,000 debentures of one pound in the 
Kassala Cotton Company were offered to the investors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate. Some shares were specially set aside for the directors who had been involved 
in negotiating the cotton concession in Kassala: `it was resolved to give the Chairman the 
right to take up at par out of the Syndicate's holding 25,000 ordinary shares for 
distribution in his discretion between himself, the Managing Director, Mr Alexander 
MacIntyre, and Brigadier General A. M. Asquith in view of their special services in 
negotiating the cotton concession. ' A further 400,000 shares were issued to subscribers. 78 
In May 1923 it was agreed that the Kassala Cotton Company would take over the 
running of the cotton growing area in Kassala at some point in 1924. " Nevertheless, the 
switch to new management had been announced to the Sudanese living and working in 
the area - including a reduction in the percentage of the profits they were to receive from 
75 SAD 416/2/12-15 Minutes of the 184th Special Board Meeting of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 16th November 1922; the Trades Facilities Advisory Committee advised on compliance of 
guaranteed loans administered under the Trades Facilities and Loans Guarantee Act 1922: GEL MS 18000 
/222B 160 London Stock Exchange Listing File, Kassala Cotton Company Ltd, 15th February 1923, 'Trade 
Facilities and Loans Guarantee Act 1922' 
76 SAD 416/2/12-15 Minutes of the 184th Special Board Meeting of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 16th November 1922 
n GEL MS 18000/222B 160 London Stock Exchange Listing File, Kassala Cotton Company Ltd, 15th 
February 1923, `Memorandum re the Kassala Cotton Company' issued bythe Sudan Plantations Syndicate 
Ltd, 10th January 1923; 'Agreement 7th December 1922 between Edward Colpays Midwinter and the 
Kassala Railway Company' 
78 SAD 416/2/17-18 187th Board Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 19th February 1923; GEL 
MS 18000/222B 160 London Stock Exchange Listing File, Kassala Cotton Company Ltd, 15th February 
1923 
79 SAD 416/2/19-22 188th Board Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 9th May 1923 
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cotton sold. The reduction from eighty percent to fifty percent of profits was justified 
`owing to the presence of the railway and the advantage of adequate supervision and 
guidance. 'so 
The capital for the Kassala Cotton Company was amended in 1935 to remove the 
hierarchical division of shares by converting the preference shares into ordinary shares. 
The reason for this was to boost the revenues of the ordinary shareholders during times 
of economic hardship such as those endured between 1930-3181 Prior to the conversion 
the profits had been split in two. As part of an agreement to compensate the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate for the loss of c. 9,300 feddans worth of irrigation water rights, the 
Kassala Cotton Company had agreed that half of all the profits should `be put to reserve 
throughout the period of the concession and should not be utilised during that period. '82 
The Syndicate's wider strategy at this time was to diversify internationally. An 
example of the wider imperial business opportunities open to the Syndicate can be seen 
when in 1923 a man called Colonel Massie of the East African and Trading Company 
offered to sell the Sudan Plantations Syndicate 25,000 acres of land purportedly suitable 
for cotton growing in what had been German East Africa (now Tanganyika, Rwanda and 
Burundi). Friedrich Eckstein thought that the land was worth surveying to establish its 
quality, but that in any event if `it proved unsuitable the estate would no doubt, in his 
opinion, be re-sold by the Syndicate without much loss. '83 The Syndicate subsequently 
bought the concession. 84 In November 1923 the Syndicate received commercial 
information supplied by the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation relating to the 
concession. Subsequently, the manager of the East African and Trading Company 
80 SAD 416/2/19-22188th Board Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 9th May 1923 
81 GHL MS 18000/357B 1612 London Stock Exchange Listing File, Kassala Cotton Company, 20" 
November 1935: `Application for re-organisation of capital'; `Kassala Cotton Company Ltd Circular to 
Shareholders', 22°d October 1935 by W. O. Simms 
82 SAD 417/4/385-387 `Note of a meeting held on 9th October 1929 at the Sudan Government's Office, 
Wellington House, Buckingham Gate' 
83 SAD 416/2/19-22 188th Board Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 9th May 1923 
e4 SAD 416/2/24 189 Board Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 27th September 1923; SAD 
416/2/29-32 16th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, November 8th 1923 
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Limited offered to plant three hundred acres at a cost of £8 per acre. This proposal was 
declined. A counter-proposal to work one hundred acres at £4 per acre was declined by 
the East African and Trading Company's South African directors. The Syndicate then 
decided to sell on the concession. " 
Another possibility for the Syndicate to diversify internationally was raised at 
the same time as the aborting of plans to develop the concession in East Africa. Lord 
Lovat had visited Brazil where he had investigated the cotton growing possibilities in the 
state of Sao Paulo. As Eckstein explained to the shareholders of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, `[t]he idea was to form a company called the Brazil Plantations Syndicate Ltd 
with a capital of £200,000 if which £ 150,000 was to be issued forthwith with 50% paid 
up. ' The remaining shares were to be withheld for distribution among the directors of 
the Brazil Plantations Syndicate with 15,000 reserved for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. 
Lovat was to be the chairman of the new Syndicate, with Eckstein and Asquith to be 
directors. " The Sudan Plantations Syndicate approved of the plan to take 15,000 shares 
in the new company. The Brazilian Plantations Syndicate purchased two small estates 
totalling 8,500 acres by late 1924, acquiring a further 60,000 acres of `virgin land' by June 
1925.87 The Brazil Syndicate subsequently borrowed £50,000 from the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate to help develop this land in March 1925 88 Half of this loan was repaid by 
August of the same year. 89 Despite having to lend the Brazil Plantations Syndicate a 
further L35,000 in order to buy cotton to keep its ginning factories running, the Board of 
85 SAD 416/2/33-37 Extraordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 27th November 
1923 
86 SAD 416/2/33-37 Extraordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 27th November 
1923 
87 416/2/46-49 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1924; SAD 
416/2/54-55 Minutes of the 197th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
4th June 1925 
88 SAD 416/2/46-49 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1924; 
SAD 416/2/51-53 Minutes of the 196th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 30th March 1925 
89 SAD 416/2/56-58 Minutes of the 198th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 19th August 1925 
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the Sudan Plantations Syndicate were sufficiently optimistic about the prospects for 
cotton growing that they advised the formation of a new company to acquire more land 
in Brazil. This company was called Parana Plantations Ltd and it was to have a relatively 
large nominal capitalisation of £750,000. £300,000 of the planned initial issue of 
£700,000 was to be used to purchase a Brazilian land company, Compania de Terras del 
Norte de Parana. 90 Parana was `essentially a land company which owns something like 
three million acres of first class land' and, by the latter part of 1925, had an option on a 
further one million acres 91 
The creation of the Brazilian company provides an insight into the long-term 
strategy of the Syndicate in the early 1920s. In responding to speculations that the 
presence of the Brazilian company indicated a lack of faith in the business in Sudan, 
Friedrich Eckstein replied that `nothing could be further from the truth' but added that 
the Directors' aim was to `gradually make our Syndicate into a holding or parent 
concern. i92 An aspect of this intention was international diversification, borne of a great 
confidence in the future of cotton growing: 
The prospects for profitable cotton growing in the world are good. You can pick 
and choose interests in other parts of the globe, and we have for this purpose the 
best staff in the world, and why should we not make use of this advantage. In this 
matter, too, please do not be alarmed, as your Board is guided by conservative 
principles and acts with caution. ... I 
have made it my business to keep au courant 
with what is going on in other countries in this respect and for years past I have 
90 SAD 416/2/56-58 Minutes of the 198th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 19th August 1925 
91 SAD 416/2/61-66 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 28th October 1925 
92 SAD 416/2/46-49 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1924 
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been convinced that Brazil will be one of the really big cotton growing countries in 
the world! ' 
By 1925 then, the Syndicate came to own significant shares in the Kassala Cotton 
Company, the Brazil Plantations Syndicate (later Parana Plantations) and a third company, 
the Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates Ltd. 94 The Cambuhy company was later 
thought to be primarily a coffee growing concern which did not interest the Syndicate 
except inasmuch as there remained a possibility for cotton growing in the same region. " 
This confirms that the Syndicate planned to expand their business by diversifying within 
the cotton trade both nationally and internationally as well as seeking to diversify by 
product. The hope that the Syndicate would become a corporate parent or holding 
company is also significant, because it reflects a model of growth that is very similar to 
that employed by the networks of mining financiers from which the Syndicate stemmed 
and continued to be dominated. 
Sudan Salt Ltd was created to exploit the possibility of salt mining and was 
registered as a company in March 1929. The company was given a concession until 2009 
by the Sudan Government to produce salt from a small area of land near Port Sudan. 
The company had an authorised capital of £250,000 and an issued capital of £227,000 96 
In August 1930 a report was received by the Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate from Imperial Chemical Industries indicating that mining was probably 
93 SAD 416/2/46-49 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1924; 
indeed, it was the presence of cotton in Brazil that had encouraged one of the more bizarre migrations in 
the history of colonialism when, in the 1860s, following the abolition of slavery in the United States of 
America thousands of Confederate families migrated to Brazil in search of sugar and cotton plantations - 
and slaves. See R. Orizio, Lost White Tribes (Sydney, 2001), in particular Chapter 3, 'Confederates in the 
Deepest South: Brazil', 96-123 
91 SAD 416/2/51-53 Minutes of the 196th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 30th March 1925 
95 SAD 416/2/61-66 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 28th October 1925 
96 Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, VoL 2,1950,2888-2889 
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possible. " By November 1930 early experiments with the salt pans had been a success, 
though there were evidently problems with labour. 98 The relationship between the 
Syndicate and Sudan Salt was, in effect, one of parent and subsidiary. For example, in 
August 1931 the Sudan Plantations Syndicate Board of Directors approved £ 14,646 
expenditure by Sudan Salt, while only two months later they cut back Sudan Salt's 
funding. " 
However, as potentially interesting as these strategic plans were they came to 
nothing. From the maturity of the scheme in 1926 to the depression was only half a 
decade. Half a decade from the recover in 1932/33 came the Second World War and 
with it, under the stringencies of war, the end of the Syndicate's concession. Events 
rather than a failure in strategy overtook the director's ability to grow the Syndicate and 
its broader interests as they had intended. 
97 SAD 416/3/22-23 Minutes of the 22311 Meeting of the Board of the Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 12th August 1930 
98 SAD 416/3/28-29 Minutes of the 225' Meeting of the Board of the Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 12th November 1930 
" SAD 416/3/445 Minutes of the 130tMeeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 28th August 1931; SAD 416/3/46-7 Minutes of the 1311, Meeting of the Board of Directors of 
the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 16th October 1931 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Syndicate was entirely concerned with the commercial importance of the Gezira 
Scheme; any wider function for the Scheme was subordinated to that imperative by the 
Syndicate. As Friedrich Eckstein commented in 1926, `unlike the Government and the 
Tenant, the Syndicate depends solely on the direct result of cotton crops and does not 
derive any indirect advantages from the Gezira Scheme. "' This is helpful in explaining 
some of the drift between the Syndicate and the government after the scheme became 
operational in 1925/26. The Syndicate then enjoyed an effective monopoly in Sudan 
relating to the production and disposal of cotton. '°' Before that moment, both parties 
had been concerned with developing the scheme to the point of commercial activity. 
After that point, the government pursued its own increasingly developmental agenda, 
while the Syndicate pursued its own commercial interest. " 
This monopoly, however, placed the Syndicate in a precarious position once 
the depression took its toll. The reliance of the Sudan Government and the Syndicate on 
the same cotton revenue, based on the monopoly holding was structurally weak for the 
Syndicate. This point needs amplification. During the formative phase of the Gezira 
Scheme's development, the Syndicate supplied expertise and links to business and the 
capital market that helped to finance the scheme and provide management. After the 
developmental stage, during the mature phase, there was no competitive commercial 
pressure that necessitated the Syndicate's involvement. Moreover, once the Scheme was 
operational the emergence of a complex and politically important agrarian society among 
the tenants and the labourers increased the Sudan Government's interest in non- 
commercial aspects of the management of the Scheme. When in 1944 the Sudan 
100 SAD 416/6/10-12 F. Eckstein to Sir G. Schuster, Financial Secretary Sudan Government, 8th 
November 1926 
101 SAD 417/4/65-115 'Details of the Agreement' 21st November 1928 
102 See also SAD 415/6/20 H Fraser to F. Eckstein, 26th November 1926 
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Government did not renew the concession this was, in part, because the involvement of 
the Syndicate was not a necessary condition for the operation of the Scheme. No 
competitive position was being maintained by the involvement of the Syndicate in Sudan; 
after 1931 Sudanese cotton only fetched the world market price for high grade cotton. 
This is significant because after the development of the Scheme the Sudan Government 
was getting no special advantage from the Syndicate as a result of the monopoly 
concession that was handed out. Or, put another way, the government was losing out on 
profits from cotton which were going to the Syndicate and was circumscribed in terms of 
the developmental policies that could be implemented by or through the Syndicate which 
was, ultimately, a business rather than a government department. 
Operationally, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate most closely maps to the U- 
form (unitary form) of firms described in the literature. "' The evidence presented in this 
chapter and Chapter 2 suggests that the Syndicate emerged initially as an S-form 
company (normally thought of as a family concern, but in this case stemming from an 
entrepreneurial origin), before developing a specialised management structure separate 
from its directorate and ownership structures which, as demonstrated earlier, were not 
conjoined. Operationally the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and its sister company the 
Kassala Cotton Company were vertically integrated, though the relationship between the 
Kassala Cotton Company and the Syndicate was really that of a horizontally integrated 
business unit - growth was achieved through the expansion of the scale of the firm 
However, once this direction of growth was pursued to completion further expansion via 
cotton growing in Sudan was limited to endogenous growth; i. e., expansion of acreage 
under cotton as part of the existing schemes or through increases in productivity. As 
suggested by the abortive strategy pursued in the inter-war period, it seems likely that the 
103 Wilson and Thomson, The Making of Modern Management, p. 13 
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Syndicate was attempting to work towards becoming a holding company (H form) for a 
group of companies, including by diversified expansion overseas. 
From the entrepreneurial start-up period under Leigh Hunt until the early 
1920s the Syndicate was itself part of the Wernher Beit group or network of companies, 
though the importance of this diminished after the First World War. A further trend can 
be seen is that the importance of metropolitan management (in the City of London) 
diminishes after the war while Sudanese based control becomes more and more 
important. In part this was a consequence of day to day management once the Gezira 
Scheme became operational. However, the internal policy making within the Syndicate 
indicates the increased importance of local knowledge and experience. The appointment 
of Alexander MacIntyre to the position of Chairman of the Syndicate in addition to being 
Managing Director points to this, as does the rise of Arthur Gaitskell later. 104 The 
Syndicate itself emerges as a kind of free-standing company in its latter years following 
the failure to become a holding company of a group of businesses in the inter-war period. 
However, the imperatives of government were increasingly toward a developmental 
agenda out of step with the commercial interests of the Syndicate and/or beyond the 
functional capabilities of the Syndicate to deliver. Again, in step with the argument 
presented at the end of Chapter 5, this points to nationalization as a prelude to the 
moment of decolonization. 
104 See Appendix 4: Arthur Gaitskell 
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Chapter 7 
Business, government and the political economy of Sudan, 
1919-1939 
There are at least three different ways in which one can define the term `control' in the 
context of relations between a foreign merchant house and a national government. 
There is, first, the deliberate control that the foreigner may exercise over officials, 
using what power he possesses to bring about decisions favourable to his own 
operations. Second, there is the more subtle and less obvious form of control in which 
policies are not wilfully forced upon the government, but which results simply from 
the circumstances confronting the government as a result of the presence and 
dispositions of the foreigner. Third, there is the control that manifests itself in 
mercantile authority and initiative in fields of activity vital to the government's well- 
being, the government itself lacking the will or power to restrain the merchant and 
exercise a jurisdiction of its own. 
- WM Mathew in D. C. M Platt, Business Imperialism (1977)' 
It has been said that that the cornerstone of the political edifice that has been built up 
with so much care in the Sudan - as in Egypt - has been low taxation. ... But with the 
development of an economic Sudan, taxation became an obligation -a duty. 
- P. E. Martin, The Sudan in Evolution 
(1921) 2 
1 W. NL Mathew, 'Antony Gibbs & Sons, the Guano Trade and the Peruvian Government, 1842-1861', in 
D. C. M. Platt, (ed. ), Business Imperiakrm, 1840-1930: An inquiry based on the British experience in Latin America 
(Oxford, 1977), p337 
2 P. E. Martin, The Sudan in Evolution (New York, 1970; 1921), 92-93 
221 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The central theme of this chapter is to chart a fundamental shift in power towards the Sudan 
Government and away from private enterprise. The British imperial system as a whole was 
weakened by the events of the 1930s, but the command and control structures within Sudan 
strengthened. As argued in Chapter 5, the Sudan Government wrested financial control and 
responsibility from the matrix of interests (Britain and Egypt in particular) from which the 
colonial state emerged. This occurred at the same time as the source of Sudan Government 
finance was found to be fragile. The consequence of governmental autonomy resting on 
fragile financial independence subtly directed Sudan towards the moment of decolonisation 
by affirming the merits of economic nationalism. 
This chapter builds on this argument by examining two areas of the political 
economy of Sudan in this period. Firstly, the relationship between the Sudan Government 
and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate evolved to reflect the gradually weaker position of the 
Syndicate, the stronger position of government, and government's greater need over this 
period to control the means of production on which valuable foreign exchange earnings for 
government rested. Secondly, then, this can be seen clearly in the relationship between 
government and the Syndicate as regards to tax -a changing factor in the wider British 
Empire at this time. ' Once again this provides evidence of reduction in the power of the 
Syndicate within Sudan, and the trend in the wider empire of the increased power of states 
and the diminished power of business. Indeed, the very strengthening of the Sudanese state 
and the tendency towards a form of economic nationalism in the period represents 
intellectually, culturally and economically the slow ossification of Britain's overseas Empire; 
or, at any rate, is a good example of such in the sub-Saharan / Middle Eastern region. 
3 Sir Alfred Sowani and W. E. Willan, The Taxation of Capital (London, 1912); J. Stamp, Wealth and Taxable 
Capacity (London, 1922); B. E. V Sabine, A History of Income Tax (London, 1966), 140-150 
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The development of the Gezira Scheme, so central to the political economy of 
Sudan, was undertaken by the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and the Sudan Government 
cooperating together. As was discussed in Chapter 3 this relationship was crucial and 
definitive of Sudan's experience of imperialism; it is a crucial area of investigation. What 
follows here is a continuation of the analysis begun in Chapter 3. As with there, the prime 
function is to explore the nature, tension and friction of the political-economic compact, in 
this case between 1919 and 1939. Once again, there are significant limitations of the sources. 
However, in this case there is a more certain overarching chronology of Gezira Agreements 
around which the negotiations and shifts in position can be sketched. The Gezira Agreement 
of 1919 remained in force until it was revised by a series of supplemental agreements in 
1930,1933,1937 and then, finally, in 1945! These dates reflect the following: 1930 was the 
time of the Northern Extension of the Scheme; the 1933 Agreement laid out the relationship 
between the Kassala Cotton Company (the subsidiary of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate) 
and the Sudan Government S The 1937 Agreement introduced the formation of the Tenants 
Reserve Fund, while the 1945 supplement came shortly after the decision in 1944 to 
terminate the Syndicate's concession in 1950. As with Chapter 3, it is not the case that the 
analysis undertaken leads to a smooth narrative as the parties moved from one agreement to 
the next. First of all the agreements are legal documents, dry and technical, and do not 
encapsulate the whole of the issues discussed and negotiation undertaken in intermittent 
times between agreements. Secondly, the functional nature of the agreements does not reflect 
the issues of interest here. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the sources are not 
complete enough to allow a smooth narrative. Instead, however, they convey change over 
4 SAD 417/2/2 'Memorandum of Contents'; SAD 417/2/104-109 'Draft Agreement Sudan Government - Sudan Plantations Syndicate' (c. 1940) 
S SAD 417/2/38-55 `Kassala Cotton Company Main Agreement 21"" February 1933' 
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time and indicate the broader shifts in position and power across the period; that is, the 
texture of the business-government relationship at this time. 
II. FINANCE, THE GEZIRA AGREEMENT, THE SYNDICATE AND THE 
GOVERNMENT 
During the First World War little progress was made on the development of the Gezira 
Scheme, and though £500,000 had been issued by the National Debt Commissioners, no 
actual loan amounts had been issued. After the war the international and national economic 
circumstances had changed and as a result new development plans had to be initiated that 
adapted and built upon the previous plans. The most significant economic change was in the 
massive inflation that Sterling underwent as a result of the war. This effectively rendered the 
initial estimates and the amounts guaranteed for loans meaningless. 
In the Autumn of 1918 the estimates and loan amounts for the Gezira Scheme were 
raised from £2,000,000 to £3,500,000 to which was added £ 1,000,000 for interest provision, 
and a further £400,000 for the building of adequate storehouses, ginning factories, offices 
and so on. Expenditure under this latter heading was not covered in the 1914 legislation, the 
idea at that time being that the Sudan Plantations Syndicate was to finance the expenditure 
with the government to take over the property on the Scheme at `valuation on the expiration 
of the Syndicate's term of management' This arrangement was deemed to be no longer 
suitable because of increased costs incurred by the Syndicate, and the changed business 
environment and considerably constricted capital market. `Consequently, the Sudan 
Government found it desirable to assist the Syndicate in this respect and to include the sum 
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of £400,000 in its estimate of expenditure', it was reported 6 The Sudan Loan Act of 1919 
authorised not just the expenditure of £4,900,000 estimated above, but £6,000,000, with a 
further £ 1,100,000 to be used for extension of the railways and the irrigation of Tokar and a 
railway extension (0700,000 and £400,000 respectively. ' 
However, by 1922 these estimates were redundant. In a Memo about the Sudan 
Loan Ordinance, the sensitivity of the Egyptian - Sudanese relationship was made clear. `I 
said that Egypt was in the position of a creditor whose debtor had embarked all his fortune 
and pledged all his credit in building a house which has now stood half finished, and on 
which no return could be expected unless the debtor was assisted to borrow further funds to 
complete the building. ' In short, too much money had been invested to abandon the project; 
considerably more money was required to ever have any hope of repaying the money to 
Egypt that Sudan owed. At this early stage, then, the political economy of Sudan was 
becoming locked into a dependent path. There had been no reason to doubt the initial 
estimates, however - it was `believed that the first loan would enable the Gezira Scheme to 
be brought to production, and thus advance rather than retard the day when Egypt could be 
repaid by the Sudan. ' It simply seems to have been the case that the project costs were 
increasing for reasons beyond the control of any of the main actors. There was only one way 
out of the financial hole that the Gezira Scheme finances and the Sudan Government were 
confronted with - to keep on spending: 
The Minister asked whether I believed that this superstructure of debt could be borne 
and repaid out of the proceeds of cultivation of 300,000 feddans? I referred him to Mr 
Baxter's report to me ... which showed incontestably at least that the Sudan would be 
6 FO 141/633/6 Memo: 'Guarantee of Soudan Loan: Clause 4, likelyJanuary 1924,34 
7 FO 141/633/6 The Sudan Guaranteed Loan Ordinance', passed 11th October 1919 
8 FO 141/633/6 Sudan Loan Ordinance, June 15th 1922 
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much more nearly able to do this if the Scheme was completed than if it was 
abandoned! 
Egypt was to be involved in the negotiation process relating to the floatation of a new loan, 
it being `neither politic nor proper to ignore Egypt in such negotiations'. Details of this 
process are hazy, but it is evident that the details of the loan were agreed at the very 
beginning of 192310 The first part of loan itself was issued in February of that year. " Hopes 
that the rest of the money required could be raised by leasing the Sudan railways had to be 
abandoned as impractical and in October 1923 the Treasury conceded that £7,000,000 was a 
more realistic figure to develop the Gezira. ' In the first part of 1924 they agreed that these 
sums would require a further Treasury guarantee, the Sudan side of the legislation being 
handled by an amendment to the Loan Ordinance of 1919" This was to considerably 
increase the overall level of indebtedness, so that by the autumn of 1924 the overall levels of 
debt were on the verge of reaching £13,000,000.14 Other sources put this figure at over 
£ 14,000,000, but it should be noted that only circa £ 11,000,000 was raised in the form of 
loans with a Treasury Guarantee is 
9 FO 141/633/6 Sudan Loan Ordinance, June 15th 1922 
10 FO 141/633/6 Lee Stack to Viscount Allenby, 4th January 1923; Egyptian Financial Adviser to the Chancery, 
British High Commission, Cairo, 10th January 1923; Stack to Allenby, 17th January 1923 
11 FO 141/633/6 Memo: 'Guarantee of Soudan Loan: Clause 4', likely January 1924,9-10; GHL MS 18000/ 
221B 22, Sudan Government Loan Stock Listing File, 12th January 1923, Trospectus: Sudan Government 
LO i% Guaranteed Stock, 1939-1973; GHL MS 18000/ 222B 180, Sudan Government Loan Stock Listing 
File, 18th February 1923, 'Application for Listing' issued by Mullen and Co, 26th February 1923; 'Trade 
Facilities and Loans Guarantee Act, 1922, Ch. 4 of which states: An Act to amend section of the Trade 
Facilities Act, 1921, and the Overseas Trade Acts, 1920 and 1921, and to authorize the Treasury to guarantee 
certain loans to be raised by the Government of the Federal Republic of Austria and the Government of the 
Soudan respectively. ' 
u Treasury position in October 1923 reported in FO 141/633/6 Lee Stack to Viscount Allenby, Cairo, 14th 
January 1924; FO 141/633/6 Otto Niemeyer (Treasury) to George Schuster, 3id October 1923 
13 FO 141/633/6 Lee Stack to Viscount Allenby, January 14th; Lee Stack to Viscount Allenby, January 17th 
1923 
'4 FO 141/633/6 Lee Stack to the Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 22nd October 1924 
"SAD G//S 1220 Extract from Note on the Financial Control by Egypt over the Sudan Finances' (1924); S. 
Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 191440 (London, 1984), Table 9 ('Loans raised by Colonial Governments in London Markets, 1919-1939), 296-297 
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The Gezira Agreement of 17' October 1919 replaced the 1911 Agreement between 
the Sudan Government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. It renewed the relationship 
between the Syndicate and the government and left in train once more the development of 
the Gezira Scheme. The new agreement in some ways changed the relationship. Firstly, the 
£32,500 that was advanced to the Syndicate so that they could issue scrip before the First 
World War had to be repaid to the government. Secondly, the agreement established that the 
`Government will advance to the Syndicate out of the funds to be raised by them under the 
Government of the Sudan Loan Act 1919 a sum of £400,000 which shall be expended by 
the Syndicate upon the following items of the works which it is responsible for providing'. 
This was issued on the terms that upon the termination of the Syndicate's management of 
the Scheme the amounts advanced should be repaid. As well as providing financial expertise 
and a link to the City of London the second function of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate was 
to provide organisation, management and control over the Gezira Scheme and supervision 
of the tenant farmers. 16 Though the agreement bound the Syndicate and the government 
tightly together, the government nevertheless warned the Syndicate that even if the Gezira 
Scheme were to be expanded at some point in the future the government would not be 
obliged to use the Syndicate as the managers. Even so, they also assured the Syndicate that 
they would not enter into any similar agreement with any other company in the lifetime of 
the agreement" The agreement also established that the Syndicate's share of the profits 
from the Gezira Scheme was to be twenty-five per cent. The Sudan Government was to 
receive thirty-five per cent while the tenant farmers were to get forty. 1e 
16 SAD 415/3/6-11 'Agreement made this 17th day of October 1919 between Major-General Lee Stack, 
Govenor General, Sudan Government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate' 
17 SAD 415/3/25-28 Letter relating to Agreement of even date between the Sudan Government and the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate Ltd, 17th October 1919 
18 SAD 415/3/6-11 'Agreement made this 17th dayof October 1919 between Major-General Lee Stack, 
Govenor General, Sudan Government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate' 
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By 1923 the Syndicate were anxious to renew the agreement with the Sudan 
Government, though they found that the `[g]overnment were not inclined to do anything for 
the present'. This reluctance revolved round £400,000 advanced to the Syndicate before the 
war. Eckstein believed that Syndicate should undertake to give up five percent of the profits 
(that is, five out of twenty-five percent as per the previous agreement) and to repay the 
£400,000 in return for an extension of the agreement 19 
The announcement at the end of 1924 that the Makwar Dam would be operation in 
time for the 1925-26 crop resulted in the date for the beginning of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate's concession over the Gezira area being fixed at July 1925. During this period the 
Syndicate continued to reassure shareholders that the relationship with the Sudan 
Government was a good one, even despite the political situation within Egypt. There was no 
sign that the problems in Egypt resulted in any kind of alteration of the basis for business 
for the Syndicate, nor disturbed the generally optimistic tenor of the times. Nevertheless, the 
Syndicate were supportive of the policy adopted by the Sudan Government, specifically to 
retain independence of action. J. Arthur Hutton observed that `We all want to see a fair 
agreement with Egypt, but at the same time we have got to look after ourselves and our own 
interests in Sudan, and there must be no weak giving way for the sake of a temporary 
peace. '2° Nineteen Twenty. five marks the end of the first phase of the relationship between 
Syndicate and government in the inter-war period. This phase was cordial and constructive, 
fashioned by mutual dependence and the need to develop the Gezira Scheme. The following 
years, however, were not as pleasant for the Syndicate or the government. 
It was in late 1925 that the Syndicate and the Sudan Government began negotiations 
relating to `a considerable further extension of our operations in the Sudan. '21 This led to a 
19 SAD 416/2/19-22 188th Meeting of the Board of Directors, Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 9th May 1923 
20 SAD 416/2/46-49 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1924 
21 SAD 416/2/61-66 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 28th October 1925 
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reduction in the Syndicate's share of the profits from twenty. five to twenty per-cent in order 
to increase the tenants' share. This change was required to address the perception that `the 
Government or its agents [have been] giving to landowners or cultivators elsewhere in the 
Gezira teens more advantageous than those ruling in the area managed by the Syndicate'. ' It 
was also a contested issue as to whether the Syndicate could establish the principle that if 
there were to be any further increase to the tenants share the government should take on the 
first two and a half per cent. Schuster argued that though he was prepared to admit that it 
was fair to ask for some degree of protection against a further increase in the tenants' share 
it might be the Syndicate itself (over which the Government had no control) that might 
make an increase necessary. " Eckstein replied, complaining that `whereas the Government is 
protected against maladministration by the Syndicate' the Syndicate was not similarly 
protected if the tenants' costs rose by means beyond their control; for example, with regard 
to the cost of seed or manure. Eckstein's principal concern was to tighten the clause in the 
agreement which might allow the government to prematurely end the Syndicate's 
concession, or reduce their share of the profits still further. Whereas the draft on the table at 
the end of 1926 stated that the government would have some kind of right of sanction if it 
`had become necessary as a result of general conditions [being] economically inadequate', 
Eckstein suggested that it read: `Results from or from the effects of negligence, inefficiency 
or fault in the manner in which the Syndicate carries out its function of management. 'Z' The 
Syndicate made their position clearer still in a memo delivered to the Sudan Government at 
the beginning of November 1926. In this memo, they outlined the essential difference of 
u SAD 415/6/25 'Addendum to Cause 7(u)', undated but likely 1926/1927 
2' SAD 415/6/3-4 George Schuster to Friedrich Eckstein, 6th November 1926; SAD 417/4/216-218 Sudan 
Government and Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd, Gezira Concession, 19th January 1929; SAD 415/6/3-4 
George Schuster to Friedrich Eckstein, 6th November 1926 
24 SAD 416/6/10-12 Friedrich Eckstein to George Schuster, 8th November 1926 
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positions (clause 12 refers to the government's right to increase the tenants' share or cancel 
the concession upon certain trigger conditions occurring): 
It will be readily appreciated that with a 25% share and a 10 or 14 year period, the 
provisions under clause 12 are different from what they are with a 20% share and a 25 
year agreement.... The risks of the clause becoming operative are much greater on a 
25 year agreement than they are on an agreement for ten or fourteen years. 
The central point made by the Syndicate was that with a considerable portion of their share, 
as gross profit, was subject to the operating costs of the business, namely `working expenses 
and a margin' and funds for reserves and to meet amortization. Though it was noted that 
exposure to amortization risks were reduced by a considerably longer term, it was bemoaned 
that this came at the expense of the possible profit margin. The Syndicate argued that an 
increase in the tenant's share might be required for a variety of possible scenarios including a 
rise in the cost of living or labour, a fall in the price of cotton, the effects of political or 
religious discontent, the government's desire to improve living standards, the creation of 
another scheme in the Gezira to rival that run by the Syndicate, or an increase in the railway 
rates or taxation. ' The essence of this critique is to stress the needs of business rather than 
the needs of government, in particular a government that was increasingly inclined to 
welfare-driven policies of social intervention. The implicit acclamation by the Syndicate that 
the government might have broader interests, especially in the long-run, is evidence not only 
of the competing as well as mutually reinforcing nature of the two partners, but also the 
structurally weaker position of business overtime. 
u SAD 415/6/13-15 `Note on Sudan Plantations Syndicate objections to the incorporation in the New 
Agreement of a provision whereby Sudan Plantations Syndicate must bear a proportion of any increase in the 
Tenants share' (1926) 
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Nevertheless in 1926, with the Gezira Scheme in its infancy and with the expectation 
that better times were close at hand, Schuster sought to reassure the Syndicate. `You have 
asked me to put it on the record', he wrote, `that the intention of the government in insisting 
on the right to premature termination is not that this right should be exercised merely for its 
own financial gain provided that your management is working satisfactorily in every way. I 
am quite ready to confirm that this is so. ' Schuster went on to explain that instead of trying 
to define the terms of when the concession could legitimately be withdrawn by the 
government it was better for the government to retain total freedom of action, but to put in 
place a generous compensation scheme in case of cancellation of the concession. 
`Government itself must be the sole judge of its own motive', he concluded. The Heads of 
Agreement were subsequently signed on I Ith November 19206 
This situation held for only two years. In March 1928 Alexander MacIntyre, 
Managing Director of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate began to propose changes to the 
relationship between the Syndicate and the Sudan Government. At the core of his proposals 
was a desire to `retain as much as possible of the partnership conception which had been 
embodied in the first agreement and in the early drafts. " It was marked by a more aggressive 
engagement on the part of the Syndicate. For example, MacIntyre suggested that 40% of the 
marketing expenses incurred by the Syndicate `on account of their common undertaking' 
should be borne by the tenants. He also suggested that the Syndicate be given protection 
from an increase in rates on cotton transport. In both the of these matters it seems that Sir 
George Schuster was fundamentally unsympathetic 28 
26 SAD 415/6/16 George Schuster to Friedrich Eckstein, 9th November 1926; SAD 415/6/19 Hugh Fraser to 
Friedrich Eckstein, 22nd November 1926 
p SAD 415/6/28-46 'New Gezira Agreement: Note of a Discussion held in the Finance Department on 8th 
and 9th March 1928 to consider various alterations proposed by Mr MacIntyre' 
28 SAD 415/6/28-46 'New Gezira Agreement: Note of a Discussion held in the Finance Department on 8'h 
and 9th March 1928 to consider various alterations proposed by Mr McIntyre' 
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Maclntyre fulminated to the Financial Secretary. `Now that the majority of the 
cotton grown outside the Gezira is grown by the government, or the fact that the 
Company's share of the Gezira crop has been reduced by five per cent under the new 
Agreement, I feel we must have some protection. ' Huddleston in the Financial Office 
replied, commenting that `[w]hile anxious to give all reasonable assurances that we will play 
the game, I have great difficulty in inserting in the agreement anything like what you are 
asking. ' MacIntyre reiterated the central point again, though extending it to appeal to 
potential for a change of policy by the government at some unspecified point in the future: 
`while I feel perfectly sure that while the present Government personnel - who are 
conversant with the spirit of the agreement - remain in office we need have no fear, on the 
other hand, our percentage is now so small and vital to our existence that I feel we should 
have a safeguard in the future, when others in office may hold different views. '' 
29 SAD 415/6/47-48 Alexander MacIntyre to George Schuster, 15th March 1928; SAD 415/6/55 A. J. G 
Huddleston to Alexander MacIntyre, 22nd March 1928; SAD 415/6/56 Alexander N1acIntyre to A J. G 
Huddleston, 24th March 1928 
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III. THE TENANTS EQUALISATION FUND 
The creation of the Tenants Equalisation Fund dominated the discussion of the relationship 
between the Syndicate and the government from 1933 until the final creation of the fund in 
1937. This stemmed from some early successes: 
In the early years of the Gezira Scheme the importance of establishing a Tenants 
Equalisation Fund appears to have been obscured by the astonishing success of the 
venture; but when the value of the crop fell from £3,254,000 in 1929 to £884,000 in 
1930, and to £393,000 in 1931, the position of the tenants demanded serious 
consideration. 
During the depression over £500,000 was lent to the tenants by the Syndicate and the 
government? ' This created two problems. First to avoid the Syndicate and the government 
from having to make a similar payment in future if there were a deleterious downturn in the 
fortunes of Sudan cotton; and secondly, to provide a framework of the repayment of the 
loans made to the tenants. In April 1933 the Sudan Government proposed the creation of 
the Fund which was intended to allow the Syndicate and the government to deal with the 
tenants as a collective body (so as to make policy easier to apply); secondly, the fund was to 
achieve `security against indebtedness of individual tenants being regarded as extinguished by 
reason of the fact that their debt to the Syndicate had been paid by the Equalisation Fund. ''' 
In early 1934 a Foreign Office Minute Sheet recorded that negotiations had been ongoing 
30 FO 141/826/1 Gvil Secretary of the Sudan Government for the Governor-General to Foreign Office, 15th 
June 1935; FO 141/616/9 S. G. Symes, Governor General of Sudan, to the British Ambassador to Egypt, 24th 
May 1937 
31 FO 141/497/4 Copy of a Letter from the Financial Secretary's Office, Sudan Government (HE. Fass) to 
Secretary of the Governor General's Council, 16th December 1933 
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since the summer of 1933 but that little progress had been made. In fact, so little progress 
had been made that HE. Fass, Financial Secretary of the Sudan Government had even 
threatened to terminate the concession over the Gezira Scheme `unless the [Syndicate] were 
not more amenable. ' The Foreign Office official writing the report professed to be little 
concerned with the negotiation (an interesting fact in itself) but he did observe that the 
success of the Gezira Scheme was so central to the viability of the Sudan Government that it 
was necessary for the British government to be kept appraised of the relationship between 
the Sudan Government and the Plantations Syndicate, `as indeed with all financial matters 
affecting the Sudan''' The dispute between the Syndicate and the government continued to 
be bogged down in technical details mainly concerned with the indebtedness of the Gezira 
tenants" The implications of this issue relating to tax are discussed more thoroughly in the 
next section of this chapter, but the Syndicate's main concern was to avoid what they 
worried would be a material alteration to the terms of the Gezira Agreement" The extensive 
quotation below indicates both the government's position and the Syndicate's concerns. 
Those proposals were directed to substitute for the machinery of the Main 
Agreement, which was intended to meet a position in which the financial return to 
the tenant is inadequate, an arrangement for ensuring, in the first place that in bad 
years tenants would be freed from debt resulting from the excess of the necessary 
advances for cultivation over the proceeds of their share (through the taking over of 
the debt by the Equalisation Fund): and, in the second place, that a Fund would be 
provided from which such deficiencies can be met in the future. At the same time 
32 FO 141/497/4 'Minute Sheet, January 12th 1934' 
33 FO 141/497/4 Copy of a Letter from the Financial Secretary's Office, Sudan Government (HE. Fass) to 
Secretary of the Governor General's Council, 16th December 1933 
x FO 141/497/4 'he Gezira: Summary of the Negotiations with the Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd (and 
the Kassala Cotton Company Ltd), Summer 1933, p. 8 
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the Sudan Government protected the Syndicate from liability should the 
indebtedness of the tenants be increased by the action of the Sudan Government. 
The Syndicate, however, in their proposals, claimed from the Government a 
payment into the Tenants Equalisation Fund whenever any action may have been 
taken by the Government which, it might be argued, had affected the financial and 
economic position of the tenants, notwithstanding that such action has neither 
increased the amount of the advances necessarily made to the tenants nor decreased 
the amount of their share of the proceeds of the crop. This went far beyond the 
Government's proposals or the Syndicate's rights under existing agreements. There 
was in the Sudan Government's opinion no justification for a claim by them for 
further safeguards or any beneficial treatment beyond what is accorded by the Main 
Agreement and the Ancillary Agreement put forward by the Government. 
The Sudan Government made it clear that they did not wish to place the Syndicate at a 
disadvantage, but that no revision should be made. At a meeting in June 1933 the Sudan 
Government felt that the Syndicate had shifted their position somewhat and were then 
asking for protection of the Syndicate's profits, a position that was apparently abandoned 
only a few days after. The disagreement went on into July, when negotiation broke down? ' 
This was emblematic of a discourse over this period (in fact, up to and including the 
autumn of 1933) that was in turn both constructive and fractious. The problem in analysing 
the twists and turns of negotiation is not just one of the limitations of the sources, it is also 
that the texture of the Syndicate-Government relationship at this time is one of flux with no 
sense of resolution. The reason was that after the development phase (1919-1925) and the 
35 FO 141/497/4 The Gezira: Summary of the Negotiations', 9-12 
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optimistic phase of operation (1925-1930/1) both parties to the Gezira Agreement sought to 
shore up their respective positions. 
Throughout 1933 the Syndicate relentlessly pushed for the tenants to be levied to 
pay for debts that were incurred during the depression. This included the suggestion that the 
tenants' share of profits be raised to 65% for one year without telling the tenant. This would 
have had the effect of raising the absolute levels of revenue generated by the proposed levy. 
Since the levy would find its way to the Syndicate to repay tenant debts, this plan would 
amount to a tax-free payment to the Syndicate out of that year's profits. In response the 
Sudan Government reiterated a previously made warning that any raise in tenants' share 
would be financed by calling in the Syndicate's debenture and might result in the termination 
of the Syndicate's concession in 1939 `because the perpetually re-iterated threat of raising the 
tenants share made the political and budgetary position of the Sudan Government 
impossible: Eventually though, in October 1933, the Sudan Government relented and 
agreed that a levy should be made on the tenants but even in doing so the government 
refused to acquiesce to all of the Syndicate's demands and did not allow unlimited access to 
the money in lieu of debts, limiting payments to 50% of the proceeds of the levy. 36 
Nevertheless, the Syndicate's relationship with the Sudan Government continued to 
be in flux. In March 1934 S. G. Symes, then Governor General of Sudan, wrote to Sir Mlles 
Lampson and expressed that though he was opposed to an early termination of the Gezira 
Agreement, he wished for an Ancillary Agreement settling the issues of the tenants' debt. 
That he raised early termination was indicative of the degree of unease in government circles 
about the Syndicate; it also indicates that what was negotiated the previous autumn was not a 
permanent agreement. No agreement was reached in 1934, but when negotiations 
36 FO 141/497/4 The Gezira: Summary of the Negotiations', 12-15 
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recommenced in early 1935 the establishment of a Tenants Equalisation Fund was brought 
close to practical realisation" 
The eventual creation of the Equalisation Fund in 1937 left the fundamental 
relationship between the Syndicate and the government unchanged. A settled position 
regarding the tenants' debts to the Syndicate dating from the period 1929-1931 was reached 
in March 1937, the debts `deemed to have been repaid and discharged' from the Tenants 
Reserve Fund. 38 
The evidence presented here is not conclusive, but it is enough to point to the shift 
that occurred as a result of the events of 1930/31 and the effect of the depression on the 
economy of Sudan. Before 1931 the relationship between the Syndicate and the government 
was constructive and broadly in favour of the Syndicate. After 1931 the relationship was in 
continual flux and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate found itself unable to extract influence as 
it had before. 
37 FO 141/497/4 G. S. Symes , Palace, Khartoum to Sir 
Miles Lampson, 7th March 1934' FO 141/616/9 G. S. 
Symes to the British Ambassador to Egypt, 24th May 1937; FO 141/826/1 Civil Secretary of the Sudan 
Government for the Governor-General to Foreign Office, 15th June 1935 
38 FO 141/616/9 Copy of Sudan Plantations Syndicate - Sudan Government Agreement, 16th March 1937 
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IV. THE SYNDICATE AND TAXATION 
As the means of generating revenue to pay for the cost of government, taxation plays an 
obvious and central part to the vitality of the colonial state. However, extracting taxation 
from Sudan had been a persistent problem for decades before the Condominium was 
formed. Reginald Wingate himself had some experience of this himself when Governor of 
Suakin in the 1880s and 1890s. Not only was he preoccupied with the reassessment of land 
tax rates within the Suakin district, but he also had significant trouble raising enough money 
through the dubious form of Rachat Militaire to satisfy the Egyptian Exchequer, something 
which the Egyptian of Ministry of Finance gave him some trouble over. 39 Rachat Militaire 
was effectively a voluntary head tax levied in return for exemption from service in the 
Egyptian Army. It is clear that it was used in a cynical way to extract money from the 
wealthier sections of Egyptian society by conscripting more men than were necessary for 
service or the Army ever intended to take. ' Wingate's experience and that of the early 
Condominium administration as a whole was one of the difficulty of extracting taxes. This 
led them to prefer to obtain tax from means they could have control over, and this pushed 
the administration towards a direct tax on business and for tax to assume prime importance 
in business-government relations. 
Sudan was no different to anywhere else in that tax might be direct or indirect. In 
terms of indirect taxation - not a central concern here - tariffs, customs and charges on 
transport accounted for the main sources. Direct taxation on the native Sudanese took 
39 Duke University Library(DUKE), Wingate Papers Folder 1884 - March 1890, FR Wingate, Diaryentry, 28th 
March 1890; Folder 1884 - March 1890, Wingate to Headquarters Egyptian Army, 20ch March 1890; Folder 
April - June 1890, Milner, Egyptian Ministryof Finance to Wingate, 20th May 1890; Folder April - June 1890, 
Wingate to Milner, 1' June 1890; Folder April - June 1890, Milner to Wingate, 2nd June 1890; Folder April - June 1890, Milner to Wingate June 10th 1890 
40 DUKE Wingate Papers Folder November - December 1890, 'Memorandum on the Abolition of Rachat 
Militaire', December 1890. 
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several forms: the land tax (set at a variety of fixed rates; rain lands were subject to usher, 
usually a tithe of ten per cent of the produce from the land), separate taxes on date trees, 
animals (camels, mules, sheep, horses and cattle), roads, houses and boats, a tax on traders 
(the Sudan Traders Tax) and tribute from nomad groups. The problem with these forms of 
taxation was that they were hard to collect. In 1913 a new direct tax was introduced - known 
as the Sudan Traders Tax - that levied businesses and individual traders earning over £E24 
per year. This was subsequently changed in 1919 to remove small scale traders from 
exemption. The Sudan Government had become concerned that many traders would be 
more useful as employed labour. By setting a minimum tax of LE1 per annum on 
assessment and a rate of 4% income tax on the first £100 earned it was hoped that those 
unable to stay in business as traders would seek `more useful and profitable employment in 
manual work on the land or elsewhere: That is, they were intentionally driven out of 
business by the Sudan Government. This should be considered as deliberate economic 
management through the manipulation of fiscal policy. '' 
From 1920 the Imperial government regarded Sudan as a territory under British 
protection, a status which conferred the usual taxation relationship between the centre and 
the periphery. As a result if a business paid Sudan Traders Tax it was eligible for relief under 
the double taxation regime. " 
41 Martin, The Sudan in Evolution, 94-95; FO 141/687/8801, 'ExplanatoryNote Traders Tax Ordinance 1919'; 
FO 141/687/8801, Telegram from High Commission, Cairo to Sudan Government, Khartoum, 16th March 
1919 
42 FO 141/687/8801, Inland Revenue (Claims Branch) to Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office re 'Sudan 
Trader's Tax', 30th August 1920 
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V. TAX AND SYNDICATE-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 
The relationship between the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and the Sudan Government was 
shaped by what was expected from both with regard to the disbursement of certain duties 
and the rewards that would ensue. In the 1920s the issues that were raised in terms of 
renegotiation were shaped directly by the needs of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate as a 
business, in particular to perform their functions while still being able to turn a profit. This 
then was connected to two issues in particular - firstly, how the Syndicate was to be 
compensated at the end of the concession period for the capital that it had sunk into the 
Gezira Scheme in order to maintain the terms of the concession, namely the provision of 
minor canalization and the management of the scheme and secondly, the extent to which 
they would be free from or obliged to pay taxation. 
The Sudan/Gezira Agreement made on the 17`x' October 1919 between the Sudan 
Government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate established that the gross profit made 
through the sale of cotton was to be divided by the three parties as agreed before the First 
World War, namely, forty per cent to the tenants, thirty five per cent to the government and 
twenty-five per cent to the Syndicate. These sums were to be split from the total from `the 
sale price of all produce received by the syndicate after deducting the cost of transport from 
the Syndicate's stores to the market, insurance, cost of ginning and other expenses incidental 
to marketing including export tax. ' The Agreement went on to be more explicit again: `The 
Syndicate's share of the said gross profits shall be exempt from any tax on profits or income 
tax which may be in force in the Sudan. t43 This reflected the belief held by the Syndicate in 
1916 at the beginning of the negotiations that eventually led to the agreement that no new 
taxes could be raised on either Syndicate or tenant other than those already existent in 1913. 
43 SAD 415/3/6-11, `Agreement made this 17th day of October 1919 between MajorGeneral Lee Stack, 
Govenor-General, Sudan Government, and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate' 
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Additionally no land tax or water levy was to be raised against the Syndicate or the tenants, 
though both animal tax and house tax would apply (though the latter was only to be levied in 
the towns) '' This original settlement was in many ways obvious. The bargain struck between 
the three parties was designed to be rewarding in relation to the contribution made by each; 
if the government were to separately raise taxes on the profits of the Syndicate they would, 
of course, be in a position to unilaterally alter the reality of the arrangement between the 
parties without materially altering the agreement. However, as Sudan and Great Britain 
increasingly had recourse to taxation during the 1920s, it became an issue of tension between 
the government and the Syndicate. As was pointed out during Syndicate-Government 
negotiations in 1926, `unlike the Government and the Tenant the Syndicate depends solely 
on the direct result of the cotton crops and does not derive any direct advantages from the 
Gezira Scheme. '45 The Syndicate was, of course, peculiarly vulnerable to the effects of a 
reduction in profits as a result of heavy taxation. Though tenants might suffer as a direct 
result as well, their partly subsistence existence would insulate them and in any event the 
change to the Gezira Agreement in 1926 resulted in their take of the profits being increased 
at the expense of the Syndicate; the government too would suffer if profits were lower but, 
also, they would be the direct recipients and beneficiaries of any tax paid - and, of course, 
governments don't pay taxes. The Sudan Government was always in an advantageous 
position with regard to its power in respect of that of the Syndicate in such a brokerage of 
the disbursement of power. It is known, for example, that the government were unrelenting 
in the request of the Syndicate in 1926 to negotiate a different basis for the calculation of the 
railways rates for cotton and cotton seed; any rise in these rates would effectively be a charge 
44 SAD 416/1/67 150th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 19th October 
1916; SAD 415/3/6-11, 'Agreement', 17th October 1919; SAD 415/3/25-28, Letter relating to Agreement of 
even date between the Sudan Government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd', 17th October 1919 
45 SAD 415/6/13-15, 'Note on Sudan Plantations Syndicate objections to the incorporation in the new 
Agreement of a provision whereby the Sudan Plantations Syndicate must bear a proportion of any increase in 
the tenants share' (1926) 
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that disproportionately affected the tenants and the Syndicate - the government, naturally, 
would be the beneficiary if there were any increase in income from a rise in rates46 
The principal claim that the Syndicate had to be free from taxation traced itself to the 
1919 Agreement and a letter written by Edgar Bernard, the Financial Secretary of the Sudan 
Government to Friedrich Eckstein in November 1922 that outlined the basis of the 
Agreement. `The guiding principle of our contract', it stated, `is that it should be a working 
partnership between your company and the cultivating tenants. ' Alongside this general 
statement of intent it also laid out the following agreement on taxation: 
You have expressed the apprehension that the Government after having agreed that 
the company shall have a certain share of the proceeds of cotton produced in the 
conclusion area might in effect take away what it has granted by levying a special tax 
on the production of cotton. ... 
This is a matter which was fully discussed in 
connection with the Gezira Agreement and as a protection to the concessionaire the 
following passage was inserted: "No tax will be ferried upon cotton grown on the land to which 
the Agreement applies unless it is a tax applicable to all cotton grown in the Sudan and apparently of 
a permanent nature. " This passage has also been inserted in Clause 8 of the Heads of 
Agreement to be signed in connection with Kassala Concession. 
Bernard and the other delegates admitted that even this did not entirely reassure the 
Syndicate, so going on to reinforce the protection offered by stating that `[o]n behalf of the 
Sudan Government we are prepared to put it on record that we recognized that you are 
entitled to protection against the government taking with one hand what it has given with 
another and we are prepared for the purpose to give you an undertaking that, if the Sudan 
46 SAD 415/6/21 George Schuster to F. Eckstein, 12th January, 1927 
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Government introduces in the Sudan any tax on the production of cotton guaranteed to the 
Kassala Cotton Company under the terms of its concession, the Company shall receive 
compensation proportionate to the reduction in its share of the proceeds of cotton - from 
the government's share such proceeds, for so long as the tax in question is in force: 
Nevertheless, they fell short of offering the "privileged enclave" that the Syndicate evidently 
had requested. " 
The Syndicate wanted later agreements to match the early conception of the 
partnership which was embodied in the 1919 agreement and the 1922 letter. The draft of the 
agreement on the table in 1928 was `designed to meet the income tax difficulty. The 
Syndicate, however, wanted to lower its tax burden as much as possible, spoiling for 
concessions in animals and motor vehicles. Alexander MacIntyre wrote to George Schuster 
requesting that the government again give the kind of protection that had been assured by 
the 1922 letter. Huddleston, at this time in the Financial Secretary's Office replied that 
though they were `anxious to give all reasonable assurances' they were unable to agree to the 
Syndicate's requests for a greater degree of protection! ' 
The decision to lower the amount that the Syndicate would take of the overall profits 
in 1926 caused the Syndicate difficulties. As Maclntyre bemoaned: `our percentage is now so 
small and vital to our existence that I feel we should have a safeguard in the future: " 
Unsurprisingly, the Syndicate wanted their tax liability to be as low as possible. However, 
two years previously the situation with regard to tax liability had been changed by the 
amendment of the 1919 Agreement: 
47 SAD 415/4/49-51 E. E. Berard, FL Fraser and R Hewison (Sudan Government) to F. Eckstein (Sudan 
Plantations S), ndicate), 8th November, 1922 
48 SAD 415/6/28-46 'New Gezira Agreement: Note of a Discussion held in the Finance Department on 8th 
and 9"' March 1928 to consider the various alterations proposed byMr MacIntyre'; SAD 415/6/47-48 A. 
MacIntyre to G. Schuster, 15th March 1928; SAD 415/6/55 A. J. C Huddleston to A. MacIntyre, 22nd March 
1928 
49 SAD 415/6/56 A. MacIntyre to A. J. C Huddleston, 24th March 1928 
243 
As regards the Company's share of the proceeds, so long as the company shall be liable 
to pay United Kingdom Income Tax on its profits or any parts thereof, any income tax 
or tax on profits imposed by the Government of the Sudan thereon shall not exceed 
the rate for the time being allowed by the United Kingdom legislation by way of relief 
against UK income tax. so 
This was the standard way of resolving the double tax problem within the empire. Louis 
Bluen, as Secretary of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, wrote in a letter from late 1928 that 
`[r]elief can only be obtained on proof of payment of the Sudan Traders Tax on the same 
profits as those upon which the United Kingdom Income Tax is levied. ' Bluen went to on to 
explain the position that this would create for the Syndicate. 
While the Directors cannot themselves deduct Sudan Tax from the dividends the 
Directors could at the forthcoming General Meeting recommend shareholders in the 
resolution declaring the dividend to deduct so much in the £ for United Kingdom Tax 
and so much for Sudan Tax, and to authorize the Directors to make such deductions 
in future declarations of interim dividends, which might get over the difficulty of 
passing on. " 
SO SAD 415/3/6-11 'Agreement made this 17thdayof October 1919 between Major"General Lee Stack, 
Govenor General, Sudan Government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate' 
51 SAD 417/4/21 Letter by Louis Bluen to unknown recipient, October 1928 
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Bluen also recommended that the Sudan Government arrive at an Agreement with the 
Inland Revenue Authorities as to the proportion of profits that should be considered as 
Sudan profits and United Kingdom profits, and the rate of relief that was to be given 52 
This then created the context for a source of genuine tension in Syndicate - 
government relations as a result of liability for taxation. The issue was whether the Syndicate 
should pay tax on the sinking funds created in order to repay the Sudan Government Loan 
Debt and the amortization fund created to recoup for the Syndicate for the capital invested 
in canalization and buildings that would become the property of the Sudan Government on 
the final expiration of the concession 53 Alexander MacIntyre wrote to Friedrich Eckstein to 
explain the problem: `Huddleston is not prepared to insert the changes in our agreement 
which Fletcher thought necessary to avoid paying income tax on the sinking funds and 
amortization and development. He feels it savours too much of robbing of the King's 
revenue. ' As a result MacIntyre considered taking steps to avoid paying tax on the 
amortization fund (though not the sinking funds) by dissolving it and paying the money as 
extra dividends to the Syndicate's shareholders. ' At the same time on the government side 
Huddleston was corresponding with Hugh Fraser in the London Office of the Sudan 
Government to explain the balance that needed to be struck with regard to the Syndicate's 
tax liability. `I think', he wrote, `that we have got to be quite clear about what our obligations 
are to them and what our obligations are to the Inland Revenue. 'ss At the core of this were 
two competing principles. Firstly, Huddleston thought that the government was obliged to 
ensure that the Syndicate was no worse off than they had been as a result of the Heads of 
Agreement reached in 1926 and that the government should show some good will, as long as 
any arrangement reached would `not cause loss to us and is acceptable to the Inland 
52 SAD 417/4/21 Letter by Louis Bluen to unknown recipient, October 1928 
53 SAD 417/4/341-354 A. E. Cutworth (Deloitte) to A. J. C Huddleston, 23'' July 1929 
54 SAD 417/4/206-207 Alexander MacIntyre to Friedrich Eckstein, 29th December 1928 
55 SAD 417/4/209-210 A. J. C Huddleston to Hugh Fraser, 2914 December 1928 
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Revenue: The second impetus behind government policy was therefore the need to avoid 
improper tax avoidance, and as Huddleston put it, to retain `cordial relations between us and 
the British financial departments. 'sb 
So, for example, a decision had to be made whether the Syndicate should be allowed 
to `purchase' ginned or unginned cotton from the tenants. On the surface this distinction 
seems irrelevant, as all three partners were to split the cost of ginning equally. However, if 
the cotton were purchased unginned from the tenant (that is, with the cost of ginning still to 
paa the Syndicate would, as the owners of the ginning factories, have to make a charge to 
the tenant that would count as income for the Syndicate and thus be taxable. If, however, 
the cotton were to be purchased already ginned, the cost could be met without a charge 
being made by the Syndicate, it effectively having been transferred to the tenants prior to 
sale. The cost would entail either a payment to be made by the Syndicate and the 
government or much more likely, to be offset against the rent the tenants paid. The Sudan 
Government decided that in this case they were bound to protect the rights of the Syndicate 
under the agreement from 1926 that they not be liable for any new tax on cotton 57 As 
Huddleston commented, it would be `absurd to tax the tenant and that any device to avoid 
this [would be]... legitimate. '58 
Over the second issue of the sinking funds liability to taxation, the government 
position was materially changed by its own tax liability which had been resolved in 1927. Sir 
George Schuster wrote to the Treasury to summarise the position as he understood it to be 
at that time: 
56 SAD 417/4/209-210 A. J. G Huddleston to Hugh Fraser, 29th December 1928 
5 SAD 417/4/144 'Memorandum illustrating the method of ascertaining the price to be paid to the tenants for 
the cotton seed and ginned cotton purchased from them', 22nd November 1928; SAD 417/4/170,172 Letter 
from Holmes Son and Pott to Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th December 1928; SAD 417/4/220-231 'Note 
of a Meeting held at Barakat on 27th December 1928; SAD 417/4/209-2 10 AJ. C Huddleston to Hugh 
Fraser, 29th December 1928; SAD 417/4/216-218 Sudan Government and Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd, 
Gezira Concession, 19th January 1929 
59 SAD 417/4/209-210 AJ. C Huddleston to Hugh Fraser, 29th December 1928; See also SAD 417/4/216-218 
Sudan Government and Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd, Gezira Concession, 19th January 1929 
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I was discussing with the Governor and Niemeyer at the Bank of England the other 
day, our policy as regards the investment of Sudan Government balances. The 
important point for us to consider is liability to British Income Tax. In order to avoid 
this we hither to confined our investment to War Loan and such of the National War 
Bond issues as may be held by foreigners free of tax. Niemeyer said that he thought it 
might be possible that the Sudan Government could get regarded as an independent 
Government and thus get a general exemption from British Income Tax. I told him I 
thought there might be difficulties in establishing that it was a sovereign state 59 
The Foreign Office and the Inland Revenue regarded the Sudan Government as a separate 
British possession for tax purposes certainly from 1923 onwards (i. e., it was treated as a 
discrete state). ' As a result of this it appears that the Sudan Government was exempted 
from tax liability to the British government on income arising from investments held by the 
Sudan Government in the United Kingdom. " These investments included debenture stock 
in the Sudan Construction and Light Company, the Kassala Railway Company as well as 
British government bonds `' 
Following this, in late 1928 the government offered to take over the Sinking Funds 
`if it was any help to the Syndicate to avoid income tax complications. ' Huddleston's 
position was that the cost of ginning, ploughing and the maintenance of the railway was 
59 IR 40/7050 George Schuster to Sir Richard Hopkins, Treasury, 4th November 1927 
60 FO 141/687/8801 Foreign Office internal memo, 29th September 1923 mentions an Inland Revenue 
publication'Income Taxes in the British Dominions: A digest of the laws imposing income taxes and cognate 
taxes in the British Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates', of which pp. 109-111 relates to Sudan. 
61 IR 40/7050 Hugh Fraser, Sudan Government to G. Myrddin Evans, Treasury, 24" November 1927 
62 IR 40/7050 L Charlton for the Controller, Sudan Government to The Inspector of Foreign and Colonial 
Dividends, 315, January 1931; See also SAD 417/4/216-218 Sudan Government and Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate Ltd, Gezira Concession, 19th January 1929, which indicates that the there had been a ruling that 
'income derived from this country by the Government is exempt from British taxation. ' 
63 SAD 417/4/209-210 A. J. G Huddleston to Hugh Fraser, 29th December 1928 
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something done of equal behalf of all three partners; as a result they should not be taxed in 
funds designed to reimburse them for capital sunk into the scheme upon the end of the 
concession. ' It was suggested in January 1929 that the Syndicate might pay to the Sudan 
Government an annual rental for the concession which would be equivalent to the sums 
they would have otherwise put into the Sinking Funds so that `at the end of the concession 
that government would have a capital sum equal to the amount at which Development 
Works stand in the Syndicate's books. ` Thus, at the end of the concession the government 
would be able to pay the Syndicate in lieu of the capital sunk into the scheme, after which 
the government would take full possession and ownership. 
At the Annual General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate in November 
1928 the Board of Directors asked the shareholders to ratify the deduction from dividends 
of both Sudan business profits tax at the rate of 4' d in the pound and British Income Tax 
at the rate of 3s 71 id in the pound. As was commented at the meeting, the `result to the 
shareholder is that the deductions of these two taxes is a slightly less deduction in amount 
than has been accustomed in the past. ' This was because the Sudan tax was charged first and 
then the British tax was calculated on the remaining balance; it was also noted that the 
Syndicate would have to adhere to this arrangement in future" Or, as Deloitte accountant 
A. E. Cutworth put it to Huddleston in July 1929: 
The present scheme, therefore, is that the Syndicate shall pay an annual rent to the 
Government, which will be chargeable against the Syndicate's profits for English 
Income Tax purposes of the Sudan Business Profits Tax. 
64 SAD 417/4/209-210 A. J. C. Huddleston to Hugh Fraser, 291h December 1928 
65 SAD 417/4/216-218 Sudan Government and Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd, Gezira Concession, 19th 
January 1929 
66 `Sudan Plantations Syndicate: Continued Progress and Development', The Times, Thursday 15th November 
1928, p. 25, Col. A 
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In return the Syndicate was to receive £650,000 at the end of the concession in 1950 to 
represent the expenditure they had made, the government generously noting that the 
Syndicate should be in `no worse position as regards taxation than if it were not subject to 
the Sudan taxation. ' The Syndicate was to follow the `Trinidad Oilfields Precedent and 
deduct both Dominion Tax and British Tax from dividends paid. ' It remained in doubt, 
however, that by 1950 whether the government would or would not be obliged to tax the 
annuity to be paid to the Syndicate. Deloitte's advised that `it would appear improbable that 
the British Authorities take cognisance of an arrangement between the Sudan Government 
and the Syndicate providing for the deduction of Sudan Tax from the annuity, even though 
embodied in a legal agreement, unless the arrangement was in accordance with the taxation 
laws of the Sudan, i. e., unless it was embodied in the ordinance and was therefore made to 
apply to all taxable entities in the Sudan and not to the Syndicate only. ' In other words, there 
was unlikely to be any exception made for the Syndicate. 67 
In September 1929 at a meeting in the Head Offices of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate in the City of London representatives of the Syndicate including Maclntyre, Bluen 
and Eckstein met to discuss the proposed `rental' agreement with the Sudan Government. 
By that time the annual rent for the Gezira Scheme was estimated at costing the Syndicate 
£21,000 per year. Eckstein argued that the plan was flawed on three grounds. Firstly, that the 
Syndicate would be better off retaining the money in its own coffers than to pay the money 
to the government. Certainly, the threat of taxation upon payment of the annuity in 1950 
gave this pointed significance. Secondly, that there was no guarantee that the rent would be 
tax deductible (from profits) as a legitimate expense, and that even if this were so, there was 
no guarantee that the Inland Revenue would not change their minds between 1929 and 1950. 
67SAD 417/4/341-354 A. E. Cutworth to A. J. G Huddleston, Financial Secretary, Sudan Government, 23" July 
1929 
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And thirdly, that the interest rate the government offered, at slightly under four per cent was 
not as high as the Syndicate could reasonably expect if they invested the money themselves. 
MacIntyre agreed and added a fourth argument: that the estimate of costs in 1929 of 
£650,000 was unlikely to be substantiated by an actual estimate of the items included in the 
whole; that the rent was high enough to pay for an estimate of expenditure that was in 
excess of the anticipated cost of the Syndicate's contribution at that time`' There is no 
evidence in the accounts of the company that the rent was ever paid and it seems likely that 
the idea was dropped around this time. 
In terms of the general liability of the Syndicate to taxation, this issue seemed to be 
near to resolution in a draft agreement between the Sudan Government and the Syndicate in 
July 1929. This stated that 
as the Syndicate is a British Company at present liable to the United Kingdom Income 
Tax and in order to avoid its subjection to a double burden it is agreed that so long as 
the Syndicate shall be able to pay United Kingdom income tax on the profits earned in 
respect of its operations in the Sudan or any part thereof any income tax or tax on 
profits imposed by the Government on such profits or part shall not exceed the rate 
from time to time allowed by the United Kingdom legislation by the way of relief 
against the United Kingdom income tax only and that no income tax or traders profit 
tax in the Sudan shall by payable except to the extent that such relief be obtained and 
so that the Syndicate shall not suffer by having to pay such Sudan tax from which it 
was exempt under the Agreement of the 17`x' October 19109 
69 SAD 417/4/364-5'The Sudan Plantations Syndicate Limited: Agreement with the Sudan Government: 
Memorandum of Interview at 1, London Wall Buildings on 30th September 1929,4th October 1929 
69 SAD 417/4/449-474 'Draft Agreement: Sudan Government - Sudan Plantations Syndicate', 11th July 1929 
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Evidence from the sources is scant from 1929 onwards70, but by 1933 as the Syndicate and 
the Sudan Government recovered from the depression, there is evidence that the two parties 
disagreed over the repayment of the manner of loans issued to the tenants during the period 
of economic hardship in 1930/31. The dispute revolved around which party would have 
primary access to a levy to be placed on the 1932/33 crop, with the Syndicate arguing that it 
was `unfair' that they `should not have first charge on any future levies, when they could be 
made, in respect of indebtedness to them by the Tenants'. The Sudan Government thought 
that the negotiations turned on the success of the 1932/33 crop, especially if there were 
individual tenants who had incurred indebtedness as a result of a smaller than average crop. " 
For some time prior to 1933 the tenants had been treated as a corporate whole, not as 
individuals. If, therefore, the crop yield were not good then the Syndicate could not reclaim 
the debts from the tenants - and the tenants would struggle financially because of increased 
railway rates and increased levels of taxation. The disagreement with the Syndicate related 
not only to this, however, but also to Syndicate's hopes to increase the tenants share of the 
profits to cope with the increases to tax rates. The Syndicate believed that increases to 
tenants' taxes compromised the 1929 Agreement whereby the government was not to 
materially alter the terms by means of legislation or taxation! ' While the government had no 
desire to enter into a formal renegotiation of the entire Gezira Agreement it is evident that 
the Syndicate felt this issue keenly. This translated into a demand by the Syndicate in June 
1933 for formal protection of their profits from erosion via taxation. This issue needs to be 
understood in light of the planned creation of the Tenants Equalisation Fund to even out 
the bad years with profits from the good. As taxation was taken from total earnings on a 
70 Indeed, a problem is that negotiation between the Syndicate and the Sudan Government simply ceased. For 
example, after a long meeting in the middle of July 1933 the Government heard nothing from the Syndicate for 
two whole months after. See: FO 141/497/4 The Gezira: Summary of the Negotiations', p. 13 
71 FO 141/497/4 Copy of a Letter from the Financial Secretary's Office, Sudan Government (H. E. Fass) to 
Secretary of the Governor General's Council, 16th December 1933 
72 FO 141/497/4 Me Gezira: Summary of the Negotiations', 7-8 
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yearly basis, the government was in a position to squeeze more money out of the Syndicate 
and the tenants by taking more in good years which would require payments from the 
Equalisation Fund in bad years to offset the effects of higher taxes, higher prices and 
radically lower incomes: 
if in good years the Government imposed additional burdens, and if some bad years 
followed a rise in the tenants share would become necessary for either or both of the 
following reasons: 
(I) because of extra taxation imposed 
(II) because, as a result of general conditions the share was economically inadequate 
The Syndicate's main concern at this time seems to have been that the government might 
use the Equalisation Fund as a means of extracting more money for itself from the profits of 
the Gezira Scheme by placing the tenant in a position of hardship as a result of taxation 
whereby drafts on the Equalisation Fund might have to be made. " This would limit the 
extent to which the Syndicate itself could reclaim debts owed by the tenants from the time 
of the depression. The Tenants Equalisation Fund itself had been an issue under discussion 
from 1933 until 1937, as discussed previously. Assurances were given and it was believed by 
the government at the time that the operation of the Fund left the arrangement between 
Syndicate and government unchanged. " 
The significance of this arrangement, however, was to reinforce the risk averse 
nature of the ever-more complex financial machinery surrounding the government and the 
Syndicate. The Tenants Equalisation Fund was not an ill-considered device (indeed, it was a 
73 FO 141/497/4 'The Gezira: Summary of the Negotiations', 9-11 
74 FO 141/826/1 Gvil Secretaryof the Sudan Government for the Governor-General to Foreign Office, 15th 
June 1935 
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rather clever innovation) but it did implicitly acknowledge the risks of cotton-growing in 
Sudan and prioritised stability ahead of profits. Though the Syndicate received assurances 
(mostly verbal) that their share of profits was not under threat via taxation they were unable 
to force the government's hand and the initiative had swung fatefully away from business 
toward government, mirroring the general Syndicate-Government relationship at this time. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
From the beginning of the 1920s onwards the Syndicate saw itself as crucial to the British 
Empire in Sudan, vital to the colonial state and the Sudan economy. In 1923 in a speech to 
the Syndicate's shareholders Friedrich Eckstein reflected on the imperial ambitions that Lord 
Cromer had espoused two decades before. 
... Cromer mentioned that 
he would like to see in a time to come the construction of 
Railways from Suakin to Atbara, from Khartoum to El Obeid, from Atbara to Kassala: 
for there to be a dam or two on the Blue Nile and, lastly, the development of the 
Gezira Plain. Gentlemen, all of these projects have either been carried out or are in the 
process of completion in the near future for the great and lasting benefit of Sudan. It is 
difficult to say what to admire most - the sagacity and foresight of that great Proconsul 
or the grim determination of the Sudan Government with its restricted means to 
realise these visions. Your Syndicate, I am proud to say, has played its humble part in 
the execution of these schemes and it is for this reason that I mention this matter. '' 
It is also clear that good relations with the Sudan Government were vital for the Syndicate 
from a business point of view - both operationally and in relation to the market 7' On the 
market side of the relationship Lord Lovat observed that successful negotiations with the 
Sudan Government had `added, at all events on paper, something like a sovereign to the 
73 SAD 416/2/29-32 16th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 8th November 1923 
76 In October 1924, for example, the Syndicate sought negotiation for the transformation of the pumping 
station at I-Jag Abdulla to supply water to 6,000 feddans of land south of the concession area that was above 
the gravitation level (i. e., that which would be supplied by water from the Makwar Dam). The Syndicate hoped 
that the Government would pay half of the £200,000 estimated cost.. SAD 416/2/42-43 Minutes of the 193,4 
Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 1" October 1924 
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value of our shares'. " Indeed, reassuring the investors that their money was well placed in 
the Syndicate was a concern, certainly before the Gezira Scheme became operational in 
1925. In November 1924, for example, in reference to the substantial increase in the capital 
of the company Friedrich Eckstein encouraged shareholders to ignore press speculation that 
their investment might be wasted: 
I noticed in the press remarks to the effect that shareholders would be well advised if 
they would find out why all this money was required, considering that our concession 
had nearly run out. Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, our concession has not yet begun and 
for the rest I can assure you that this additional money is not required for a joy- 
ride... 78 
During the early 1920s the prospects for the Gezira Scheme were good, and the Sudan 
Government needed the syndicate to provide expertise in business services and management 
of the scheme. After the depression, however, the government's reliance on income from 
the Gezira Scheme combined with the diminished usefulness of the Syndicate to the 
government. Government-Syndicate relations changed as the government began to establish 
that the commercial considerations of the Syndicate did not run in tandem with their own 
interests. Gradually through the inter-war period the Syndicate was less and less able to exert 
influence over the Sudan Government to establish that the parameters of the business- 
government compact were in the interests of business. By the end of the period business 
capital had become more than simply dependent on the state, it had become reliant on it and 
unable to exert influence as in the past. Moreover, as argued in Chapter 6, the Syndicate 
itself had failed to diversify or significantly expand and, ultimately, it was left producing a 
n SAD 416/2/29-32 16th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 8ih November 1923 
78SAD 416/2/46-49 Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 12th November 1924 
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cash-crop of diminished value. Thus it was not only the rise of the state and the increase in 
state power nor the effects of the world-wide economic depression that accounts for the 
decline of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate from the 1930s, but the combination of the two. 
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Chapter 8 
The Economy, Business, War and Decolonization, 1939-1955 
[S]ome surprise may be felt that a co-partnership which has frequently been quoted as 
a model for others should be dissolved. 
- Sir Alexander MacIntyre, Managing Director and Chairman of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, April 1945.1 
'T'his chapter will survey the main changes in the political economy of Sudan, 1939-1956. It 
will examine the impact of the war on the main productive functions of the economy as well 
as on prices, the money supply, the labour force and Sudan Government revenue. In 
addition, this chapter will examine the trends in imports and exports, and will conclude by 
briefly touching on the creation of the Gezira Board to administer the Gezira Scheme at the 
end of the concession to grow cotton held by Sudan Plantations Syndicate. The argument 
presented here is that in Sudan, as elsewhere in the British Empire, including Britain, the 
Second World War increased the importance of the state to the organization and 
management of the economy. For example, on the outbreak of war, the first thing that the 
government did was to restrict the export of certain goods from Sudan, most especially 
foodstuffs? The second thing was to fix the price of certain goods to prevent profiteering 
and hoarding? This interventionist and managerial approach to the economy occurred at the 
I SAD 416/5/72-73 Sir Alex MacIntyre at the 37th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 19th April 1945 
2 SAD 634/9/1 'Notice of the Third Schedule Part II (4) Prohibited and Restricted Goods Ordinance 1939' 
3 SAD 634/9/6-8 Memo: Trice Fixing Policy in relation to Imperial Articles' by J. D. R. Chataway, Director, 
Economics and Trade, Sudan Government, 1939 
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same time that world trade was curtailed, exchange controls were introduced within tlie 
Sterling Area and the British Empire as a whole became concerned with colonial 
development, in particular with regard to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 
1940 4 Political reforms, associated with the call for self-government and democratization 
were implicit in the Atlantic Charter, another touchstone at that time. ' In this sense, what 
happened in Sudan was part of a more general process elsewhere -a process that was to end 
in decolonization. Yet as argued previously, Sudan's economic position was not healthy by 
1939. The onset of war was therefore a significant problem that challenged the Sudan 
Government both economically and politically, one factor affecting the other. 
I. THE ECONOMY 
As the graphs below illustrate, using exports as a proxy measure for the economy as a whole, 









Graph 8.1. Sudan Imports and Exports, 1939-1946 (I E) 
Source: Appendix 6 
imports -- exports] 
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I D. K. Fieldhouse, The Vest and the Third World (Oxford, 1999), p. 86; SAD 635/11/31-34 'Sudan's Finances in 
Wartime and The Sudan's Financial War Effort' (likely 1941) 
5 GGR 1942-44, p. 9 
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The rise in exports between 1939 and 1946 from £E5.3 million to £E10.0 million was 
substantial. This, however, was nothing compared with the post-war expansion in the 
economy as can be seen in the graph below. 
Graph 8.2. Sudan Imports and Exports, 1939-1955 (£ E) 
Source: Appendix 6 
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Here the levels of exports increased from LE 10.0 million in 1946 to £E50.5 million by 1955; 
this represents a rise of 403% from 1946, and a massive 841% since 1939. There was as 
would be expected, an increase to imports across both time-periods selected (see graphs 
above). What, then, caused this rise? Firstly, it is true that there was inflation during this 
period, as was experienced and noted by the Sudan Government. `' The tables below show 
the export levels nominally and deflated to 1901 prices. ' 
6 SAD 635/12/39-41 `War Inflation', Finance Department, 20'1ß June 1943 
Lawrence H. Officer, "Five Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a UK Pound Amount, 1830 - 2005" 
MeasuringWorth. Com, 2006. In all cases the GDP deflator was used. The index created was bawd on 1901 
prices. 
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Graph 8.3. Sudan Exports, 1919-1946 (nominal and deflated to 1901 prices) (G F) 
Source: Appendix 6 








The graph above demonstrates that in real terms, the war-time period did not result in any 
substantial economic growth in the export sector. Indeed, the peak of nominally priced 
exports before the Second World War was in 1937 with £E 8.13 million or £E 4.25 million 
at 1901 prices. Though this nominal value eventually rose to £E 8.54 million in 1941, this 
value in 1901 prices was onlyLE 3.47 million. The level of exports in 1947 was £E 14.86 
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Again, the graph above shows the dramatic post-war rise in nominal values: from £E 14.86 
million in 1947 to a peak of £61.03 million in 1951, but levels at or above LE 40 million 
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Graph 8.4. Sudan Exports, 1939-1955 (nominal and deflated to 1901 prices) (! E) 
Source: Appendix 6 
I-ý nominal -ý- GDP deflated 
during the early 1950s. However, the deflated line shows a more modest picture. 
Nevertheless, the deflated values bear analysis because they still show a significant 
improvement in export performance. At 1901 levels Sudan's exports rose from LE 3.01 
million in 1946 to £E 14.8 million in the peak year 1951, and then to LE 10.84 in 1955.111c 
same pattern is evident from the data relating to imports (see table below). 
Graph 8.5. Sudan imports and exports, 1939-1955 (L E) 
Source: Appendix 6; GDP deflated to 1901 prices 
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These graphs illustrate that Sudan did experience a post-war boom even when controlling 
for inflation. This is explained by the post-war commodities boom, caused by increases in 
US demand for primary commodities! 
8 Havinden and Meredith, Deve%pmenr and Co/wtinb. vn, p. 235 
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Graph 8.6. Sudan Export Destinations, 1939-1959 ('%%) 
Source: The Republic of Srid in ., 
l Innmal Foreign Trade Report 1959 











lýICP Ne Ille -ý Ne 
As the graph clearly shows, both of the co-domini took less and less of Sudan trade as a 
proportion across the period 1939-1959. Egypt's decline began in 1944 when she absorbed 
27.6% of Sudan's exports. By independence in 1956 this had fallen to 11.11% and to only 
3.03% by 1959. In a similar fashion, exports to Britain peaked both absolutely and relatively 
in 1951 and thereafter went into a sharp decline. In 1951 exports to Britain represented 
66.52% of all exports. By independence in 1956 this had fallen to 32.95%, and by 1959 stood 
at 26.09% of the total, though in point of fact this percentage figure had been lower in 1957 
(immediately after independence) at 22.93%. 
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Graph 8.7 Sudan Import Origins, 1939-1959 (`%%) 
Source: The Republic of Sudan Annual Foreign Trade Report 1959 
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The graph above indicates that a similar pattern to that of export destinations can he seen 
also in import origins. The first thing to note from the graph is that the share of imports 
from Britain shrank dramatically during the Second World War. Despite obtaining only 
7.32% of imports from Britain in 1944, this figure had risen to 41.52% in 1953; thereafter it 
fell to 27.59% in 1956 and then to 24.87% in 1959. Where then, were exports and imports 
going to and coming from? Unfortunately, the data for the later period is rather scarce (for 
example, the data collected in the Annual Reports ends in 1947). Nevertheless, the pattern 
revealed there can be seen in the table below. 
GGR, 1947, p. 47 
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Table 8.1. Sudan Export Destinations, 1944-47,1960 (%) 
Source: GGR, various years; Osman and Suleiman, `The Economy of Sudan ''' 
1944 1945 1946 1947 1960 
United Kingdom 42.66% 42.39% 36.54% 39.66% 27.16% 
Egypt 27.52% 23.98% 18.45% 17.91% - 
India 19.42% 22.86% 25.60% 21.79% 10.78% 
USA 2.78% 3.61% 6.68% 6.44% 3.30% 
Palestine 2.80% 1.48% 1.62% 4.07% - 
Abyssinia 0.89% 0.77% 1.26% 0.23% - 
Syria 0.44% 0.64% 0.36% 0.23% - 
Turkey 0.10% 0.47% 0.04% 0.06% - 
Eritrea 0.60% 0.39% 0.35% 0.14% - 
South Africa 0.04% 0.36% 0.26% 0.05% - 
Cyprus 0.73% 0.27% 1.88% 0.41% - 
Lebanon 0.15% 0.21% 0.21% 0.24% - 
Arabia 0.25% 0.20% 0.10% 0.08% - 
Australia 0.28% 0.15% 0.48% 0.40% - 
Belgian Congo 0.25% 0.15% 0.33% 0.15% - 
Argentine 0.19% 0.02% 0.01% 0.09% - 
Uganda 0.24% 0.00% 0.03% 0.01% - 
Canada 0.04% 0.09% 0.12% 0.04% - 
Other 0.61% 1.97% 5.68% 8.00% 57.76% 
What the table shows beyond doubt is the importance of India as a trading partner and, to a 
lesser extent, both to the USA and the mandate territories in Palestine. Thus by 1947 circa 
ninety per cent of Sudan's exports went to the UK, Egypt, India, Palestine and the USA. By 
1960 the United Kingdom continued its relative decline as an export destination for 
Sudanese manufactures. India's share of exports also dropped, apparently a longer term 
trend. What the table does not express, but is revealed in the source from which the data is 
drawn, is that by 1960 exports to the European Economic Community accounted for some 
twenty-three per cent of the total exports. " 
10 Sources: GGR, 1945; GGR, 1947; the data from 1960 is from Osman and Suleiman, 'nie Economy of 
Sudan', p. 466 
11 Osman and Suleiman, 'The Economy of Sudan', p. 466; the EEC at this time was France, West Germany, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy. 
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II. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
The war changed the role of the Sudan Government in the Sudan economy. A War Trade 
Information Bureau was established by the Sudan Government in 1939 and an `Emergency 
Supplies Committee' was created in June 1940. The Emergency Supplies Committee was 
replaced by the Resources Board and then by the War Supply Department. " The machinery 
of government was put on a war footing. " The role of the Sudan Government expanded 
considerably and by 1943 Sudan Government departments such as the Finance Department 
were being `substantially affected by the acceleration of the administrative and devolutionary 
policy' that had been adopted, as well as expanded responsibilities brought about by the war. 
Exchange control, war savings campaign, and counter-inflationary problems; the 
financial aspects of war supply, e. g. wheat pool, cotton sales policy, dura reserves and 
distribution policy, the production of industrial and agricultural commodities for war- 
time needs, war-time taxation, financial relations of the Central Government and of 
the railways with the military. 'a 
Anti-inflationary policy took three forms. Military expenditure was not to cause a budget 
deficit; trade was to be kept in balance and, most of all, `the incomes received by producers 
were very much less than the figures of export values ... the Government 
did not allow the 
benefit of high prices in the other Middle East countries to be reaped by producers, but 
12 SAD 635/11/31-34 'Sudan's Finances in Wartime and The Sudan's Financial War Effort' (likely 1941) 
13 SAD 635/12/1-44 'Sudan Cotton in Wartime' (1941); SAD 635/12/3-6J. W. Qimmins, 'Organization of the 
Finance Department', 8th Manch 1943 
14 SAD 635/12/3-6J. W. Ciurunins, 'Organization of the Finance Department', 8th March 1943 
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appropriated the difference between the prices at which goods were sold externally and the 
internal price. "5 These policies were not entirely successful, as can be seen in the table below. 
Table 8.2. Inflation indicators, December 1939 - June 1945 
Source: Prest, War Economics1' 
Currency and notes Wholesale and retail Labourers cost of 
issued (£ million) price index (1938-100) living index (1938-100) 
December 1939 2.7 113 100 
December 1940 2.8 139 110 
December 1941 4.1 168 130 
December 1942 4.6 206 151 
January1943 - 220 175 
June 1943 5.6 - - 
December 1943 5.1 220 177 
June 1944 5.0 217 167 
December 1944 4.2 228 160 
June 1945 4.8 217 166 
The inflation in retail and wholesale goods that can be seen above is attributable to the 
higher cost of imports. 
The effects of war on the labour force of Sudan were minimal in comparison with 
the British controlled countries in the Middle East. Though the Sudan Defence force grew 
from 4,500 men in 1939 to 26,000 in 1944, and some 10,000 extra workers were employed 
by the British War Department, the Sudan Government Departments and the Defence 
Force itself, the total man power requirement amounted to `about 30,000' out of a total 
population of 6.5 million in 1943 (up from 5.7 million in 193917 Another effect was 
Sudanization in the labour market, especially in the government service. 
is AR Prest, War Economics of Primary Producing Countries (C. ambridge, 1948), 168-9 
16 Prest, War Economics, p. 166 
17 Prest, W/arEconomics, p. 162,392 
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Table 8.3. Sudanization and the Second World War. the effect on the Sudan Civil 
Service Composition, 1936-1945 
Source: SAD 635/14/1918 
31s` December 1936 30"' November 1945 
Division 1 Division 2 Total Division 1 Division 2 Total 
British 462 358 820 505 266 771 
Sudanese 4 3,074 3,078 71 4,063 4,134 
Egyptian 5 527 532 10 344 354 
Other 4 81 85 7 35 42 
Total 475 4,040 4,515 593 4,708 5,301 
The other economic policies of war were mostly predictable. General prices were 
fixed. Petrol and oil reserves were built up. By 1942 the Sudan Government were 
increasingly concerned with the provision of adequate food, the cultivation of which they 
wanted to increase in order to become as self-sufficient as possible, and there was a tendency 
towards import substitution in certain products (for example, soap, butter and charcoal)" 
Cotton, as ever Sudan's most important product, was tightly controlled in terms of 
destination and function via inter-governmental agreement, with a large proportion of it 
going to India! ' The trade in cotton was controlled by the British Ministry of Supply, while 
the trade in cotton seed was controlled by the Ministry of Food. " The Ministry of Supply 
fixed the price, but as a result of higher prices in India, surpluses were generated that were 
diverted back toward the cotton reserve funds u Sudanese Cotton was important to Britain 
during the war for making barrage balloons, fabrics used in the fuselage of aeroplanes, while 
18 SAD 635/14/19 'The numbers of officials on the strength of the first two divisions of the Civil Service on 
December 31' 1936 and November 30th 1945' 
19 Prest, WarEconomics, p. 169; SAD 635/11/18-30 'T'he Sudan Government's Financial Contribution to the 
Prosecution of the War' (Khartoum, 24th July 1941); SAD 635/11/31-34 'Sudan's Finances in Wartime an The 
Sudan's Financial War Effort' (companion piece to SAD 635/11/18-30; likely 1941); SAD 634/9/9 Clipping: 
'His Excellency the Governor General's Message', Sudan Herald, 24th August 1942; SAD 417/8/1 A. G. 
Gaitskell, 'Gezira Scheme: Memorandum on some Limitations at Present Affecting Development' (1948); SAD 
634/10/8 Fragment of report relating to war measures; GGR, 1942-1944, p. 10 
20 FO 371/41353 Gphec From Cairo to Foreign Office, 7th March 1944 
21 SAD 416/5/60-61 274th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 25th March 
1942 
22 Prest, War Economics, 169-70 
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excess cotton seed was being used as a source of fuel by the Sudan Railways, and two years 
into the war one report noted that Sudan's success in selling and shipping cotton had 
enabled the Sudan Government to maintain its financial position! ' Nevertheless, in order to 
free land for food production it was necessary to cut the acreage under cotton towards the 
beginning of the war, and prices were fixed to attempt to ensure that inflationary pressure 
was limited? ' One effect of the control in the trade of cotton was, of course, to limit the 
importance of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate in the marketing of their product. 
In summary, the Sudan Government's policy during the war was to limit the negative 
economic impact of the ware price fixing, subsidies, income limitation and changes to 
taxation, restriction on the import of luxury goods, increased Sudanization in the Labour 
market, control of importation and exportation and so on were all ways in which the Sudan 
Government became more heavily engaged with a process of economic management . This 
dirigisme during wartime was to utterly alter the approach to economic policy and the nature 
of government in Sudan. For example, the marketing arrangement in Sudan continued in the 
post-war period as it had during the war whereby it was sold via the Sudan Government's 
own selling agency direct to the Raw Cotton Commission? ' The profits were then credited 
in the first instance to a joint cotton account against which expenses were paid. The net 
profits were then divided in accordance with the agreement between the Sudan 
Government, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, and the Tenants which in the 1940s was forty 
percent, twenty percent, and forty percent respectively? The Tenants share was paid into 
the Tenants Collective Account from which payments to the Gezira tenants were made 
23SAD 634/9/9 Clipping: `His Excellency the Governor General's Message', Sudan Herald, 24th August 1942; 
SAD 635/ 12/1-44 'Sudan Cotton in Wartime' (1941) 
24 Prest, War Economics, p. 163 
u See Prest, iVarEconomics, passim 
26 'Controversy over cotton', The Economist, 3111 April 1948, p. 551; SAD 408/1/6-14, Memo: 'The Gezira 
Scheme', 21st June 1950 
27SAD 408/1/6-14, Memo: 'The Gezira Scheme', 211, June 1950 
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`when the tenants need of cash is greatest and when the distribution of large quantities of 
money will have the least inflationary efect. '28 This and other similar policies gave confidence to a 
view of state intervention, and state power, in which the government was central to all 
economic activity, even those which had previously been the purview of free markets or 
private commercial transactions 29 
III. GOVERNMENT AND THE END OF THE SYNDICATE'S CONCESSION 
In several of the statements made on termination of the Syndicate's concession in June 1950, 
Sudan Government officials were effusive in their praise for the work done by the company. 
LC Chick, the Financial Secretary of Sudan, publicly stated that the Syndicate had displayed 
enterprise, hard work and courage without which `the hard work of the tenants alone would 
not have availed to convert an area of limited agricultural resources into a Scheme of great 
productivity. " Generally officials were aware that the involvement of the Syndicate had 
helped bring much needed capital into Sudan? ' Arthur Gaitskell, despite himself favouring a 
different role for the Syndicate and the Gezira Scheme observed that for a business `[t]he 
financial responsibility and the need for efficiency demand a minimum of risk. Moreover, 
there is a great deal to be said for it. ''Z 
28 SAD 408/1/6-14, Memo: `The Gezira Scheme', 21st June 1950; the emphasis is mine. 
29 See, for example, Mohamed Hamid El Lacey, 'Some views of the Development of the Northern Sudan', in 
D. Hawley (ed), Khartoum Perspective:: A collection of lecture: irren at the Sudan Cultural Centre, Kbatoum, in the 1940r 
and 1950: (Lymington, 2001), 194,197 
30 Chick made these comments when moving the 3^I Reading of the Gezria Bill in the Sudan Legislative 
Assembly. See FO 957/98 Sudan Cotton Growing 1950, Memorandum: 'Nationalization of the Gezira 
Scheme Completed' 
31 FO 957/98 Sudan Cotton Growing 1950, Memorandum: `Nationalization of the Gezira Scheme Completed' 
32 SAD 418/6/3 A.. G. Gaitskell, 'A Consideration of the General Trend of the Gezira Scheme and its effect on 
our future interests here', 25th August 1938 
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Writing in 1948 Gaitskell made the claim that the negotiations between Syndicate and 
government that were discontinued before the Second World War were being conducted on 
the basis on `new aspects' in addition to the previous primary objective which was `to 
produce money by the cash crop cotton. ' These new aspects were to `teach the tenants 
farming as a whole as opposed to just cotton-fanning' and `to train the tenants to run their 
own affairs '2' These two functions - of agricultural diversity and devolution - certainly 
affected government thinking on the issue in the 1940s. The general view seems to have 
been that the Syndicate was not an appropriate vehicle to deliver the economic and social 
development policies that the Sudan Government envisaged. Indeed, in the late 1940s the 
Financial Secretary of the Sudan Government was forceful in arguing that the terms of the 
concession to run until 1950 were not altered `by the Government pressing the Companies 
to do ahead of 1950 those things which were in fact the reason for not renewing the 
concessions. ' These policies, in general terms, can be seen in the passage below: 
Nationalization of capitalistic industry has three aims; firstly, increase of efficiency, 
secondly, the fairest possible treatment of, and help to, workers of the industry, thirdly, 
profits to the nation who own the industry. In essence more teamwork. " 
Specifically, the Sudan Government planned to implement a series of policies referred to 
collectively in several sources as `Schedule X'. Broadly speaking this was to improve the 
33 SAD 417/8/1 A. G. Gaitskell, 'Gezira Scheme: Memorandum on some Limitations at Present Affecting 
Development' (1948) 
34 SAD 418/7/42-45 'Appendix: Comments by the Financial Secretary at the 31n Meeting of the Gezira 
AdvisoryBoard on the Taking over the of concession of the Gezira in 1950', April 1948 
35 SAD 418/7/22-24 Anonymous Letter (likely to or from Gaitskell), 220d March 1948 
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farming skills of the tenants, increase tenants' access to education and health, and to provide 
social amenities and social activities 3' 
The decision not to renew the concession for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate 
introduced the need to create a replacement managerial structure. The Sudan Government 
recognised the need to be able to run the Gezira Scheme as well as the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate. `If we do not make certain of this', a report commented, `we shall cause grave 
harm to country as well as to the tenants of the scheme. ' Not only this, but the new 
authority was also charged with actively pursuing social welfare in the Gezira area. To do so, 
it was reinforced that the new authority must be free to exercise its power, albeit `subject to 
the overriding control of the Executive Council. "Though it was planned that the wishes of 
the Sudanese in the form of the Legislative Assembly should be accommodated in the new 
plans for the governance of the Gezira Scheme, the Legal Secretary of the Sudan 
Government clarified by the middle of 1950 that the new Gezira Board was to have `full 
powers to discharge its duties', `must, as far as possible, be kept free from political conflict', 
and it was to be `a separate legal entity with contractual powers and its own staff. iJB It was 
also to have access to adequate capital and was to have a statutory right to revenue from 
certain sources - i. e., the profits from the sale of cotton. 
The Sudan Government identified the six core functions of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate that the new Gezira Board would have to undertake: the general management of 
the Gezira Scheme, the collection and storage of cotton crops including the provision of 
transport in the Gezira in the form of the light Railway, the maintenance of the ginning 
factories and the ginning of cotton, the maintenance and provision of machinery used on the 
M SAD 418/7/3 'Gezira Scheme: Memorandum on some limitations'; Clarkson, Courts, 137.142 
» SAD 408/1/2 Memo from A. F. Chick, Financial Secretary, Sudan Government to the Legislative Assembly, 
Khartoum, 'The Future Administration of the Gezira Scheme', 16th July 1949 
38 SAD 408/1/6-14, Memo: 'The Gezira Scheme', 2 1st June 1950 
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plantations, the marketing of cotton and cotton seed, issuing of loans to tenant farmers and 
the maintenance of houses and stores in the Gezira. In addition to this the new Board was 
also to be charged the social development of the Gezira Scheme. The Gezira Board was to 
be responsible to the Executive Council; the Legislative Assembly's `control' over the Gezira 
Board was to `be exercised by question and debate' on matters of major policy, it would have 
no day to day role. Assembly control was, then, nebulous at best. The key to understanding 
the way in which the Gezira Board was established was that it was to assuage the nationalists 
and accommodate the devolved co-governmental model of quasi-democratic governmental 
structures that had been established, but was in fact to remain very much within the control 
of the executive arm of the Sudan Government. The reason was clear. 
The Financial Secretary [of the Sudan Government] explained that the Executive 
Council's authority over the Gezira Board, which was greater than that exercised by 
the UK Government over state corporations such as the Coal Board and the British 
Transport Commission was essentially owing to the very large proportion of the 
Central Government revenue which is derived from the Gezira Scheme. 
The new plans also called for the creation of a Gezira Advisory Council and a Gezira Local 
Council. The Gezira Board itself would be responsible via the Financial Secretary to the 
Executive Council of the new Legislative Assembly, which had been created `under a new 
constitution promulgated on June 19th 1948. ' As half the Executive Council were Sudanese 
it was hoped that they would `share in the ultimate responsibility for the direction of the 
Scheme', though the scope for shaping policy by the Sudanese in this area was very limited. 
Though it was hoped that the wishes of the people would be filtered though the Legislative 
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Assembly via the Executive Council, it was clarified by the Legal Secretary of the Sudan 
Government that the Gezira Board was to have full power to carry out its duties and `not to 
be encumbered by the formalities necessary to the central government machine', that it was 
to be kept free of political conflict and that it was to be a separate corporate entity for 
contractual and staffing purposes39 The problem was that it was not free from political 
interference: `Plans for orderly development are liable to be upset by lobbying in Khartoum 
and there is hardly an activity of government that is not tarnished by "political 
considerations"', reported The Economict. 40 The same article recorded that the morale in the 
Sudan Political Service was at a `low ebb'. There is little doubt also that the process of 
Sudanization brought its own tensions: `Everywhere there is the politically fostered hatred of 
a generation that knew not the Khalif a', The Economist commented, going on to say that: 
There is however a more serious aspect of Sudanization - it is being treated as an end 
in itself, not a means. In an official statement, for public consumption, the 
nationalisation of the Gezira was primarily justified by the opportunities it would offer 
for Sudanization; its possible repercussions on crop yields, government revenue and 
foreign trade were apparently matters of secondary importance. 
Some of these concerns were articulated within the Sudan Government at the time. In 1948 
the Financial Secretary to the Sudan Government commented that a `fundamental error' in 
the Sudanization programme with reference to the Gezira Scheme was `the mixing up of the 
79 SAD 408/1/3-4 'Note on the Future Administration of the Gezria Scheme', 14th July 1949; SAD 408/1/6- 
14, Memo: `The Gezira Scheme', 21st June 1950 
40 'Nationalisation in the Sudan', The Economist, April 8th, 1950,777-778 
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scope of local Government with the management of an agricultural enterprise. " 
Nevertheless, the direction of policy was clear - that the business imperatives were to be 
suborned to the social need, and that the economy was to be structured in such a way to 
support economic, social and political development; or, at any rate, this was the intention. 
IV. THE END OF THE SUDAN PLANTATIONS SYNDICATE 
At around the time of the outbreak of the Second World War, the Syndicate and the Sudan 
Government were engaged in negotiations that the Syndicate believed would be successful, 
that would lead to the continuation of the partnership that had run the Gezira Scheme for 
the previous fifteen years! ' It was not to be. War interrupted the negotiations and in March 
of 1940 the Sudan Government informed the Syndicate that no new agreement would be 
forthcoming while the war was ongoing. " While this was true it disguised that the Sudan 
Government did not preclude unilaterally deciding the future of the Gezira Scheme. The 
Syndicate did not know this, however, and proceeded to pursue a course of action with 
renewal in mind. During the abortive negotiations of the late 1930s, the Syndicate had 
understood that the Sudan Government would require a merger of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate and the Kassala Cotton Company as a prerequisite to a new agreement. 
Consequently from January 1941 onward, the Syndicate began systematically purchasing 
Kassala Cotton Company shares on the London Stock Exchange, to allow them to acquire 
that company. By March 1942 they had acquired a 71% stake in Kassala Cotton. Then, 
41 SAD 418/7/42-45 'Appendix: Comments by the Financial Secretary at the 31-1 Meeting of the Gezira 
AdvisoryBoard on the Taking over the of concession of the Gezira in 1950', April 1948 
42 SAD 416/5/39-41 Minutes of the 266th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 10, h October, 1939 
43 SAD 416/5/43-44 32nd Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 13th December 1939; 
Minutes of the 260th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 26th March 1940 
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without explanation, the Syndicate began to sell shares in March 1944. Between 1941 and 
mid 1942 the Syndicate acquired 64,318 Kassala shares on the open market at prices ranging 
from one shilling one and a quarter pence, to one shilling and five pence. ByMarch 1944 the 
Syndicate had sold off 119,428 shares at over two shillings a share. " The date of the 
Syndicate becoming aware of the Sudan Government's decision not to renew is not known. 
On the 24`' August 1944 Alexander MacIntyre announced to the shareholders that the 
Sudan Government had notified the Syndicate that the Gezira concession was not to be 
renewed. In general terms, it was a surprise. Though the Syndicate was, of course, aware that 
the concession was to expire in 1950 they had previously assumed that negotiations would 
result in a renewal; `in view of the measure of agreement which had been reached in 
negotiating for an extension of the concession, negotiations which we only thought had been 
postponed by the outbreak of war, the present announcement was not expected''' As 
mentioned, this is borne out by the relevant records from the late 1930s that indicate a 
constructive and broadly positive engagement between government and Syndicate regarding 
renewal of the concession' The government's official justification in 1944 was, however, if 
nothing else, emphatic: 
The Sudan Government has now notified the Sudan Plantations Syndicate Ltd and the 
Kassala Cotton Company Limited that in view of certain developments now taking 
place and under contemplation due to conditions resulting from the war, and because 
µ SAD 416/5/58-59 Minutes of the 273, d Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 17th March 1942 
45 SAD 408/1/1 A. MacIntyre to the shareholders of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 24"6 August 1944 
46 See, for example, SAD 416/5/28-29 262nd Board Meeting of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 28"h Jul( 938, 
which reported that negotiations with the Government had been'sympathetic'. Even by the outbreak of war 
the Syndicate believed that the two parties were 'not very far apart'. See SAD 416/4/39-412661h Meeting of the 
Board of Directors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 10th October 1939 
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of political and social changes which these will involve, the Government will not be in 
a position to extend the existing concession beyond June 30th 1950. 
While expressing their regret at the decision MacIntyre and the directors of the Syndicate 
pointedly observed the direction of the government's policy: 
They recognise, however, that certain tendencies towards devolution and native 
administration to which the war has given impetus are the declared policies of the 
Government, and that such a policy must render difficult the conclusion of any new 
agreement on lines similar to those which have been appropriate in the past" 
The decision not to renew the concession was intimately connected to the winding down of 
Empire in Sudan and of a model of economic governance which was even more dirigiste 
than the corporate model that underpinned the Gezira Scheme itself. Non-renewal of the 
concession led directly to an effective nationalisation of the Gezira scheme which was 
brought directly under the control of the state. Or, put another way, the colonial state had 
become positively hostile to business. 
Part of this hostility was related to the importance of cotton to the Sudan economy 
and the revenue to the Sudan Government4e Equally, however, it has to be put with the 
context and tenor of the time - where wartime planning was giving impetus and confidence 
to corporatist models of economic organisation. Some of the press reaction was damning in 
+7 SAD 408/1/1 A. MacIntyre to the shareholders of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 24t August 1944 
48 Indeed, this point was made more emphatically after the concession had not been renewed. See SAD 
408/1/2 Memo from A. F. Chick, Financial Secretary, Sudan Government to the Legislative Assembly, 
Khartoum, 'The Future Administration of the Gezira Scheme, 16ch July 1949; SAD 408/1/6.14, Memo: 'The 
Gezira Scheme', 2 1st June 1950 
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this regard. The Financial News was quoted in the Sudan Star that the news was `sad', `not 
because there is anything in anyway improper in the development , but because it is just one 
more instance of enlightened private enterprise being engulfed in the impersonal maw of 
Government control. '" The Economist (also quoted in the Sudan Star) noted that the measure 
was a `further indication of the probable post-war attitude to the investor ... the Sudan 
Government makes it clear that the considerations they have in mind are political. 'S° The 
Sudan Star itself gave the headline `Sudanese Welcomes Ending of Cotton Concessions' 
noting, among the generally `delighted' reception that the news had in Sudan that it was a 
`happy coincidence ... that the Scheme goes 
back to the Sudan Government at a time when 
the Sudan debt is diminishing. "' 
+9 SAD 408/2/75 Clipping: 'Gezira News in London: Market Shocked: Cotton Shares Fall', Sndan Star, 4th 
September 1944 
50 SAD 408/2/76 Clipping: 'The Economist of September 2nd Says', Sudan Star, no date; 'Sudan Plantations 
Disappointed', The Economist, September 2"d, 1944, p. 327 
sl SAD 408/2/74 Clipping: 'Sudanese Welcome Ending of the Cotton Concessions', Sudan Star, 31st August 
1944 
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Table 8.4. Sudan Plantations Syndicate data, 1940-1950 (£ E unless stated otherwise) 
Source: Gaitskell, The Gezira Scheme, 267-274 
Amount 
Price of 
of Net dividend 
Yield Sudan return, before 
in cotton after Direct deduction 
Cotton kantars in deducting expenditure Syndicate's of Sudan 
area in per pence marketing on the Total share of net Syndicate's and UK 
feddans feddan per lb expenses Scheme profits return expenses tax 
1940 206,880 3.80 9.60 2,722,407 714,654 358,585 581,958 240,528 198,000 
1941 207,594 4.00 8.90 2,952,244 696,740 440,388 621,993 217,809 198,000 
1942 207,121 4.00 9.10 2,922,591 698,365 488,707 616,261 214,870 247,500 
1943 206,486 4.80 9.30 3,697,480 716,792 693,224 776,878 221,545 297,000 
1944 206,571 3.10 10.60 2,614,936 737,323 578,700 533,584 237,131 495,000 
1945 206,578 4.90 10.60 4,280,156 752,519 1,111,991 837,611 260,047 544,500 
1946 196,541 3.40 10.30 2,605,760 773,543 963,682 516,938 270,189 618,750 
1947 206,176 4.00 19.20 6,789,924 855,843 1,984,013 1,372,042 301,716 618,750 
1948 206,346 3.40 38.50 11,753,038 918,832 4,213,545 2,339,120 336,423 618,750 
1949 206,778 4.30 38.50 13,819,832 966,628 4,576,516 2,741,206 401,243 618,750 
1950 206,737 4.60 41.30 16,118,155 1,134,693 5,820,630 3,189,374 541,108 618,750 
The market reaction to the news that the Syndicate's concession had been withdrawn 
resulted in the share price of the company dipping steeply from 50 shillings and 6 pence per 
share to 38 shillings and 6 pence, though it rallied to 44 shillings and 4'h pence by the close 
of trading. The Sudan Star reported that the market was active, with one jobber dealing in 
15,000 shares in one day. The market rallied because of news of an estimated break-up value 
of about 45 shillings per share as well as the reserves accumulated in the intervening period, 
1944-1950, the Sudan Star observing that for the previous three years the Syndicate had put 
£80,000 in cash on reserve each year. In fact the reality was somewhat better than this. By 
April 1945 the Syndicate was in a position to distribute generous dividend payment, at which 
time the shares of the company were changing hands at forty six shillings. By the end of the 
concession in 1950 the share price of the Syndicate had risen to circa 69 shillings per share. 
The advance notice that the Syndicate was not to have its concession renewed in 1944 had 
the effect of damaging the standing of the Syndicate in 1944 only. In fact - though it almost 
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certainly was not deliberate - by 1950, having had time for the market and the business to 
adjust to impending liquidation, the Syndicate was not subjected to furious off-loading of 
shares on the London Stock Exchange which was reported to have shown `no distress' at the 
de facto nationalisation of the Gezira Scheme. So, in a sense, the early announcement of 
non-renewal allowed the Syndicate to cope with its own impeding demise surprisingly well. 52 
On the 30th June 1950 the Sudan Government effectively nationalised the Gezira 
Scheme and a little less than a year later, on 4`h April 1951, the Syndicate was placed into 
voluntary liquidation, though it continued to pay dividends on shares until the final meeting 
of the company in 2155 April 1953 53 The concession on the Gezira itself ran out on 30`h June 
1950, at which time the balance sheet capital of the company was carried forward as 
£2,487,782, with Capital Reserves at £ 1,530,389 and General Reserve at £2,046,851»' Thus, 
despite the end of the concession and the impending transfer of the general reserves to the 
Sudan Government, the Syndicate's 20 shilling shares continued to trade at between 52 
shillings and 68 shillings per share in 194955 The 1929 Gezira Agreement - the last made 
between the Syndicate and the government - seems to indicate that the Syndicate was to pay 
the government any expended fund balances, but with the initial capital costs to be repaid to 
the Syndicate 56 According to the Agreement of 31" January 1929 on termination of the 
concession on 30th June 1950 the `Government [was] to pay the Syndicate 29.6% of the 
capital expended upon Development of the Northern Extension area' according to the terms 
of the supplemental agreement of February 1930. The Syndicate was required to hand over 
32 SAD 408/2/75 Clipping: 'Gezira News in London: Market Shocked: Cotton Shares Fall', Sudan Star, 41h 
September 1944; 'Sudan Plantations', The Economist, April 14th, 1945, p. 486 ; 'Nationalisation in the Sudan', The 
Economist, April 8th, 1950,777-778 
53 FO 957/98 Sudan Cotton Growing 1950: 'Nationalisation of the Gezira Scheme; Stock Exchange Official 
Yearbook, Vol 1,1954 (London, 1954), p. 796 
54 Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, Vol 2,1951 (London, 195 1), p. 3338; Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, Vol 1, 
1952 (London, 1952), p. 862 
ss Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, Vol 2,1950 (London, 1950), p. 3289 
s% SAD 417/2/12 'Sudan Plantations Syndicate Main Agreement, 3 1nn January 1929' 
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`the land and all canals, drains, roads and bridges constructed on Sudan land by the Syndicate 
in a good state of repair without any payment therefore... i5' The reserves of the company 
were large, having been steadily built up over the preceding twenty years. The effect was to 
render the withdrawal of the Concession to be relatively painless. Though the withdrawal 
itself was a statement of anti-business sentiment (albeit high-minded), the process itself was 
a good deal more gentle than occurred elsewhere in the British Empire. 
57 SAD 417/2/5-32 `Sudan Plantations Syndicate Main Agreement, 3 13 January 1929' 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The period 1939-1950/1956 was one of significant managerial and political change within 
the economy. The state increased its importance; business was diminished. Though the state 
had always been important to the development of cotton growing in Sudan, the period of 
the Second World War and its aftermath transformed its role from importance to outright 
dominance. The primary reason for the full incorporation of cotton growing within the 
ambit of the state was the reliance of the Sudan Government on cotton revenue. Yet the role 
of ideology should not be underestimated. The Sudan Government began to incorporate the 
notion, and certainly the rhetoric, of welfare into the justification for the nationalisation of 
the Gezira Scheme in addition to dirigiste economic management more generally. 58 As the 
British Empire as a whole began the painful process of decolonization, the new missions of 
development and national self-determination became powerful engines for altered political- 
economic arrangements in Sudan as elsewhere. 
The decision to effectively nationalize the Gezira scheme was, then, the logical 
conclusion of both financial need on the part of the Sudan Government, an increasingly 
nationalist agenda within Sudan, and stemmed, indirectly, from central imperial policy that 
reflected a changed attitude to the colonies (partly in response to war) as the century headed 
towards its mid-point. The template that roughly guided the creation of the Gezira Board 
established to run cotton-growing was the creation in Britain of commissions to run 
nationalized industries as well as being guided, inevitably, by the close relationship enjoyed 
58 SAD 408/1/2 Menmo from A. F. wick, Financial Secretary, Sudan Govenunent to the Legislative Assembly, 
Khartoum, 'The Future Administration of the Gezira Scheme', 16th July 1949 
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between the Syndicate as managers of the Gezira Scheme and the Sudan Governments' 
Corporatism, not the free-market or private enterprise, was the guiding mechanism of the 
1930s. This segued into statism and economic nationalism as the inspiration in the 1940s. 
The decision not to renew the Syndicate concession over the Gezira Scheme did 
not appear at first sight to be in the Syndicate's interests. Nevertheless, in many ways it was a 
boon. First of all, though generally a surprise, it provided the Syndicate with stability and 
expectation. The end of the concession six years after was something that the Syndicate 
could plan for. This was reflected in the Syndicate's financial and organizational strategy 
which was to disburse profits to the shareholders and build up the Gezira Sinking and 
Depreciation Fund. Second, the decision for an orderly nationalisation of the Gezira Scheme 
was in contrast to some of the more sudden and disruptive sequestrations of British business 
as a result of decolonization elsewhere in the British Empire. Indeed, it is questionable 
whether the withdrawal of the Syndicate's concession should be identified as a conscious part 
of the process of decolonization for the simple reason that it was made in 1944 as Britain 
was still dominated by the course of the Second World War and came a full twelve years 
before British withdrawal from Sudan. However, this event should be interpreted as a 
significant step on the way to decolonization that gave increasing form to the intensifying 
process of economic nationalism and Sudanization. 
The final comment is to evaluate the extent to which the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate - without question Sudan's most successful company in the Condominium era - 
was itself a success in absolute terms. The evidence tends towards the conclusion that is was 
a decent and moderately profitable investment. However, the problem for the Syndicate was 
the same as for the economy of Sudan as a whole - disease, depression, and war wrought a 
59 SAD 418/7/22-24 Anonymous Letter (likely to or from Gaitskel», 22nd March 1948; SAD 408/1/6-14 
Memo: 'The Gezira Scheme', Reference Division, Central Office of Information, 21't June 1950 
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terrible consequence and the Syndicate did not enjoy a prolonged period of uninterrupted 
cotton-growing to reap the rewards as once was hoped. Under these circumstances the 
relative success of the Syndicate is actually quite impressive. 
The legacy of the imperial phase of Sudan's economic history is now clear. Sudan's 
was unequivocally an agricultural economy. Dominated by cotton, by independence in 1956 
a full eighty five per cent of the industriallabour force were employed in agriculture, livestock 
production, forestry work or fishing. Of the entire population the industrial labour force was 
thought only to account for forty-seven per cent of the total population. ' Despite a full half- 
century of efforts to develop the economy of Sudan, the effect was limited -a pattern not 
unique to Sudan it ought to be noted. Dependence on cotton was as much of a limitation as 
it had been in the depression of the 1930s where the monocultural nature of agrarian 
production made Sudan's economic position extremely vulnerable to deleterious conditions 
in the world economy. The evidence from the end of the colonial period points to an 
economy without a diverse economic base. Indeed, in the fifteen years after independence 
cotton remained dominant as an export, other products remained variable and the overall of 
levels of foreign trade volatile (see table below). 
60 Osman and Suleiman, 'The Economy of Sudan', p. 461; the 'industrial' labour force refers to the labour 
employed in the sectors of the Sudan economy associated with market transactions: manufacturing, 
construction, commerce, transport, and services - as defined by Osman and Suleiman. 
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Table 8.5. Sudan's Export Trade, 1950-1965 (£ m) 

















1950 24.8 2J 0.2 1.8 3.6 33.1 
1951 49.3 3.5 0.8 0.4 2.0 6.8 62.8 
1952 31.5 2.5 1.1 1.3 1.3 5.1 42.8 
1953 30.0 3.0 2.0 1.5 1.6 6.3 44.4 
1954 24.9 3.8 1.1 1.6 2.4 6.6 40.4 
1955 33.8 4.7 2.4 1.8 1.9 5.9 50.5 
1956 46.9 5.4 3.8 2.1 2.6 6.1 66.9 
1957 28.8 47 47 3.0 3.1 7.1 51.4 
1958 23.8 5.2 3.4 2.2 2.4 6.4 43.4 
1959 45.0 5.1 3.6 2.8 2.2 8.1 66.8 
1960 36.3 7.0 4.4 4.6 2.5 8.9 63.7 
1961 34.7 6.1 5.4 42 2.5 9.3 62.2 
1962 48.5 4.6 67 5.6 1.8 11.7 78.9 
1963 49.4 5.5 5.9 4.8 2.3 10.7 78.6 
1964 33.6 6.5 9.2 6.5 17 11.1 68.6 
1965 33.1 7.2 8.6 4.8 3.2 11.1 68.0 
Yet this period was not without its successes. As the graph shows, notwithstanding inflation, 
exports in general grew in this period as, in fact, did imports. " Cotton and agricultural 
products might be vulnerable, but they were also marketable. Not only this, but across that 
same period Sudan's considerable colonial debt was not just paid down, but paid off. '2 
Additionally, in the final years of the Condominium the boom in world commodity prices 
helped push government revenue substantially into surplus. 
61 Osman and Suleiman, `The Economy of Sudan', p. 465 
62 See Appendix 3: Sudan Debt 
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Graph 8.8. Sudan Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1939-1956 (G E) 








As the graph above indicates, government coffers were generously filled as a result of 
surpluses especially from 1947 onwards. By the time of the end of the concession in 1950 
the Sudan Government was in confident position. For hie i : ionomisi this was damning. 
Identifying that the Sudan Government surpluses were an artificial product of wartime, The 
Economist wondered what would happen when the reserves were exhausted: `less developed 
countries will again require outside finance unless they are to adopt the heroic methods of 
Soviet Russia. The indications are at present that, when the time comes, foreign capital will 
only be welcome if it is used to set up companies operating under the local law and 
controlled in no small measure by local nationals. Past experiences suggests that, under such 
conditions, money will only be forthcoming if the gross return to be expected is much 
higher than is obtainable in the country which produces the capital. ' ' '11iey were, of course, 
broadly correct. Furthermore, the increased revenue from cotton after 1950 was enhanced 
because the Syndicate was no longer claiming a share; yet this had conic at the cost of the 
withdrawal of capital from the Sudan. As Sir Alex Maclntyre commented in 1945, `[t]hcenv 
cannot be many Ministers of Finance who would willingly contemplate the withdrawal of 
63 `Sudan Plantations Disappointed', The Economist, September 20,1944, p. 327 
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1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
between five and six million pounds of public money from fruitful employment in the 
country they administer. ' 
The position, then, at the end of empire in Sudan was mixed. Considerable 
infrastructural development had been made and the Gezira Scheme was an impressive 
symbol of corporate models of development. Alternatively, Sudan possessed a cash-crop 
economy in the latter half of the Twentieth Century, with all the development difficulties 
that this entailed. Moreover, the state had, increasingly, moved towards a model of economic 
management that was hostile to business, a further limitation on the potential sources of 
developmental capital available. 
64 SAD 416/5/72-73 Sir Alex MacIntyre at the 37th Ordinary General Meeting of the Sudan Plantations 
Syndicate, 19th April 1945 
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Conclusion 
Economic Imperialism in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 
`How then, did the colonial state stand as a substitute for an independent state? 
The argument [here] is that it was not so much bad as was alleged by both colonial 
nationalists and western liberals and some later historians, as inadequate. " 
- D. K. Fieldhouse, The West and the Third World (1999) 
There were neither old foundations on which they could rebuild nor materials for 
new constructions; there was no law, no cohesion, no money, no industries, no 
organised agriculture, no roads ... Not even a Bolshevik could say that 
by taking 
over the Sudan in 1898 England made an enviable haul? 
- Odette Keun, travel writer, A Foreigner Looks at the British Sudan (1930) 
He has evidently not understood the desirability of separating Egypt and Sudan 
from a military and political point of view. 
- Governor-General Reginald Wingate reflecting on Lord Kitchener's views of 
the constitutional status of Sudan in 1908 
Sudan has previously escaped the full attention of imperial historians. Gallagher and 
Robinson in Africa and the Victorians deal with Sudan briefly, limited to the invasion of 
1898/9. In British Imperialism Cain and Hopkins subsume Sudan into their analysis of 
Egypt, while others points to the strategic imperatives for the acquisition of the territory, 
1 Fieldhouse, The West, p. 89 
2 O. Kean, A Foreigner Looks at The British Sudan (London, 1930), p. 8 
3 SAD 469/1/4 Wingate to Clayton, 1st September 1908 
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but generally go no further. 4 So the first contribution made by this thesis has been to 
deepen understanding of Sudan as part of the British empire from the perspective of 
economic and business history, and historical political economy. What makes Sudan a 
challenging example of an imperial possession is, first of all, its constitutional ambiguity. 
As The Economist reflected in 1945, `Egypt supplied the title deed ... that gave the 
expedition according to those days, its legal justification. Britain's contribution was the 
organisation and leadership of the whole venture .5 Somewhat paradoxically this led the 
British Cotton Growing Association to describe the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1910 as 
`not entirely British'. ' It also facilitated autonomy and over the duration of the 
Condominium period the Sudan Government was gradually able to consolidate and 
centralise power especially in response to the risk of losing economic control. This 
eventually contributed to the process of decolonization - in terms of Sudanization, 
economic nationalization and a kind of political nationalism among the British officials 
who placed considerable significance on the independence and separation of Sudan from 
Egypt regardless of the position of the Foreign Office. ' The sense of comparative 
difference is reinforced by the omission of Sudan from various comparative histories on 
the one hand, and promulgated by various `Sudanists' on the other, who tend to 
emphasise difference. Sudan has been considered `an awkward child, historiographically 
as well as historically. " However, Sudan was locked into an economic path dominated by 
a cash-crop. This experience was a common one in the tropical colonies of the British 
Empire. Therefore the first section of this concluding chapter will examine the ways in 
which Sudan was economically different within the British Empire and the ways in which 
4Gallagher, and Robinson, Africa and the Victorians, 351-378; Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 317; J. 
Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians: the dynamics of territorial expansion', English Historical Review, 
1997, p. 635 
3'The World Overseas: Egypt and Sudan', The Economist, 11th August 1945,192-193 
6 SudA PK 1569 2 BRI, British Cotton Growing Association, 'Memo on the Development of Cotton 
Growing in the Sudan', November, 1910, p. 2 
7 Wm. Roger Louis, `The Dissolution of the British Empire', in JM Brown & W. R. Louis (eds. ), OHBE 
Volume IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), 340-341 
8 J. Willis, 'Violence, Authority and the State in the Nuba Mountains of Condominium Sudan', The 
Historical Journal, 2003, p. 90 
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it was the same. Following this, there have been two principal areas of historiographical 
inquiry developed in the main body of the thesis: business imperialism and Gentlemanly 
Capitalism In examining questions relating to these areas the evidence presented and the 
argument developed support that the state's financial and economic interests are crucial 
to a convincing explanation of economic imperialism in Sudan. The remaining three 
sections of this chapter develop this argument by examining firstly the case for business 
imperialism and then, secondly, Gentlemanly Capitalism as explanations of economic 
imperialism in Sudan; and then lastly to summarise and restate once more the central 
argument of this thesis that British imperialism in Sudan created and institutionalised a 
modem state where the various sources of military, economic, and political power were 
increasingly gathered together, and that this institution was the crucial determinant of the 
political economy of imperial Sudan. ' These institutions and concentrations of power 
were to survive decolonization and form the basis of the post-colonial state. " This is why 
these questions remain important. The issues discussed here echo in modem debates 
about the impact of imperialism in the international system, which itself indicates the 
continuing need to understand the role that states, firms and markets play in creating the 
opportunity, means and processes of imperialism, if not the motives as well. " 
9 Sharkey, living with Coloniialism, in particular Chapter 4: `The Mechanics of Colonial Rule', 67.94; 
i 
Again, a good guide is Sharkey, living with Colonialism. See Chapter 6: 'The Nation after the Colon)', 120- 
11 See, for example, N. Ferguson, Colossus. the use and fall of the American Emphv (London, 2004); M. Maiur, 
Incoherent Empire (London, 2003); African Review of Political Economy, June/September 2005. No. 104/5, Vol. 
32, special edition on `Oiling the wheels of Imperialism. A summary of this emerging field and an 
interesting contribution in its own right is A. G. Hopkins, `Capitalism, Nationalism and the New American 
Empire', Journal of Impeuial and Commonwealth History, 2007,95-117 
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I. WAS SUDAN ECONOMICALLY DIFFERENT? 
Sudan was different in the sense that all colonies are different to each other. Yet Sudan 
should be regarded as a fairly typical African tropical colony in the British Empire despite 
its Condominium status. This can be seen by briefly examining the following areas. 
The Economy. Sudan developed a cash-crop economy based around cotton. In this, 
Sudan was similar to other African colonies that also developed cash crops. What is less 
well known, but is established in `Appendix 8: Sudan - an international comparison' is 
that in terms of the size and general trajectory of both imports and exports (used as a 
proxy for the economy as a whole) Sudan's economy was not untypical among other 
tropical colonies (Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Gambia, Gold Coast (Ghana) and Kenya and 
Uganda). Moreover, in terms of government revenue and expenditure, Sudan compared 
favourably with the other tropical colonies included in the data. Where Sudan was 
somewhat different was in the growth of the economy between 1909 and 1947. During 
this period Sudan's economy grew more strongly in comparison with the other tropical 
colonies. Whether this is wholly to do with the earlier date of conquest and therefore 
more advanced economic development in other colonies (i. e., a lead in economic 
development over Sudan) or has to do with other structural factors is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to answer. However, growing more strongly should not be mistaken for 
enjoying strong growth. Sudan's economy suffered in a similar way to all colonial 
economies producing primary commodities for export markets; that is, declining terms 
of trade and limited development without diversity of commodities or markets. " 
Development policy and the ideology of development. There is a substantial literature 
relating to development and underdevelopment in Africa which is, quite consciously, 
12 Havinden and Meredith, Development and Colonialism, p. 275 
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only indirectly addressed here. " However, notwithstanding this there are a number of 
observations to make. First of all, as mentioned in the Introduction to the thesis, 
Geoffrey Jones identifies two phases for development among colonial officials in India, 
that of the `benevolent night-watchmen' who gave way to a conscious but retarded 
developmentalism among colonial officials that led to unbalanced growth. " Fieldhouse 
reaches a similar conclusion, citing among others Havinden and Meredith to support the 
point that while there was economic growth, colonial economies were much too 
dependent on a narrow economic base of cash crops which suffered from worsening 
conditions in the world markets for primary commodities. " In this experience of colonial 
development, Sudan was entirely typical. Jones' depiction of the benevolent night- 
watchmen might have been written about the colonial officials in the early years of the 
Condominium as the Sudan Government did relatively little to foster economic growth 
beyond the provision of infrastructure and were inclined to idealise Sudan as a pastoral 
arcadia in need of preservation rather than development. " 
Only once a putative mining industry had all but failed did the Sudan 
Government offer protection to cotton-growing (to the Sudan Plantations Syndicate) in 
the form of a monopoly concession. What was different about the plans for the 
development of cotton-growing in the Gezira area is that that the Sudan Government 
cooperated closely with business in a way that prefigured state sponsored development 
schemes elsewhere in the Empire and the metropolitan imperial legislation to facilitate 
13 See Fieldhouse, The Wert, Ch. 6, 'The Concept of a Colonial Economy, 164-186 for a survey of this area 
circa 1999. A more econometrically minded approach is that of P. Collier and J. W. Gunning, 'Explaining 
African Economic Performance', Journal of Economic Literature, 1999,64-111. Gunning and Collier outline an 
agenda for research to establish more completely whyAfrica has grown so slowly. The issues they identify 
range from a lack of social capital, to government mismanagement of development policy and finance, to 
geography, demography and the incidence of disease. 
14 G. Jones, The State and Economic Development', p. 353 
15 Fieldhouse, The West, p. 168; Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Devehpmext, 160-183 
16 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 579; idealising the indigenous population in terms of custom, 
political authority, tribal structure and so on continued through much of the Condominium. See Leonardi, 
'Knowing Authority', 'Chapter One: Knowing the Native', 45-76 
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them" Such innovation is interesting precisely because Sudan was not supervised by the 
Colonial Office but by the Foreign Office, described by Martin Daly as `a benign and 
distant master'. " Though this meant that Sudan was frequently a `pawn' in the Foreign 
Office's strategic and diplomatic policy, the distant relationship granted latitude to the 
Sudan Government19 Economic policy innovation, such as it was, therefore came from 
within the Sudan Political Service and there is no sense in the Foreign Office sources on 
Sudan that development policy was handed down during the inter-war period or before. 
Does this make Sudan different? There is reason to doubt the extent to which it does. 
With reference to British colonies as a whole, Stephen Constantine argues that it was 
colonial governments who demanded funds for development, commenting that these 
initiatives were `not inspired by metropolitan needs. '2° 
Nevertheless, it is also the case that there was a transition in development 
thinking among the officials in Sudan that ran in tandem with the developmental agenda 
adopted more widely in the Empire. A good example of this can be found in Arthur 
Gaitskell, last managing director of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and first Chairman 
of the Gezira Board after nationalization (see Appendix 4). Gaitskell used the phrase `co- 
operative socialism' to describe how he envisaged the Gezira Scheme developing from 
the 1940s onwards, a markedly different view of how the economy of Sudan should be 
managed in comparison with the corporatist but nevertheless market based model that 
underpinned the development of the Gezira Scheme earlier in the century. 21 The 
transition in the rhetoric of economic matters including development and changes to 
17 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 575-577; Constantine, The Making of Colonial Development Polity, 
passim 
la M. W. Daly, 'The Development of the Governor General of the Sudan, 1899-1934, journal ofAf ican 
History, 1983, p. 89 
19 Wm. Roger Louis quotes MargeryPerham who described Sudan as 'the pawn in our Egyptian policy' in 
1953. See Wm. Roger Louis 'The Dissolution of the British Empire', in J. M. Brown & WR Louis (eds. ), 
OHBE Volume IV: The Twentieth Century, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999), p. 340 
20 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, p. 294 
21 SAD 418/5/46.58 `The Gezira Scheme: a talk given at the Sudan Cultural Centre on February 17th 1943 
byA. Gaitskell'; SAD 408/2/11-13 'A Broadcast on the Gezira Scheme from Omdurman Station, 18th 
January 1943. For interest, Gaitskell's brother was Hugh Gaitskell, Labour Minister in the United 
Kingdom in the 1950s and 1960s. 
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economic management during the Second World War contributed to the decision to 
nationalize the Gezira Scheme and create a Gezira Board, similar in many ways to the 
marketing boards used to coordinate commodity production elsewhere in the tropical 
colonies' 
Indebtedness. Sudan incurred substantial levels of debt as a result of capital 
intensive development, specifically the Gezira Scheme (see Appendix 5). This was a 
structural economic/financial weakness and a determinant of the political economy of 
the country, especially in the critical period during and immediately after the depression 
(as argued in Chapter 5) when Sudan, like other tropical colonies, suffered financial 
distress connected to indebtedness. Total debt incurred by 1930 was £ 11,643400. This 
places Sudan in the mid range of debtors by comparison. In 1930, Nigeria's public debt 
was £28.4 million, Kenya's was £ 16.9 million, Gold Coast's (Ghana) was £ 13.0 million, 
Tanganyika's was X5.2 million, Uganda's was X1.1 million, while Nyasaland's (Malawi) 
was onlyL0.9 million. However, while Sudan Government debt fell somewhat to 1940, 
elsewhere in the British Empire the debt levels typically rose. ' For example, Kenya's 
debt levels reached £17.6 million by 1936, while Nigeria's debt topped X28 million in 
1934. Sudan's avoidance of increased debt between 1928-1938 was similar to the 
experience of the Gold Coast Z' The sense of general similarity to other African colonies 
is reinforced by examining the ratio of debt to export levels. 
Table Cl. Ratio of Average Debt Outstanding to Average Annual Exports, 1928-1938 
Source: Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Development, p. 174; Appendix 5: Sudan Government Debt; 
Appendix 6: Import and Export Data 
Kenya / Uganda Gold Coast Nigeria Sudan 
Average debt outstanding (; Em) 18.34 12.10 26.36 11.13 
Average annual exports (Cm) 6.39 8.33 12.57 5.21 
Ratio 2.87 1.45 2.10 2.14 
u Fieldhouse, The Wert, p. 213 
23 Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Development, 174,176-177; these data are used to calculate the 
table below and can be found reproduced in'Appendix 5: Sudan Government Debt'. 
24 See Appendix 5 for data relating to comparative colonial indebtedness. 
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Overall, the economic circumstances of Sudan were in general terms similar to those 
elsewhere in tropical colonies of the British Empire. Nevertheless, as explained earlier in 
some detail the political-economic compact that developed in Sudan was corporatist and 
in that sense unique. The principal partners in this arrangement were the Sudan 
Government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. So, what drove the accrual of imperial 
economic power? What was the engine of imperialism in Sudan? 
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II. BUSINESS IMPERIALISM 
Much of the original scholarship in the area of business imperialism concentrated on 
trying to establish whether areas of the globe not part of the British Empire in the formal 
sense should be considered within the informal sphere of the British Empire23 This has 
tended to result in the assumption (or at any rate not the immediate repudiation) that 
where the British Empire was existent formally, the interests of business were served. 
Certainly, the idea that Empire was hostile to business is rarely observed, while hostility 
to business was a distinct feature of decolonisation. The process of deconstruction is not, 
however, simply the reversal of the process of construction. Nevertheless, there is a 
wealth of literature on the imperialism of free trade, the imperialisms of capital and 
finance, capitalists and financiers, as well as the literature related to colonial development, 
some of which has focused on capital accumulation - which, whether by private 
enterprise of via government contracts for large scale capital projects involved British 
business. Why then bother to examine or question sometimes taken as a given? The 
answer, simply, is that the evidence from Sudan reflects a more complex picture. The 
notion that the colonial state in Sudan was supportive of business and vice versa is at 
best contested. 
Charles Jones, writing in 1980, observed that one reason for rejecting the case for 
British imperialism in Latin America was that `there were not ambitious militarists and 
aristocrats with their sights set on the South American republics. This element was quite 
adequately catered for in the Empire. '26 He concluded that `capitalists' operating in Latin 
America did not want British state intervention, nor did the British state wish to pursue a 
territorial vision of empire in that area. He further argued that such `conspiracy theories 
are generally unsatisfactory in analysing British imperialism because the level of social 
25 Robinson and Gallagher, 'Imperialism'; Platt, (ed ), Business Impena/irm 
26 Jones, B#s ness, p. 437 
295 
integration between business and governing elites in Britain was lower than in any other 
of her competitors at least until 1914. "7jones went on to make a somewhat overlooked 
observation: 
This has led many to feel that the debate about imperialism must ultimately be 
reducible to debate about asymmetries of power between territorial States. Business 
firms, by contrast, are primarily functional not territorial entities, and ultimately 
depend on States for legitimization and for any territorial monopolies they try to 
establish. 
Jones' statement that firths are `primarily functional' is important. He goes on to make a 
further critical distinction: 
Therefore, observations about the growth of business monopoly, the division of 
world markets, and the growing concentration of control of capital which stress the 
analogy from the world of business to contemporary developments in international 
relations and the causes common to both sets of phenomena are, by themselves, 
insufficient to justify the term `business imperialism' or to license the use of 
`imperialism' and `monopoly capitalism' as synonyms. What is required is a solid 
connection between the changing character of capitalism and the advent of a more 
aggressive phase in international relations after 1900 28 
Jones identified this as being the new forms of business that began to emerge in the 
period up to 1914, that were, he argued, subject to one common factor. at that time 
`[m]erchant or commercial capital, accumulated through the operation of small firms 
27 Jones, Business, p. 437; the conspiracy barb was directed at Schumpeter and J. A. Hobson, but this 
prefigures a considerable and lengthy debate the influence of elites over imperial policy 
28 Jones, Business, p. 438 
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with cost-cutting competition strategies, was being forced to seek shelter from the 
middle years of [the 19"] century onwards as trade was revolutionized by innovations in 
communications (and to a lesser extent the transport of goods). '`' Though emerging at 
the end of the epoch discussed by Jones, the early commercial enterprises in Sudan fit 
the categorisation almost perfectly. The Sudan Plantations Syndicate was initially a small 
entrepreneurial firm established to exploit the commercial shelter provided by a 
protected monopolistic concession, the purpose of which was to produce cotton using 
relatively technologically sophisticated techniques of irrigation and agronomy married to 
cheap labour, while the cotton itself was to be sold on the World market in the manner 
typical of a cash-crop - but in particular that there was no local market for the cotton 
produced requiring considerable transhipment. In fact, without the competitive 
advantages realised by cost minimisation through technology and cheap labour and the 
innovations in transport and cotton marketing, developing the Gezira Scheme would 
have been impossible, just as indeed the hoped for development of a mining sector 
proved unviable. 
It is therefore necessary to place commercial enterprise in Sudan in the frame of 
reference of business imperialism for two reasons. First, because there is a need to 
examine the role of business as an engine and driver of empire. The field of business 
history offers considerable scope for enquiry at this level of analysis, as (it is hoped) this 
thesis demonstrates. Secondly, as `business imperialism' was piloted in the arena of 
`informal empire' where independent sovereign States were supposedly subverted and 
imperialised (if not colonised) by the overweening might of the British Empire (i. e., in 
Latin America, and to a lesser extent mina) the unusual political history of Sudan has to 
be considered. Relatively independent of London, and entirely independent of the 
Colonial Office from its inception in 1899, Condominium Sudan may well compare 
rather better from a governmental perspective with the independent states of Latin 
29 Jones, Business, 438-439 
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America or with the dominions, than with Colonial Office administered areas of Africa, 
the dominions or with India. Similarly, it begs the observation that if Latin America was 
in reality not ultimately acquired by policy makers in London despite its economic riches, 
so Sudan has to be viewed as acquired despite its obvious economic problems. 
In short then, was Sudan and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate especially a case of 
`business imperialism' or not.. ) 
1899-1919 
The first observation to state was that during this period business found it hard to gain a 
commercially viable foothold. Even if the Sudan Government had been unequivocally 
supportive - and this was not the case - the marginality of commercial opportunity in 
Sudan was a persistent problem. Following the failure of mining business in the early 
years of the first two decades of the Condominium, the Government became more 
interventionist through the building of infrastructure necessary to business (in particular 
Port Sudan and the development of a railway network) as well as by issuing a 
monopolistic concession to the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. Yet even with regard to 
cotton, surprisingly little progress was made across a twenty year period. As outlined 
earlier in the thesis, there were good reasons for this, but it cannot be maintained 
conclusively that the colonial state was acting in the interests of capital or business; 
equally, it cannot be conclusively argued that capital or business were entirely supportive 
of the colonial state. This needs to be understood in two distinct ways: firstly investors 
and business were self interested and sought to extract maximal advantage out of their 
involvement in Sudan (this was not always forthcoming, of course) and secondly, the 
impact of the sparse sprinkling of business has to be questioned. It is true that in the 
embryonic Gezira Scheme a significant determinant of imperialism in Sudan was brought 
into being, but by 1919 this had not either provided a source of income for the Sudan 
Government, nor had it begun the social transformation which is the less perceptible but 
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nonetheless important economic and cultural impact of Western business operating in 
developing countries. 1he simple fact is that no large scale British business was a success 
in Sudan before 1919. It is therefore difficult to attribute business as an engine of 
imperialism in this period. 
1919-1950 
The inter-war period marked the high water mark of imperialism in Sudan and, in the 
impact of the depression, the beginnings of the undoing of that same process. This is 
also true for the influence and role of business. Immediately after the First World War 
the development of the Gezira Scheme with the influx of capital that it brought began 
transforming the economy of Sudan. The Sudan Plantations Syndicate, by then the 
significant British business in Sudan without peer, briefly enjoyed both economic and 
governmental centrality- and the picture that is revealed from Syndicate - Government 
relations at the time of the first loan negotiations in 1912 is that the Syndicate has the 
whip hand, that its role in the Gezira Scheme was sufficiently crucial to make the 
Government more supine than it later became. However, wartime was to change this 
complexion and was to make business much less important to the Government to 
develop the Gezira Scheme. Then, from 1924 onwards the process of greater political 
autonomy enjoyed by the Sudan Government and the increasing importance of cotton 
revenue rebalanced this relationship once again. The dramatic events of the depression 
not only caused the Syndicate problems, but its repercussions for the Sudan Government 
were significant, sparking a realisation that the economic base of Sudan was too narrow 
(something that was not addressed) and that the government's own revenue sources were 
dependent on that narrow base. This weakened the Sudan Plantation Syndicate's position 
in the longer run. It also invigorated the `Sudanization' process in Sudan that followed 
from the expulsion of Egyptian troops from Sudan in 1924. 
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The Second World War and the growth in importance of the state put paid to 
large scale commercial enterprise in Sudan when in 1944 the Sudan Government decided 
not to renew the Syndicate's concession in Gezira. This action was the culmination of a 
process whereby the state went from being important to dominant within the economy. 
There was an economic imperialism in Sudan, but it was not a business imperialism. 
Rather, it was the economic needs of the colonial state, not business, which increasingly 
drove policy. Moreover, the Sudan Government moved from economic corporatism 
(already a statist economic model) to outright economic nationalism in the form of 
nationalization in order to shore-up its own position. Though this nationalization was 
relatively benign (to business) in comparison to nationalization elsewhere in the British 
Empire during decolonization, business in Sudan was not able to influence policy to its 
own ends and, as judged by the Financial Secretary of the Sudan Government in 1950, 
was not itself imperialist in the classic conception of anti imperialists: 
The opponents of concession to foreign companies sometimes drew a picture of 
rapacious foreign shareholders bleeding the country and giving it little in return. If 
that picture is ever true it is certainly not true of the two Gezira Companies [the 
Sudan Plantations Syndicate and the Kassala Cotton Company]. They brought to 
this country a large sum of badly needed capital in which they have through the 
years received no more than a fair return. 0 
Indeed, John Stone -a former Assistant Commissioner for Development in Sudan prior 
to independence - observed that a greater problem was not rapacious business, but the 
difficulty of attracting business in the first place: `African territories are not popular places 
in which to invest money: the value of their output of export crops varies far too widely 
30 FO 957/98 Sudan Cotton Growing 1950, Memorandum: 'Nationalization of the Gezira Scheme Completed' 
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from year to year, capital investment is not profitable, and security is often 
questionable. " Ihis was certainly the case in Sudan. Business in the form of the Sudan 
Plantations Syndicate was a key component of the economy of Sudan during the 
Condominium, but it was not the primary driving force of imperialism, nor in the long- 
run was it able to exert pervasive influence over the colonial state. The operation of the 
Sudan Plantations Syndicate as a business was first and foremost functional, to use Jones' 
terminology. Where the business was structurally important to the Sudan Goverrunent 
and the colonial state this was in fact a weakness for business because in the longer-term, 
the state treated business not as an ally but as an inconvenience and, eventually, as an 
economic agency to be nationalized. 
31 J. Stone, `Colonial Economic Policies in Africa' (no date), in D. Hawley (ed ), Khartoum Perspectives, p. 390 
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IV. GENTLEMANLY CAPITALISM 
Cain and Hopkins British Imperialism traces the impact of what they describe as 
Gentlemanly Capitalism, the influence of the gentlemen and the capitalists of empire, 
through four centuries. Yet by its own volition and the opinion of others it is primarily a 
view of imperial influence exerted financially and socially - and the fusion of the two, 
somewhat to the exclusion of business as a unit of analysis'' Already it has been partly 
discounted that Sudan was a case where business imperialism drove the colonial project. 
This obviously negates the extent to which the gentlemanly aspects of business might be 
described as imperialist. Instead Cain and Hopkins point to flows of `gentlemanly' capital 
and a nexus of gentlemanly interests in politics, finance and business, reinforced by social 
ties which acted as drivers of imperialism. How then does this apply to Sudan? 
First of all, there is a case to be made for gentlemanly finance - or at the very 
least a form of finance imperialism As discussed in Chapter 3 and Appendix 5, the debt 
incurred to finance the Gezira Scheme was raised by virtue of a Treasury guarantee 
which indicated a close social connection between the officials of the Sudan Government 
and the British Government in London, as well as indicating connections between the 
Syndicate and the Sudan Government. Later, this debt was to be crucial in establishing 
the independence of the Sudan Government; failure to service the debt might have led to 
the British Treasury stepping in which would have put at risk the emergent independent 
constitutional settlement with regard to Sudan, as discussed in Chapter 4 and the first 
part of Chapter 5. The debt itself, of course, was maintained and then paid off. It is not 
possible to disaggregate whether the Sudan Government was protecting its own interests 
or those of the bond-holders - though in a sense it does not matter. It was protecting 
both. The finance provided helped to develop Sudan's economy and provided a source 
of revenue for the Sudan Government, and in this way finance supported and was to a 
32 Cain and Hopkins, Bjitirh, 62-103,107-134,135-150, and passim; Dumett, 'Introduction' 
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certain extent the impetus behind imperialism in Sudan. It is worth observing also that 
prior to the First World War the Sudan Plantations Syndicate was especially useful to the 
Sudan Government because it was expected - at that time - that to enter the capital 
markets to finance the Gezira Scheme the Syndicate would be necessary. In fact after the 
First World War the Syndicate was not as necessary or as useful as the Treasury 
guarantee. This reinforces the notion that the state writ large (that is, the Sudan 
Government and the British Government in London) was more important than business 
to raise capital and develop the economy of Sudan. But was this gentlemanly capitalism and, 
secondly, was it imperialist? 
There were networks of `gentlemen' involved in business and government in 
Sudan, as is presented here in various chapters. However, there is little sense that there 
was any special economic significance to their gentlemanliness. For example, in Chapter 
2 social links between some mining finance entrepreneurs and Sudan Government 
officials conferred no special or preferential advantage. Indeed, there was a positive 
hostility to business capital in the early years of the Condominium In the totality of the 
relationship traced over several chapters between the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and 
the Sudan Government, both of which had gentlemen within their ranks, cordiality in 
personal relationships often went hand in hand with tension and divergent interests 
between business and government (though there was plenty of cooperation and amity as 
well, of course). Whether the arrangement of the Treasury guaranteed loans constituted a 
gentlemanly transaction is arguable either way. On one hand those involved in the 
negotiations could be described as gentlemen arranging finance to develop a colonial 
economy to support a colonial state and, by the by, creating an investment opportunity 
for `capitalists', gentlemanly or otherwise. On the other hand this was simply what many 
states have done whether within the British Empire or outside of it - to borrow to 
develop infrastructure. 
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Though the development of cotton as a cash-crop served the needs of 
Manchester (and was facilitated by the British Cotton Growing Association) and 
therefore seems to support the delineation made by Cain and Hopkins between the City 
and manufacturing industry, the institutional origins of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate 
were in fact to be found with the mining financiers of the Wernher Beit group. This 
indicates, if nothing else, that the sharp divisions made between City finance and 
provincial manufacturing industry were not as sharply drawn in terms of company 
formation, governance and management as might be supposed from the argument made 
by Cain and Hopkins. Moreover, it indicates the significance of the City of London as a 
deep pool of capital, management and technical expertise necessary for the metropolitan 
aspects of imperial business, regardless of the markets that the business was ultimately to 
serve. The second aspect of the delineation made by Cain and Hopkins is with regard to 
the North-South (finance), East-West (cash-crop) explanation of British economic 
interests in Africa. Again, when it comes to Sudan, these sharp definitions are much less 
clear. As argued above, the presence of large amounts of publicly issued British Treasury 
guaranteed debt to finance the Gezira Scheme indicates a financial interest which - 
though used to facilitate a cash-crop - was in itself simply money lent to a government to 
develop the economic infrastructure of the state. Yet it certainly gave the bond-holders 
and the Sudan Government a financial interest in Sudan and the Gezira Scheme 
respectively. Indeed, eventually it was the financial interests of the Sudan Government in 
the Gezira Scheme, both as debt liability and source of revenue, that mitigated against 
the Sudan Plantations Syndicate's continued management of cotton-growing in Sudan. 
Nevertheless, Sudan was, of course, based round a cash-crop economy which, as 
discussed below in more detail, had a significant impact on the developmental trajectory 
of the colony, country and state. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Sudan was not wholly a case of `business imperialism'; Gentlemanly Capitalism does not 
provide an overwhelmingly convincing explanation of the relationships that developed 
between business and government; and the scale of capital investment and its nature 
does not indicate that imperialism in Sudan was driven by the needs of financial capital. 
Yet Sudan was not untypical as an example of a tropical colony in the British Empire. So 
what was the driver of imperialism in Sudan if not business or gentlemanly capital? 
There are two possible explanations. The first is that imperialism in Sudan should 
be seen in the light of more traditional political theories of empire - strategy, security, 
prestige, diplomacy and accident; that, in a sense, there was no economic imperialism at 
work In terms of the invasion of 1898 there is something in this, but the causes of the 
invasion have to be disaggregated from the process of imperialism - much of it 
economic - that Sudan experienced for the next fifty years or so. Political dynamics are 
important, but Sudan's relationship with the Empire was characterised by disinterest on 
the part of the Foreign Office (which in itself indicates the remoteness of Sudan within 
the British imperial system) and by increasing separation from Britain's other co-domini 
in Sudan - Egypt - as argued in Chapters 5 and 7. So, the notion that economic 
development and the structure of the political economy was driven directly by 
metropolitan policy has to be discounted. Yet the British in Sudan were not unaware of 
the need to promote economic growth nor were they inactive in the economic sphere. As 
such, therefore, there must be a robust reason why the political economy of Sudan 
emerged as it did, apparently without metropolitan direction on the one hand, or 
particular relevance to the theories of imperialism discussed previously on the other. 
The second explanation rests with a colonial/imperial economic unit that is 
somewhat neglected, that is, the corporate state. The colonial state as both state and 
economic coordinator is widely known inasmuch as the state was the instrument 
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whereby the colonial development policy was pursued. In Sudan, however, the state was 
not only the provider of infrastructure and the facilitator of economic development 
schemes, but was the major economic actor. A similar but more limited point has been 
made by G. N. Sanderson. Sanderson was only concerned with six years of the 
Condominium, 1934-1940, but his argument similarly identifies the following about the 
economic policy, the economy and position of the Sudan Government: `the Sudan 
Government was not only a quasi monopolistic producer of cotton. It enjoyed a virtual 
monopoly of large scale commercial activity, notably but by no means exclusively in the 
provision of rail and steamer transport, of which its monopoly was complete. " In fact, 
this central economic role stretched from the outset of the Condominium until 
independence and, in effect, beyond. It intensified over time. The institutions of the state 
and the institutional context of the economy, in particular the Gezira Scheme, locked 
Sudan into a developmental path described in Chapter 5 as a colonial bind. 
The corporatist nature of government-business relations connected to cotton- 
growing configured the political economy of the colonial state. The state itself was 
shackled to this narrow based cash-crop economy. In turn, capital was both captive and 
dependent on the state. Over time the effects of the failure for a broad-based market 
economy to emerge pushed the state to ever more closely control the economic 
environment in order to promote economic and financial security. The difficulty that 
business had in finding sufficient commercial opportunity, as well as dealing with an 
increasingly hostile government, negated the likelihood of wider economic development 
beyond the Gezira Scheme and cotton-growing. Indeed, the parlous nature of the World 
cotton markets from the depression onwards suggests that it is questionable whether the 
corporate model adopted could sustain economic development at all. The tenuous nature 
of market-based economic activity created a fundamental structural weakness for Sudan 
both economically and politically because it engendered almost total reliance on the state 
3.3 Sanderson, 'The Ghost of Adam Smith' p. 101 
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to coordinate activity for economic growth. The lack of competition in the economy was 
therefore a problem for both business and the economy, a problem solved by the state 
through nationalization of the Gezira Scheme in the 1940s. The position of business was 
therefore eroded over time; further investment by existing business became less likely, 
and new investment became unlikely - indeed, no substantial new ventures were 
undertaken in Sudan after the 1930s. 
By the time of the end of the British Empire in the mid 20th Century it was 
inherent within commonplace views of international politics - for example, in the role of 
the United Nations, in many varieties of African nationalism, or in the Atlantic Charter - 
to invalidate the idea of empire alongside vaunting the legitimacy and the instruments of 
independent states. 34 Structurally, functionally and intellectually these factors gave 
succour to the legitimacy of the state in the name of trusteeship, economic development, 
and nationalism, and conferred a degree of acceptance for the political future of the soon 
to be post-colonial state. The colonial state in Sudan was, as many states around the 
world now are, the most important and largest coordinator of economic activity. 
However, the state was `inadequate', to use Fieldhouse's description, when it came to 
widening or substantially deepening economic activity. Nevertheless, it was able to 
ensure its own survival as an institution - and an economic institution at that - through 
ever closer economic control. This state built up its own sovereignty from within, 
jealously guarding against outside influence that threatened its own interests, be this 
business, finance, metropolitan policy, or the interests of Egypt's In Sudan the colonial 
34 R. Hyam, Britain's Declining Empire The Road to Decoloniration, 1918-1968 (Cambridge, 2006), 304-305,343- 
344; F. Cooper, Africa since 1940 (Cambridge, 2002), passim; K. Jeffrey, 'The Second World War', J. M. 
Brown & W. R. Louis (eds ), OHBE Volume IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), p. 314; in the case of 
Sudan the Atlantic Charter was linked to an emerging 'nationalistic spirit' in many part of the country. See 
GGR, 1942-44, p. 9 
33 For a discussion of sovereignty in colonial/imperial states see: M. W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca and London, 
1986), 30-47; S. D. Krasner, 'Rethinking the sovereign state model', Review of International Studies, 2001,17- 
42,17; CM Warner, 'The rise of the state system in Africa, Review of International Studies, 2001,65-89. It is 
not clear that the breached sovereignty of colonial states is fundamentally different from other breaches of 
state sovereignty that have punctuated the history of international relations. As Krasner comments: 
'[b]reaches of the sovereign state model have been an enduring characteristic of the international 
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state as an economic coordinator pursued policies and developed structurally in such a 
way as to indicate that its own survival was a primary imperative? ' 
For Sudan the legacy of the political economy established between 1899 and 
1956 was a cash-crop economy located in the North of the country, offering few wider 
benefits and without offering much hope for economic innovation or diversification 
beyond the narrow sector that was created - and a state that was inadequate and 
financially reliant on cash-crops and state monopolies for income. As this settlement was 
fragile, the post-colonial state began from a position of structural weakness. 
environment. ... Mutual recognition 
has not always gone to juridically independent territorial entities. There 
has never been a golden age for sovereignty. ' 
36 The nature of imperial economic institutions including states might therefore be a fruitful avenue for 
further inquiry. See: J. Foster, `The Institutionalist (Evolutionar)) School' in D. Mair and A. G. Miller (eds. ), 
A Modern Guide to Economic Thought (Aldershot, 1991), 207-232; G. M. Hodgson, How Economics Forot History 
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Appendix 2: Sudan's Imports by International Origin and 
Type, 1908-1913 
Imports by international origin and q7,1908-1913 (£E) [Source: Stone, Sudan Economic Development, (1955)] 
Coaon goods Egypt 
Great Britain 






























India and Aden 
Other countries 
55,300 73,400 79,400 191,400 117,700 143,500 
48,400 36,900 43,300 60,200 27,600 41,800 
100 5,700 9,500 44,500 30,500 48,800 
3,100 3,600 3,900 2,500 11,000 11,800 
12,000 113,200 102,400 152,100 66,600 40,200 
27,000 12,600 800 100 1,200 1,100 
6,300 5,000 9,100 7,200 11,800 4,500 
11,500 1,500 1,200 5,600 800 5,500 
6,100 500 700 800 700 1,700 
11,300 7,600 8,200 11,500 13,200 16,200 
2,600 1,600 2,500 2,000 4,500 4,800 
4,200 3,800 2,800 4,400 3,100 1,000 
8,200 0 0 0 0 0 
1,000 1,200 1,300 5,200 6,000 2,300 
11,400 11,500 8,900 12,100 1,200 15,800 
6,900 2,700 7,600 00 900 
700 1,400 3,000 800 700 800 
18,800 13,600 11,500 14,300 12,800 13,700 
31,000 15,400 9,000 22,400 6,600 7,700 
0 20,000 0 0 0 0 
3,000 7,300 0 0 0 3,900 
5,200 2,900 2,000 4,000 3,700 3,800 
97,200 110,600 158,400 152,100 23,100 29,100 
40,800 47,000 32,500 34,600 42,500 38,600 
18,600 16,800 18,800 30,500 54,200 51,500 
5,900 5,800 8,100 16,300 14,000 11,700 
1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 191; 
72.7% 67.9% 677% 48.6% 54.7% 51.2i 
14.1% 19.7% 18.9% 33.0% 28.5% 28.59 
12.4% 9.9% 10.3% 10.4% 6.7% 8.39 
0.0% 1.5% 2.3% 7.7% 7.4% 9.79 
0.8% 1.0% 0.9% 0.4% 2.7% 2.39 
16.6% 9.5% 0.7% 0.1% 1.5% 2.191 
3.9% 3.8% 8.0% 4.3% 14.5% 8.53 
7.1% 1.1% 1.1% 3.4% 1.0% 10.49 
3.7% 0.4% 0.6% 0.5% 0.9% 3191 
5.9% 4.0% 4.1% 6.9% 15.8% 16.09 
1.4% 0.8% 1.3% 12% 5.4% 4.79 
22% 2.0% 1.4% 2.6% 3.7% 1.09 
4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.09A 
0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 3.1% 7.2% 239A 
8.5% 7.6% 4.8% 6.1% 0.5% 6.891 
5.2% 1.8% 4.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.491 
0.5% 0.9% 1.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.39 
19.3% 12.3% 7.3% 9.4% 55.4% 47.19A 
31.9% 13.9% 5.7% 14.7% 28.6% 26.59 
0.0% 18.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0'% 
3.1% 6.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.491 
5.3% 2.6% 1.3% 2.6% 16.0% 13.19 
28.5% 24.1% 31.6% 37.5% 49.0% 50.69 
9.0% 8.3% 13.6% 20.0% 12.6% 11.591 
00.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0'% 
India and Aden 0 100 0 100 35,200 55,500 50.0% 14.3% 69.4% 95.218 
Egypt 0 100 0 500 14,700 2,600 50.0% 71.4% 29.0% 4.591 
Other countries 0 0 0 100 800 200 0.0% 14.3% 1.6% 0.39 
Total 0 200 0 700 50,700 58,300 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.094 
Egypt 700 1,700 2,100 1,500 1,500 200 0.9% 2.3% 2.8% 2.0% 1.5% 0.20A 
British South Africa 0 0 0 0 9,200 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.2% 0.0' 
India and Aden 0 0 0 0 8,400 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.4% 0.09c 
Other countries 0 300 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0' 
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Coffee Abyssinia 11,900 15,500 25,900 45,500 53,500 57,500 31.5% 34.3% 65.1% 82.1% 82.996 85.291 
Egypt 23,700 20,500 8,400 4,000 4,500 4,800 62.7% 45.4% 21.1% 7.2% 7.0% 7.19i 
Brazil 300 6,500 4,700 4,100 200 1,600 0.8% 14.4% 11.8% 7.4% 0.3% 2.40A 
Other countries 1,900 2,700 800 1,800 6,300 3,600 5.0% 6.0% 2.0% 3.2% 9.8% 5.3' 
Total 37,800 45,200 39,800 55,400 64,500 67,500 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.09A 
Tea Egypt 14,700 11,000 14,400 17,600 12,800 9,700 53.1% 66.3% 58.8% 53.5% 35.9% 24.891 
India and Aden 11,900 4,000 7,700 13,000 20,400 26,500 43.0% 24.1% 31.4% 39.5% 57.1% 67.89 
Other countries 1,100 1,600 2,400 2,300 2,500 2,900 4.0% 9.6% 9.8% 7.0% 7.0% 7.49A 
Total 27,700 16,600 24,500 32,900 35,700 39,100 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0'% 
Soap Egypt 13,600 14,400 16,400 21,100 20,600 20,900 73.1% 79.6% 75.2% 77.0% 76.3% 73.391 
France 2,000 1,600 2,200 3,100 2,400 3,800 10.8% 8.8% 10.1% 11.3% 8.9% 13.3'% 
Great Britain 2,000 1,500 1,700 1,900 3,400 3,000 10.8% 8.3% 7.8% 6.9% 12.6% 10.59( 
Other countries 1,000 600 1,500 1,300 600 800 5.4% 3.3% 6.9% 4.7% 2.2% 2.891 
Total 18,600 18,100 21,800 27,400 27,000 28,500 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.09 
Perfumery Egypt 12,100 13,200 13,100 15,900 9,400 6,900 58.7% 63.8% 69.3% 69.4% 71.2% 64.5% 
India and Aden 5,400 5,700 3,100 4,500 2,600 3,200 26.2% 27.5% 16.4% 197% 19.7% 29.99 
Germany 1,600 1,000 2,200 1,700 500 100 7.8% 4.8% 11.6% 7.4% 3.8% 0.99 
Other countries 1,500 800 500 800 700 500 
Total 20,600 20,700 18,900 22,900 13,200 10,700 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.00A 
Tobacco Egypt 64,500 31,500 32,100 33,500 41,200 45,800 97.3% 94.0% 95.5% 94.6% 96.7% 96.8' 
Other countries 1,800 2,000 1,500 1,900 1,400 1,500 2.7% 6.0% 4.5% 5.4% 3.3% 3.29 
Total 66,300 33,500 33,600 35,400 42,600 47,300 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.09 
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Appendix 3: Sudan's Exports 
Exports by product and destination, 190& 1913 
Source: Stone, Sudan Economic Development (1955) 
LE 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 
Gum Egypt 44,000 27,300 53,500 76,100 101,500 21,800 25.1% 13.6% 24.6% 17.5% 16.8% 5.9% 
France 45,100 47,000 41,900 115,500 91,000 88,300 25.8% 23.4% 19.2% 26.5% 15.1% 23.8% 
Great Britain 20,000 34,000 26,400 69,300 125,200 68,300 11.4% 16.9% 12.1% 15.9% 20.7% 18.4% 
Germany 15,900 33,600 35,900 80,600 109,700 67,100 9.1% 16.7% 16.5% 18.5% 18.2% 18.1% 
USA 15,100 24,500 25,700 35,100 85,000 50,800 8.6% 12.2% 11.8% 8.1% 14.1% 13.7% 
Belgium 11,300 12,500 13,100 23,000 35,300 26,800 6.5% 6.2% 6.0% 5.3% 5.8% 7.2% 
Austria 14,100 9,500 7,800 13,200 19,800 13,700 8.1% 4.7% 3.6% 3.0% 3.3% 3.7% 
Italy 4,300 4,300 4,300 7,400 13,600 10,400 2.5% 2.1% 2.0% 1.7% 2.3% 2.8% 
Others 5,200 8,500 9,300 15,400 22,400 24,300 3.0% 4.2% 4.3% 3.5% 3.7% 6.5% 
Total 175,000 201,200 217,900 435,600 603,500 371,500 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Cotton Egypt 78,100 55,000 223,800 187,800 97,100 100,000 96.9% 973% 99.6% 79.6% 69.8% 65.6% 
Great Britain 0 200 100 40,900 39,600 50,900 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 17.3% 28.4% 33.4% 
Others 2,500 1,100 800 7,100 2,500 1,600 3.1% 2.0% 0.4% 3.0% 1.8% 1.0% 
Total 80,600 56,300 224,700 235,800 139,200 152,500 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Dura Egypt 49,600 128,200 72,600 72,800 5,300 10,900 85.2% 93.9% 61.5% 84.0% 85.5% 50.2% 
Eritrea 7,500 3,300 10,500 2,300 800 10,800 12.9% 2.4% 8.9% 2.7% 12.9% 49.8% 
India Aden 600 2,700 15,200 800 0 0 1.0% 2.0% 12.9% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Great Britain 0 0 7,400 1,700 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Others 500 2,400 12,400 9,100 100 0 0.9% 1.8% 10.5% 10.5% 1.6% 0.0% 
Total 58,200 136,600 118,100 86,700 6,200 21,700 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
cattle Egypt 1,600 1,400 47,400 129,400 107,500 73,300 100.0% 100.0% 99.8% 100.0% 99.9% 98.1% 
Others 0 0 100 0 100 1,400 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 1.9% 
Total 1,600 1,400 47,500 129,400 107,600 74,700 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
$ ep and Goats Egypt 32,000 39,000 61,900 86,200 110,200 95,700 993% 99.0% 98.4% 99.5% 99.5% 98.6% 
Others 100 400 1,000 400 600 1,400 0.3% 1.0% 1.6% 0.5% 0.5% 1.4% 
Total 32,100 39,400 62,900 86,600 110,800 97,100 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
No Great Britain 29,000 40,200 54,300 66,200 75,700 85,100 73.0% 89.1% 89.0% 89.6% 80.1% 75.2% 
USA 0 0 0 0 16,300 24,700 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 17.2% 21.8% 
Egypt 8,200 4,300 2,300 800 200 400 20.7% 9.5% 3.8% 1.1% 0.2% 0.4% 
Others 2,500 600 4,400 6,900 2,300 3,000 6.3% 1.3% 7.2% 9.3% 2.4% 2.7% 
Total 39,700 45,100 61,000 73,900 94,500 113,200 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Hides and Skin Great Britain 3,100 3,000 5,200 9,600 10,500 14,200 48.4% 38.5% 24.1% 24.4% 23.8% 25.9% 
France 1,000 200 2,100 3,600 3,600 10,700 15.6% 2.6% 9.7% 9.1% 8.2% 19.5% 
USA 0 2,300 6,300 12,900 15,400 9,600 0.0% 29.5% 29.2% 32.7% 34.9% 17.5% 
Austria 600 800 1,200 3,400 900 8,100 9.4% 10.3% 5.6% 8.6% 2.0% 14.8% 
Germany 0 0 900 3,700 6,800 2,100 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 9.4% 15.4% 3.8% 
Egypt 1,100 1,100 4,200 2,900 4,800 6,100 17.2% 14.1% 19.4% 7.4% 10.9% 11.1% 
Others 600 400 1,700 3,300 2,100 4,000 9.4% 5.1% 7.9% 8.4% 4.8% 7.3% 
Total 6,400 7,800 21,600 39,400 44,100 54,800 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sesame Egypt 24,000 45,900 46,900 55,900 68,100 85,500 95.6% 727% 71.1% 78.1% 76.4% 81.5% 
France 0 6,500 11,100 10,400 14,900 7,300 0.0% 10.3% 16.8% 14.5% 16.7% 7.0% 
Austria 200 8,200 5,500 2,300 1,000 200 0.8% 13.0% 8.3% 3.2% 1.1% 0.2% 
Others 900 2,500 2,500 3,000 5,100 11,900 3.6% 4.0% 3.8% 4.2% 5.7% 11.3% 
Tot 25,100 63,100 66,000 71,600 89,100 104,900 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.096 
Dates Egypt 33,100 35,300 34,400 42,600 35,600 31,000 99.7% 100.0% 99.7% 99.5% 100.0% 99.4% 
Others 100 0 100 200 0 200 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.5% 0.0% 0.6% 
Total 33,200 35,300 34,500 42,800 35,600 31,200 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.096 100.09b 100.0% 
Ostrich Feathers Egypt 4,800 3,800 22,900 14,200 6,300 5,500 82.8% 88.4% 90.5% 97.3% 98.4% 100.0% 
Others 1,000 500 2,400 400 100 0 17.2% 11.6% 9.5% 2.7% 1.6% 0.0% 
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Arthur Gaitskell, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and the 
end of the Gezira Concession 
The treatment of evidence from Arthur Gaitskell is problematical. No only was he the 
Manager of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate's operation in Sudan and the first Chairman 
of the Gezira Board, but he also authored the only systematic study of the Gezira 
Scheme to explore the role of the Syndicate alongside the development of the Scheme. ' 
His papers in the Sudan Archive at Durham University are a major source for this thesis. 
-However, they also include a series of memos, talks, discussions and reports authored by 
Gaitskell himself and reflect his interpretation of the future direction of the Syndicate, 
the Gezira Scheme and Sudan as a whole in the period to 1950. For example, in April 
1943, before the government decided not to renew the Syndicate's concession in 1944, 
Gaitskell argued in a letter to Harold Wooding that `it would not be in the interest of our 
company to extend its contract beyond 1950. ' The main thrust of his argument was the 
risk of political attack as a result of doing too well in business terms. ' 'T'his view was 
consistent with ideas that Gaitskell held for some time previously, and it is not at all clear 
that Gaitskell was entirely the Syndicate's man, despite being a prominent employee. As 
early as 1928 Gaitskell criticised the terms of tenancy for creating `a rich idle class, largely 
uneducated and lacking in responsibility and self control upon whom a veneer of western 
civilisation will annually increase, an ideal centre for future political trouble. ' Such ideas 
were not uncommon at the time and though it is clear that over time Gaitskell become 
less hostile to the tenants, the ramifications increased political rights for Sudanese is a 
1 Gaitskell, Gezira 
2 SAD 418/8/1 Arthur Gaitskell to Harold Wooding, 23rd April 1943 
3 SAD 418/3/3-9 Memorandum by A. Gaitskell, 14th March 1928 
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theme to which Gaitskell returned again and again. In 1938 he commented that `a small 
intelligentsia is beginning to voice the germ of public opinion', a reaction to `Sudan for 
the Sudanese' and associated with Arab Nationalism For Gaitskell nationalist politics of 
the late 1930s demanded `a more awakened interest in the future evolution of the 
Scheme than has been required so far. '4 These writings indicate a man who was not 
entirely happy with the organisation of the Gezira Scheme and the role of the Syndicate 
within it. Specifically, Gaitskell seems to have spent a considerable amount of time in late 
1930s arguing for a form of political and organizational devolution within the Gezira, 
even going so far in one letter to apologize to Alexander MacIntyre for being `so verbose 
and apparently obstinate in again bringing up this subject .5 
Though there is a danger of evaluating Gaitskell from a retrospective position to 
have been largely correct (and therefore influential), his opinions were, in point of fact, 
prescient. Despite riding some hobbyhorses in terms of specific policy Gaitskell was 
correct in his judgement, made in 1938, that the `Syndicate's present concession maybe 
terminated in 1944 and at any rate ceases in 1950'; his argument with that in mind was 
that `long before that date some plan of devolution must be stated and the sooner and 
more gradual the process the better the prospect of success. " This view informed 
Gaitskell's later advice to the Syndicate's director's in London, though it is impossible to 
say how influential it was. Referring to one of the many reports written by himself 
relating to the future of the whole of Sudan, Gaitskell explained that the Syndicate would 
either be excluded or coerced to the new regimen: 
4 SAD 418/6/1 A. Gaitskell, 'A Consideration of the General Trend of the Gezira Scheme and its effect 
on our future interests here', 25th August 1938 
s SAD 418/6/11 Arthur Gaitskell to Alexander MacIntyre, 25th August 1938; SAD 418/6/13-35 A. G. 
Gaitskell, 'Sudan Plantations Syndicate: a proposal for the future development of the Gezira Scheme', 
(likely September 1938) 
6 SAD 418/6/13-35 A. Gaitskell, 'Sudan Plantations Syndicate: a proposal for the future development of 
the Gezira Scheme', (likelySeptember 1938) 
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If the Company's contract is to be renewed beyond 1950, it is extremely important 
for our own reputation in this country that these matters should be discussed and 
decided without delay. If the Company's contract is not to be renewed beyond 
[1950], the question is only of indirect concern to the country and the staff here. It 
is clear that some changes along the lines written down in this note will be 
introduced before long. There is no dispute about that. at we are uncertain 
about is what part we are supposed to play... '. ' 
Gaitskell's argument here constitutes one possible explanation for the Sudan 
Government's decision not to renew the Syndicate's concession, namely that the needs 
of development were deemed incompatible with those of private capital and enterprise. 
The Gezira Scheme was, for Gaitskell, `a rare opportunity of carrying into practical effect 
those necessary changes in Imperial policy which are bound to be demanded by world 
opinion foreshadowed in the Atlantic Charter. ' His desire to see the Gezria Scheme pass 
from private hands to some form of public control was clear, often using the phrase `co- 
operative socialism' to describe the re-ordering of the Scheme, and if nothing else, these 
observations indicate that in the latter years of the Syndicate's tenure of the Gezira 
Scheme it (the Scheme) was managed by a man whose instincts were for a model of 
imperial governance rooted very much in the notions of trusteeship popular at the time? 
In this, Gaitslcell shared many fundamental values with the Sudan Government officials 
of the same period; in short, that the needs of business were to be suborned to the needs 
of the Sudan Government acting, as they saw it, in the best and progressive interests of 
7 SAD 418/8/1 Arthur Gaitskell to Harold Wooding, 23' April 1943 
s SAD 418/8/2 `Future of the Gezira Scheme' by A. Gaitskell (Apra 1943). Gaitskell made reference to 
the Atlantic Charter both before and after the decision not to renew the Syndicate's concession. See also 
SAD 418/5/109-126 A. Gaitskell, 'The Future of the Gezira Scheme' (1948) and SAD 417/8/1-20 A. G. 
Gaitskell, 'Gezira Scheme: Memorandum on some Limitations at Present Affecting Development' (1948) 
9 SAD 418/5/46-58 'The Gezira Scheme: a talk given at the Sudan Cultural Centre on February 17th 1943 
by A. Gaitskell'; the phrase is also used in SAD 408/2/11-13 'A Broadcast on the Gezira Scheme from 
Omdurman Station, 18th January 1943' 
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the Sudanese. In this context it is little surprise that Gaitskell became Chairman of the 
Gezira Board as it took over from the Syndicate in 1950. 
Gaitskell's beliefs can be summarised by looking at both what he believed should 
be the policy in Sudan, and what should not be the policy in Sudan. In his `A 
consideration of the general Political Trend of the Gezira Scheme and its Effect on our 
future interests here' from 1938 Gaitskell identified three possible future directions for 
the Gezira Scheme. The first was direct control by the British. The second was direct 
`native' control, of a `tribal or pseudo-tribal character' where the British adopted a purely 
advisory role. The third was the gradual reduction of British influence alongside the 
introduction of western democratic and educational `influences'. It is clear that Gaitskell 
personally favoured the latter policy direction - he was critical of the first `conservative' 
direction claiming also that `it represents the Syndicate's real attitude', a surprisingly 
critical observation for an employee to make in a circular for the Board of Directors. 
Interestingly, Gaitskell also claimed that the Sudan Political Service favoured `native' 
control and that this was at odds with both the Governor-General and the general 
direction of the British Government in London. " 
10 SAD 418/6/2-3 AG Gaitskell, 'A Consideration of the General Trend of the Gezira Scheme and its 
effect on our future interests here', 25th August 1938 
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Appendix 5 
The Sudan Government Debt 
`[IJhe magnitude of any borrowings from abroad will depend on the lender's 
assessment of the Sudan's capacity to eventually repay the loans ... [it is] the 
repayment of loans strictly in accordance with the loan agreements which has 
encouraged the International Bank and other foreign lenders to lend such 
considerable sums of money for the Managil Extension, the Roseires Dam, the 
expansion of Railways, etc. ' 
- Sir John Carmichael, November 19611 
The first debt to be issued was £3,500,000 M1% guaranteed bonds issued at X95 10/- bythe 
Bank of England in October 1919! This stock formed part of the six million guaranteed by 
the Sudan Loan Act 1919. The Prospectus for the issue stated that the bonds would be 
redeemable at 105% as a result of the establishment of a special sinking fund `to provide for 
the redemption of the whole of the bonds not later than 1" November 1959. ' Repayments 
were to begin in 1929. The number of people allotted bonds in the subscription was 2,055, 
the largest single applicant having asked for L 350,000, to which only £ 150,200 was allotted. 
The total amount applied for was £6,667,500, indicating that the appetite for Sudan 
Government stock in the market was significant, auguring well for the potential popularity of 
1 SAD 448/12/2-4'"The Sudan Budget" -A talk given by Sir John Carmichael to the Anglo-Sudanese 
Association on Satwday25th November 1961' 
2 GHL MS 18000/198B 1083, Sudan Government Loan Stock Listing File, 4th October 1919, 'Application for 
Listing' placed by Mullen Marshall and Co, 14th October 1919 
3 GHL MS 18000/198B 1083, Sudan Government Loan Stock Listing File, 4th October 1919, Trospectus for 
Sudan Government £5½% Guaranteed Bonds' 
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any future issue 4 An application to undertake a subscription of the remaining £3,500,000 
Sudan Government guaranteed loan stock under the 1919 Loan Act was made at the end of 
1920 5A prospectus offering £2,880,000 at 511% interest guaranteed to be issued at £92 
with £5 paid was published by Mullens and Co, the Bank of England's brokers, on 26th 
February 1921, the bonds to rank equally with the previously issued stock. 6 
A further £3,250,000 of 414% interest stock was issued in February 1923 at X93% 
under the `Sudan Government Loan Ordinance 1922', which was used by the Sudan 
Government to proclaim the stock after the `Trade Facilities and Loans Guarantee Act 1922' 
had given a Treasury guarantee for principal and interest to any bonds issued. 
' The Sudan 
Loan Ordinance itself invested the Governor General with the ability to borrow up to seven 
million pounds, though it was also established by supplement that if the Treasury had to pay 
for the loan on default, the Sudan Government would be liable for the principal and interest. 
As a safeguard against this the trustees of the sinking funds established to repay the loan 
were to include the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury alongside a nominee of the High 
Commission in Cairo and a nominee of the British Foreign Secretary. ' A further £513,000 
4 GHL MS 18000 18000/199b 1308, Sudan Government Loan Stock Listing File, 28th November 1919, 
'Application for Listing'; 'Legal Oath sworn by Ernest Musgrave Harvey, Chief Cashier of the Bank of 
England'. IV, November 1919 
s GHL MS 18000/211B 1828 Sudan Government Loan Stock Listing File, 30th December 1920 
6 GHL MS 18000/212B 140 Sudan Government Loan Stock Listing File, 1' March 1921 
r GHL MS 18000/ 221B 22, Sudan Government Loan Stock Listing File, 12th January 1923, 'Prospectus: Sudan 
Government £4S% Guaranteed Stock, 1939-1973, GHL MS 18000/ 222B 180, Sudan Government Loan 
Stock Listing File, 18th February 1923, 'Application for Listing' issued by Mullens and Co, 26th February 1923; 
'Trade Facilities and Loans Guarantee Act, 1922, Ch. 4 of which states: 'An Act to amend section of the Trade 
Facilities Act, 1921, and the Overseas Trade Acts, 1920 and 1921, and to authorize the Treasury to guarantee 
certain loans to be raised by the Government of the Federal Republic of Austria and the Government of the 
Soudan respectively. ' 
8 GHL MS 18000/ 222B 180, 'The Sudan Government Loan Ordinance 1922; 'The Sudan Government Loan 
(Supplements' Ordinance 1922' 
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under this ordinance was issued between October 1923 and May 1924 at £951/ 9 This debt 
was known as the Sudan Government 4'h% Guaranteed Stock, 1939/73. 
The third and final loan raised by the Sudan Government occurred in late 1924, 
when £ 1,500,000 was issued at X86 with a four per cent guarantee. This was authorized by 
the Sudan Loan Ordinance of 1922 and the Trade Facilities and Loan Guarantee Act 1922, 
and a new piece of legislation, the Trade Facilities Act 1924.10 This debt was known as the 
`Sudan Government 4% Guaranteed Stock, 1974.11 The amount cumulatively applied for by 
applicants was £13,583,100, again indicating that the market for Sudan Government debt 
(albeit as a proxy for British Government debt) remained buoyant. 
Thus by 1924, the total amount of Treasury guaranteed debt issued on behalf of the 
Sudan Government was £11,393,000, though additional borrowing for interest payments in 
the early years of the Gezira Scheme before cotton production began caused this figure to 
rise to £ 11,643,400, which is the level it stood at in 1930, the first year when repayment of 
the principal began to reduce the overall burden of debt. The first repayments began in 1929 
for the 1939-59 stock, the 1939-73 stock began to be repaid in 1939, while the 1974 stock 
began to be repaid only in 1951 (see Table for details). By 1939 the outstanding debt of the 
1939-59 stock stood at £5,220,900. In June of that year a £2,000,000 loan at 31A% was 
issued `guaranteed as to interest, though not as to principal' by the Treasury to be used along 
with the sinking funds to repay the entire outstanding principal of the 1939-59 stock. " This 
reduced both the outstanding principal to just £2,000,000 and considerably reduced the 
9 GHL MS 18000/ 230B 390, Sudan Government Loan Stock Listing File, 16th May 1924, Letter from Mullen 
and Co to the London Stock Exchange, 16th May 1924 
10 GHL MS 18000/ 235B 1103, Sudan Government Loan Stock Listing File, 11th December 1924, 'Application 
for Listing' 
11 GHL MS 18000/233B 907, Sudan Government Loan Stock Listing File, 10th November 1924, 'Prospectus: 
Sudan Government £4% Guaranteed Stock, 1974' 
12 The Statist, 22nd June 1939, p. 112; Stock Exchange Yearbook, 1945, (Thomas Skinner, London, 1945), p. 11 
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interest payments on the debt. In the mid 1930s the Sudan Government took advantage of 
the low interest rates of the to refinance the loans at lower rates. '3 
Though no data has been forthcoming with regard to repayment during the Second 
World War period, it is evident from both the graph and table below that there was no 
interference in the repayment of the Sudan Government debt caused by the war. By the end 
of the war in 1945 the levels of debt stood at £6,490,700" As Sudan prepared for 
decolonization, these outstanding amounts were gradually paid down: the 3'/a% 1954-59 
stock was finally repaid on the 1" May 1959, the 4'A% 1939-73 stock on the 1°` January 1973, 
while the 1974 stock on was eventually fully repaid on the 10' November 197315 By the 
time the Sudan Plantations Syndicate's concession came to an end in 1950, the level of 
overall debt stood at slightly under half the 1930 level on forty-nine per cent or £5,750,300; 
by independence in 1956 this had fallen further to only thirty-seven per cent of the 1930 
level or£4,326,400.16 It is clear that neither wartime, decolonization nor the civil conflicts in 
Sudan during the 1960s and 1970s interfered with the successful repayment of the 
outstanding debts. This is evidence that the financing for the Gezira scheme - for which the 
Sudan Government debt provided the vast bulk - was basically sound. The fact that such a 
large debt was successfully repaid should be considered a considerable achievement. 
13 FO 141/497/4 Dispatch re Gezira Irrigation Scheme, 13thDecember 1934; FO 141/482/7 Dispatch re 
Finances Sudan, 28th May 1934 
14 Stock Exchange Yearbook, 1945 (London, 194 5), p. 11 
is tendon Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, 1960 (London, 1960), 7-8; London Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, 1973 
(London, 1973), p. 9; London Stock Exchange Ojicial Yearbook, 1974 (London, 1974), p. 9 
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Sudan Government Treasury Guaranteed Loan Debt, 1930.1973 
Source: London Stak Excbange OJ al Yeardoak, various }ears 
Stock, 1954-9 [re-financed Sudan I Guaranteed Stock, 1974, £I Guaranteed Stock, 1939-73, 


























































































































































Redeemd at par It January 1973 
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Public Debt, various African colonies, 1928-1938 (£ m) 
Source: Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Development, p. 174; London Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, 
various years (see above) 
Gold 
Sudan Kenya Uganda Tanganyika Nyasaland Coast Nigeria 
1928 11.6 13.5 1.1 5.2 0.8 11.8 23.6 
1929 11.6 133 1.1 5.2 0.8 11.8 23.6 
1930 11.6 16.9 1.1 52 0.9 13.0 28.4 
1931 11.4 16.9 1.1 8.2 1.1 13.0 28.4 
1932 11.2 16.9 2.0 8.2 3.2 13.0 27.8 
1933 11.1 17.2 2.2 8.2 33 13.0 27.8 
1934 11.0 17.2 2.2 8.2 5.0 11.9 28.0 
1935 10.9 17.2 2.2 8.2 5.1 11.4 28.0 
1936 10.8 17.6 2.2 8.2 5.2 11.4 24.8 
1937 10.6 17.6 2.2 8.2 5.3 11.4 24.8 
1938 10.5 17.6 2.2 8.2 5.4 11.4 24.8 
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Appendix 6 
Import and Export Data, 1901-1956 
326 
Sudan Imports, 1901-1955 (£ E) 
Source: see note on ' rt and export data 
Imports (public Imports (Govt) Total Imports 
1901 - - 547,211 
1902 744,677 
1903 - - 747,995 
1904 - - 1,091,406 
1905 - - 1,263,000 
1906 - - 1,132,000 
1907 - - 1,604,137 
1908 - - 1,892,798 
1909 843,796 489,453 1,333,249 
1910 - - 1,931,426 
1911 - - 1,709,193 
1912 1,471,039 496,390 1,967,429 
1913 1,605,300 504,176 2,109,476 
1914 1,400,333 491,161 1,891,494 
1915 1,359,364 344,886 1,704,250 
1916 1,905,561 755,907 2,661,468 
1917 2,195,777 906,340 3,102,117 
1918 3,036,403 988,179 4,024,582 
1919 3,000,947 1,804,798 4,805,745 
1920 3,988,210 3,018,655 7,006,865 
1921 3,119,799 2,686,271 5,806,070 
1922 2,556,355 1,696,535 4,252,890 
1923 2,974,225 1,694,779 4,669,004 
1924 3,654,700 1,820,210 5,474,910 
1925 3,827,358 1,610,369 5,437,727 
1926 3,778,884 1,795,517 5,574,401 
1927 3,835,126 2,320,188 6,155,314 
1928 4,416,946 2,046,260 6,463,206 
1929 4,769,614 2,086,500 6,856,114 
1930 4,381,271 1,796,139 6,177,410 
1931 2,550,523 1,210,490 3,761,013 
1932 2,505,318 549,326 3,054,644 
1933 2,512,452 648,167 3,160,619 
1934 3,071,523 873,626 3,945,149 
1935 3,751,211 1,618,658 5,369,869 
1936 3,904,103 1,470,956 5,375,059 
1937 4,771,452 1,511,624 6,283,076 
1938 4,158,098 2,125,299 6,283,397 
1939 3,776,529 2,158,960 5,935,489 
1940 3,697,233 1,936,656 5,663,889 
1941 5,468,915 2,591,934 8,060,849 
1942 6,161,049 1,718,646 7,879,695 
1943 7,311,463 1,889,749 9,201,212 
1944 7,250,297 2,697,635 9,947,932 
1945 7,885,953 2,132,660 10,018,613 
1946 9,664,762 1,764,781 11,429,543 
1947 13,500,290 2,706,839 16,207,129 
1948 14,607,109 7,546,148 22,153,257 
1949 17,847,143 6,022,426 23,869,569 
1950 19,858,333 7,408,532 27,266,865 
1951 32,719,793 9,246,298 41,966,091 
1952 46,263,866 15,431,850 61,695,716 
1953 36,159,016 14,616,854 50,775,870 
1954 37,957,157 10,532,403 48,489,560 
1955 38,594,368 10,208,266 48,802,634 
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Sudan Expott4,1901-1955 (£ E) 
Source: see note on ' rt and export data 
Exports Re-exports Tot Exports 
1901 306,099 - 306,099 
1902 395,321 - 395,321 
1903 381,856 - 381,856 
1904 388,805 - 388,805 
1905 - - 309,000 
1906 264,096 264,096 
1907 449,329 40,542 489,871 
1908 488,677 27,261 515,938 
1909 673,902 
1910 - - 977,621 
1911 1,202,840 59,298 1,262,138 
1912 1,373,119 92,657 1,465,776 
1913 1,185,186 93,655 1,278,841 
1914 1,020,260 87,986 1,108,246 
1915 1,577,991 130,315 1,708,306 
1916 2,288,403 277,112 2,565,515 
1917 3,490,565 238,616 3,729,181 
1918 3,923,771 286,613 4,210,384 
1919 2,740,759 288,810 3,029,569 
1920 4,712,652 363,319 5,075,971 
1921 2,057,230 261,303 2,318,533 
1922 1,993,436 305,334 2,298,770 
1923 2,562,091 196,334 2,758,425 
1924 3,541,866 288,305 3,830,171 
1925 3,801,348 367,016 4,168,364 
1926 4,876,236 314,269 5,190,505 
1927 4,956,090 273,329 5,229,419 
1928 5,634,769 312,257 5,947,026 
1929 6,526,112 283,010 6,809,122 
1930 4,953,282 292,731 5,246,013 
1931 1,733,795 281,802 2,015,597 
1932 3,797,528 363,423 4,160,951 
1933 2,605,725 280,786 2,886,511 
1934 3,848,679 267,977 4,116,656 
1935 4,567,279 435,217 5,002,496 
1936 5,581,023 834,369 6,415,392 
1937 8,130,453 585,043 8,715,496 
1938 5,490,362 479,372 5,969,734 
1939 5,367,835 304,636 5,367,835 
1940 5,022,978 421,819 5,444,797 
1941 8,547,327 347,830 8,895,157 
1942 7,150,779 321,410 7,472,189 
1943 6,016,920 590,718 6,607,638 
1944 8,638,695 630,301 9,268,996 
1945 10,555,878 538,702 11,094,580 
1946 9,267,144 773,267 10,040,411 
1947 14,865,848 529,833 15,395,681 
1948 23,250,039 628,502 23,878,541 
1949 26,435,396 1,001,081 27,436,477 
1950 32,081,533 1,031,320 33,112,853 
1951 61,037,707 1,739,822 62,777,529 
1952 41,164,872 1,606,230 42,771,102 
1953 43,037,785 1,380,969 44,418,754 
1954 38,901,743 1,493,417 40,395,160 
1955 48,836,083 1,672,949 50,509,032 
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Note on import and export data 
Consistent runs of data have been preferred to piecemeal data collection where possible. 
The indication of "no value" means that no data was available. `Public imports' is the 
Sudan Government's own definition of non-governmental imports. Public and 
Government imports have been added together to form `Total Imports' where possible, 
representing the greatest import value available from the data for that year. Government 
Export and Re-export figures have been added together to form `Total exports', 
representing the greatest export value for that year. The sources for the data were as 
follows. 
1901-1904 taken from GGR 1904,226-236. 
1912-1931 taken from CIB Annual Report, 1931-32, p. 116 
1932-1955 taken from Annual Foreign Trade Report, 1955, p. 2 
The remaining data were taken from 
GGR 1908, p. 83 
GGR 1909, p. 259 
GGR 1912, p. 40 
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Sudan: An International Comparison 
There is little question that post-colonial Sudan suffered from a similar experience of 
economic underdevelopment to much of the rest of Africa! But what of Sudan as a 
colony in comparison with other like colonies? Was Sudan's economic history 
comparably similar? To answer this relatively straightforward question two areas germane 
to wider debates relating to development and economic growth will be examined. Firstly, 
Sudan will be compared with other tropical colonies from the perspective of imports and 
exports as proxy measures of economic growth. ' Second, the levels of government 
revenue and expenditure in comparative terms will be examined. 
The tables below indicate that the levels of Sudan's imports and exports were 
similar to those of other colonies during the colonial period. Exports, as commented 
previously, are especially useful as a proxy for gauging economic performance. Sudan's 
export performance was at times very similar to both that of Kenya and Uganda 
(recorded together) and also the Gold Coast (Ghana). All of the tropical colonies 
economies moved together in response to changing circumstances in the global 
economy. This reveals that Sudan's experience of the depression, for example, was no 
more severe that that of some of the other tropical colonies. For example, the value of 
Nigeria's exports fell from c. £9 million in 1929 to just c. £4.5 million in 1931. Similarly, 
1 F. Cooper, Africa Since 1940 - The past of the present, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002), 
Chapter 5, 'Development and Disappointment: social and economic change in an unequal world, 1945- 
2000', 91-133 
2 To a certain extent the data to answer this question has been available for some time, albeit that Sudan 
has not been specifically commented on. See J. Forbes Munro, Africa and the International Econonry 1800- 
1960, (jM Dent and Son, London, 1976), 'Appendix I: Total Foreign Trade of Sub-Saharan Africa - 
Selected Years (Cmillion)', 217-219. Though the data given by Forbes Munro is extensive, the figures 
included appear not to be adjusted for inflation which means that the estimates for growth given in 
'Appendix II: Percentage Change in Foreign Trade by Value Between Selected Years' may be unreliable. 
See: 220-222 
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between 1928 and 1934 the Gold Coast's exports either remained static or fell every year 
(that is, for seven years), whereas Sudan's never declined for more than two years in 


















































































































This is not to say that Sudan's experience of the depression was anything other than 
brutal; rather it is to say that in terms of export performance, Sudan experienced a 
common lot. This is explained further by looking at estimates of comparative growth 
rates. ' First of all, the figures for the later part of the period for the Gold Coast are 
skewed by the explosive growth in Gold Coast exports from 1948 caused by a boom in 
cocoa prices. ' However, by looking at the period 1910-1947 as a whole we note that the 
change in Sudan's export levels were on average approximately twice that of all of the 
other colonies listed; this holds true even when an average of the previous three years is 
used to calculate growth for any given year. 
Total and Mean Average Annual Exports (1901 prices), 1909-1947 
Source: see note 
Total 
Mean annual Exports, Exports, exports, 
exports 1909 1947 1909-1947 
Kenya and Uganda £2,995,205 £6,196,596 £6,167,799 £116,813,010 
Nigeria £6,100,314 £4,143,986 £11,004,444 £237,912,240 
Sierra Leone £880,310 £975,114 £ 1,108,404 £34,332,110 
Gambia £390,762 £475,132 £328,482 £15,239,730 
Gold Coast £3,983,984 £2,640,064 £4,926,042 £ 155,375,380 
Sudan £2,262,951 £669,859 £4,572,517 £88,255,070 
A clue as to why this might be can be seen in the table above. While reinforcing the sense 
that Sudan was a smaller economy than the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Kenya/Uganda 
between 1909-1947, the table also indicates that in terms of exports Sudan started well 
behind those states but by 1947 had drawn almost level with Gold Coast and closed the 
gap with the other larger economies. Moreover, despite starting from well behind in 1909 
Sudan had leapt ahead of Sierra Leone by 1947 and, unsurprisingly, stayed ahead of 
Gambia. In fact close inspection of the export graph (above) reveals that Sudan's exports 
3 The period 1910-1947 is adopted because the data for Kenya and Uganda as reported jointly ceases after 
1947 and these dates avoid the rapid expansion Gold Coast exports also after 1947. This is more clearly 
evident in the export data. 
4 See RL. Tignor, W. Arthur Lewis and the Birth of Development Economics, (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton and Word, 2006), 115-119 
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were comparatively robust despite the problems of the inter-war years. What we can also 
comment is that in such an unstable market environment a proportion of the increases 
should be attributed to volatility and probably do not indicate substantial economic 
growth (this goes for all data, not just that for Sudan). Indeed, the three year average 
provides a more general indication of the export levels from which to calibrate an 
increase in exports levels and this suggests that while Nigeria might have enjoyed an 
enhanced growth rate in comparative terms, Gambia went backwards finishing 1947 with 
lower real terms exports than in 1909. While both Kenya/Uganda and Sierra Leone start 
and finish the period 1909-1947 with similar real-terms export levels, the real story for 
them is with the annual average. For Kenya/Uganda the period ended as it began with 
circa £6.1 million in exports, but the annual average through the period was just circa £3 
million: Kenya-Uganda recovered somewhat. However, for Sierra Leone exports in 1909 
were only marginally higher than the yearly average for the whole period which was only 
marginally less than exports in 1947, all observations in real terms being circa £1 million 
per annum. By this measure the economy of Sierra Leone did not grow very much at all 
in this period. In comparison Sudan appears a relative success story with real terms 
exports rising from less than £1 million in 1909 to circa X4.5 million by 1947. This is 
reinforced by looking at average export levels for decades. 
Average annual export levels for decades, 1909-1918,1938-1947 and 1946-1955 
(£ 000s at 1901 prices) with estimates of annual growth rates 
Source: see note 
Kenya 
and Sierra Gold 
Uganda Nigeria Leone Gambia Sudan Coast 
1909-1918 1,745 5,240 1,144 620 1,400 3,788 
1938-1947 4,283 5,995 923 149 3,170 3,162 
1909-1947 3.73% 0.37% -0.49% -1.95% 3.24% -0.42% 
1946-1955 22,657 1,927 596 8,428 15,5873 
1909-1955 7.07% 1.46% -0.08% 10.68% 85.43% 
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Again, with the exception of the explosive growth in the Gold Coast's exports after 1947, 
Sudan's export growth compares favourably with that of all the other states for all dates. 
The period from 1945 onwards was marked by a rapid increase in the value of exports 
connected to rising commodities prices, so the period 1938-1947 is a better comparator 
to estimate general export growth during the colonial period. This leads to the conclusion 
that economic growth in the first half of the 20th Century was modest throughout the 
tropical colonies, with Sudan achieving a comparatively respectable growth rate of 3.24%; 
only Kenya/Uganda also enjoyed positive growth in real terms between 1909-1947. For 
Sudan to have the export performance enjoyed on average in the decade 1946-1955 the 
annual average export level for Sudan in the decade 1909-1918 would have had to 
increase by 10.68% in each and every year between 1909 and 1955, when in fact much of 
the growth occurred after 1945. Thus 3.24% is a more reliable estimate of the basic rate 
of export growth during the colonial period. Overall, these observations reinforce that in 
comparison Sudan was decidedly average in terms of the absolute levels of export 
performance - Sudan was a mid-sized exporter in comparison with other topical colonies 
- but exports grew comparatively strongly between 1909 and 1947/1955. 
However, it is also clear from the data that Sudan was affected by the conditions 
in the global economy in much the same way as the other topical colonies with cash-crop 
economies. Below is a graph which depicts the percentage change in export levels on the 
mean average of the previous three years of exports. What it shows is that there is a 
fundamental relationship connecting the movement of export levels among the tropical 
colonies; self-evidently the graph shows a high degree of co-variation, especially from 
circa 1920 onwards. 
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Exports percentage change on previous three years, 1912-1947 















Sudan Government Revenue and Expenditure; Sudan Exports, 1909-1955 
(£ 000s at 1901 levels) 
Source: see note 
Revenue -0- Expenditure A Exports 
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What the table above demonstrates is the close relationship between export levels anal 
Government revenue and expenditure. This is expected in a colony whose economy was 
dominated by one cash-crop. The huge increase in exports, revenue and expenditure 
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after 1945 was generated by the huge increases in the prices of commodities after the 
war. This generated substantial surpluses for the Sudan Government, as can be seen in 
the graph where expenditure lagged behind revenue from 1947. This enabled revenue to 
continue to rise in the run-up to independence in 1956 even as the value of exports fell 
from 1952. Was Sudan typical in this experience? 
Government Revenue, various tropical colonies, 1899-1955 (L 000s at 1901 prices) 
Source: see note 
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Government Revenue, various tropical colonies, 1919-1939 (£ 000s at 1901 prices) 











Once again, the graphs above show that between 1909 and 1955 Sudan was typical of the 
other tropical colonies in terms of government revenue. First of all, Irom the grapple 
covering 1909-1955, we can see that the other colonies experienced a similar burst in 
revenue after 1945, alike to Sudan, linked to the increase in commodity prices. Moreover 
the graph also reveals that Sudan's revenue was remarkably similar to the other tropical 
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colonies (bar Sierra Leone which fared poorll both in trajectory over the whole period, 
but also in absolute levels which were generally similar. Turning specifically to the 
important and economically fateful inter-war years the graph reveals the similarity of 
Sudan's experience to the other tropical colonies. Sudan's governmental income was in 
excess of the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone's for much of the period and held up 
favourably in comparison through the difficult years of the depression. The same pattern 
can be seen for expenditure, both in the long run (1899-1955) and during the inter-war 
period. 
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Government Expenditure various tropical colonies, 1899-1955 
(L 000s at 1901 prices) 
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In conclusion Sudan was both typical in terms of the absolute levels of exports, imports, 
government revenue and expenditure and the effects of the changes in the global 
economy in each of these. Where Sudan was different was in enjoying higher levels of 
export growth, both in the longer period 1909-1955, but also in the shorter period before 
the commodities boom, 1909-1947. 
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Note on sources: 
Import data are from Statistical Abstract for the British Empire in Each Year from 1899-1913, 
(I-MO, London, 1915), 35-36; Statistical Abstract of the Several British Oversea Dominions and 
Protectorates in each year f om 1909-1923, (1-MO, London, 1926), 35-36; Statistical Abstract 
for the British Empire for each of the ten years 1924-1933, (HMSO, London, 1935), p. 35; 
Statistical Abstract for the British Commonwealth for the years 1933-1939 and 1945-1947, 
(HMSO, London, 1950), p. 3; Statistical Abstract of the British Commonwealth for each of the ten 
years 1936-1945 (trade and Commerce Section), (HMSO, London, 1947), p. 5; and 
from B. R. 
Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania, 1750-2000, (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003), 524-534 
Export data are from Statistical Abstract of the Several British Oversea Dominions and 
Protectorates in each year from 1909-1923, (I1vISO, London, 1926), 49-50; Statistical Abstract 
for the British Empire for each of the ten years 1924-1933, (FIIvISO, London, 1935), p. 134; 
Statistical Abstract for the British Commonwealth for the years 1933-1939 and 1945-1947, 
(-JIVISO, London, 1950), p. 8; StatisticalAbstract of the British Commonwealth for each of the ten 
years 1936-1945 (Trade and Commerce Section), (HMSO, London, 1947), p. 5; and 
from B. R. 
Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania, 1750-2000, (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003), 524-534 
Government revenue and expenditure data for the tropical colonies is from B. R. 
Nfitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa, Aria and Oceania, 1750-2000, (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003), 887-888,890,892,895,897,910-911,914-915,918-920 
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All data in the tables above were adjusted to 1901 prices using the GDP deflator 
provided by L. FL Officer, `Five Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a UK Pound 
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Sudan Plantations Syndicate Papers 
Sunderland Papers 
Wingate Papers 
Barlow Rand Archive, Barlow Rand Corporation, Johannesburg, South Africa (BRA) 
Wernher, Beit and Co Papers 
National Archives, Kew, London 
Treasury Papers (I) 
Foreign Office Papers (FO) 
Inland Revenue Papers (IR) 
Board of Trade Papers (BT) 
Guildhall Library London (GHL) 
London Stock Exchange Listing Files 
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Newspaper articles 
`Nationalisation in the Sudan', The Economist, ApriWh, 1950,777-778 
`Sudan Plantations Disappointed', The Economist, September 2"d, 1944, p. 327 
`Sudan Plantations Syndicate: Continued Progress and Development', The Times, 15th 
November 1928, p. 25, Col. A 
Me World Overseas: Egypt and Sudan', The Economist, 11th August 1945,192-193 
`Sudan Finances: substantial surplus achieved in 1915 Budget', The Times, 4`h August 
1916, p. 12 
Published Reports and Annuals' 
Budget Note, 1931 (Sudan Government Finance Department, Khartoum, January 1931) 
Budget Note, 1933 (Sudan Government Finance Department, Khartoum, January 1933) 
Budget Note, 1935 (Sudan Government Finance Department, Khartoum, January 1935) 
port of the Finances Administration and Condition of Sudan are in some years divided internally 1 Iiie annual Re 
between the Consul General's Report (CGR) and the Governor General's Report (GGR). These 
abbreviations have been used which in conjunction with the year refer to the correction volume of the 
annual reports. The annual Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central Economic Board Director's Reports listed 
below are abbreviated in text as 'C[B, [year]'. 
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Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central Economic Board, Sudan Government: The Director's 
Annual ßeportfor 1914 (Al-Mokattam Printing Office, Cairo, 1915) 
Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central Economic Board, Sudan Government: The Dnrctor's 
Annual Report for 1915 (Al-Mokattam Printing Office, Cairo, 1916) 
Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central Economic Board, Sudan Government: The Director's 
Annual Report for 1916 (Al-Mokattam Printing Office, Cairo, 1917) 
Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central Economic Board, Sudan Government: The Director's 
Annual Report for 1918 (Al-Mokattam Printing Office, Cairo, 1919) 
Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central Economic Board, Sudan Government., The Director's 
Annual Report for 1919 (Al-Mokattam Printing Office, Cairo, 1920) 
Commerce and Intelligence Branch Central Economic Board, Sudan Goverment: The Director's 
Annual Report for 1920 (A1-Mokattam Printing Office, Cairo, 1921) 
Directory of Directors 1939 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1939 
Finance and Trade Statistics, 1926-38 (Sudan Government, Khartoum, 1939) 
London Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, 1960 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1960) 
London Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, 1973 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1973) 
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London Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, 1974 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1974) 
Parliamentary Bill; (220) 1913 R. 911 to authorise the Treasury to guarantee the Payment 
of Interest on a Loan to be raised by the Government of the Sudan 
ParliamentaryBill; (271) iii. 97 to amend the Schedule to the Government of the Soudan 
Loan Act, 1913. 
Post Office London Directory, 1911 (Kelly's Directories, London, 1910) 
Report of the Special Retrenchment Committee (Sudan Government, Khartoum, 1931) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Soudan in 1909 (F. Nimr and Co, 
Cairo, 1910) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Soudan in 1910 (F. Nunc and Co, 
Cairo, 1911) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Soudan in 1911 (Waterlow and Sons, 
London, 1912) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Soudan in 1912 (Waterlow and Sons, 
London, 1913) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Soudan in 1913 (Waterlow and Sons, 
London, 1914) 
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Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Soudan in 1914 (Waterlow and Sons, 
London, 1915) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1902 (Sudan Government, 
Cairo, 1905) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1903 (Sudan Government, 
Cairo, 1905) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1904 (HMSO, London, 
1905) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1905 (Khartoum, 1905) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1906 (Waterlow and Sons, 
London, 1907) 
Rehort on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1907 (Waterlow and Sons, 
London, 1908) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1908 (Waterlow and Sons, 
London, 1909) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1921 (HMSO, London, 
1923) 
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Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1925 (1-IMSO, London, 
1926) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1926 (HMSO, London, 
1927) 
Deport on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1927, with the report of the Lee 
Stack Indemnity Fund (-MO, London, 1929) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1928, with the report of the Lee 
Stack Indemnity Fund (FIMSO, London, 1929) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1929 (HMSO, London, 
1930) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1930 (HMSO, London, 
1931) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1931 (HMSO, London, 
1932) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1933 (HMSO, London, 
1934) 
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Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1934 (F MO, London, 
1935) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1936 (HMSO, London, 
1937) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1937 (1-IMSO, London, 
1938) 
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1938 (HMSO, London, 
1939) 
Report on the administration of the Sudan, 193941 (McCorquodale and Co, Khartoum, 1950) 
Report on the administration of the Sudan, 1942-44 (McCorquodale and Co, Khartoum, 1950) 
Report by the Governor-General on the administration, finances and conditions of the Sudan, 1945 
(HtvISO, London, 1948) 
Report by the Governor-General on the administration, finances and conditions of the Sudan, 1946 
(HMSO, London, 1948) 
Report by the Governor-General on the administration, finances and conditions of the Sudan, 1947 
(HMSO, London, 1949) 
Report on the administration of Sudan, 1948 (McCorquodale and Co, Khartoum, 1950) 
351 
Keilort on the administration of Sudan, 1949 (McCorquodale and Co, Khartoum, n. d. ) 
Report on the administration of Sudan, 1950-51 (McCorquodale and Co, Khartoum, 1955) 
Report on the administration of Sudan, 1951-52 (McCorquodale and Co, Khartoum, 1955) 
Statistical Abstract for the British Commonwealth for theyears 1933-1939 and 1945-1947 
(I MSO, London, 1950) 
Statistical Abstract for the British Empire for each of the ten years 1924-1933 (HMSO, London, 
1935) 
StatisticalAbstractfor the British Empire in Each Yearfmm 1899-1913 (HMSO, London, 1915) 
Statistical Abstract of the British Commonwealth for each of the ten years 1936-1945 (Trade and 
Commerce Section) (HMSO, London, 1947) 
StatisticalAbstract of the Several British Oversea Dominions and Protectorate: in eachyearf vm 1909- 
1923 (HMSO, London, 1926) 
Stock Exchange OfcialIntelligence 1914 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1914) 
Stock Exchange OfcialIntelligence 1920 ('Thomas Skinner, London, 1920 
Stock Exchange Ofidallntelligence 1930 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1930) 
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Stock Exchange Officiallntelligence, 1905 (Spottiswoode & Co, London, 1905), 
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, 1910 (Spottiswoode & Co, London, 1910) 
Stock Exchange Official Yearbook 1939 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1939) 
Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, 1945 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1945) 
Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, 1956 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1956) 
Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, Vol. 1,1950 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1950) 
Stock Exchange O icial Yearbook, Vol 1,1952 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1952) 
Stock Exchange Offs al Yearbook, Vol. 1,1954 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1954) 
Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, Vol. 2,1950 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1950) 
Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, Vol. 2,1951 (Thomas Skinner, London, 1951) 
Sudan Gazette, various editions 
Sudan Trade and Investment Guide 1960-61 (The Diplomatic Press and Publishing Co, 
London, 1960) 
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Summary Guide to the Sudan Archive (Durham University Library Archives and Special 
Collections, Durham, n. d. ) 
The Sudan Chamber of Commerce Monthly journal, various editions 
The Sudan Directory (The Sudan Advertising and Publishing Co, Khartoum, 1927) 
The Sudan Today (Central Economic Board, Sudan Government, Khartoum, 1913) 
Who was Who, 1897-1916 (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1920) 
Who was Who, 1916-28 (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1929) 
Who was Who, 1929-1940 (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1941) 
Who was Who, 1941-1950 (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1952) 
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